Talk:Battle of Waterloo
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[edit] Additions to the Battle Section
I've added the following to the Battle Section of the arcticle please let me know what you think here.
At the time the French Guard was being chased off of the British center, the Prussian 1st Corps was breaking through the French center. This allowed Wellington to reinforce his center in time to repluse Napoleon's attack on his center. Throughout the late afternoon, Zieten's 1st Corps had been arriving in greater strength. By 7:30 pm the French position was bent into a rough horseshoe shape. The ends of the U where now based on Hougomont on the French left, Plancenoit on the French right, and the center on La Haye. The French had retaken the positions of Le Haye and Papelotte in a series of attacks by Gen Durette. Oberst von Hofmann's 24th regiment led an advance towards Le Haye and Papelotte and the French forces retreated behind Smohain without contesting the advance. The 24th Regiment advanced against the new French position but was see off after some early sucess. The Silesian Schutzen and the F/1st Landwehr moved up to support as the 24th regiment returned to the attack. The French fell back before the attack without much of an attempt at defense. At this point the French began to seriously contest ground attempting to regain Smohain and hold on to the ridgeline along Papelotte and the last few houses of Papelotte. The 24th Regiment linked up with a Highlander Bn on its far right. Determined attacks by the 24th Regiment and the 13th Landwehr regiment with cavalry support threw the French off these positions and further attacks by the 13th Landwehr and the 15th brigade expelled the French from Fichermont. Durutte’s division was beginning to unravel under the assaults when General Zieten’s 1st Corp cavalry was being poured through the gap. At the threat of a charge by massed Cavalry moved quickly from the battlefield. 1st Corp then attained the Brussels road and the only line of retreat available to the French.
About the same time the Prussians were pushing through Plancenoit in the 3rd assault upon the town this day. The Prussian 5th, 14th, and 16th brigades, were involved in the attack. Each Prussian brigade would be about 9 battalions strong or roughly the size of a French division. Descriptions of Plancenoit sound like depictions of hell itself. The church was fully involved in a fire, with house to house fighting leaving bodies laying about from both sides. The French Guard battaltions a Guard Chasseur and 1/2e Grenadiers being identified in the position. Virtually all of the young guard was now involved in the defense with rements of Lobau's Division as well. The key to the position proved to be the wood to the south of Plancenoit. The 25th regiment's muskesteer battalions threw the 1/2e Grenadiers (Old Guard) out of the Chantelet woods, flanking Plancenoit and forcing a retreat. The Prussians IV Corps advanced beyond Plancenoit to find masses of French retreating in a mass jumble from advancing British units. The Prussians were unable to fire for fear of hitting allied units. It was now seen that the French right, left, and center, were failing.
Tirronan 19:01, 9 December 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Order of battle
I'd like to change this section slightly as it refers to Division's in Bulow's 4th Corp. The Prussians use a Corp/Brigade system. If there are any thoughts please let me know before I make the change.
Tirronan 15:17, 19 October 2006 (UTC)
See main article Order of Battle of the Waterloo Campaign The battle was to involve 71,947 French soldiers; while the Allied army from Britain, Brunswick, Hanover, Nassau and the Netherlands were 67,661 men strong. (Of the 26 infantry brigades in Wellington's army, 9 were British; 7 of the 12 cavalry brigades were British. The remainder were Hanoverian, Netherlands, Nassau and Brunswick troops. Half the 29 batteries of guns were Hanoverian or Netherlands).
Two and a half Prussian army corps were engaged in the battle, attacking the French right flank, bringing the number of Prussians fully engaged by about 18:00 to 48,000 men. (Two divisions under Friedrich von Bülow, commander of the IV Corps, attacked Lobau at 16:30, Georg von Pirch's II Corps and parts of Graf von Ziethen's I Corps engaged at about 18:00.)
