Talk:Battle of Quatre Bras

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"Picton" is a town or two in the current version of WP. So this gentlemen should be disambiguated (nicely, please!). Robin Patterson 01:30, 23 Jul 2004 (UTC)

This was done a long time ago: Sir Thomas Picton – Philip Baird Shearer 18:05, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Contents 1 Who Won? 2 Prelude 3 d'Erlon 4 Defeat for Wellington? 5 Title of the article 6 What exactly constitutes a tactical victory?

[edit] Who Won?

I have just reverted this Article from an Allied stratigic win to a French stratigic win.

If they could combine with the Prussians commanded by Gebhard von Blücher the allies combined army would be larger than Napoleon's. Napoleon's strategy had been to cross the border without alerting the allies and to defeat the Prussians before turning on the Anglo-allied army. He was very successful in this move. By dispatching Marshal Ney with a corps to block the crossroads it stopped any contingents of the Anglo-allied army going to the aid of the Prussians during the Battle of Ligny.

It was a strategic victory for the French, because along with the French victory at the Battle of Ligny it forced the Allied armies to retreat in different directions while the French were free pursue either allied Army.

I am not sure how 209.86.18.216 can argue

it was a strategic victory for the allies, because it denied the chance for Napoleon to possibly annihalate the Prussians at the Battle of Ligny using Ney's men (which were caught up at Quatre Bras). Napoleon, after sending the still-intact Prussians fleeing

because if Nay had not held the Allies they would have arrived at Ligny, much as the Prussians arrived at Waterloo. Look at the map, the Allies forces nearest to Ligny were dispersed around Nivelles. Which is why Napoleon sent Ney to block at Quatre Bras. QB sits on the crossroads of the main Nivelles-Namur road which is a much easier and faster route to Ligny than the cross country one the Prussians had to use to get to Waterloo. If it is a question of the wisdom of detatching Nay to block the road in the first place, I would go with Napoleon's judgment over 209.86.18.216. Philip Baird Shearer 09:31, 17 Oct 2004 (UTC)

[edit] Prelude

Given the fact, that Napoleon wanted Ney to push his vanguards on to Brussels that day, at least no later that 17 June, it was a strategical defeat to the french. Because of the alertness of Dutch commanders, Napoleon's plan to fully drive a wedge between the allies did not succeed. With regard to french pre-war plans and ambitions Quatre Bras has to be regarded as a strategical loss.

Napoleon did drive a wedge between the coalition armies. Philip Baird Shearer

Personally I do believe that this stage of the campaign can't be understood without taking into account Wellington's flawed handling of intelligence and extremely cautious troop deployment. In fact his orders and deployments left Quatre Bras and the road to Brussels wide open to any french advancement. Wellington's hesitation to accept the inexpected fact, that the main thrust of the french advance was aimed along the road from Charleroi to Brussels, did almost lead to desaster. While Wellington was waiting for news from Paris (Fouché?) about the expected attack via Mons and having lunch for one hour and a half at midday, Prussian outposts and finally the entire 1st Army Corps (Ziethen) were already engaged in heavy combat in and around Thuin/Sambre and then Charleroi. It took Wellington nine (!) hours from 9am to 6pm to react to the intelligence he had received throughout the day, starting with Ziethen's handwritten account, which arrived at his headquarters at 9am on 15 June. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Canadian historian (talk • contribs) 19:18, 8 October 2005 (UTC)

You can not have your cake and eat it. If Wellington had been the dilettant you imply and the French had wanted to reach Brussles, then one Dutch Corps would not have stopped them. As a general rule the French did not look on cities as objectives, they looked for the enemy to engage them in a pitched battle. I think the two battle that day were a stratigic victory for the French just as the battles two days later were a French stratigic loss. Philip Baird Shearer 01:14, 9 October 2005 (UTC)

