Canadian Intelligence Corps
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The Canadian Intelligence Corps (C INT C) was an administrative corps of the Canadian Army.
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[edit] Canadian Intelligence Corps and Military Intelligence in Canada, 1942-1945
The Canadian Intelligence Corps (C Int C) was created to respond to an identified need for a separate military unit to deal with the function of intelligence. While many of the Corps’ first personnel were active as early as 1939, the C Int C did not become a separate Corps of the Canadian Army until October 1942. At the start, the C Int C was small, with its membership composed mostly of men whose specialist knowledge or civilian skills could be readily used to evaluate or interpret information about enemy intentions and capabilities.
In the summer of 1942, Army Colonel W.W. “Jock” Murray was made Canada’s Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and Lieutenant (Navy) C.H. Little was promoted to Lieutenant Commander after successfully coordinating Canadian and British SIGINT interests. The organization of “Military Intelligence” agencies in Canada “now assumed the structure” they were to “retain throughout the war.” The sub groups of the Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence elements were divided into the following departments:
- MI1 “dealt with Intelligence on military operations and monitored the war situation world-wide.” MI1 “relied mainly on the reports of Canadian Army Intelligence officers in the field and those attached to the Allied Commands.” MI1 “was sub-divided into five sections” covering “Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Australia and, a library and map department. Canadian battlefield commanders were ...subordinate to the British or the Americans,” thus MI1’s “usefulness was mainly confined” to “providing background information to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.”
- MI2 “consisted of three Special Wireless Stations” (located in “Ottawa, Point Grey, and Victoria) and a headquarters section” in Ottawa “called the Discrimination Unit” (DU), “all under Capt Edward Drake with a “total staff” of “about 100.” The DU was collocated with the EU in a house on “Laurier Avenue,” but it later moved to “Bank Street,” where it “received the raw intercepts from the Army’s three listening stations, attempted to identify” the radio messages “and then passed on the raw material to the appropriate Canadian, American, or British authorities.”
- MI3 was concerned with “Army Security.” MI3 was set up in 1940 under Lt Eric Acland. It dealt mainly with the problem of “counter-espionage and security with respect to Army personnel and classified information. It maintained close liaison with U.S. Military Intelligence (G2), British Security Coordination (BSC) and Britain’s MI5. Its primary job was to keep an aggressive watch on Canadian soldiers” with “suspected subversive backgrounds.”
- MI4 “was responsible for prisoner-of-war camps and POW mail.” (MGen Reginald J.G. Weeks was a Capt in MI-4 in 1943 under the command of Major (later LCol) Alex Wygard, a former Polish Cavalry officer who came to Canada after the German invasion of Poland).
- MIX “was set up in the last year of the war to record information” on all people in Canada, whether Canadian, British, or American, who were engaged in counter-espionage.”
“Both Naval Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence had similar security sections.” The Navy called its security section Navy Intelligence 4 (NI4) and the Air Force named theirs Air Military Police and Security Section A (AMP S/A).
As the course of the World War II progressed, the individual “directors of Intelligence for” each of “the three” Canadian Armed “Services began to meet regularly to discuss their mutual security concerns and to advise the Canadian Chiefs of Staff accordingly.” They called “themselves the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), but had a much more restricted role” in comparison with the size and scope of the British JIC. The Canadian JIC proved to have “a useful inside track to the Chiefs of Staff.”
[edit] 1942-1945, Canadian Intelligence Corps
Many Canadians were active in the Intelligence field as early as 1939. Major John P. Page GSO3 (Intelligence) at CMHQ in Ottawa was tasked “to evaluate Intelligence and consider how to promote the idea that the Canadian Army should form its own Canadian Intelligence Corps (C Int C).” His proposals were initially refused or set aside and it was not until 29 Oct 1942, that Canadian Army Intelligence was officially recognized as a Corps.