I don't know what's going on with the William Sadler credit for the painting. If there's a painter by that name, then it shouldn't link to the actor, correct? Right now it links to the actor if you click on the picture. 69.162.19.28 12:17, 14 September 2006 (UTC)
There is much in this Article that bothers me more than a bit. The problem with Waterloo histories is that often national honor seems to be at stake and historians need to be a blind justice of what actually happened not what we think happened. It is not just Waterloo of course there is just as much of these issues in the American Civil war histories as ever was in Napolenic histories. If a unit is reported as routing can't we look at the unit histories and confirm that the unit did indeed run? At least 2nd hand accounts if we can't read German and French (I'm an English speaker only unfortunately). There are serveral aspects of the battle that are completely left out. Some of the sections are less than clear.
This section should be up for an edit
"Ambiguous orders by Napoleon on the 17th to his subordinate Marshal Grouchy, to pursue the Prussians with 30,000 men, contributed to Napoleon's eventual defeat. Because Napoleon took his time issuing orders on the morning of 17 June, Grouchy started the pursuit late on 17 June, by which time the Prussians had disengaged. Precious time was lost locating the main body of the Prussian Army, by which time it was too late to prevent it reaching Wavre, from where it could march to support Wellington. On the 18th, with the right wing of the Army of the North, reinforced with a cavalry corpsGérard's, he engaged the Prussian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant-General Baron Johann von Thielmann at the Battle of Wavre."
Further to the above it might be good to be explicit about at least one example of the uncertainty of histories. In particular the British version of the battle history compiled by Captain William Siborne and perhaps disowned at the time by Wellington himself. The account has been the basis of much subsequent british viewpoints using the source witness materials he collected. Unfortunately it has now been revealed [e.g. Waterloo new perspectives, the great battle reappraised;D Hamilton-Williams; 1993; Brockhampton Press; 1860199968] that Siborne's history is based: firstly on British views only, secondly on a selected set of witness accounts with significant unresolved contradictions to the excluded set and lastly that the selected set's content may have been influenced by financial considerations. So unless there are objections i'd like to add a paragraph that covers this aspect of many still existing versions of the Waterloo history. Facius 16:19, 1 December 2006 (UTC)
Grouchy was ordered to agressively follow up the Prussian army to prevent its reorganization. Occasional violent attacks by Prussian calvary discourged close pursuit and Grouchy pursuit of the Prussian army was lax at best. In point of fact Grouchy blundered into the Battle of Wavre and had the Prussian III Corps blocking the shortest path to Waterloo. Grouchy never had an option of marching to the Battle of Waterloo, no road net existed that could have possibly got him there in time except for the road that III Corp sat astride. The battle of Wavre went on till midnight and Waterloo was over by then.
2nd point, at the time of the Guard's retreat from the British center right, the center of the French lines had been shattered and I Corp(Prussian)was in the process of shoving its entire calvary complement through the gap peeling up the lines in either direction. This needs to be contained in the account. The newer histories include action reports by Prussian and French units involved and seem unreproachable at least at this time.
All that I am asking here is that we be accurate and use 1st hand (temporal) accounts where possible. Too much of what I see in many histories is a rehash of some Officer's recollections decades after the event. Like all human beings they too often remembered it the way they wanted it to be.
