Clash of Civilizations

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Cover of The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
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Cover of The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

The Clash of Civilizations is a controversial theory that people's cultural/religious identity will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. The theory gained widespread attention after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Popularized by Samuel P. Huntington, it was originally formulated in an article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in the academic journal Foreign Affairs in 1993. The term itself was first used by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic Monthly titled The Roots of Muslim Rage.[1] Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

Contents

[edit] Overview

Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature of global politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that liberal democracy and Western values had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, Francis Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense.

Huntington believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural conflict. In his thesis, he argued that the primary axis of conflict in the future would be along cultural and religious lines. As an extension, he posits that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of cultural identity, will become increasingly useful in analyzing the potential for conflict. In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Huntington falls in the primordialist school, believing that culturally defined groups are ancient and natural. His view that nation states would remain the most powerful actors is in line with realism. Finally, his warning that the Western civilization may decline is inspired by Arnold J. Toynbee and Oswald Spengler.

Due to an enormous response and the solidification of his views, Huntington later expanded the thesis in his 1996 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

[edit] List of civilizations

Huntington's civilizations
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Huntington's civilizations

The definition, nomenclature, and even the number of civilizations are somewhat ambiguous in Huntington's works. Civilizations may consist of states and social groups (such as ethnic and religious minorities). Predominant religion seems to be the main criterion of his classification, but in some cases geographical proximity and linguistic similarity are important as well. Using various studies of history, Huntington divided the world into the "major" civilizations in his thesis as such:

The Buddhist areas of northern and western India, Sri Lanka, parts of Nepal, Bhutan, Mongolia, Kalmykia, Siberia, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos are identified as separate from other civilizations, but Huntington believes that they do not constitute a major civilization in the sense of international affairs.

[edit] Huntington's thesis of civilizational clash

Emerging alignments as predicted by Huntington in 1996. Thicker lines represent more conflictual relationships.
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Emerging alignments as predicted by Huntington in 1996. Thicker lines represent more conflictual relationships.

Huntington argues that the trends of global conflict after the end of the Cold War are increasingly appearing at these civilizational divisions. Wars such as those following the break up of Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, and between India and Pakistan were cited as evidence of intercivilizational conflict. The War on Terror is seen as its largest manifestation.

Huntington also argues that the widespread Western belief in the universality of the West's values and political systems is naïve and that continued insistence on democratization and such "universal" norms will only further antagonize other civilizations. Huntington sees the West as reluctant to accept this because it built the international system, wrote its laws, and gave it substance in the form of the United Nations. Huntington identifies a major shift of economic, military, and political power from the West to the other civilizations of the world, most significantly to what he identifies as the two "challenger civilizations", Sinic and Islam.

In Huntington's view, East Asian Sinic civilization is culturally asserting itself and its values relative to the West due to its rapid economic growth. Specifically, he believes that China's goals are to reassert itself as the regional hegemon, and that other countries in the region will 'bandwagon' with China due to the history of hierarchical command structures implicit in the Confucian Sinic civilization, as opposed to the individualism and pluralism valued in the West. In other words, regional powers such as the two Koreas, Vietnam, and Cambodia will acquiesce to Chinese demands and become more supportive of China rather than attempting to oppose it. Huntington therefore believes that the rise of China poses one of the most significant problems and the most powerful long-term threat to the West, as Chinese cultural assertion clashes with the American desire for the lack of a regional hegemon in East Asia.

Huntington argues that the Islamic civilization has experienced a massive population explosion which is fueling instability both on the borders of Islam and in its interior, where fundamentalist movements are becoming increasingly popular. Manifestations of what he terms the "Islamic Resurgence" include the 1979 Iranian revolution, the War on Terror, and extremely widespread Islamic opposition to the United States during both Gulf Wars. Perhaps the most controversial statement Huntington made in the Foreign Affairs article was that "Islam has bloody borders". Huntington believes this to be a real consequence of several factors, including the previously mentioned Muslim youth bulge and population growth and Islamic proximity to many civilizations including Sinic, Orthodox, Western, and African.

Huntington sees Islamic civilization as a potential ally to China, both having more revisionist goals and sharing common conflicts with other civilizations, especially the West. Specifically, he identifies common Chinese and Islamic interests in the areas of weapons proliferation, human rights, and democracy that conflict with those of the West, and feels that these are areas in which the two civilizations will cooperate. Russia, Japan, and India are what Huntington terms 'swing civilizations' and may favor either side. Russia, for example, clashes with the many Muslim ethnic groups on its southern border (such as Chechnya) but cooperates with Iran in order to avoid further Muslim-Orthodox violence in Southern Russia and in an attempt to continue the flow of oil. Huntington argues that a "Sino-Islamic connection" is emerging in which China will cooperate more closely with Iran, Pakistan, and other states to augment its international position.