The initial organizational elements of the C Int C included the “Intelligence Sections at HQ 1st Canadian Army, 1st Canadian Corps; 1st, 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions, 5th Armoured Division; No. 1 and No. 2 Canadian Special Wireless Sections Type B; seven Field Security Sections (Army, Nos. 1,2,3,7,11,12); I9X at CMHQ“ and the Intelligence “Pool.” Additional field Units were in service in Canada, such as the “Security Intelligence Sections at the Districts.”
With the formation of the “1st Canadian Army (1 Cdn Army) in Europe on 06 April 1942 and 2nd Canadian Corps (2 Cdn Corps) on 14 January 1943,” additional Intelligence staff were required and in due course added to the Canadian military establishment. Intelligence staff duties at CMHQ also continued to expand, as it became the clearinghouse for all security-clearance cases initiated in Canada and investigated in Britain.
To facilitate cooperation “throughout the period of hostilities, personnel in the Canadian Intelligence Corps formed part of the Canadian Army Staff in Washington and worked in close co-operation with the Intelligence Staff of the United States War Department.” They were linguists for the most part, proficient in German, Japanese and many other foreign languages.
Canada’s Naval and Air Intelligence Staffs were equally busy fighting the war. Canadian Naval Intelligence Officers studied German Naval Telecommunications, exchanging through 1943 for example, a daily U-boat Situation Report. Special Intelligence from the UK was also provided to Ottawa and Washington. The level of cooperation between the three nations and their Naval Intelligence (NI) organizations was extremely close and both the American and Canadian officers paid visits to the Senior British Naval Intelligence Officer. All three nations promulgated the processed information to ships and commands within their zone of control. The UK recorded that formal integration of the three nation’s NI staffs was never necessary, because the Anglo-American organization worked as one against the U-boat threat.
Throughout the war, foreign radio messages were being intercepted by Canadian Army, Navy (RCN), Air Force (RCAF) and Department of Transport (DOT) Radio Division stations, located in places such as Forest (and later Winnipeg), Manitoba and, Point Grey, British Columbia. Following the collapse of France in 1940 for example, the RCN continued to monitor French naval frequencies at Britain’s request in order to determine the fate of the French fleet. German communications intercepted by the Canadians also “helped the British in mounting” their “successful attack on” the famous battle-cruiser “Bismarck“ in May 1941.
In May 1943, as well as receiving the Intelligence summaries issued by Whitehall to the naval commands at home and overseas, the (radio interception) Tracking Room in Ottawa began to receive a full series of Enigma decrypts. The material allowed Ottawa to carry on a completely free exchange of communications by direct signal link with the Tracking Room in the Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC). The results were such that, “Canadian...intercept stations and Direction Finding (DF) organizations...made an indispensable contribution to the Allied North Atlantic SIGINT network.”
The Intelligence Staffs of both the First and Second Canadian Infantry Divisions in England and other newly inducted C Int C personnel in theatre, continued to be sent to British Intelligence Schools for advanced training. On conclusion of their courses, they were attached to the Intelligence staffs of some of the more experienced British formations, while British Intelligence officers filled their places in the Canadian Army temporarily. As the Canadians became more proficient, they gradually replaced their British colleagues. By 1943, (most of) the Intelligence appointments in the First Canadian Army were filled by Canadian personnel. There was a War Intelligence School where courses were given to officers who had been selected for Intelligence duties in Canada.
C Int C personnel were included in the organizations of “1st Canadian Division (1 Cdn Div) and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade (1 Cdn Armd Bde).” These “were the first Canadian formations to embark on a regular campaign during the war from the landings in Sicily in 1943” and through the fighting in both “Sicily and Italy.” Shortly afterwards, “1st Canadian Corps went to Italy and took part in the fighting there” along “with 5th Canadian Armoured Division.” More C Int C casualties were added in the Mediterranean Theatre, when Cpl A.D. Yaritch was killed while on duty in the Adriatic. Intelligence operations continued in this theatre until all of the “Canadian Mediterranean Force moved to Belgium in 1945” and then went back “into action in Holland.” In North West Europe, C Int C Sgt G.A. Osipoff and Sgt F. Dummer were killed during operations in France.
