Talk:Battle of Nagashino

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Japan To-do:

Correct me if I am wrong, but to my best knowledge, the cavalry charge at Battle of Nagashino was a fictional event created much later. Japan simply did not have the horse breeding that could perform a charge at the time. The Japanese horses at the time was not much bigger than donkeys in size and speed. It was until the 1800s was Arabian horses introduced into Japan.

This was further evident in the Korean war of 1580s when Japanese forces was outmatched in by the Ming Chinese cavalry.

You make a very logical and compelling argument. But every history book I've seen speaks of a cavalry charge at Nagashino. The cavalry charge was used not only here (in which case, it could be feasible to have been invented later) but was in fact the specialty of the Takeda family. I certainly do not argue that the native Japanese horses were smaller and slower, and that the way it is more recently portrayed is romanticized. But if you propose that cavalry charges never happened, what about the battle of Mikata ga Hara, or any of the other Takeda battles? LordAmeth 17:50, 31 August 2006 (UTC)
I am trying to find the citation right now. It came from BBS discussion with my friends from Taiwan a few years ago. The popular history books' reference are drawn from Edo literatures which I am fairly sure are at least a hundred year after the actual event. In true Asian history recording style the contemporary record was very murky about the actual battle. The problem at hand was the reference were in Japanese and I don't have them with me at the moment but I would like to bring them in.Centralk 18:32, 3 September 2006 (UTC)CENTRALK
Our discussions concluded that it is almost certain that not only the Takeda forces but of whole Japan at the time, there wasn't a cavalry force capable of charges. There are multiple reasons. First is of course the Japanese indiginious horses are not capable of charging. Second is the economic behind supporting a heavy cavalry and the trainning required. Nobunaga would be the first warlord to have a regular army if I recalled correctly. Third reason is really simple. The horsed samurai were usually officers (loosely using the word) or close vassals of the warlords. Having them to group up and charge would be the equivalent of having the lieutants and above ranking commanders of an army to make a charge at the forefront of the battle. It would be a suicide in terms of the breakdown in command and communication, not to mention the prohibitive cost. Centralk 18:49, 3 September 2006 (UTC)

Sorry for posting in Chinese, but for the record, this is the summary of our discussion. 多长篠之战的文章，多指称“拒马栅”和三段射立了大功。且多处提及“胜赖过份相信骑兵....”、“骑兵为栅栏所阻....”等论述 。但从各种真实的文献资料看来，显然长篠之战并不是一场“洋枪打败骑兵”的战争，那么，长篠之战到底是怎样的一场战争呢 ？

　　详细分析一下的话，大家可以知道，武田军这次战斗的败因至少有以下几个：

　　1.人数上居于绝对劣势。

　　2.敌方的防御工事作得太过完善，武田军几乎是在打“攻城战”。

　　3.武田军指挥权本身发生严重分裂，部队各自为政。

　　4.织田信长开战前立下的“狙击武田军大将”战术大成功。

　　5.武田军缺乏备用战术，三位领军大将中，一个不服从命令、一个缺乏经验、 第三个则是为了补救第二个的错误而冲出去救人，结果先被打退， 导致后来武田军前线三大队群龙无首，根本无法战斗。

　　6.严重轻视斥候，造成鸢巢山队、预备队全军溃灭， 让武田军陷入“可能遭到前后夹杀”的窘境。

　　其中除了2、4这两个变数是武田胜赖“事前无法预防”、 而1这个变数则是胜赖“就算知道，也完全无能为力”的之外，另外三个变数通通都是胜赖时代、或者该说是武田军从信玄时代以来的常态， 信玄没有改革，胜赖无能为力去改变这个事实， 后果就是武田军在长篠的溃败。

　　那么，拒马栅是否也是江户时期符应“武田骑兵团”说法的想像呢？答案是否定的。马防栅（目前学研等书籍比较喜欢采用的写法）这个说法倒不是江户时代才出来的，从甲阳军鉴的记载看来，其实织德联军方从一开始就放出了这样的消息： “我们建造那些栅栏等野战防御工事，是为了防止武田骑兵‘冲锋’才这么做”

