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[edit] Draft of article on Soviet assault plans (1941)

According to the widely accepted canon of World War 2 history, German Operation Barbarossa came as a shock to the Soviet Union, which was unprepared for the war; even a possibility of a pre-emptive strike preparations was not discussed until 1990s. The accepted theory has been contested during the recent decades, though.

The introducor of the Soviet strike theory was Soviet dissident Pyotr Grigorenko, former general himself, who had studied the background of Soviet initial defeat in Summer 1941. He reached the striking conclusion that its real origin was that the Red Army had concentrated near border with the aim of invading Germany.

The theory was developed and brought to fame by another Soviet dissident Viktor Suvorov, author of controversial books such as Icebreaker (Suvorov), M-Day, The Last Republic and Suicide (Suvorov). Suvorov's Icebreaker was officially neglected as pseudo-history in the West and initially not much attention was paid, but its publication in Russia turned out a sensation. Naturally, his claims were first denied, but as some proffessional historians began to side with him, researchers turned ad fontes. Actually, a sort of Russian ‘Historikerstreit’ followed: historians supporting Soviet strike theory are Mikhail Meltiukhov, V. A. Nevezhin, V. D. Danilov. To the goup opposed to the theory belong journalist Lev Bezymenski (also professor at the Academy of Military Sciences), General M. A. Gareyev, V. A. Anfilov, and Yu. A. Gorkov.

Some documentary proof to Suvorov's claims has been revealed, such as Soviet invasion plans developed from 1939 on.

An example result of research on archive materials that supports the Soviet strike theory, is Mikhail Meltyukhov’s “Stalin's Missed Chance”. The book contains valuable data on Soviet forces in the period from 1939 to 1941 as well as an overiew of Soviet military planning. Most of the documents had been published in Russia before, but unfortunately have not been published yet in the West.

[edit] Zhukov's proposal

This document from May 15, 1941 was first revealed by Hero of the Soviet Union V.V.Karpov, who had access to secret archives. He probably intended to show Zhukov as a military genius, who in the decisive moment had suggested a surprise attack on the enemy. True, the paper has signaturees of neither Zhukov nor Timoshenko. [4]

[edit] Considerations to the plan of the strategic development of the armed forces of the Soviet Union

15 May 1941.

To the chairman of the Soviet of People’s Commissars.

Taking into account that Germany at present holds its army mobilized, with the developed rears, she has the possibility to forestall us in the deployment and to give us a surprise blow. In order to avoid this, I consider it inevitable by no account to give initiative to German Command, to forestall enemy in the deployment and to attack German army at the moment, when it is still in the stage of deployment and has not yet managed to organize front and interaction between troops.

The first strategic objective of the actions of the Red Army is crushing the main forces of German army deployed south of Brest-Demblin, and to the 30th day [from the start of assault] pierce northern boundary near Ostrolenko, river Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreizburg, Opeln, Olomütz. The subsequent strategic objective - to assault from Katowice region in the northern or northwestern direction, to crush the large forces of the enemy of center and northern wing of German front and to seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.

The immediate task - to break German army east of river Visla and in the Krakow direction to cross the boundary on river Narev, the Visla and to seize the area of Katowice, for which:

a) to deliver the main strike by the forces of South-Western Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, to cut Germany off from its southern allies;

b) the deliver the supporting strike by the left wing of Western Front to the direction of Warsaw, Demblin with the purpose of tying the Warsaw group and seizing Warsaw, and also to assist the South-Western Front in crushing the Lublin group;

c) to carry out active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary, Rumania and to be ready to deliver strikes against Rumania under favorable circumstances. Thus, the Red Army begins offensive operations from the front of Chizhev, Lyudovleno with the forces of 152 divisions against 100 German divisions, in other sections of state border the active defense is provided... The group of forces is shown in detail on the map enclosed. The personnel and task of those deployed in the West front (map 1: 1 000 000).

Northern Front. Task – defense of Leningrad, port Murmansk, by Kirov railroad together with BVMF to ensure us complete supremacy in the waters of Gulf of Finland.