In London, Canadian Intelligence Corps staff officers formed part of the group assisting the First Canadian Army Planning Staff. They studied the role the Canadians were to play and assisted in the collation of the voluminous amounts of Intelligence detail, which poured into London from every conceivable source. This information was carefully sifted, examined, analyzed and, if corroborated by similar information provided by other recognized sources, was recorded and passed to the Operations Branch of the Planning Staff to consider what effect the data might have on the overall plan. The innumerable sources and agencies included refugees from Axis occupied countries, members of the various resistance groups, Allied personnel dropped by air into enemy held countries who then transmitted their information by portable wireless sets, raids conducted on the French coast for a specific purpose, air photographs, neutral newspapers, mail censorship, air reconnaissance, interception of enemy wireless radio broadcasts and countless others. All of this effort was directed towards the one object of finding out as much as possible about the enemy, weather and terrain that would be encountered by the assaulting allied forces. Details concerning German Troop Strength, their defences, their armaments, administrative and supply systems, general strengths, dispositions, state of morale, fighting ability, personality studies concerning characteristics of enemy commanders, the German military state of preparedness, and reinforcement capabilities.
During all this planning activity at staff level, the training of Intelligence personnel with field formations and Units continued unabated. The Intelligence Corps staff devoted considerable time and effort during the pre-invasion period conducting a massive “background study” into the organization of the German Army, its weapons, tactics, equipment, civil administration and Party organization, the language, the country and its people. Anything and everything that was considered useful and helpful towards completing the preparation of the invasion plans was actioned. The intensity with which this preparation was undertaken bore fruit, as evidenced by the tactical surprise which the actual assault achieved. During an interrogation after the battle, General-Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt, the Commander-in-Chief of Germany’s Army Group West during the Normandy invasion, revealed that although he had expected the invasion to occur daily from March 1944, he had not been prepared to oppose the landings where they actually took place.
Many C Int C personnel went into Europe with the “3rd Canadian Infantry Division (3 Cdn Inf Div) under 1st British Corps (1 Brit Corps)” when it “landed in Normandy on D-Day.” Subsequently, additional Intelligence staff with the “2nd Canadian Corps (2 Cdn Corps)” participated in the operations at Caen while “under the command of the 2nd British Army.” From 23 July 1944, senior C Int C staffs worked in the “Headquarters of the 1st Canadian Army, which was at that time in command of both British and Canadian Corps composed of a great variety of Allied forces.”
Intelligence coordination and passage of information between the British and Canadian formations was successfully conducted at all levels of command. It was essentially uniform in substantial matters because Intelligence at Eighth Army and within 21 Army Group was inspired by the direction of Brigadier E.T. Williams, CBE, DSO, Field Marshal Montgomery’s chief Intelligence Officer in Africa, Sicily, Italy and North West Europe.
The Intelligence organization within First Canadian Army was centralized in the GSO 1 Intelligence. He had no direct relationship to the Director of Military Intelligence in Canada. Any requests or observations, which he had with regard to Intelligence matters, he passed to the DDMI and CMHQ who alone dealt with Canada. On several occasions during the war, HQ First Canadian Army was visited by the DMI and other officers from Canada but they exercised no control over the operational Intelligence within the Army which was entirely the concern of 21 Army Group and the Intelligence Staff Officers at various levels.
1942, Formation of the Canadian Intelligence Corps
The Department of National Defence – Army- issued the following instruction from Ottawa on 6 November 1942:
Formation – Canadian Intelligence Corps
Authority is granted, effective date 29 Oct 1942, for the formation of a Canadian Intelligence Corps. This Corps is to be constituted as follows:
Such active Units as may from time to time be allocated thereto, namely:
Intelligence Sections of field formations down to and including Divisions; Field Security Sections;
Security Intelligence Sections; and,
Miscellaneous Units organized for and engaged in Intelligence and Wireless Intelligence Duties.
Such personnel as may from time to time be posted thereto, namely, those engaged in Intelligence duties at NDHQ, CMHQ, Coastal Commands and Districts except those holding General Staff appointments.
