Cold War (1947-1953)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| History of the Cold War |
|---|
| Origins |
| 1947–1953 |
| 1953–1962 |
| 1962–1979 |
| 1979–1985 |
| 1985–1991 |
The Cold War (1947-1953) discusses the period within the Cold War from the establishment of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the Korean War in 1953.
Contents |
[edit] The breakdown of postwar peace
When the war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, Soviet and Western (U.S., British, and French) troops were located in particular places, essentially, along a line in the center of Europe. Aside from a few minor adjustments, this would be the "Iron Curtain" of the Cold War. In hindsight, Yalta signified the agreement of both sides that they could stay there and that neither side would use force to push the other out. This tacit accord applied to Asia as well, as evidenced by U.S. occupation of Japan and the division of Korea. Politically, therefore, Yalta was an agreement on the postwar status quo in which Soviet Union hegemony reigned over about one third and the United States over two thirds.
There were fundamental contrasts between the visions of the United States and the Soviet Union, between the ideals of capitalism and communism. Those contrasts had been simplified and refined in national ideologies to represent two ways of life, each vindicated in 1945 by previous disasters. Conflicting models of autarky versus exports, of state planning against private enterprise, were to vie for the allegiance of the developing and developed world in the postwar years.
Despite the wherewithal of the United States to advance a different vision of postwar Europe, Stalin viewed the reemergence of Germany and Japan as Russia's chief threats, not the United States. He assumed that the capitalist camp would soon resume its internal rivalry over colonies and trade and not pose a threat to the USSR. Economic advisers such as Eugen Varga reinforced this view, predicting a postwar crisis of overproduction in capitalist countries, which would culminate by in another great depression. He believed that America's prosperity in 1945 was not so much a triumph of free enterprise as the result of the government bankrolling business.
What would be the result of massive postwar demilitarization? Stalin predicted overproduction and depression. Stalin thus assumed that the Americans would need to offer him economic aid, needing to find any outlet for massive capital investments just to maintain the wartime industrial production that brought the U.S. out of the Great Depression. Thus, the prospects of an Anglo-American front against him seemed slim from Stalin's standpoint. However, there would be no postwar crisis of overproduction. As Stalin had not anticipated, this was averted by maintaining roughly the same levels of government spending. It was just maintained in a vastly different way.
But the whole role of government was not set in stone and was in question once again. Although America's military-industrial complex was born in World War II, it could have been scaled back. Pressures to "get back to normal" were intense. Congress wanted a return to low, balanced budgets, and families clamored to see the soldiers sent back home. The Truman administration worried first about a postwar slump, then about the inflationary consequences of pent-up consumer demand. The GI Bill of Rights, adopted in 1944, was one answer: subsidizing veterans to complete their education rather than flood the job market and probably boost the unemployment figures. Moreover, on July 20, 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued the first peacetime military draft in the United States amid increasing tensions with the Soviet Union.
Thus, a conversion to the prewar economy would be extremely difficult, and in the end, it did not happen. In the end, the postwar US government would look a lot like the wartime government, with the military establishment, along with military-security dominant. The postwar capitalist slump, predicted by Stalin, would be averted by domestic management, supplemented perhaps by a greater role in promoting international trade and monetary relations.
[edit] The U.S. vision
The United States hoped to shape the postwar world by opening up the world's markets to capitalist trade - a rebuilt capitalist Europe that could again serve as a hub in world affairs. The Atlantic Charter was publicized regarding this with principles such as self-determination - the right of nations to choose their own government - but was in practice abrogated by the Soviet Union.
[edit] The Soviet vision
The withdrawal of the United States to advance a different vision of the postwar world conflicted with Soviet interests, which motivated their determination to shape postwar Europe. The Soviet Union had, since 1924, placed higher priority on its own security and internal development than on Trotsky's vision of world revolution. Accordingly, Stalin had been willing before the war to engage non-communist governments that recognized Soviet control of the former Tsarist Empire and offered assurances of non-aggression. Germany's betrayal of its non-aggression promise convinced Stalin that he could no longer rely on non-communist governments. In September, 1947, the Central Committee secretary Andrei Zhdanov declared that the Truman Doctrine "intended for accordance of the American help to all reactionary regimes, that actively oppose to democratic people, bears an undisguised aggressive character".
After the war, Stalin sought to secure the Soviet Union's western border by installing Communist-dominated regimes under Soviet influence in bordering countries of Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Some historians argue that this decision was a response to a 150-year history of repeated assaults on Russia, including World War II, World War I and Napoleon's 1812 invasion.