North-Western Front - task in the scheme.

Western Front. Tasks: defense there. Later with the transition of YUZF [South-Western Front] to the offensive by the assault of the left wing of the front in the direction of Warsaw and Sedlez, Radom to break Warsaw grouping and to seize Warsaw in interaction with YUEF, to crush the Lublin-Radom group of enemy, to pass river Vistula and by mobile units to seize Radom.

YUZF [South-Western Front] - with the immediate tasks:

a) by the concentric strike of the armies of the right wing of front to surround and to destroy basic grouping East of river Visla in Lublin region;

b) simultaneously by strike of the front of Senova, Peremyshl, Lyubavnekha to break the forces of enemy in the Krakow and Sandomirskokelec direction and to seize Krakow, Katowice, Kelze regions having regard to assault later from this region in the northern or northwestern direction for crushing the large forces of the northern wing of the front of enemy and to seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia;

c) to defend solidly state border with Hungary and Rumania and to be ready to deliver mighty assaults against Rumania and regions of Chernovits and Kishinev with the immediate objective of crushing the northern wing of Rumanian army and crossing the boundary on river Moldova, Yassy...

Военно-Исторический журнал. 1992, № 2. С. 17-19.; Хрестоматии по отечественной истории (1914 - 1945 гг) под редакцией А.Ф. Киселева, Э.М.Шагина. М. 1996

[edit] On 'considerations'

"Considerations of the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed forces of the Soviet Union in Case of War with Germany and its Allies," is dated May 15, 1941. It was prepared mainly by General A. Vasilievsky, Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the Soviet General Staff (Stavka). The Memorandum was presented to Stalin by Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov. [5] the document does not have any signatures, though. The non-presence of signatures has led the critics to doubt, if it was ever presented to Stalin.

Zhukov himself had admitted the plan (as a pre-emptive strike) to journalists of BIZh, but on the first occasion told Stalin had rejected it and on the other occasion said he hadn't handed it over to Stalin, but given to latters personal secretary. This version looks implausible: at the time it was strictly forbidden to tranfer documents of such importance via some secretary to the receipient and secondly, it is not clear why could not Zhukov personally hand it over and discuss the plan with Stalin.

We should note that it (i.e doc unsigned) was not exception but rather a rule. Military documents of the time are not signed with the exception of Polish campaign 1939 were not signed. Already from the time of beginning of Soviet power, the Politburo had been working in conditions of uttermost secrecy, no minutes were composed. During Stalin’s times,decision were often passed in Stalin’s dacha after nocturnal meetings, where of course no secretaries or stenographers were present. Mikoyan, the man who served 40 years as a member or candidate of Politburo, has later recalled: ‘’Usually there were five of us. As a rule, we met late in the evening or night. The agenda was not announced beforehand. Minuted were not taken and no noted were made either. [1] Marshall of the USSR, wartime people’s commissar of arms industry Dmitry Ustinov: ‘’On sessions and meetings, that were presided by Stalin, usually the questions were discussed and decisions made without keeping a record, often without forming documents officially. [2]

Question, whether the Considerations... were accepted by Stalin and to how great an extent were these used in actual Soviet troops deployment, remains disputed. Western historian Richard Overy e.g insists in his recent book, that this plan was developed by Zhukov et al independently of Stalin, who had later rejected it, fearing to provoke the Germans. [3]

However, already V.Danilov who published the Considerations... noted that any initiative within the range of military-strategic planning, differing from that of Stalinist, Could have been regarded as opposing the line of party, i.e. Stalin, with all the consequences[4] As noted by some Russian historians, e.g Boris Sokolov, taken into account the concentration of decision-making into hands of political leadrship, it is “completely improbably that the highest officers of General Staff could have developed the plan of pre-emptive assault against Germany without Stalin's sanctioning.”[5] (Sokolov also cited admiral Kuznetsov, who has recalled how severly the uttermost secrecy by the political leadership affected the military decision making and commanding of forces [6])