The following units presently authorized are to be included in the above Corps:
Field Security Sections
Serial Army Unit Designation
1151 First Army Field Security Section II/1940/62R/2
541 1 Field Security Section II/1940/23/1
542 2 Field Security Section II/1940/23/1
543 3 Field Security Section II/1940/23/1
544 4 Field Security Section I/1940/19/1
1402 5 Field Security Section II/1940/23/1
546 6 Field Security Section II/1940/23/1
547 7 Field Security Section I/1940/19/1
1602 8 Field Security Section I/1940/23/1
551 11 Field Security Section III/1940/62R/2
552 12 Field Security Section II/1940/62R/2
Intelligence Sections
2A 1 Division Intelligence Section II/1940/22/1
152A 2 Division Intelligence Section II/1940/22/1
701 3 Division Intelligence Section II/1940/22/1
901 4 Division Intelligence Section I/1940/18A/1
563 5 Division Intelligence Section I/1940/18A/1
1800A 6 Division Intelligence Section II/1940/22/1
1401 7 Division Intelligence Section II/1940/22/1
1601 8 Division Intelligence Section II/1940/22/1
607 1 Corps Intelligence Section III/1940/62E/1
2 Corps Intelligence Section III/1940/62E/1
1150A First Army Intelligence Section BWE II/1931/62D/1
Miscellaneous Units
524 Pacific Command Security Intelligence Section V/1940/309A/1
380 Atlantic Command Security Intelligence Section V/1940/309/1
462 1 Canadian Weather Intelligence Section III/1940/62G/2
1195 2 Canadian Weather Intelligence Section III/1940/62G/2
521 Military District No. 2 Security Intelligence Section V/1940/311P/1
490 Military District No. 3 Security Intelligence Section V/1940/311P/1
565 1 Discrimination Unit.
1942-1944, First Special Service Force Intelligence Section
Canada-US Intelligence sharing became a practical necessity at the tactical level. In the Brigade-sized combined Canada-United States First Special Service Force (FSSF), which operated in Kiska and in Italy for example, the Unit Intelligence Officer was Major R.D. Burhans, an American, throughout the unit’s WWII service. Capt Robert D. Burhans had worked in the Army Intelligence Section in Washington before being promoted and becoming the FSSF G2 in July 1942. His Intelligence Assistant was Lt Finn Roll, also an American.
1944-1945, Canadian Army Intelligence in North West Europe
Once the Canadian Army was “firmly established in France,” its C Int C personnel made good use of “the principles they had learned in England, North Africa, Sicily and Italy.” They achieved effective results “during the Canadian Army’s drive through Belgium and South Holland in December 1944,” and on into Germany in 1945.
As the Allied armies advanced eastward through France, groups of “stay-behind” enemy agents were rapidly ferreted out from their places of concealment and, if of French nationality, turned over to the French for examination and trial. Caches of explosives that had been prepared and stored or set in place to destroy key points, facilities, infrastructure, personnel, and equipment, were retrieved from underground storage vaults and rendered harmless. So effective were these efforts, that instances of sabotage were few and isolated. Other branches of Intelligence were similarly active.
“Captured enemy personnel and material were subjected to” a “thorough search, examination” and Interrogation in order to provide a current data base that would “keep pace with the ever changing enemy order of battle and improvements in weapons and equipment.” German radio messages were intercepted and decoded. The Intelligence gleaned by C Int C staffs enabled them to gain an accurate indication of changes in the identity of enemy formations facing them. These indications were supported by all available sources and agencies, including debriefing reports provided “from Canadian reconnaissance patrols, tactical air reconnaissance pilots, air photographs, as well as captured documents” and enemy equipment (CED & CEE). (No. 2 Canadian Special Wireless (SW) Section for example, operated from a Bedford truck under Major R.S. Grant as it fought its way towards and into Germany). All collected information was carefully processed and examined for useful information and then disseminated to the decision makers for further direction using the “Intelligence Cycle“ process.
