Talk:Consensus theory of truth

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"Another objection to the theory..." Surely this should be "An objection to the theory..." ? (20040302)

An objection to the theory is that it presupposes that for every possible statement, investigators are destined eventually to agree about it one way or the other. But this seems dubious: It has been argued, for example, that statements of beauty or moraliy are intrinsically controversial.

This objection is mistaken. The presupposition would only stand if it were assumed that all statements must have a truth value: Maybe Pierce would agree that statements like "She is beautiful" are not necessarily truth-holding statements.

The consensus theory of truth as defined is certainly in accord with such a response: As we can never agree as to whether or not "she is beautiful", the statement cannot be said to be true. But we cannot state that the counter-thesis ("she is not beautiful") is true either, otherwise we could come to an agreement about the first statement. Therefore, at least implicitly, Peirce states that according to the concensus theory of truth, not all statements can be assigned a truth value.

--I added this to the article.. Discussion is welcome (20040302)

Contents 1 Reference 2 The Matrix 3 State of the consensus theory of truth article 4 Relation between pragmaticism and consensus theory of truth 5 Work Area 5.1 Draft 1 5.2 Draft 2 5.3 Commentary 5.4 Discussion 6 Bare Consensus 7 Removed brief section and placed here for further consideration 8 Article needs a rewrite 9 Problems 9.1 Problem 1. Lack of definition 9.2 Problem 2. Lack of sources 9.3 Problem 3. Misattribution 10 Removed material from intro paragraph 11 Talk page clutter 12 Habermas → Pragmatic theories of truth

[edit] Reference

In an article in "PC mag", John Dvorak discusses the utility of wikis. He encourages his readers to read this article, suggesting that it is this sort of truth that emerges on a wiki. See http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,1835857,00.asp for details. Pcb21| Pete 12:44, 14 July 2005 (UTC)

[edit] The Matrix

Is not an irrelevant "See Also". The entire movie trilogy is predicated on the problems of a consesus theory of truth. That said, I'll add it to a list of semi-related things. --24.22.227.53 03:00, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

You need to add an explanation like this to where the reference appears in the article. Otherwise, it will strike all of the other people, like me, who haven't seen those movies as irrelevant. --Nate Ladd 04:23, July 31, 2005 (UTC)

I have seen all three "Matrix" films and I recall no direct mention of the consensus theory of truth in any of them. And it does come across a bit ridiculous, connecting a philosophic concept to a Hollywood movie. Why not put a "See Also" from the outer space article to Star Trek? --Gecko 18:30, 31 July 2005 (UTC)

Just for those who haven't seen them: in the Matrix movies, most human beings are in fact living in vats, attached to feeding rubes and electrodes, and constantly fed messages that lead them (us?) to believe they/we are living active lives. This came about because way back in the 21st century when computers became self-conscious they decided they could live off the electric energy humans generate when humans thing they're living an active life but aren't. A few rebellious types have escaped from these vats, and are constantly dodging the sentries of the computer trying to trak them down or return them to a vat. The premise, in other words, is a computerized and collectivized form of Descartes' idea of a malicious demon, and implies that the consensus truth believed in by all those folks still in their vats who think themselves to be living a 'normal' life as that was understood back at the start of the 21st century, is false. --Christofurio 13:29, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Please see the discussion on the Talk:Existentialism for a critique of the "X in popular culture" sections of philosophy articles and a proposal for criteria for what should and shouldn't be in them. According to those criteria, the Matrix shouldn't be in this article. Jeremy J. Shapiro 14:27, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] State of the consensus theory of truth article

As it currently stands, I think that the article needs quite a bit of work, and I have started to do some of it but don't have time right now to do any more. Consequently I have left it in a lopsided state, i.e. by adding certain things and taking out a few others, it is not internally consistent. But I thought it worthwhile inserting at least the beginnings of additions. The article doesn't deal with counterfactual claims to validity, i.e. it seems too focussed on actual empirical consensus. It doesn't deal with Habermas's huge batch of recent work on this (including claims to validity other than truth claims), as well as critiques of his work by e.g. Rescher (which I've only read a bit of, so I can't yet fully represent his arguments). So I've just mentioned those things briefly but haven't had time to work them all out. I also temporarily took out the stuff about metaphysical idealism because it didn't seem relevant to the main thrust of the consensus theory of truth. Jeremy J. Shapiro 00:01, 30 August 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Relation between pragmaticism and consensus theory of truth