　　问题是高阪昌信在他写的第十四品里头，火力全开的反驳这个说法：

　　“武田武者马をいるゝと云仪、それも虚言也。 长篠合战场马を十骑とならべてのる所にてなし。”

　　略译：

　　（信长）说什么“武田军有骑兵、会冲锋”云云，根本都是谎话， 长篠的地形，就连想找个地方让十匹马并排都不可得（亦即地形不平坦）。

　　“信长公老功にて大军なれども、合战ちとしにくうして栅をふり给へば、 马入ると有るは、かざり词かとみえ候。”

　　略译：

　　信长公虽说颇有战阵经验、而且人数上还占优势， 不过在（长篠会战）时建造了太多防御工事，（为了保住面子）， 便用武田军骑兵会冲锋作为藉口（掩饰自己没种、盖了一堆防御工事的事实）。

　　“いづれも马をば大将と役者と一そなえの中に七八人のり、 残りは皆马あとにひかせ、おりたつてやりをとつて一そなへにかゝる（后略）”

　　略译：

　　武田军每备里头，只有七、八个（可以骑马的）大将等人仍然骑马， 其他人全部把马往（后方）牵、（交给非战斗员照顾后）徒步持枪战斗。

　　:从当事人的证言来看就可以知道，长筱之战，其实就是一场非常传统的，人多打人少的战争而已。 织田方3万人，武田方1万5千人 。2:1的差距 ，胜负在战前已经分出一半了。

　　所谓3千挺铁炮，只占3万人的10分之1 ，这个数字不算多。近年来也有日本学者推测，武田方铁炮有1500挺。而从天正年间武田军的“洋枪化程度”来看， 这个数字稍高、但是不算夸张，只是针对这一千五百挺洋枪会不会全部出现在长篠会战主战场上， 倒是比较存疑的。

　　在武田军方面，似乎是把洋枪拿来当攻城兵器用的， 而且在长篠会战时，武田军除了前往连子川的本队之外， 还有留守鸢巢山的鸢巢山队跟后备队存在， 要说这两队里头连一挺洋枪都没有，这实在说不过去。

　　相较于这个一千五百挺的说法，正统学研的书籍里头做出来的推测是“五百挺”， 而且还满始终如一的（没有之前那种“出现了三个版本”的情况）， 不过不论是多少挺，最起码的， 武田军配备的洋枪不算少、也留下了实战记录，这倒是不争的事实。

　　在长篠会战后，家康进入长篠城内巡视， 结果发现长篠城的墙壁被打得像是蜂窝一样、 然后长篠城的门板（木制）也几乎都被洋枪扫烂，为了防御，城内的人甚至拿榻榻米靠在墙边充当墙板硬撑（参见“太平杂话”）。 而且有名的茶屋四郎次郎在长篠会战中， “遭到敌方洋枪攻击、打跛了脚，从此无法从军”（南纪德川史）， 也可以作为“武田军洋枪队绝对不等于装饰品”的有力证据。 只能说是集中运用发挥了效果

　　另一个问题是武田方本身没有时间做好准备工作， 导致武田军的洋枪队不能发挥完全的战力。虽说目前一次史料上很少有“胜赖抵达决战处”的明确时间记载， 但是比照织田、德川、武田三方史料说法之后，我们可以确定胜赖大概是在五月二十日下午以后才抵达长篠布阵地， 此时距离第二天早上“两军开战”的时间，只剩下不到十二个小时。在十二个小时之内，武田军能作的防御工事有限， 偏偏洋枪队又是一种“最需要防御工事掩护”的兵种，在这种情况下，人数不如人、防御工事不足、加上武田军洋枪队人数较少， （有部分必然留守鸢巢山继续攻击长篠城。） 自然难敌织德联军的人海战术。

　　另外 参考较冷门史料《长篠日记》的说法 ，战后织田方斩敌首7000人，战死6000人。若这个数字跟真实情况差异没有太大，那织田方其实赢得也没多轻松 。而且 若7000为夸大数字 6000为保守计算 (基本上长篠日记是站在织田方的立场叙述) 的话，那么这个数字已经算是目前最中立的数字了，就算是“信长公记”，也免不了把武田军的伤亡比率灌到万人以上， 如果去翻阅德川实记的话，会看到更爆笑的伤亡比：织德联军阵亡十几人，武田军死了一万多人。