The one occasion when the Canadian Army found itself on the defensive came in December 1944. The Germans launched an offensive in the Ardennes, with the object of seizing the River Meuse and the capture of Liege to prevent the Allies from mounting an attack in the Aachen sector. Scattered along the length of the Lower Maas, from Nijmegen in the East to Walcheren Island in the West, elements of the Canadian Army were deployed to guard the Allies’ northern flank. Threat of attack from this quarter became more apparent hourly as evidenced in reports reaching Canadian Intelligence. Enemy activity along the north bank of the Lower Maas involved mass movement of formations, the erection of rafting sites and barges, and vast numbers of recently positioned gun emplacements were clear indications to Intelligence that an attack from this direction, combined with the one already in progress in the Ardennes, was imminent. As a result, formations of the Canadian Units were re-deployed to meet the attack, which was later revealed to have been directed at Antwerp but cancelled due to the failure of German forces in the Ardennes to reach their objectives.
“After the defeat of the German armies, personnel of the C Int C” remained in Germany to assist in “the liquidation of the German Intelligence Services, the disbandment of the Nazi party in all its manifestations and the de-Nazification of German institutions.” Similar activity took place “in Holland where large German forces whose escape to Germany had been cut off by the Canadians were “screened.” Those whose names appeared on specially prepared “lists” were arrested and held for trial.”
Cooperation with American and British agencies took place in many forms and it included the fight against the threat of biological warfare. According to U.S. Army Col Murray Sanders, a highly qualified bacteriologist with the U.S. Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) at Camp Detrick in Maryland, “the cooperation [with Britain and Canada], the sharing of discovery and conjecture was total...we were more cautious with the French and we told the Soviets nothing.”
By “the end of the war, the C Int C was several hundred strong and its personnel were scattered throughout the world.” Many of its members had been seconded to British and American organizations and were employed in a wide variety of activities including clandestine operations in Europe and Asia. C Int C specialists also assisted in Interrogations and document research during and after the surrender of Japan. The contributions of the C Int C to the security of Canada, however, did not cease with the close of WWII.
[edit] Post World War II Military Intelligence in Canada
Canada’s strategic and political position in the world in 1945 had undergone considerable change from where it had been in 1939. “The requirement for Intelligence and security in the Canadian Army after the war was recognized and the Canadian Intelligence Corps was therefore included in the post-war regular Army. It was one of the first such Corps to be included in the Regular Forces of any nation” (Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa developed their Regular Force Intelligence organizations much later). Both British and American authorities referred to the C Int C “when they eventually created their own regular Intelligence Corps some years later. In the immediate post-war period, the Canadian Intelligence Corps was largely concerned with security duties and could almost have been called a Counter Intelligence Corps. The Gouzenko spy case undoubtedly had some influence on this.”
It may be of interest that the entire Canadian Intelligence Community went through many changes in 1946. Before that year, Counter Intelligence and counter-subversion functions had been the responsibility of the Intelligence Section of the RCMP Criminal Investigation Branch. The Gouzenko incident led to the creation of a separate Special Branch to handle such activity. “As of 1946 however, the Canadian Intelligence and Security Community consisted of the NRCEU, the Special Branch of the RCMP, the Army’s Directorate of Intelligence, the Navy’s Directorate of Intelligence,” the RCAF‘s “Directorate of Security and the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence of the Department of National Defence.”
In “December 1945 the Chief of the General Staff” (CGS) attempted to amalgamate the various Canadian Intelligence agencies by proposing “the establishment of a National Bureau of Intelligence.” This “proposal” was not accepted, but one “that fared better” “called for the” formation “of a Joint Intelligence Bureau” (JIB). The Canadian JIB was similar to the collection of UK Defence Intelligence agencies, which trace their present day organization back to 1946 when the UK JIB was established under General Kenneth Strong, General Eisenhower’s wartime Chief of Intelligence. Following the creation of a unified Ministry of Defence in 1964, the UK JIB was amalgamated with the three single-service intelligence organizations to form the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). The Canadian JIB was established in 1950 and “administered by the Defence Research Board “ (DRB). The JIB “was responsible for Intelligence common to all users on such subjects as topography, communications, economics and logistics.” Later, the JIB was divided into two elements, “with its non-defence functions performed by a Special Research Bureau (later called the Economic Intelligence Bureau” (EIB)) “and transferred to the Department of External Affairs (DEA).”