Others see it as a realization of age-old Russian dreams of controlling all Slavic lands. Some see this policy as an aggressive effort to spread Communism to a dozen new countries. No one has come up with a satisfactory explanation of why Stalin was willing to turn the United States into a determined foe. Stalin considered it essential to destroy Germany's capacity for another war, which conflicted with the U.S. desire to rebuild Germany as the economic center of a stable Europe. Thus, much of the heavy industry was uprooted and shipped to the USSR. The West viewed these developments as violations of those nations' basic rights and a clear disregard of the Yalta agreement. Winston Churchill accused Stalin of cordoning off a new Russian empire with an "Iron Curtain." The dispute over Germany escalated after Truman refused to give the Soviet Union reparations from West Germany's industrial plants because he believed it would hamper Germany's economic recovery further. Stalin responded by splitting off the Soviet sector of Germany as a communist state.
There were signs of caution on Stalin's part. The Soviet Union eventually withdrew from Northern Iran, at Anglo-American behest; Stalin did observe his 1944 agreement with Churchill and did not directly aid the communists in the struggle against a weak government in Greece that was supported by the UK; in Finland, he demanded a neutralized, but non-communist government; and Russian troops were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by the end of 1945. However, a communist coup in 1948 made Czechoslovakia an effective Soviet satellite and raised further suspicions of Soviet intentions.
[edit] Containment
[edit] The Truman Doctrine
Main article: Truman Doctrine
The immediate post-1945 period may have been the historical high point for the popularity of communist ideology. The burdens the Red Army and USSR endured had earned it massive respect which, had it been fully exploited by Stalin, had a good chance of resulting in a communist Europe. Communist parties won sizeable shares of the vote in free elections in countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland and won significant popular support in Asia - in Vietnam, India, and Japan - and throughout Latin America. In addition, they achieved a significant popularity in such nations as the People's Republic of China, Greece, and Iran. In northern Iran, the USSR created the Republic of Mahabad, the second Kurdish independent state. After the Red Army left Iran, the Republic was conquered by Iranian forces.
Britain and the United States were concerned that a political, electoral victory by communists in any of these countries could lead to a Soviet takeover similar to those in Eastern Europe. Both East and West regarded Greece as a nation well within the sphere of influence of Britain. Stalin had respected his agreement with Churchill to not intervene, but Yugoslavia, under Tito who defied the USSR's advice sent supplies during the Greek Civil War to the partisan forces of the Communist Party of Greece, the ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army). Startlingly, the UK had given aid to the royalist Greek forces, and ELAS leaders who, failing to realize that there would be no Soviet aid and foolishly having boycotted the elections, were at a disadvantaged position. However, by 1947, the near-bankrupt British government could no longer maintain its massive overseas commitments and was forced to receive aid from such nations as Canada. In addition to granting India independence and handing back the Palestinian Mandate to the United Nations, the British government decided to withdraw from both Greece and nearby Turkey. This would have left the two nations, in particular Greece, vulnerable to a communist takeover.
Notified that British aid to Greece and Turkey would end in less than six weeks, the U.S. government, already hostile towards and suspicious of Soviet intentions, decided that action was necessary. With Congress solidly in Republican hands and populated by the traditional isolationists, Truman adopted an ideological approach. In a meeting with congressional leaders, the argument of "apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one" was used to convince them of the significance in supporting Greece and Turkey. It was to become the Domino Theory, the justification for containment. On the morning of March 12, 1947, Truman appeared before Congress to ask for $400 million of aid to Greece and Turkey. Calling on congressional approval for the United States to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," or in short a policy of containment, Truman articulated a presentation of the ideological struggle that became known as the Truman Doctrine. Although based on a simplistic analysis of internal strife in Greece and Turkey, it was to be the single dominating influence over U.S. thinking until at least the Vietnam War.
Truman's speech had a tremendous effect. The anti-communist feelings that had just begun to hatch in the U.S. were given a great boost, and a silenced Congress voted overwhelmingly in approval of aid. The United States would not withdraw back to the Western Hemisphere as it had after World War I. From then on, the U.S. would actively engage any communist threats anywhere in the globe under the ostensible causes of "freedom", "democracy" and "human rights." The U.S. brandished its role as the leader of the "free world." Meanwhile, the Soviet Union brandished its position as the leader of the "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" camp.
In view of increased concerns by General Lucius D. Clay and the Joint Chief of Staff over growing communist influence in Germany, as well as of the failure of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it previously had been dependent, in the summer of 1947, Secretary of State General George Marshall, citing "national security grounds" was finally able to convince President Harry S. Truman to rescind the punitive U.S. occupation directive JCS 1067, and replace it with JCS 1779. In July 1947 JCS 1067, which had directed the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "…take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany", was thus replaced by JCS 1779 which instead stressed that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany". JCS 1067 had then been in effect for over two years.
In 1947, the Marshall Plan began and was designed to give billions of dollars to assist the recovery of Europe. The Soviets, however, refused to accept any aid in their satellite states. Consequently, Western Europe gained an economic boom while Eastern European living standards remained low.