(EDIT by CanHist):I do not "imply" that Wellington was a "dilettant", that's your reading. He just wasn't up to the task on 15/16 June and failed to react properly after having received numerous reports about the beginning of hostilities, waiting for definitive confirmation from Paris, that Napoleon would not attack via Mons. They did not "fully" drive a wedge through the allied forces' positions, as can be proven by the events on 17/18 June. Can't you just quit your tone: "you can not have your cake and eat it" [sic!] and base your argument on factual data? That would be more helpful. Another riposte (see discussion battle of Waterloo) : Why do you write "stratigic" and not strategic and even worse: "Nay" instead of Ney? If we were to combine efforts we could easily turn these erroneus, flawed articles on wikipedia about the entire campaign into true marvels. But that would require a approach to data and thinking based on factual evidence. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.68.7.33 (talk • contribs) 08:17, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

Why do I make spelling mistakes? Because my spelling is bad! Usually I run it through a spelling checker but not all I write all the time, particularly if I decide to tweak something I have already written. One of the nice things about this project is that there are people about like you who can and do correct my bad spelling. That you think Wellington fail to react properly is your (and others) POV. The problem are that the "facts" which historians use are frequently disputed because, as Wellington said, you may as well try to write a history of a ball as a battle. There were so many players making so many decisions simultaneously and recording them sometimes many years afterwards from their perspective, or not at all, that all the "facts" are not known and can not be subject to full coherent analysis. Then interpretation of the "facts" are always subject to the POV of the historian. Now with some battles, history may allow a consensus to emerge as to what the relevant facts are, along with a generally accepted POV. But so long as nationalism is a potent force in Europe The Waterloo campaign and its battles will never have a generally agreed POV. Even battles, where the English perspective has been settled for hundreds of years, can suddenly flare up into a contested interpretation by historians who specialise in the battle. For example Professor Anne Curry's new (none trivial) analysis of French numbers at the Battle of Agincourt has thrown into doubt the traditional view of the number of Frenchmen engaged in the battle and that this an impact of other facets of the traditional view of the battle. Philip Baird Shearer 12:44, 16 October 2005 (UTC)

(EDIT by CanHist): I do totally agree with you with regard to what you've said about different view points and nationalism. But still, as Hofschroer succeeded to show: It is one thing to word writings in a biased tainted fashion and quite another to bluntly omit sources and data at hand that is readily accessible, in part probably because of language barriers and in part because of shere ignorance or even fear to lose ground in a discussion fuelled by nationalist motives. It started with Wellington's treatment of Siborne. We should at least try to overcome this now, don't you think? Spelling? Well then please write Neidhardt von Gneisenau correctly (also in the links) and I shall drop my "riposte" and I shall silently hunt down spelling errors. Thanks very much! —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 67.68.21.123 (talk • contribs) 04:06, 17 October 2005 (UTC)

BTW I disagree with much of what you added to the Prelude to this battle but I do not have a decent reference book here, so I have delayed editing it not because I think your addition is completly correct, but I want to check one or two things first. Philip Baird Shearer 10:57, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

(EDIT by CanHist): I do not expect you to agree 100% on this version, BUT you should have read what has been said in this article before: A narrative just gruesome and terrible! Same applies to the description of events at Ligny. Please do include Hofschroer in your readings ;-) and perhaps Chesney. Hamilton-Williams is interesting too.... - specifically when it comes to examine faulty fabrications of the very same old style. ;-) Fact is, that Wellington risked the outcome of the entire campaign by being a late riser as he was relying too much on intelligence other than that timely given by his allies.

Again, late at night on June 15, and long after Hofschröer maintains that Wellington ought to have moved, Blücher himself was writing: "Tomorrow will decide if Napoleon will turn against me or Wellington."[1]. What are your thoughts on this? Philip Baird Shearer 17:38, 20 October 2005 (UTC)

An other opinion which has been voiced is that Wellington didn't believe the information that was coming to him about Napoleon concentrating at the frontier because he thought it was coming from French spies and not from his own chief intelligence officer whereas one of his own generals, commanding a brigade at the border, had been negligent to mention that the information was coming from the aformentioned colonel when he forwarded it to Brussels. Thus Wellington discarded the information and didn't start to act untill Ziethen's posts were already under attack near Charleroi (the "humbugged"). - fdewaele 19:50 CET

