Calder v. Bull

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Calder v. Bull
Supreme Court of the United States
Full case name: Calder et Wife v. Bull et Wife Citations: U.S. ; 3 Dall. 386
Holding
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority by: Samuel Chase Joined by: James Wilson, William Cushing, James Iredell, William Paterson

Calder v. Bull 3 Dall. 386 (1798) is a famous Supreme Court case dealing with Americans' individual rights, and whether the Supreme Court has the authority to review state legislature decisions. ^[1]

[edit] Background

The Connecticut legislature ordered a new trial in a court case about the contents of a will, overruling an earlier court ruling. In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the legislatures actions did not violate the ex post facto law in article 1, section 10 of the US Constitution, which states:

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

An ex post facto law or retroactive law, is a law that retroactively changes the legal consequences of acts committed or the legal status of facts and relationships that existed prior to the enactment of the law.^{[2] [3]}

The holding in this case still remains good law: the ex post facto provision of the Constitution applies solely to criminal cases, not civil cases. ^[1]

[edit] Legal arguments

In this case, the participating Supreme Court judges were: William Cushing, James Iredell, William Paterson and Samuel Chase.^[4]

Justice Samuel Chase argued that the government has no authority to interfere with an individual's rights, and "the general principles of law and reason" forbid the legislature from doing interfering.

Justice James Iredell stated that:

[t]he ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.

Iredell was skeptical about both the existence of natural rights, and the ability of the judiciary to assess accurately the content of those rights. Throughout American constitutional history, there has been skepticism about natural rights. But in the late 18th century more Americans were comfortable with the notion of natural rights than are Americans in the early 21st century.^[1]

Iredell affirmed the ability of the Supreme Court to review the legislature by writing:

If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void...If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice... There are then but two lights, in which the subject can be viewed: 1st. If the Legislature pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid...they exercise the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are responsible for the faithful discharge of their trust... 2nd. If they transgress the boundaries of that authority, their acts are invalid...they violate a fundamental law, which must be our guide, whenever we are called upon as judges to determine the validity of a legislative act.

[edit] Notes