(thick skinned here feel free to disagree) Tirronan 23:26, 12 June 2006 (UTC) 208.254.22.50 18:51, 17 June 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Neidhardt von Gneisenau
>> In fact, the Prussian chief of staff General August von Gneisenau, planned to withdraw toward the Rhine, away from the Anglo-Allied army. ...... However, General Blücher arrived at Wavre (he had fallen under his horse leading a counter charge and been ridden over by French cavalry twice) and in a stormy meeting with Gneisenau it was decided to march upon Wellington's left flank at dawn with the I, II and IV Corps. <<
This narrative is not historical for it was Neidhardt von Gneisenau (not "August") who, despite of his mistrust of Wellington, decided to rally all available Prussian forces in and around Wavre thus giving up the "natural line of retreat". Bluecher
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- His full name was August Wilhelm Anton, Count Neithardt von Gneisenau Philip Baird Shearer 21:37, 11 October 2005 (UTC)
wasn't available at the time these orders were given, due to his wounds and bruises and finally lateron approved of Gneisenau's orders (as was always the case due to their likemindedness). As soon as Wellington received this news (not earlier) he decided to wage battle at Mont Saint Jean on 18 June, as he had been re-assured of timely Prussian assistance. Prussian assistance was then delayed by the catastrophic condition of the muddy roads near Lasne brook and the outbreak of a fire in Wavre itsself. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Canadian historian (talk • contribs) 18:45, 8 October 2005 (UTC)
Gneisenau and Blucher were not like minded. There were several incidents where the arugments were open and loud. Gneisenau was indeed going to pull back on the Prussian lines of communication in large part as he felt he had been betrayed on the battlefield by Wellington. In this case the promised support never arrived. Newer histories Peter Hoffschroder for one outline this pretty clearly. If it is your opinion that this is incorrect lets start the quotations of sources so we can get this resolved. Until then I will stand by the narative as given as accurate. Tirronan 22:27, 18 October 2006 (UTC)
- "Give me night, or give me Blucher."
- Please see Wikipedia:Sign your posts on talk pages Philip Baird Shearer 00:31, 9 October 2005 (UTC)
[edit] 9 of 25 Allied Brigades were English...so what were the other 16?
I imagine some of the other 16 brigades were dutch included in that number as 25 brigades would roughly equal the total number of troops of the allied force at waterloo. But it needs clarification I feel, for someone with only a passing knowledge of the battle I am left asking questions such as "were any of the additional Brigades Indian Sepoy regiments?" for example. Can anyone more knowledgeable than I help on this subject? Thanks, --WikipedianProlific(Talk) 21:46, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
- There's an article about the Waterloo OoB: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_Battle_of_the_Waterloo_Campaign
- You can see here that Wellington's entire army (Waterloo and Halle positions) comprised of:
- 9 British infantry brigades; 13 German (Brunswick, Hannover and KGL) infantry brigades and 6 Dutch infantry brigades
- 3 British cavalry brigades, 3 mixed British-KGL cavalry brigades, 3 German cavalry brigades and 3 Dutch cavalry brigades.
- No sepoy brigades though: the "British" troops consisted out of some guard regiments, highland regiments and the rest were territorial regiments --fdewaele, 31 July 2006, 16:25
[edit] some questions about tactics etc
I have some general questions and observations about this entry.
1/ ISTR that Napoleon initially targeted Wellington because the latter had a military reputation that Napoleon wanted to destroy, for reasons of achieving a quick and spectacular success. When the Prussians instead concentrated in a forward position at Ligny, beyond Anglo-Allied help, he hit them instead. I forget what source this was from - Chandler? - but it was cited as evidence of the flexibility of the French strategic system. Does anyone know if it's true?
1a: It is true that Napoleon was very aware of Wellington's reputation. However Napoleon didn't go after the British to confirm his own reputation. Napoleon was far too great a general to allow that to influence him. He had to eliminate in rapid succession both the Prussian and British armies. To that end he defeated but could not destroy the Prussian army. 1b: The reason for the Prussian defeat were many but 2 major factors stand out. Bulow's 4th Corp was late to the battle due to willful misunderstanding by General Von Bulow. The Prussian deposistion in forward positions appears to not be the case (Hoffschroer), However posistioning an entire Corp to the left in a posistion that could not be taken (swampy ground) was a factor. Tirronan 16:52, 2 November 2006 (UTC)
2/ Bylandt's brigade actually took very few artillery casualties, despite being bombarded for a good hour. Not sure if this was because the ground made such bombardment ineffective, or because only a few batteries targeted his brigade (which is not what most histories claim), or because the likely effect of bombardment of troops in line has been overstated. There can be little doubt of its effect on troops in column.