　　武田方面对两倍的敌军，能打得出这种战果，已经是相当难得了，以长篠会战当天的情况来看，武田军打出来的战果， 简直只能用一句“凄まじい”（可怕）来形容，如果把两军情势对调、换成是信长或是家康带着少数人， 去冲武田胜赖“以逸待劳、装备精良”的大部队的话，笔者不认为信长、家康甚或是信玄能打得比武田胜赖更好（当然，信长和家康假如没有胜利的绝对把握，决不会贸然发动一次自杀式的进攻就是了。）

　　长篠会战当天，织德联军的人数是武田军的两倍以上、 而且占有“构筑了完整的防御工事＋居高临下＋诱敌狙击战术”等优势，反观武田方，则是“没有防御工事＋必须由下往上攻＋人数居绝对劣势”。 问题是在这种压倒性不利的情况下，武田军竟然打出了几乎五五波的战斗，这种战力，已经不是“战力强”、“不是盖的”之类的形容词可以形容的了。而最后武田军之所以输，很大程度上，和织田军“专挑武田军大将打、全力狙击武田军大将”的战术有关。所以虽说两方的“士兵伤亡率”差不多，但是武田军第一线指挥官几乎全遭狙杀殆尽， 结果造成武田军的第一线部队当场溃散、无法再战。

　　笔者比对过手边可考的三方史料， 确定这里的“骑兵冲锋”叙述，最早应该见于“甫庵信长记”， 而且那个描述其实也很难说是“明确的骑兵冲锋记载”， 充其量不过是“看起来有点像骑兵冲锋的说法”而已。

　　三番に西上野小幡が一党、三千余骑辔を双べて、马上に枪を持ち、 多くは太刀を真甲にかざし一面に进んで悬りけるに...（后文德川军行动略）

　　略译：

　　（武田军第三波攻击部队）小幡信贞队的三千多名骑兵排成一列开始行动， （小幡队骑兵）在马上持着长枪，很多人还把刀举得与头同高、一面往前进军。

　　首先先不管“三千多人”这个问题（当天武田军南翼总兵力也不过三千人左右， 小幡不可能一人就带着三千人出战），光说那个拿枪跟举刀的部分：很多学者藉此认为“武田军骑兵的主要装备就是长枪跟武士刀”、 进而认为“武田军骑兵属于肉搏兵种”，加上那个“排成一列”，便把武田军骑兵解释成一种“拿着枪刀全面冲锋的兵种”。 坦白说：这真是个不负责任的解读法。

　　在这里先不谈甫庵信长记的可信度问题（三河物语狠狠消遣过“甫庵信长记”， 说里头“只有三分之一的东西可以相信，剩下的都是一堆乱搞出来的东西”），我们直接就事论事、来看一下现代史学家的解释上有何盲点： 以日本武士刀的形制而言，如果真的打算“冲杀”的话，没有人会把武士刀举到跟头一样高的高度去“冲杀”， 毕竟武士刀不是一种用来“刺击”、而是用来“砍劈”的武器。而且当天“织德联军严禁骑马出战”（已确定三方史料都有相关记载），也就是说：武田军这群骑马武士的敌手是“步兵”，（当天只有大久保兄弟得到家康的特许、可以骑马，剩下的织德联军全军步战）依照常理，他们的武器应该压低，这样才能成功的杀伤敌方步卒。

　　问题是他们无视于“敌军都是步卒”，照样把刀举得那么高，这意味着什么？那可能意味着指挥动作、也可能只是一种单纯的“持刀架势”， 但是不论怎么说，这绝对不意味着他们打算拿刀、拿枪厮杀。所以用“甫庵信长记”的叙述来作为“大规模骑兵战术存在”的佐证， 不用说从史料价值的角度来看，就是光看甫庵信长记的前后叙述，也不能认为这种解释方法正确。