[edit] The Berlin Blockade
Main article: Berlin Blockade
Stalin responded by blocking access to Berlin, which was deep within the Soviet zone although subject to four-power control. The Soviets cut off all rail and road routes to West Berlin. No trucks or trains were allowed entry into the city during the Berlin Blockade. Truman embarked on a highly visible move that would humiliate the Soviets internationally: flying supplies in over the blockade during 1948-1949. Military confrontation loomed while Truman flew supplies through East Germany into West Berlin during the 1948-1949 blockade. This costly aerial supplying of West Berlin became known as the Berlin Airlift.
[edit] NATO
Main article: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Truman joined eleven other nations in 1949 to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), America's first "entangling" European alliance in 170 years. Stalin retaliated against these steps by integrating the economies of Eastern Europe in his version of the Marshall Plan, exploding the first Soviet atomic device in 1949, signing an alliance with People's Republic of China in February 1950, and forming the Warsaw Pact, Eastern Europe's counterpart to NATO, in 1955.
[edit] NSC-68
Main article: NSC-68
U.S. officials quickly moved to escalate and expand "containment." In a secret 1950 document, NSC-68, they proposed to strengthen their alliance systems, quadruple defense spending, and embark on an elaborate propaganda campaign to convince the U.S. public to fight this costly cold war. Truman ordered the development of a hydrogen bomb; and, in early 1950, came the first U.S. effort to opposing communist forces in Vietnam, plans to form a West German army, and proposals for a peace treaty with Japan that would guarantee long-term U.S. military bases there.
[edit] 1949: The official divide between superpowers
With the Soviets able to start their own nuclear program in 1949, the superpowers of the US and USSR were now at equal world power levels. The Berlin Blockade now ended and led to the formation of the Iron Curtain in 1949. This lead to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 as well. The Marshall Plan continued to make Western democratic Europe even wealthier than Communist Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that Western Europe still had an advantage over Eastern Europe, the USA and USSR alone were now officially equal as superpowers.
[edit] Communist China
Shortly after World War II, an all out civil war resumed in China between the Communist Party of China led by Mao Zedong and the Nationalist Party of China (Kuomintang) led by Chiang Kai-shek (see Chinese Civil War). The USSR had signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Kuomintang in 1945 and disavowed support for the Cinese Communists. However, the demoralized and undisciplined Nationalist troops and their corrupt leaders proved no match for the communist People's Liberation Army, which had gained the support of the peasantry. Although the Nationalists had an advantage in numbers of men and weapons, initially controlled a much larger territory and population than their adversaries, and enjoyed considerable international support, they were exhausted by the long war with Japan and the attendant internal responsibilities. In addition, the Chinese Communists were able to fill the political vacuum left in Manchuria after Soviet forces withdrew from the area and thus gained China's prime industrial base. The Chinese Communists were able to fight their way from the North and Northeast and virtually all of mainland China was taken by the end of 1949. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek and 600,000 Nationalist troops and 2 million refugees, predominantly from the government and business community, fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan. In December 1949, Chiang proclaimed Taipei the temporary capital of the Republic of China and continued to assert his government as the sole legitimate authority in China.
The continued hostility between the Communists on the mainland and the Nationalists on Taiwan would continue throughout the Cold War. Though the United States refused to aide Chiang Kai-shek in his hope to "recover the mainland," it continued supporting the Republic of China with military supplies and expertise to prevent Taiwan from falling into Communist hands. Through the support of the Western bloc (most Western countries continued to recognize the ROC as the sole legitimate government of China), the Republic of China on Taiwan retained China's seat in the United Nations until 1971.
[edit] The Korean War
In early 1950 came the first U.S. commitment to form a peace treaty with Japan that would guarantee long-term U.S. military bases. Some observers (including George Kennan) believed that the Japanese treaty led Stalin to approve a plan to invade U.S.-supported South Korea on June 25, 1950. Korea had been divided at the end of World War II along the 38th parallel into Soviet (Northern) and American (Southern) occupation zones, in which a communist government was installed in the North by the Soviets and a capitalist government in the South came to power after UN-supervised elections in 1948. Fearing that a united communist Korea could neutralize U.S. power in Japan and encourage communist movements world-wide, Truman committed U.S. forces and obtained help from the United Nations to drive back the North Koreans. In a historic diplomatic blunder, the Soviets boycotted the UN Security Council and thus lacked its power to veto Truman's action in the UN, because the UN would not admit the People's Republic of China and continued to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan as the sole legitimate Chinese government.