2b: Quoting without the source in front of me makes me nervous in the extream. However serveral of the more contempory histories of the Battle of Waterloo show temporal accounts that the artillery was not nearly as harmless as has been claimed in some earlier histories. Some units were being pretty badly mauled. Tirronan 01:02, 9 November 2006 (UTC)
3/ What was the purpose then of Wellington's reverse slope position? Concealment and shelter clearly, but was this a means to make his essentially 18th-century linear tactics work better? A column advancing towards a ridge cannot be sure that it will face its opponents squarely when it breasts the slope. Its front may be misaligned with enemy units, so that when the exchange of fire does start, the formation in (say) d'Erlon's situation finds itself receiving fire from its front, but also from either side of its front - from formations which have wheeled to engage its flanks. This is the only way lines can bring superior firepower to bear on each other, I think. Otherwise you would have had the French six battalions deep exchanging fire with the Allies rather less deep, and since the French were no slouches this could only go one way.
3b: Paddy Griffon's work showed that the line vs. column musket counting fire vs. fire was not what was in fact happening. He gave fairly convining work that the British would stand ground in utter silence, wait until the opponent was close, fire 1 volley, then charge bayonets with a cheer. This would send any opponent scrambling for the rear in a hurry. Tirronan 01:02, 9 November 2006 (UTC)
4/ As the four French divisions advanced, the two outermost would have been drawn into action against La Haye Sainte and Papelotte respectively. This left the middle two advancing against a front wider than their own, and which would be overlapped from the sides. D'Erlon is often criticised for having advanced in an unwieldy formation, but it seems to me he actually did this attack right, given what he knew of how Wellington fought a position. He had his men deployed for a firefight, and he had his most exposed flank - the left flank of the left-middle division - covered by cuirassiers.
5/ Do we definitely know for sure that the combined Union / Household brigades' charge was a mistake - or at least unintended? That is how it is usually related in British histories. Uxbridge was a capable cavalry commander though, and as such, he must have known that the orthodox way to use heavy cavalry by 1815 was en masse. If he had studied Marengo, Austerlitz or Eylau he would have known that a full-blooded cavalry strike could win battles. At Wagram, the Austrians' tendency to use cavalry in penny packets in support of their infantry worked fine up to the point the French launched their cavalry corps en masse, at which point the Austrians had no answer. That Wagram-style of use seems to be what most writers think Uxbridge had in mind.
I don't know...it just seems questionable. In the Peninsula, he had relatively few cavalry to play with. At Waterloo, he had (by my count) 7 regiments or about 3,000 heavy cavalry in the Union and Household brigades alone, plus he had the Dutch heavies too. It seems conceivable to me that the mass charge actually was intentional, that it achieved its effect in removing most of one of Napoleon's three corps from consideration, and that the claims afterwards that nobody knew who ordered them all forward may perhaps have been a CYA exercise when the charge went out of control and the heavies got themselves destroyed. I appreciate that this is speculation and thus doesn't belong in the main entry. --Tirailleur 13:45, 31 July 2006 (UTC)
[edit] unreferenced
added an unreferenced tag since there are no sources for anything in the article - PocklingtonDan 16:06, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
I removed the unreferenced template because: I don't think it should not be placed at the top of the article; and there are some citations for some of the points which are contentious, but most of the battle is so well known that it is uncontentious. I would not disagree that more citations would improve the article but I don't think that the template is needed. --Philip Baird Shearer 20:41, 21 November 2006 (UTC)
I would agree with Philip on this as well. The top of the article lists only the time, date, and place, of the battle. Given that there is a monument on the site I don't think there can be much disagreement on where and when the battle was. Tirronan 21:08, 21 November 2006 (UTC)
[edit] referenced
I would suggest the the suggested reading be moved to the reference section as Peter H's work is what I use as well as Chandler.
Tirronan 15:24, 21 November 2006 (UTC)
I've added one referrence and I will be adding others.
Tirronan 14:32, 4 December 2006 (UTC)
[edit] Rewriting the intro
The latter part of the first paragraph is confusing and slightly incorrect. I'm not knowledgeable enough to edit it, but it'd be great if someone else could. Xiner 02:55, 2 December 2006 (UTC)
Please outline your objections in exact terms and perhaps a rewrite may be considered. Your request itself is rather vague...
Tirronan 05:50, 4 December 2006 (UTC)