[edit] Soviet propaganda before the war

Citations

According to Nevezhin, “The analysis carried out led to the following conclusions: On 5 May, 1941, Stalin unambiguously expressed that Germany was examined as the potential military enemy, and the USSR should pass from the peaceful policy "to the military policy of offensive operations", and propaganda must be reconstructed in the offensive spirit.” [7]

“Their analysis gives the possibility to understand that on the eve of 22 June 1941 in the Soviet propaganda the turn was outlined, and it began to be reconstructed under the slogan of "offensive war". In our opinion, in the Soviet propagandistic documents was conducted the thought about the need for being prepared thoroughly for the war, in any situation acting with "offensive means"”[8]

Others: “and it could not be borne only on the initiative of General Staff officers. Actually, in the political management "offensive moods" occurred. In this spirit was sustained the appearance of Stalin before the graduates of military academies on 5 May 1941 g."[9].

This view has met with criticism from Western historians: according to John Erickson's analysis, “The text, now available for all to see, does not support previous contentions that this was a summons to aggressive war against Germany. Stalin intended to counter impressions of Red Army weakness, counter German over-confidence in the Wehrmacht and bolster army morale should war materialise. The subsequent shift in propaganda did not reflect advocacy of `revolutionary war', rather the discharge of the Red Army's `international tasks' in the context of defence of the Soviet Union.”[10]

[edit] Soviet strategical planning

This way or that, Meltyukhov proves that the idea to prevent the attack of Germany arose long before May of 1941 and was the basis of Soviet military planning in 1940 – 1941. (Meltyukhov 2000:375) Contary to popular opinion, no significant defense plans have been found.

As noted by B.Sokolov, “according to Vasilevsky's evidence, the General Staff had already finished by April 1940 the plan of the strategic development [in case] of war against Germany,” and “only under the effect of the results of the war shooting by Germany on the West it was necessary to itroduce correctives.” [11] Materials regarding the 1940 plan of development against Germany have not been not published. It is unknown, if these were preserved. However, being based on the published version of the strategic development of 18 September of 1940, the assault was planned to take place in Warsaw direction.[12]

True, main plans possible Wehrmacht invasion is suggested in plans cited by Meltyukhov, but with obvious lack of depth: the estimation of the enemy’s intentions, with exception of the possible direction of the main attack, did not undergo substantial changes. What is more, Meltyukhov claims those plans did not proceed from factual data and two possible Wehrmacht assault directions (Southern version – through Ukraine and Northern on lithuania and Latvia, latter was later abandoned) were supposed, while assault on Byelorussia was excluded without any reasoning. Thus, one might wonder it was rather a kind of guess-out work. (Meltyukhov 2000:379)

On the other hand, the concentration of Red army on the borders was elaborated throughout different plans (Meltyukhov reports five different versions of the plan) and went through substantial changes. As indicated by M.A. Gareyev, "the direction of the concentration of basic efforts by Soviet command was chosen not in the interests of the strategic defensive operation (this operation was simply not provided and was not planned -, and that’s the main error), and conformably entirely to other methods of operations". (Meltyukhov 2000:381)

The main concentration of forces was allocated to South-western regions rather than North-West, the latter should have ‘’if the strategic concept were conducted in the beginning of the war for defensive operations i.e the repulsion of aggression. In this case undoubtedly it would have been more advantageous if the basic efforts had been put in the strip of Western direction. ‘’ (Meltyukhov 2000:). ‘’However, in case of Red Army’s invasion to German controlled territories, the concentration on Southern regions was comprehensible, since a strike in that direction, would have cut Germany off from the basic allies and Romanian oils. Whereas main assault in the north-western direction would have led to the collision with main forces of German army and it would have required the breakthrough of fortified areas. ‘’(Meltyukhov 2000:381)

[edit] Defence/Offence

A phrase to characterise Soviet military doctrine of the time was ‘active defence’. The first point in the instructions in case of war with Finland used to be ‘active defence of state borders’, but this ‘defence’ by was suggested to take part in the territory of Finland: ‘’tasks of the northern and Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF) testify that this "active defense" was assumed in the territory of Finland (Meltyukhov 2000:384). (!) This evidence is directly contradictory to Erickson's affirmation, that “Most importantly, General Staff operational documents, those for the `covering armies on the frontiers and those for the second echelon (of which `Suvorov' had made great play, the `secret offensive army'), did not include offensive operations 'against neighbouring states'. None was contemplated.”[13]

It might be stated that Red Army intended to repel the enemy’s aggression and then give its own crushing blow.