Canada’s Regular Forces were greatly reduced after the war “in order to conform to the nation’s peacetime requirements. The officers and men of the active component of the C Int C either continued to be employed in Intelligence duties” or served on “tours of duty with other branches of the Army in order to acquire a broader knowledge of military affairs.”
The greatest threat to the post war Canadian Intelligence Community came from within, when personnel in DEA attempted to have the SIGINT Examination Unit disbanded. “Col William Waldie “Jock” Murray, Cdr C. Herbert Little and Group Capt H. Ronald “Ronnie” Stewart argued emphatically, “Canada’s position in world affairs required the existence of a cryptographic organization.” The Directors of Army and Naval Intelligence “felt that Canada could not expect to obtain useful Intelligence information at an adequate level from the UK,” the United States or anywhere else “without making some effort” to look after collection of Intelligence for itself. They suggested that not only would it be undignified to depend entirely on other nations and in effect beg for information, but it might well mean Canada would be denied essential “Intelligence in the very critical period following the war.”
Col Murray prepared a formal request to the “Chiefs of Staff to retain a peacetime cryptanalysis and intercept organization. He wrote a lengthy TOP SECRET paper which outlined the history of Canada’s SIGINT program from its prewar beginning” to 1945. “He described how it had begun as a simple adjunct of the British worldwide” SIGINT program known as the “Y network,” and “how it had grown to become by 1945 a full-fledged SIGINT service, complete with intercept stations, traffic analysis and code- and cipher-breaking.” “He also mentioned the (communications channel known as) HYDRA, run by British Security Coordination (BSC).” He discussed “the sharing of assignments for Intelligence collection among the three countries, and the exchange of raw intercepts and decrypts between Ottawa, the Government Code and Cypher School” in the UK “and the US Army’s “Special Security Agency” in Washington.”
Col Murray had seen that the Americans wanted a fair exchange for the information they provided. When Canada didn’t contribute its share, Murray suspected that it had often been left out of meetings and discussions concerning the conduct of the war. Strategy and planning sessions may have been his chief concern. Murray was sensitive to any possibility of Canadians again being at an Intelligence disadvantage. He was likely aware of the observations that had been made by LCol G. Pat Henderson, Maj R.C. Unwin and Maj Peter E.R. Wright who participated in the Dieppe assault as a ship-borne Intelligence officers. These IOs had witnessed the devastating effects on Canadian soldiers in terms of lost lives and heavy casualties that may have owed much to weak planning based on poor Intelligence.
[edit] Canadian Forces Security Branch
Prior to the unification of the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force into the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, each arm of service performed the security and police functions differently. The Army had divided the responsibility for security and security incidents between the C Pro C and the C Int C. The security sections of the C Int C conducted Field inquiries whilst the police functions of the C Pro C involved the provision and supervision of guards, the operation of Service Detention Barracks and the investigation of service (disciplinary) and criminal offences. The Air Force Police (AFP) had the dual tasks of performing both police and security duties and were under the command of the base that they served. Security in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was the responsibility of the Assistant Director Naval Intelligence who reported to the Director of Naval Headquarters. The navy had no police organisation comparable to the C Pro C or the AFP, but relied on the Dockyard Police, Corps of Commissionaires, local Civil police and shore patrols to maintain security of establishments and to maintain discipline. The RCMP conducted field inquiries in support of the security program.
All police and security elements of the Canadian Forces were initially amalgamated when the Directorate of Security was formed during October 1964 at Canadian Forces Headquarters. When the functional command structure was introduced in April 1966, the security staffs and Provost Marshals in existing single service command structures were eliminated, the command and base security officers were appointed at the new HQ’s, and the investigative elements of the Services were joined into a single organisation called the Special Investigative Unit (SIU).