I agree with Jon Awbrey's comment that in Peirce pragmaticism and the consensus theory of truth are not the same thing. For Peirce, as I understand him, the core of pragmaticism has to do with the meaning of statements ultimately coming down to practical operations carried out in and on the world. The consensus theory of truth isn't about people sitting around and agreeing about things, it has to do with the likelihood that investigators will have the same or similar results in their interaction with the world. Jeremy J. Shapiro 06:26, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Regarding Jon Awbrey's bold comments - it appears the article is in need of a clean-up - I am not even a good lay philosopher, and wouldn't attempt that task.. Anyone else? Jeremy? (20040302 15:15, 20 December 2005 (UTC))

I would joint others to participate but unfortunately because of work commitments would not be able to do anything before the second half of January. Jeremy J. Shapiro 16:25, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Hi, sorry, will clean it up as I get acquainted with the wikimarkup,

style sheet, etc. Just kept running into that statement in my daily

web searches and it seemed to clang a bit, but it may take a while

to iron out all the wrankles. Not all that fussy about pragmatism

versus pragmaticism myself, so long as one says whose version of it,

but indexicality is the best policy with any philosophy, in any case.

Is there a way to move the Note to Editors to here while we work on it?

Jon Awbrey 19:00, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Note to Editors.

Re: "The consensus theory of truth, originated by Charles Sanders Peirce who called it pragmatism, and later pragmaticism, holds that a statement is true if it would be agreed to by all those who investigate it if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular direction."

It is a false attribution to attribute "The consensus theory of truth" to C.S. Peirce. It is a false equation to equate "The consensus theory of truth" either to pragmatism or to pragmaticism.

I understand that writing an encyclopedia involves a certain amount of simplification, ignoring many of the nuances that specialists may wrangle over, but there's only so far that one can go with this simplification before it becomes a question of misinformation.

It might be a good idea to consider whether there really is such a thing as "the" consensus theory of truth. In other words, there is no consensus about what the consensus theory of truth is or ought to be. The only way to handle this is to do what any good lexicon would do, provide the variety of definitions for the variety of meanings that are actually current in practice or important to the history of the term.

Many readers will not care what term you use so long as you provide a definition. So you could call the various consensus theories: (1) the Gallup consensus theory, (2) Peirce's consensus theory, (3) Kirkham's theory of Peirce's whatever theory, (4) Peirce's omega point theory, (5) de Chardin's omega point theory, ad inf., so long as you give a characterization or a definition of each.

Other readers will expect your attribution of a theory to a tradition to stick to the terms that are actually used in the tradition itself. For the sticklers, then -- and who isn't on the wrong kind of day? -- it would be best to observe the following principles of attribution:

  1.  When we say that "P originated the Q-theory of R", the phrase Q
      should be one that P actually used, characteristically and as
      a matter of principle, to describe P's theory of R.

  2.  When we want to report the fact that the source S describes
      P's theory of R as a T-theory of R, then we should say that
      "S describes P's theory of R as a T-theory of R".

That addresses the issue of false attribution. I will address the false equation another time.

Jon Awbrey, 20 Dec 2005

[edit] Work Area

I will keep a working draft here while I work on it over the next few day? weeks?
Jon Awbrey 03:40, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Draft 1

Began: Jon Awbrey 03:40, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

The label "consensus theory of truth" is currently attached to a number
of otherwise very diverse philosophical perspectives.  Thus it becomes
a reasonable question whether there is any such thing as "the" consensus
theory of truth, that is, whether there is any single principle that all
of these approaches have in common, or whether the phrase has become
a catch-all for many unrelated positions.  At present, there does not
seem to be much consensus as to what a consensus theory of truth is,
or ought to be.