Hofschroer is a historian 'with an axe to grind' (his own words I believe), and his highly critical opinions of Wellington may not be entirely unbiased. He has weaknesses as much as many other historians, and there's no particular reason to base this article around his opinion rather than others. There's also a Wellingtonphobe - if not Anglophobe - community out there which the early part of this article possible panders excessively to: the tone of 'long before any British troops started to intervene' doesn't strike me as neutral. Which I may as well deal with shortly, actually...Agema 17:30, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] d'Erlon

Why are references about the consequences of d'Erlon's countermarching being removed? Many distinguished European scholars (N. Vels Heijn, L. De Vos, D. Hamilton-Williams) have stated in their work that if d'Erlon had entered either battle he would have tipped the scales... if he had entered at Ligny, (as ordered by Napoleon) he would have made a French victory into an even bigger one, Austerlitz scale, if he had entered Quatre Bras, he and his 20.000 men would have flanked Wellington's position. fdewaele 20:31 CET

Because it is speculation, as Churchill said "The terrible ifs accumulate". I do not disagree with the analysis but that is not what this encyclopaedia is about. Philip Baird Shearer 23:10, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Defeat for Wellington?

So according to this page, this is Wellington's one and only defeat? I'm sure the anglophiles of wikipedia will be here to "correct" this soon.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 68.78.132.138 (talk • contribs) 17:10, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, technically it wasn't a defeat but a tactical draw. It must be said however that Quatre Bras wasn't Wellington's finest hour cause he bungled the concentration of his army... but neither was it Ney's. fdewaele 5 May 2006, 19:25

I concur. Lots of battles are fairly described as draws and yet one side has gained a strategic advantage. For that matter, sides have won battles and suffered a strategic defeat (a Pyrrhic victory, as an obvious example), but you don't go around pretending they haven't won the actual battle. For that matter, the strategic victory is arguable. Napoleon's intention was to split the allied armies and defeat them in turn. Quite evidently as Waterloo showed, he failed to adequately split them, even if he stopped them combining on the day.Agema 17:17, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

I must say I'm a bit astonished about who is considered the victor for this battle. Wellington had planned to concentrate well north of the Quatre Bras crossroads. As far as I know he had no plan to march to the support of the Prussians at this time (and leave his LOC open). As a result of his battle he was able to temporarily occupy a more advantageous position. Ney on the other hand had the order to seize the crossroads (orders from the previous day) and received new orders to proceed to Ligny and fall onto Blücher's flank (the entire left wing, not just d'Erlon's corps). Due to the dutch-belgian resistance this move became impossible. According to that I'd say the anglo-dutch achieved more then their day's aims and were not sufficiently weakened to imperil their future operations. The french on the other hand did not achieve either of their aims (a firm hold on the crossroads) and mount a flank attack on the Prussians (that order by Napoleon was not too realistic anyhow). The french also took substantial casualties which affected their action later in the campaign. So in my opinion it's a french tactical victory (they were left in control of the battlefield) and anglo-dutch strategic (they made execution of the french orders impossible).

Lastly, it is not quite that clear what caused d'Erlon's countermarching. At one time at least the Ist corps received direct orders by one of Napoleon's aide de camps without informing d'Erlon (returning from Ney's HQs he found his corps marching towards Ligny, he immediatelly turned the corps around before he could be informed of new orders (an AdC had no business overuling d'Erlon's orders regardless of the orders he was carrying)).--Caranorn 14:48, 3 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Title of the article

Shouldn't it be Battle of Quatre-Bras? (with a -) Otto 10:19, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] What exactly constitutes a tactical victory?

Can someone explain how this is an allied tactical victory? Wellington lost more men and he had to retreat thereby preventing him from helping at Ligny. How is this in any sense a victory for the allies?!

Because the battle itself was a tactical victory, not the aftermath. Wellington managed to fight Ney to a standstill, thwarting Ney's goals of the day, which were to occupy the crossroads and then march towards the Prussian flank at Ligny. This resulted in Blucher being defeated in stead if being annihilated and at the end of the day the tide of war had put Ney on the defensive. It's only after Blucher had to retreat post haste towards Wavre, that the position Wellington held became untenable and forced him to withraw. -- fdewaele, 20 July 2006, 14:58.