Huntington also argues that civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims", identifying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. He believes that the current global war on terror between the West and Islam is not a modern consequence of a few crazed radicals, but rather reflects a millennium-plus history of conflict between the two civilizations. This conflict dates back as far as the initial thrust of Islam into Europe, its eventual expulsion in the Spanish reconquest, the attacks of the Ottoman Turks on Eastern Europe and Vienna, and the European imperial division of the Islamic nations in the 1800s and 1900s. He believes that some of the factors contributing to this conflict are that both Christianity (upon which Western civilization is based) and Islam are: Missionary religions, seeking conversion by others Universal, "all-or-nothing" religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one. Teleological religions, that is, that their values and beliefs represent the goals of existence and purpose in human existence More recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash, Huntington wrote, are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism - that is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western values - that infuriate islamic fundamentalists.

All these historical and modern factors combined, Huntington wrote briefly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail in his 1996 book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. Along with Sinic-Western conflict, he believed, the Western-Islamic clash would represent the bloodiest conflicts of the early 21st century. Thus, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent events including the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have been widely viewed as support for the Clash theory.

[edit] Modernization, westernization, and "torn countries"

Critics of Huntington's ideas often extend their criticisms to traditional cultures and internal reformers who wish to modernize without adopting the values and attitudes of Western culture. These critics sometimes claim that to modernize is necessarily to become Westernized to a very large extent. In reply, those who consider the Clash of Civilizations thesis accurate often point to the example of Japan, claiming that it is not a Western state at its core. They argue that it adopted much Western technology (also inventing some technology of its own in recent times), parliamentary democracy, and free enterprise, but has remained culturally very distinct from the West. China is also cited by some as a rising non-Western economy. Many also point out the East Asian Tigers or neighboring states as having adapted western economics, while maintaining traditional or totalitarian social government.

Perhaps the ultimate example of non-Western modernization is Russia, the core state of the Orthodox civilization. The variant of this argument that uses Russia as an example relies on the acceptance of a unique non-Western civilization headed by an Orthodox state such as Russia or perhaps an Eastern European country. Huntington argues that Russia is primarily a non-Western state although he seems to agree that it shares a considerable amount of cultural ancestry with the modern West. Russia was one of the great powers during World War I. It also happened to be a non-Western power. According to Huntington, the West is distinguished from Orthodox Christian countries by the experience of the Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment, overseas colonialism rather than contiguous expansion and colonialism, and a recent reinfusion of Classical culture through Rome rather than through the continuous trajectory of the Byzantine Empire. The differences among the modern Slavic states can still be seen today. This issue is also linked to the "universalizing factor" exhibited in some civilizations.

Huntington refers to countries that are seeking to affiliate with another civilization as "torn countries." Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically tried to Westernize the country since the 1920s, is his chief example. Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived from Islamic civilization, but Turkey's Western-oriented elite imposed western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin alphabet, joined NATO, and is seeking to join the European Union. Mexico and Russia are also considered to be torn by Huntington.

According to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements in order to redefine its civilizational identity. Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country.

As noted in the book, to date no torn country has successfully redefined its civilizational identity, this mostly due to the elites of the 'host' civilization refusing to accept the torn country.

[edit] Criticism

Huntington's piece in Foreign Affairs created more responses than almost any other essay ever published in that journal. There have been many criticisms of his thesis from wildly different paradigms. Some have argued that his identified civilizations are fractured and show little internal unity.[2] The Muslim world is severely fractured along ethnic lines with Kurds, Arabs, Persians, Turks, Pakistanis, and Indonesians all having very different world views. Moreover, the criteria of the proposed delineation are not clear. One can argue, for instance, that cultural differences between China and Japan are not more important than between China and Vietnam.[3] However, Vietnam is put together with China under the label of the Sinic civilization while Japan is supposed to form a separate civilization. In fact, Vietnam keeps a massive army mostly to guard against China. Whereas, Western civilization includes both Protestant and Catholic branches; and the Germanic and Romance cultural differences in Western Europe are also disregarded. The distinction between the Western and Orthodox civilizations excludes non-religious factors, such as the post-Communist legacy or the level of economic development. It also ignores differences within Muslim communities.

