Talk:Cold War (1947-1953)

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[edit] Documents

I've come across some online documents while doing research for the article the Morgenthau Plan.

I thought this was a very good document collection:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/index.php

The main theme is an assortment of documents relating to how the marshal plan originated and developed (covers the period 1946 - 1967), but some documents are equaly relevant to the beginings of the cold war, and I think some might make a good source for material about the birth of the European Union (maybe something to bite into?). I've already inserted one of the documents into the weblinks section a few days back.

An example of another document:

"The Ruhr - The Times' article and editorial on the breach in the US ranks on the subject of the Ruhr were accurate, and the latter excellent. I have been disturbed over the arena in which the debate has been carried out. Clay and Draper claim that Germany will go communist shortly after any proposal to infringe on its sovereignity over the Ruhr is carried out;".

Ruhr Delegation of the United States of America, Council of Foreign Ministers American Embassy Moscow, March 24, 1947

It would not surprise me if there is also a main collection of documents relating to the cold war, but I have not looked. I leave it to those more intrested in the subject (I.e with time to spare...).

The Truman library also contains oral history interviews with a lot of government characters that were deeply involved at ::the time. Fascinating reading. For instance: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/kindbrgr.htm#25 Not that much about ::the cold war, but nevertheles.

Finaly I think, the U.K. National archives have a lot to offer. I've already posted this bit in the main article talk page, but as noone seems to have read it I do a double posting. The full war cabinet meetings documents (along with a lot... of other documents) are available as pdf, a bit hard to read though, as they are in shorthand, exactly as the secretary wrote down the conversations. This page gives the gist of a conversation about russia.

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/releases/2006/january/january1/review.htm

At the Cabinet meeting in April 1945 the PM welcomed representatives of the Dominions to the meeting during which they reviewed the world situation. The PM and Jan Smuts, the South African Prime Minister, made some interesting comments on how they saw the world at the time:

P.M.

R. relations have deteriorated since Yalta…Hope we shall get through: but only by unity. New balance (or lack of balance) of power in Europe. These are the dominating world facts. How can we match them? Only by our superior statecraft & experience & above all by our Unity… Smuts. …World needs our maturity & experience. Danger of power suddenly acquired w´out experience & mature responsibility – exemplified by Germany & Japan. Hope won´t be true of U.S. & Russia. We have renounced Imperialism. But what of the economic imperialism of U.S.A. & the ideological imperialism of U.S.S.R. Eire is a warning tht. we may easily break up, as did Roman Empire.

W.M.(45)39th Meeting held on 3 April 1945.

At the meeting of the caretaker Cabinet in June 1945 the PM gave his views of de Gaulle and the Russian advance into the heart of central Europe. The latter is almost a forerunner of his Iron Curtain speech:

P.M.

But no hope of trustworthy relations with France until we are rid of de Gaulle. This advance of R. into heart of central Europe will be one of most terrible events in history. Don´t believe they will willingly go back at least in this generation. 10 European capitals fall into R. hands.

W.M.(45)7th Meeting held on 11 June 1945.


Hope at least some of this was useful to your work.

Stor stark7 21:14, 26 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Two visions of the World

As the text now stands, it implies that Roosevelt was not intrested in punitive measures against germany. This is false:

se Post-Surrender Program for Germany, Roosevelt Presidential Library
Se also this critisism of Roosevelts plans in a note from his secretary of War:

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. dated September 5, 1944. [1]

"We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace' and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty."

So basically, if there was any intention not to repeat the mistakes of the Versailles treaty, then these intentions should be referenced and attributed to Roosevelts successor Truman, who in time slowly managed to turn the U.S. administration away from the dangerous course set by his predecessor.

This report of the situation in 1947 shows how difficult it was for Truman to get parts of the U.S. administration to give up their plans for turning Germany into a nation of destitute peasants. [2]

Stor stark7 18:23, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Duplication?

Am I the only one seeing every section in this article duplicated?

Why is the Bolshevik Revolution in this article? It should be in the origins of the Cold War!

[edit] Yugoslavia

You have failed to mention Yugoslavia's role in the Cold War. I would mention US fears of Russia backing Yugoslavia in the Trieste crisis, also mention the official split between Tito and Stalin in 1948 as the US believed it set a precedent for further Eastern European countries to abandon a close relation with Stalin

[edit] The Stuttgart Speech

I've added the following text to the important documents section.

  • Speech by James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State "Restatement of Policy on Germany" Stuttgart September 6, 1946. Also known as the "Speech of hope" it set the tone of future U.S. policy as it repudiated the Morgenthau Plan economic policies and gave the Germans hope for the future. The Western powers worst fear by now was that the poverty and hunger would drive the Germans to Communism. General Lucius Clay stated "There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand". The speech was also seen as a stand against the Soviet Union as it stated the firm intention of the United States to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely. But the heart of the message was as Byrnes stated a month later "The nub of our program was to win the German people . . . it was a battle between us and Russia over minds. . . ."

Some related external links are

--Stor stark7 Talk 21:32, 8 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Added text on the reversal of JCS 1067

I've added the following text on the reversal of JCS 1067:

In view of increased concerns by General Lucius D. Clay and the Joint Chief of Staff over growing communist influence in Germany, as well as of the of the failure of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it previously had been dependent, in the summer of 1947 Secretary of State General George Marshall, citing "national security grounds" was finally able to convince President Harry S. Truman to rescind the punitive U.S. occupation directive JCS 1067, and replace it with JCS 1779. In July 1947 JCS 1067, which had directed the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "…take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany", was thus replaced by JCS 1779 which instead stressed that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany". JCS 1067 had then been in effect for over two years.

Some sources:

And for those intrested, a link to the text of the directive.

  • Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 JCS 1067/6 of 28 April 1945 (The final version, JCS 1067/8 of 10 May 1945, contained an amendment allowing the production of just enough synthetic rubber and oil, aluminum, and magnesium to meet the needs of the Allied occupying forces, where the previous version (JCS 1067/6) had ordered the complete destruction of such industries.)

--Stor stark7 Talk 19:31, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] POV Propaganda

There needs to be emphasis on the fact that the Western powers had de facto or complete control of the Indian subcontinent, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. The West manifested its brutality with its suppression of liberation campaigns waged in Indochina, Indonesia, Madagascar, Kenya, Algeria, Greece, and so on.

In regard to the Greek Civil War, Stalin agreed with the West to stay out of the conflict. Tito's involvement is irrelevant since there was not a single Red Army soldier present in Yugoslavia. In short, the USSR never had control of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav partisans were the ones who liberated their country. While Tito did send supplies to ELAS, this was in direct defiance of advice given by the USSR.

In regard to China, Stalin had agreed with the West that he would support the Kuomintang in China in exchange for concessions from Japan which included annexation of southern Sakahalin, Kurile islands, Port Arthur, and joint operation of China's railroads. Indeed, USSR had signed a Friendship Treaty with Chiang in 1945 and proceeded to withdraw early in 1946. In short, Stalin had betrayed the Chinese Communists with his support for the Kuomintang as the legitimate government of China. In exchange with this relationship, China agreed to the preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. Jacob Peters

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