Meltyukhov rejects such argumentation: firstly, it looks like putting Soviet forces delibarately into unfavourable condition by ceding the initiative to enemy, and – more more significant – Meltyukhov argues no significant preparations for the defensive war/repel were made. Naturally, a question would arise why was it necessary to plan offensive operations in case the troops are in prospect of defending enemy’s aggression.

“transition from the defense to the offensive ... is a very complex process, which requires thorough and comprehensive preparations, which should had to began from the equipment of four defensive lines to 150 km depth. But nothing similar was done prior to the beginning of war, and hardly it is worthwhile to defend earnest thesis about the fact that the Red Army could have successfully defended [the country] in the unprepared locality.” Furthermore, it is unclear, why it is necessary to plan offensive operations, if for troops is in prospect defense from the attacking enemy.(Meltyukhov 2000:385-6)

It is true, that Soviet drafts included notions of repelling the enemy's invasion and a counterblow, but as noted by Sokolov, “in exactly the same manner, on the assertion by Meretskov, attack against Finland in 1939 was prepared as a "counterblow" within the framework of the plan for the cover of state border, although no-one, of course, did assume that Finland would dare to attack the USSR first.”[14] Sokolov's conclusion is that not a single one of the versions of the pre-war strategic development of the Red Army in the West in reality contained any plans for defensive operations in case Germany striked first.(ibid)

Approximatlely a month before the start of the war, when the deployment of the fascist forces along our border was actually being carried out overtly, our command still had an opportunity to complete at least the deployment of the first strategic echelon... It was assumed that initially the aggressor would invade our country with only part of its forces; border engagements would take place, under the cover of which ...the deployment of the main masses of troops ...would be completed. ...this assumption was not justified."..."Thus, the fascist German command, literally during the last 2 weeks befor the war, was able to preempt our forces in completing deployment..."

(S.P.Ivanov: The Initial Period of War. Moscow, 1974. pp. 182 183- translation by the US Air Force (series Soviet Military Thought-s.a)-)

[edit] Criticism

”The records of the conference proceedings do not reveal any assessment of the critical `initial period' of operation, nor any analysis of German blitzkrieg experience, Timoshenko having asserted that the Red Army had nothing to learn from it. General Klenov, who introduced the subject of `a special type of offensive operation in the initial phase of a war' -- a pre-emptive, preventative blow? -- was heard in hushed silence.” [15]

[edit] Rough notes

[16]

Distribution of troops (dif versions): Meltyukhov 2000: 380, referring to Военно-исторический журнал. 1992. № 1. С.28—29; Новая и новейшая история. 1993. № 3. С.42—44; 1941 год — уроки и выводы. С.212—215; 1941 год. Документы. Кн.1. С.185—189, 242—250, Кн.2. С.218—219, 359.

While planning the operational use of the Red Army, the draftsmen thoroughly worked out questions of the strategic development of RA. The documents on military planning make it possible to trace the dynamics of strengthening Western TVD, where it was intended to allocate main forces. According to July 1940 plan, for the actions in the West 68,7% of available ground forces were allocated; according to September plan 68,9%; March 1941 plan assumed 83,5%, May - 85,1%, and June documents - 79,2% Table 37, p.380-381 referring to [17]

Development of the armed forces of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1941

January 1, 1939 June 22, 1941 1941 percentage of 1939
Divisions 131.5 316.5 240.7
Personnel 2,485,000 5,774,000 232.4
Guns and mortars 55,800 117,600 210.7
Tanks 21,100 25,700 121.8
Aircraft 7,700 18,700 241.8

[18]