In his book Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman proposes another criticism of the civilization clash hypothesis. According to Berman, distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day. He argues there is no "Islamic civilization" nor a "Western civilization", and that the evidence for a civilization clash is not convincing, especially when considering relationships such as that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he cites the fact that many Islamic extremists spent a significant amount of time living and/or studying in the western world. According to Berman conflict arises because of philosophical beliefs between groups, regardless of cultural or religious identity.[4]

In his book, Huntington relies mostly on anecdotal evidence. On the contrary, more rigorous empirical studies show no particular increase in the frequency of intercivilizational conflicts in the post-Cold War period.[5]

It has been claimed that values are more easily transmitted and altered than Huntington proposes.[6] Nations such as India and Japan have become successful democracies, and the West itself was rife with despotism and fundamentalism for most of its history. Some also see Huntington's thesis as creating a self-fulfilling prophecy and reasserting differences between civilizations.[7] Edward Said issued a response to Huntington's thesis in his own essay entitled "The Clash of Ignorance." Said argues that Huntington's categorization of the world's fixed "civilizations" omits the dynamic interdependency and interaction of culture. According to Said, it is an example of an imagined geography, where the presentation of the world in a certain way legitimates certain politics.

[edit] Related concepts

Also, in recent years the theory of Dialogue Among Civilizations, a response to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, has become the center of some international attention. The concept, which was introduced by former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, was the basis for United Nation's resolution to name the year 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. [1] [2] In 2005 Secretary General Kofi Annan launched an initiative called Alliance of Civilizations.

[edit] Huntington's predictions: analysis and retrospect

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Huntington is increasingly regarded as having been prescient as the United States invasion of Afghanistan, 2003 Invasion of Iraq, the 2005 cartoon crisis, and the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis fueled the perception that Huntington's Clash is well underway.

Some maintained that the 1995 and 2004 enlargements of the European Union brought the EU's eastern border up to the boundary between Huntington's Western and Orthodox civilizations; most of Europe's historically Protestant and Roman Catholic countries (with the exception of Croatia and countries like Switzerland and Norway who voluntarily opted out of EU membership) were now EU members, while a number of Europe's historically Orthodox countries (with exceptions such as longtime EU member Greece and newly accepted Cyprus) were outside the EU. As others have noted, however, the strong EU candidacies of Bulgaria, Romania, and their NATO membership of Romania and Bulgaria (since 2004) present a challenge to some of Huntington's analysis.

German geographers have pointed out that Huntington's regions of "civilizations" are affected by the concept of the "Kulturerdteile" (culture-continents) of the geographer Albert Kolb - a deprecated theory from 1962. In this theory, the effect of religious aspects was less important than historical and social aspects. Huntington notes in his book that German scholars hold a separate concept of civilization than presented in his analysis.

[edit] Recent issues

The following list includes recent conflicts between states and groups belonging to different civilizations. It does not mean that all those conflicts were caused by the civilizational cleavages.

[edit] China et al. & the West

  • Chinese response to the Hainan Island incident: Detention of American pilots by China.
  • North Korean nuclear crisis: "Sinic" North Korea asserting nuclear weapons against predominantly "Western" and "Japanese" reactions.
  • Chinese transfer of missile and nuclear technologies to "Islamic" Pakistan.

[edit] Hindu & Islam

[edit] Islam & Orthodox

[edit] Islam & the West

[edit] Orthodox & the West

[edit] See also

[edit] Bibliography

[edit] External links

[edit] References

  1. ^ http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/summer01-02/polsumm01-3.pdf
  2. ^ Russett, Bruce; John Oneal & Michaelene Cox (2000). "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence", Journal of Peace Research 37(5): 583-608.
  3. ^ Tusicisny, Andrej (2004). "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?". Journal of Peace Research 41 (4), 485–498.
  4. ^ Berman, Paul (2003). Terror and Liberalism. W W Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-05775-5.
  5. ^ Tusicisny, Andrej (2004). "Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?". Journal of Peace Research 41 (4), 485–498.
  6. ^ Russett, Bruce; John Oneal & Michaelene Cox (2000). "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence", Journal of Peace Research 37(5): 583-608.
  7. ^ Russett, Bruce; John Oneal & Michaelene Cox (2000). "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Déjà Vu? Some Evidence", Journal of Peace Research 37(5): 583-608.
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