As it a rule, it is important to distinguish the types of labels that the
writers of a given tradition adopt for themselves, characteristically and
as a matter of principle, and the types of labels that different schools
of thought try to stick on each other.

Any person who has a comprehension of the everyday meanings of the words,
"consensus, "theory", and "truth", and who hears them put together in this
way for the first time, would quite reasonably think that the phrase refers
to some such idea as that "the truth is nothing but whatever the majority
believes".  Most philosophical traditions that go by the title in question,
or have it laid on them, would have something more complicated and qualified
than that to say for themselves, however.  This rest of this article takes up
a sample of that variety.

Ended: Jon Awbrey 07:12, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Draft 2

Began: Jon Awbrey 20:34, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

The label consensus theory of truth is currently attached to a number of otherwise very diverse philosophical perspectives. This makes it reasonable to ask whether there is any such thing as the consensus theory of truth at all, in other words, whether there is one single principle that the various approaches have in common, or whether the phrase is being used as a catch-all for a host of unrelated positions. As of this writing, there does not seem to be much of a consensus as to what a consensus theory of truth is or even ought to be!

Someone who understands the everyday meanings of the words, 'consensus, 'theory', 'truth', and who hears them put together in this way for the first time, may reasonably think that the phrase refers to some such idea as that the truth is nothing but whatever the majority believes. However, most philosophical traditions that use the phrase consensus theory of truth would have something more complicated and qualified than that to say for themselves.

Ended: Jon Awbrey 20:42, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Commentary

[edit] Discussion

Good stuff, Jon, though I feel that the middle paragraph is more of a defence for the other two, and may be excised with no problem. I rephrased a little bit, but stuck the text in more or less verbatim. Now we need to find some way of describing the history of this phrase, as well as the ways in which the phrase has been interpreted!

Sorry if I mislaid your intent during the rephrase - please adjust accordingly. I also did a rough job of trying to link the remainder of the article as was, but clearly this needs to be rewritten eventually. (20040302)

Thanks, I think the second paragraph is more like another try at formulating an "attribution principle" or a "truth in labeling law" that probably needs to be abstracted and packed to a separate article or norm location, so it can be referenced in brief whenever needed, if you folks don't already the moral equivalent somewhere. Jon Awbrey 13:36, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Actually, I don't know for sure that Peirce "never" used the target phrase, but I am pretty sure that his theory of inquiry, which is what this is all about, is a whole different ball of yarn than what the phrase seems to mean on the contemporary neo-scene. So it will be necessary to untangle that. Jon Awbrey 20:46, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Bare Consensus

I didn't like the snootiness of "Consensus in the Popular Sense", especially since the whole idea of inquiry and education is to make consensus popular. Although math folk could use a phrase like "Naive Consensus" in a non-pejorative sense, most folk would not hear it that way, so I'm trying "Bare Consensus" -- in the sense of a zeroth or a first approximation to consensus -- for a few days to see if I like it. Physics folk may think of "bare mass" and "dressed mass", if that helps. Jon Awbrey 05:24, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

heh.. I hear you.. Better than 'vulgar consensus' ... But 'bare' implies something else to me -- e.g. stripped of something(s), which is not what you intend.. How about consensus in common use? (20040302) -- hmm probably not helping !!

Another good choice, that I might ultimately opt for -- for which I might ultimately opt? -- would be "Topical Consensus", in the sense of Aristotle's Topics, but that would take a segue that I that don't have in mind right now. Words to be brandied about the glass. Jon Awbrey 15:06, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

Some explanation of bare versus dressed -- or is it just the stuffing talking? -- what I barely remember from childhood physics courses is that particles like electrons or photons have a bare mass or rest mass that's sort of like their "ding an sich" (DAS), and so in-a-sense a formal fiction, and then they have their dressed mass or virtual mass, which is the mass that they have have in virtue of a particular mode of interactivity in relation to everything else in the universe, or maybe even all possible universes, including being relative to a given observer. The funny thing is that particles like photons have zero rest mass, so all their mass is virtual, then again they are never at rest, so it's not a problem for them what others say they weigh. Notice the curious identity or inversion now of actual and virtual. But it's all kinda fuzzy. And I have a nagging sense that there may be some distinctions I forgot about. So I'll wiki the words and look'em up later. Jon Awbrey 15:48, 27 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Removed brief section and placed here for further consideration