The content of these documents shows once more that the operations of troops under the cover in the period of concentration and development were not compulsorily connected with the repulsion of the attack of enemy, but they were a kind the combat security unit of the concentrated troops. Furthermore, one ought not to forget that the operations on the cover were undertaken by the Red Army in autumn of 1939 with the troop concentration for the attack in Poland and Finland and in the summer of 1940 for actions against the Baltic countries and Rumania (Meltyukhov 2000:386)

Version about the fact that "as the basis of the document was assumed defensive strategy "{1253}, has no base whatsoever. The fact is that in the document it was clearly indicated: "offensive to begin on June 12 {1254}. The precise period of beginning [ 387 ] offensive, as is known, is determined by the side, which assumes to have available the initiative for the beginning of war shooting. … The refinement of the tasks of Soviet troops found its further development in the document of 15 May, 1941. There it is for the first time opened and clearly formulated the thought, that the Red Army must "forestall enemy in the development and attack German army at the moment, when it will be in the stage of development and it will not have time to organize front and interaction between troops". (Meltyukhov 2000:386-7)

Term "active defense" must not lead to error, since it indicated the totality of defensive and offensive operations. Since in the document it is repeatedly emphasized that the precisely Red Army will be the initiator of military actions, [and thus] this term, most likely, hides particular offensive operations for the forging of enemy. (Meltyukhov 2000:387-8)

Since the plan of strategic development and the concept of the first strategic operations were designed for the complete mobilization of the Red Army, then they were tightly connected with the mobilization plan. From April 1940 began the development of the new mobilization plan, which was affirmed by government on 12 February, 1941. Mobilization deployment of the Red Army for plan MP-YAY (official name "Mob- plan Nr. 23") was to lead to the creation of the army of war-time. After the mobilization the number of the armed forces of the USSR were to compose 8,9 million people, troops had to have 106,7 thousand instruments also of mortars, to 37 thousand tanks, 22,2 thousand combat aircraft, 10,7 thousand armored cars, about 91 thousand tractors and 595 thousand motor vehicles. (Meltyukhov 2000:392)

In the opinion of V.A. Anfilov, B.N. Petrov and V.A. Semidetko, the planned group of troops of cover was more fitted for the offensive, than for defense [19]

“it so enticed some leading military workers, that the possibility of conducting the military actions in its territory practically was excluded. Certainly, this negatively affected the preparation not only of defense, but also as a whole of the theaters of military actions in the depth of its of territory"{Гареев М.А. М.В.Фрунзе -- военный теоретик. М.,1985. С.231.}

“the intrusion of enemy, i.e., the plans of defensive operations, since reflection of the offensive of superior forces of enemy cannot be accomplished in passing, simply as intermediate task. Conducting a whole series of the prolonged bitter defensive battles and operations is required for this. If such plans were, then in accordance with them entirely differently, namely taking into account defensive tasks, the groups of forces and facilities of these regions would have been located, control would have been constructed differently and the separation of the material reserves and other mobilization resources would have achieved. (Meltyukhov 2000:397)[20]

According to the evidence of the former chief of staff of the 4th army L.M. Sandalov, "all pre-war studies on their concepts and fulfillment [of?] oriented troops were mainly [directed?] toward[s] the realization of the breakthrough of the fortified positions". "commanding staff studies and outputs [?] in the field during the entire winter period and the spring 1941 were conducted exclusively on the offensive themes... During March-April 1941 the staff of the 4th army participated in the circumferential operational game on the maps in Minsk. Front offensive operations from the territory of Western Belarus in the direction of Belostok, Warsaw were studied [21]

The basic idea of Soviet military planning consisted in the fact that the Red Army under the cover of western near-boundary regions expanded to the boundary troops which would complete concentration on TVD [teatr voyennyh deistvy-area of war activity] of the forces, intended for the war, and would go over to the sudden decisive attack, delivering main strike through South Poland (Meltykhov 2000:413)