However, Truman would offset this with his own monumental, historic error: allowing his forces to go to the Chinese-Korean border. Communist China responded with massive attack in November 1950 that decimated U.S.-led forces as well as their own. Fighting stabilized along the 38th parallel, which had separated the Koreas, but Truman now faced a hostile China, a Sino-Soviet partnership, and a bloated defense budget that had quadrupled in eighteen months.
[edit] Hydrogen Bomb
The hydrogen bomb- which produced nuclear fusion instead of nuclear fission- was what also helped the US stay ahead in the Soviet-US arms race after it was deployed in 1952.
[edit] Culture and media
Fear of a nuclear war saw the production of public safety films by the United States federal government's Civil Defense branch that demonstrated ways on protecting oneself from a Soviet nuclear attack. The 1951 children's film Duck and Cover is a prime example.
[edit] Significant documents
- Potsdam Declaration: July 26, 1945. A informal statement issued by Harry S. Truman (U.S.), Winston Churchill (Britain), and Chiang Kai-Shek (the Republic of China) which outlined the terms for a Japanese surrender.
- Baruch Plan: 1946. A proposal by the U.S. to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) to a) extend between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; b) implement control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes; c) eliminate from national armaments atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; and d) establish effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions. When the Soviet Union was the only member State who refused to sign, the U.S. embarked on a massive nuclear weapons testing, development, and deployment program.
- George F. Kennan: 1946/1947. The Long Telegram and The X Article, formally titled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct. The article describes the concepts that would become the bedrock of American Cold War policy and was published in Foreign Affairs in 1947. The article was an expansion of a well-circulated top secret State Department cable called the X Article and became famous for setting forth the doctrine of containment. Though the article was signed pseudonymously by "X," it was well known at the time that the true author was Kennan, the deputy chief of mission of the United States to the Soviet Union from 1944 to 1946, under ambassador W. Averell Harriman.
- Paul Nitze April 14, 1950: NSC-68 was a classified report written by and issued by the United States National Security Council. The report outlined the National Security Strategy of the United States for that time and provided a comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints. NSC-68's principal thesis was that the Soviet Union intended to become the single dominant world power. The report argued that the Soviet Union had a systematic strategy aimed at the spread of Communism across the entire world, and it recommended that the United States government adopt a policy of containment to stop the further spread of Communism. NSC-68 outlined a drastic foreign policy shift from defensive to active containment and advocated aggressive military preparedness. NSC-68 would shape government actions in the Cold War for the next 20 years and has subsequently been labeled the "blueprint" for the Cold War.
- Speech by James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State "Restatement of Policy on Germany" Stuttgart September 6, 1946. Also known as the "Speech of hope" it set the tone of future U.S. policy as it repudiated the Morgenthau Plan economic policies and gave the Germans hope for the future. The Western powers worst fear by now was that the poverty and hunger would drive the Germans to Communism. General Lucius Clay stated "There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand". The speech was also seen as a stand against the Soviet Union as it stated the firm intention of the United States to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely. But the heart of the message was as Byrnes stated a month later "The nub of our program was to win the German people . . . it was a battle between us and Russia over minds. . . ."
[edit] References
- Ball, S. J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991 (1998). British perspective
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1989);
- Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History (2005)
- Gaddis, John Lewis. Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987)
- Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (1982)
- LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992 7th ed. (1993)
- Mitchell, George. The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe (2004)
- Ninkovich, Frank. Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question since 1945 (1988)
- Paterson, Thomas G. Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan (1988)
- Sivachev, Nikolai and Nikolai Yakolev, Russia and the United States (1979), by Soviet historians
- Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, 2nd ed. (1974)
- Walker, J. Samuel. "Historians and Cold War Origins: The New Consensus", in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review (1981), 207-236.
- Cumings, Bruce The Origins of the Korean War (2 vols., 1981-90), friendly to North Korea and hostile to U.S.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (1972)
- Holloway, David . Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1959-1956 (1994)
- Goncharov, Sergei, John Lewis and Xue Litai , Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (1993)
- Leffler, Melvyn. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (1992).
- Mastny, Vojtech. Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (1979)
[edit] External links
- Draft, Report on Communist Expansion, February 28, 1947
- The division of Europe Portal to topic documents
- James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly The division of Germany
- The beginning of the Cold War Portal to topic documents
- The Sinnews of Peace Winston Churchill speech in 5, March, 1946, warning about the advance of communism in central Europe.
- Dividing up Europe The 1944 division of Europe between the Soviet Union and Britain into zones of influence.
- James Francis Byrnes and U.S. Policy towards Germany 1945-1947 Deutsch-Amerikanische Zentrum / James-F.-Byrnes-Institut e.V
- U.K. Policy towards Germany National Archives excerpts of Cabinet meetings.
| History of the Cold War | |
|---|---|
| Origins of the Cold War | 1947–1953 | 1953–1962 | 1962–1979 | 1979–1991 | 1985–1991 | |