I have removed this section and put it here for justification, clarification, and possible improvement or rewriting...Kenosis 00:58, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

===Naive consensus===

Someone who understands the everyday meanings of the words, 'consensus', 'theory', 'truth', and who hears them put together in this way for the first time, would probably think that the phrase is nothing but a new name for an old slogan: "The truth is whatever the majority says it is", or something to that effect. However, most philosophical traditions that willingly go under the banner of a consensus theory of truth, or have that label pinned on them by other schools of thought, would have a lot more to say in the way of if's, and's, or but's.00:58, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Article needs a rewrite

This article needs some work. I'd like to start by going through the introduction. There is no summary, no definition and description at present. The intro currently reads as follows: ... Kenosis 19:54, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

The label consensus theory of truth is currently attached to a number of otherwise very diverse philosophical perspectives. This makes it reasonable to ask whether there is any such thing as the consensus theory of truth at all, in other words, whether there is any one single principle that the various approaches have in common, or whether the phrase is being used as a catch-all for a motley assortment of barely related positions. In short, when it comes to what a consensus theory of truth is, or ought to be, there is really not all that much consensus yet!

If any of the words in the phrase consensus theory of truth is being used equivocally, then the entire phrase is equivocal, all equivocations being independent in a first approximation, with an overall measure of equivocality in rough proportion to the product of the constituent measures. One way to count its senses, then, is to examine each word in turn and to sensus its senses by their categories of use. In particular, if we count among the various categories of use the sundry categories of user, this brings us to examine what each of the component concepts means to each of the major communities or traditions that use it. 19:54, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Problems

JA: It never made much sense to describe Peirce as having a consensus theory of truth, so I'm moving this material here until the useful bits can be sorted out to more fitting pages. Jon Awbrey 04:52, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

Peirce And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. (C.S. Peirce, "Consequences of Four Incapacities", Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 140-157 (1868), Collected Papers, CP 5.311). The real is that which is not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it. (C.S. Peirce, ["Review of Alexander Campbell Fraser's The Works of George Berkeley"], North American Review, vol. 113, pp. 449-472 (1871), Chronological Edition', CE 2, 467). Thus we may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be. (C.S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", Popular Science Monthly, vol. 12, pp. 286-302 (1878), Collected Papers, CP 5.405). A consensus theory of truth is sometimes attributed to Charles Sanders Peirce, though it's fairly certain that he never used the phrase to describe his own position in anything that should be confused with the bare sense of consensus alluded to above. This attribution is based on statements that he made roughly to the effect that a statement is true if and only if it would be agreed to by all those who investigate it, assuming that the inquiry were to be carried sufficiently far in that particular direction. For example, if the ultimate consensus would be that the sky is blue, then the claim "the sky is blue" is considered to be true. This pragmatic variety of consensus theory is identified by some with the general philosophical approach that Peirce called 'pragmatism' and later 'pragmaticism'. Certainly there is an intimate relationship between his theory of inquiry and his pragmatic philosophy, but flat out asserting that the two are one would spoil the surprise of seeing exactly how and why they are related. One road between them passes by way of his ideas about a community of inquiry. As it happens, a variety of different communities of inquiry must be considered: finite, indefinite, infinite, and ultimate, to mention but a few. One of the first questions that we'd need to ask before we attribute any variety of 'consensus theory of truth' to Peirce would have to be whether Peirce's own statements about the issue reflect a descriptive theory or a normative policy. In order to decide this question we'd need to consider the pertinent aspects of Peirce's brand of pragmatic philosophy, beginning at the beginning with the pragmatic maxim, which is like it says a 'maxim'. Next, it would be necessary to contemplate the complex of relationships that exists among any species of regulative principle, a certain 'principle of hope', and abductive hypothesis formation in general. Finally, completing the circuit, it would be incumbent on us to take up the key role of abductive reasoning, along with the constraints on it that render inquiry scientific, in pragmatic thinking as a whole.