[edit] Formation of Polish divison

Interestingly, “on June 4 the Politbureau made a decision on the formation of the Red Army 238-1 rifle division [in] Central-Asian military district, "complemented of personnel of Polish nationality/knowing Polish language" with total number into 10 298 people.” (Sokolov, op cit) To this divison were also planned Soviet citizens who knew Polish and even those, who had Polish names. Similar 'Finnish' divison had been formed before the Winter War. Also, establishing some Polish units meant broking MRP points. Sokolov confirms that “Now, obviously, Stalin decided that the time for arrived the invasion to Poland had arrived. By no other purposes is it possible to explain shaping a Polish division. To form This division was more difficult than [to set up a] usual rifle division (Polish regulations, form, instructions in Polish language), its existence itself in peacetime presented a risk great enough: in case German reconnaissance learnt about the Polish connection, this could have slightly pushed Hitler to the war against USSR, since it would have clearly shown the aggressive intentions of Stalin.”[22]

[edit] References

  1. ^ Военно–исторический журнал. 1976. №.6, с. 68
  2. ^ Устинов Д.Ф. Во имя победы. Записки наркома вооружения. Политиздат. Москва с. 91
  3. ^ Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia, 2004, ISBN: 0393020304
  4. ^ Данилов В.Д. Сталинская стратегия начала войны: планы и реальность // Отечественная история. 1995. № 3. С. 37. cited in: [1]
  5. ^ http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/02.html
  6. ^ Кузнецов Н. Г. Крутые повороты. С. 51.
  7. ^ Невежин В.А. Синдром наступательной войны... Гл. 4;/Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's 5 May 1941 Adresses: The Experience of Interpretation // The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 1998. Vol. 11. no 1. P. 116-146.
  8. ^ Готовил ли Сталин наступательную войну против Гитлера? С. 92-122-168; Nevezhin V.A. Stalin's 5 May 1941 Adresses...; Hевежин В.А. Синдром наступательной войны... Гл. 4, 5. Cited in [2]
  9. ^ Гареев М.А. Готовил ли Советский Союз упреждающее нападение на Германию в 1941 году? // Война и политика., 1939-1941. С. 274. cited in [3]
  10. ^ Barbarossa June 1941...
  11. ^ Василевский А. М. Дело всей жизни, 6-е изд. Кн. 1. М.: Политиздат, 1988. С. 100.
  12. ^ Соколов Борис Вадимович Собирался ли Сталин напасть на Гитлера? http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/02.html
  13. ^ Barbarossa June 1941: Who was Attacking Whom? by John Erickson
  14. ^ Б.В. Соколов Правда о Великой Отечественной войне (Сборник статей). — СПб.: Алетейя, 1999
  15. ^ Barbarossa June 1941... by John Erickson
  16. ^ For zhurnal of Stalin's visitors 1941 (see May 14, 19 (Zhukov) and May 24 (military commanders) http://militera.lib.ru/research/gorkov2/index.html
  17. ^ Военно-исторический журнал. 1991. № 12. С.19; Военно-исторический журнал. 1992. № 1. С.27; № 2. С.22; Новая и новейшая история. 1993. № 3. С.41; 1941 год — уроки и выводы. С.214—215; 1941 год. Документы. Кн.1. С.185, 241, 745, Кн.2. С.217, 359—360.
  18. ^ Meltyukhov 2000:446 Table composed by the author according to: История второй мировой войны. Т.4. С. 18; 50 лет Вооруженных Сил СССР. М.,1968. С.201; Советская военная энциклопедия. T.I. M.,1976, С.56; Боевой и численный состав Вооруженных Сил СССР в период Великой Отечественной войны (1941— 1945 гг.). Статистический сборник № 1 (22 июня 1941 г.). М.,1994. С. 10— 12; РГАСПИ. Ф.71. Оп.25. Д.4134. Л.1—8; Д.5139. Л.1; РГВА. Ф.29. Оп.46. Д.272. Л.20—21; учтены пограничные и внутренние войска: Пограничные войска СССР в годы Второй мировой войны, 1939—1945. М.,1995. С.390— 400; РГВА. Ф.38261. Оп.1. Д.255. Л.175—177, 340—349; Ф.38650. Оп.1. Д.617. Л.258—260; Ф.38262. Оп.1, Д.41. Л.83—84; РГАЭ. Ф.1562. Оп.329. Д.277. Л.1—46, 62, 139; Д.282. Л.3—44.
  19. ^ Meltyukhov 2000 -- Военно-исторический журнал 1996. № 2. С.9—13; № 3. С.7—9; № 4. C.3—8; № 5. С.5—9; № 6. С.4—7
  20. ^ Гареев М.А. Указ. соч. С.230; (=М.В.Фрунзе -- военный теоретик. М.,1985), Гарсев М.А. Неоднозначные страницы войны. C.119—120.
  21. ^ (Meltyukhov 2000:406-7 and Сандалов Л.М. Указ. соч [which one?]. С.39—41; Скрипка Н.С. По целям ближним и дальним. М.,1981. С.41.)
  22. ^ Sokolov, http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/02.html