To achieve a common approach within the Canadian Forces, security and police functions were regrouped into three categories - personnel security, police and custody, and security of information and materiel. A single trade of Military Police replaced five trades that had previously existed. This also provided standards for the training required by all NCOs in the police and security field.
[edit] Turcot Report
In June 1966, MGen Turcot was instructed to examine the role, organisation and responsibilities for security within the Canadian Forces and to make recommendations for any changes. At the time there were two philosophies within the police, intelligence and security families. Director General Intelligence saw a distinction between police and security, but saw a closer relationship between security and intelligence. The Chief of Personnel saw the police and security functions as complimentary. The Turcot Report when completed on 22 July 1966 directed that the responsibility for security should be placed under DGI.
[edit] Piquét Report
In January 1967, the Chief of Defence Staff directed the Director General Intelligence to perform a management analysis in order to make recommendations for the future management system for Intelligence, Security and Military Police in the Canadian Armed Forces. The report, which was submitted in March 1967, concluded that the security/intelligence/police should be managed under a Directorate General Intelligence and Security (DGIS) in the Vice Chief of Defence Staff Branch. The Security Branch was officially created on 1 February 1968.
[edit] Piquet Report Recommendations
In March 1967, the “Piquét Report “made several recommendations concerning the unification of the “Police, Security and Intelligence in the Canadian Forces.” One of these recommendations was that “the Directorate of Security be placed in the Vice Chief of Defence Staff Branch under the Director General Intelligence (and Security).” On 01 January 1968, an Act of Parliament formally integrated the three separate arms of the Canadian Forces Army, Navy and Air Force. The unification of the military services eliminated their separate Intelligence Units. “Instead, a Director General Intelligence and Security (DGIS) in DND oversaw all Intelligence and security functions for the military. Subsequently, the Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI) of the Defence Research Board was absorbed into DGIS.
Integration also led to the formation of the Canadian Forces (CF) Security Branch. Until this time, the C Int C provided Intelligence personnel for the Canadian Army. The RCAF employed personnel from the Clerk-Intelligence (Clerk-Intel) trade and the Royal Canadian Navy used operational personnel to conduct Intelligence duties. On the integration of these services into the Canadian Forces in 1968, members of the C Int C and the Clerk-Intel trade were amalgamated, along with members of the Canadian Provost Corps (C Pro C) and the Air Force Police, into the Security Branch of the Canadian Forces.
Unification resulted in some fifteen Security, Intelligence and Police Trades of the former services being combined into two trades. The 1967 Piquét Study at one point had recommended that the two services be combined into one trade. (This study was later shelved). Members of the Security Branch were designated as Military Policemen (MP 811) or as Intelligence Operators (Int Op 111) and, as Security Officers (Sec MP 81B) or Intelligence Officers (Sec Int 81D). All members wore the newly designed “Thunderbird” insignia. The theory, at the time, was that personnel would be cross-trained; i.e., an officer with primary training and experience in Intelligence duties could eventually be given training in and posted to security duties. In practice, this seldom occurred.
Even before the formal integration of the CF had taken place, “the C Pro C School and the RCAF Service Police School had been ordered to co-locate in September 1966.” On 18 September 1967, orders were issued authorizing “the disbandment of the Canadian Provost Corps School and the Canadian School of Military Intelligence and the formation of a new Unit called the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security (CFSIS).”
Later decisions resulted in the reformation of the Canadian forces Intelligence Branch on 29 October 1982, and CFSIS was split back into two separate schools, now called the Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI), and the Canadian Forces Military Police and Security Academy (CFMPSA). Although the two independent branches have been in existence since 1982, the separation of the schools took place in June 1999. The CFSMI formally moved to CFB Kingston in June 2000.
[edit] References
- Harold A. Skaarup, “Out of Darkness – Light, a History of Canadian Military Intelligence, Volume One, Pre-Confederation to 1982,” (iUniverse.com, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2005), excerpts.