Geez, I thought you'd retired. ;) This article does need work, though, so I'm glad to see you're tackling it. •Jim62sch• 07:31, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

JA: I retired a while back. Whether this constitutes a good use of my retirement is another question entirely. "I'm reviewing the situation".

JA: The more I look at it the more problematic this entire begins to look. The first time I ran across it I was much more tolerant of unsourced statements than I am today, and I spent a lot of effort trying to figure out "What was he/she thinking?" in regard to the statements that I found in it. As I have come to realize, that is not my job. So I will put the remainder of the article here for review, and probably start deleting stuff that nobody can source with credible sources. Jon Awbrey 13:22, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

The label consensus theory of truth is currently attached to a number of otherwise very diverse philosophical perspectives. This makes it reasonable to ask whether there is any such thing as the consensus theory of truth at all, in other words, whether there is any one single principle that the various approaches have in common, or whether the phrase is being used as a catch-all for a motley assortment of barely related positions. In short, when it comes to what a consensus theory of truth is, or ought to be, there is really not all that much consensus yet! If any of the words in the phrase consensus theory of truth is being used equivocally, then the entire phrase is equivocal, all equivocations being independent in a first approximation, with an overall measure of equivocality in rough proportion to the product of the constituent measures. One way to count its senses, then, is to examine each word in turn and to sensus its senses by their categories of use. In particular, if we count among the various categories of use the sundry categories of user, this brings us to examine what each of the component concepts means to each of the major communities or traditions that use it. ..Dimensions of consensus The varieties of philosophical positions that fall, or get thrown, under the heading of a consensus theory of truth, can be classified according to the diversity of senses that are attached to the component terms, namely, consensus, theory, and truth. ...Senses of consensus ...Senses of theory One source of variation in the meaning of the phrase consensus theory of truth arises from variations in the meaning of the word theory. ....Descriptive theories and normative policies Briefly if roughly put, a descriptive theory is one that tells how things are, while a normative theory tells how things ought to be. Expressed in practical terms, a normative theory, more properly called a policy, tells what we ought to do. A policy can be an absolute imperative, telling what we ought to do in any case, or it can be a relative directive, telling what we ought to do if we want to achieve a particular goal. A policy will often be stated in the form of a piece of advice called a heuristic, a maxim, a norm, a rule, a slogan, and so on. Other names are recommendation and regulative principle. There is never any shortage of advice, hence its name is legion. ...Senses of truth ..Varieties of consensus ...Consensus gentium An ancient criterion of truth, the consensus gentium (Latin: agreement of the people), states "that which is universal anong men [sic] carries the weight of truth" (Vergilius Ferm, p. 64). A number of consensus theories of truth are based on variations of this principle. In some criteria the notion of universal consent is taken strictly, while others qualify the terms of consensus in various ways. There are versions of consensus theory in which the specific population weighing in on a given question, the proportion of the population required for consent, and the period of time needed to declare consensus vary from the classical norm. ...Habermas Main article: Jürgen Habermas This article or section does not cite its references or sources. Please help improve this article by introducing appropriate citations. (help, get involved!) This article has been tagged since August 2006. [Quote from source requested on talk page to verify interpretation of source] The consensus theory of truth is currently advocated by Jürgen Habermas. In Habermas's version of the theory, truth is not dependent on actual consensus. Rather, it is what would be agreed to by all investigators who followed principles of equal, undistorted, unconstrained communication and adopted a discursive orientation, i.e. an attitude of stepping outside of beliefs taken for granted in everyday life and willing to investigate the validity of truth claims, which would include the criteria currently available to the scientific community for investigating a mind-independent reality. This is a situation of communication and investigation very different from most that prevail in everyday life. Thus in Habermas's consensus theory of truth, the pragmatic meaning of a truth claim is that it could be verified or made good in a discourse oriented toward rational consensus. Its validity is unaffected by any actual consensus about at arrived under conditions of distorted communication in everyday life. This theory has been strongly criticized by the philosopher Nicholas Rescher. In contemporary philosophy, the notion of truth has sometimes been broadened to that of validity, on the grounds that different types of statements (e.g. descriptive, normative) have different kinds and conditions of validity, with truth applying only to descriptive statements or assertions about states of affairs in the world. This also can involve, as in the case of Habermas, an extension of the consensus theory of truth to other kinds of validity. For example, moral principles may be right or wrong rather than true or false, but the same sort of consensus validation may apply to their rightness or wrongness as would apply to the truth status of a descriptive statement. Thus Habermas's consensus theory of truth is really a consensus theory of validity, of which truth is just one case. ..Consequences Note that, if we work from the view that there exist mind-independent realities, and that people are seeking to know these realities, then it is possible in principle for everyone to agree but be mistaken about the facts. Thus, on the assumption that there are mind-independent realities, a purely empirical form of the consensus theory of truth would imply that a statement can be true even if it fails to describe reality. For example, if all who investigate "The center of Venus is molten copper" are destined to accept it, then it is "true" on the consensus theory even if they are all wrong about the fact of the matter. Peirce would deny that if investigation were carried sufficiently far that all who investigate would agree upon this. ..Criticism Objection: An objection to the theory is that it presupposes that for every possible statement, investigators are destined eventually to agree about it one way or the other. But this seems dubious: It has been argued, for example, that statements of beauty or morality do not lend themselves to such consensus. Response: The above presupposition would only stand if it were assumed that all statements must have a truth value: Perhaps statements like "She is beautiful" are not necessarily truth-holding statements. The consensus theory of truth, as defined, is in accord with such a response: We may never agree whether or not "she is beautiful", so the statement cannot be said to be true. But we cannot state that the counter-thesis ("she is not beautiful") is true either, otherwise we would agree on the first statement. Therefore, at least implicitly, Peirce states that according to the consensus theory of truth, not all statements can be assigned a truth value. ..Not to be confused with The consensus theory of truth should not be confused with either subjectivism — the claim that what is true is whatever one happens to believe, or relativism — the belief that what is true is whatever is accepted by one's culture or community.