[edit] Russian originals

[edit] Notes

  • Mikhail Meltyukhov 'Stalins Missed Chance' (2000) -- Мельтюхов М.И. Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939-1941 (Документы, факты, суждения). — М.: Вече, 2000
  • [6] Suvorov, Viktor 'The Shadow of Victory' ch.9 -- Суворов В. Тень победы-2. (2005)
  • Михаил Ходаренок 'Урок, оплаченный большой кровью' -- (http://militera.lib.ru/opinions/0033.html)
  • http://www.deutsche-zeitung.net/html/stalin-plan.html

[edit] Further reading on topic

[edit] In English

  • Bobylev, Pavel Nikitič: For What Kind of War Was the Red Army General Staff Preparing in 1941?- In: Russian Studies in History 36 (1998), H. 3, S. 47-75.
  • Gor'kov, Iu.A.: Was Stalin Preparing a Preemptive Strike Against Hitler in 1941?- In: Russian Studies in History 36 (1998), H. 3, S. 2-46.
  • Nevezhin, V.A.: The Pact with Germany and the Idea of an "Offensive War (1939-1941)".- In: The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 8 (1995), H. 4, S. 809-843.
  • Sokolov, B.V.: World War II Revisited: Did Stalin Intend to Attack Hitler?- In: Journal of Slavic Military Studies 11 (1998), H. 2, S. 113-141.
  • Albert L. Weeks Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941 ISBN: 0742521923 [7]

[edit] In Russian

  • Bobylev, P.N.: Repeticija katastrofy.- In: Voenno-istoričeskij žurnal (1993), H. 6, S. 10-16.
  • Bobylev, Pavel Nikitič: K kakoj vojne gotovilsja Generalnyj Štab RKKA v 1941 godu?- In: Otečestvennaja istorija (1995), H. 5, S. 3-20.
  • Gor'kov, Ju.A.: Kreml'. Stavka. Genštab.- Tver' 1995.
  • Mel'tjuchov, M.I.: Ideologičeskie dokumenty maja-ijunja 1941 goda o sobytijach Vtoroj mirovoj vojny.- In: Otečestvennaja istorija (1995), H. 2, S. 70-85.
  • Nevežin, V.A.: Reč' Stalina 5 maja 1941 goda i apologija nastupatel'noj vojny.- In: Otečestvennaja istorija (1995), H. 2, S. 54-69.
  • Nevežin, V.A.: Sindrom nastupatel'noj vojny. Sovetskaja propaganda v preddverii "svjaščennych boev" 1939-1941 gg. Posleslovie B. Bonveča.- Moskva 1997.
  • Nevežin, V.A.: Stalinskij vybor 1941 goda: oborona ili..."lozung nastupatel'noj vojny"? (Po povodu knigi G. Gorodeckogo "Mif Ledokola").- In: Otečestvennaja istorija (1996), H. 3, S. 55-73.

[edit] In German

  • Danilow, Walerian D.: Hat der Generalstab der Roten Armee einen Präventivschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet?- In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 31 (1993), S. 3-41.

[edit] External links

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