[edit] Problem 1. Lack of definition

JA: There does not appear to be a consensual definition of consensus theory of truth. The current introduction dances around that problem a bit, but maybe it needs to be stated more straightforwardly.

Again we have the fork with common usage versus technical usage, so we need to decide if this article is meant to be a documentation of popular usage or an article about a technical concept.

The only definition that I found so far in the standard philosophy references that I consulted is the one that refers to consensus gentium. This was previously described as bare or naive consensus. This seems to be recognized as a fallacy, equivalent to argumentum ad populum, and I do not not find any writers of note saying of themselves that they subscribe to such a theory. Jon Awbrey 13:58, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Problem 2. Lack of sources

JA: I read a lot of Habermas in the 90's (years not Fahrenheit) and have a whole shelf of his works, and though his writing, as translated perhaps, makes Peirce seem like Spot and Puff by comparison, I'd be happy to check the statements about his having a consensus theory if the editors who added them would give me half a clue as to the loci cited. I am highly suspicious of secondary sources, however, as it seems to be the general rule here that writers will often attribute a strawperson consensus theory to others while seldom confessing to anything so naive in their own writes. Jon Awbrey 18:12, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Problem 3. Misattribution

[edit] Removed material from intro paragraph

This just removed from the intro. No doubt there's more to say here, but any seasoned WP editor will recognize this is not how the article should say it. ... Kenosis 17:18, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

• [See above] Jon Awbrey 02:18, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Talk page clutter

How about moving these big sections of text to a subpage as a workspace, rather than filling up the discussion area? Not everyone has high speed internet access. --Blainster 22:09, 1 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Habermas → Pragmatic theories of truth

JA: In view of Habermas' use of universal pragmatics to describe his own position, I propose moving the Habermas material to a section devoted to him on the pragmatic theory of truth page. Either that or just merge it with the article on universal pragmatics. Discussion? Jon Awbrey 02:32, 2 August 2006 (UTC)