　　另外，藤本正行曾经提到： 在信长公记里头，有“（武田军）上野众冲锋”的记载，

　　（原文“关东众马上の功者にて、是又马入るべき行にて、 推太鼓を打つて悬り来る”）

　　问题是藤本正行把那个“行”字给漏解掉了。

　　在信长公记里头，这个“行”字一向出现在揣测语气里头， 换句话说，这里应该解释为“武田军‘似乎’（或是‘看来’）好像想冲锋”，而不是“武田军真的发动骑兵冲锋”； 更何况在信长公记里头也提到小幡队前进时：“第一线士兵拿着挡子弹用的竹束”（原文作“身がくし”），如果说小幡队的“骑兵”真的是俗说里头那种冲锋骑兵的话， 前面挡着碍事的步兵，武田军骑兵要怎么“冲锋”？ 难道要武田军骑兵先把自己人给踩平？

　　然后藤本正行也引用了家康的书状（龙城神社文书）， 企图证明武田军的“骑兵冲锋战术”真的存在：

　　先刻申し含め候场所の事、样子见积らしめ、 栅等能゜念を入れらるべく候事、肝要に候。马一筋入れ来るべく候 其中的关键句是“马一筋入れ来るべく候”，在藤本正行的解读下，

　　这一句的意思是“我之前提醒过你们要注意的地方，你们要用点心、 把栅栏建得坚固一点，因为敌人‘必定’会用骑兵冲锋。”

　　藤本正行把这里的べし解释成“当然”，但是事实上， “べし”这个助动词在日本古文里头，总共有“推量”、“意志”、“可能”、“当然”、“命令”、“适当” 等六种比较主要的解释方法，虽说藤本正行将之解释成了“当然”，但是同一句话也可以解释成“推量”、“可能”， 因此“敌人‘必定’会用骑兵冲锋”， 当场就会变成“敌人‘应该（可能）’会用骑兵冲锋”，这样的差异恐怕是猪羊变色级的不同，而不是单纯的“语意会发生小小改变”而已。

　　关于那封信的解释，到底是藤本正行对、还是笔者对？笔者不敢打包票，毕竟他是母语者、对古典日文的造诣理当也比笔者要深，但是笔者敢保证的是：这封信本身有如此多解释的空间，而且解释起来“都说得通”， 因此藤本正行一口咬定这里的べし应该解释为“当然”，这个解释法似乎有明显失之武断的嫌疑。

　　而在铃木真哉跟柴十俊六的书里头，揭载了这封信件的最后一部分，并且提到“这封信一直有伪造说的嫌疑”（这是铃木真哉提到的）。 在读过藤本正行不录而铃木真哉有附录的部分之后， 笔者个人比较赞同铃木真哉的说法：如果这封真的是家康写给石川数正、鸟居元忠的信件， 那么理论上，家康的结语顶多用个“谨言”就已经很偷笑了（大名级人物彼此间书信往来时。多半只会用到“谨言”）， 但是家康非常有礼貌、非常有教养的用到了“恐恐谨言” （平辈武将之间在用的，比如说秀吉写信给小早川隆景时， 用到的就是“恐恐谨言”或是“恐惶谨言”）， 看起来实在非常非常的不对劲。

　　单从信长公记来看 小幡众不管是当然冲锋 还是可能冲锋 不都表示冲锋(或类似战术)在当时是常识内的做法? 问题出在前面引述过的甲阳军鉴记载： “信长是为了自己的面子，这才坚称武田军‘有骑兵可能冲锋’， 藉以掩饰自己没种、盖了一堆防御性工事。” 在这种情况下，信长公记这种“冲锋”记载的正确度，本身就很有问题。

　　更何况“马入る”这个用法要怎么解释，也是“十人十色”（大家各有不同解释）的： 藤本正行把这个词（？）加重翻译成现代文的“冲锋”，问题是“入る”这个字在古文里头，其实只找得到“前进”的意思， 换句话说，真要忠于古典日文文法的话， “马入る”这个用法，顶多只能翻译成“骑兵前进”，绝对没有“冲”的意思。

　　在古文、尤其是军记物语里头，往往会碰到“作者写得太委婉，导致现代翻译者必须帮他们加重语意，不然会看不懂”的情况， 问题是有时候要加重语气，不代表没事干就得加重语气。藤本正行把这里的原文给“自动加重翻译”， 不但导致很多不懂古典日文、甚至连现代日文都看不懂的读者容易遭到误导，更造成一种现象、也就是“为了要跟藤本正行讨论， 讨论者不得不完全丢开藤本正行在这里搞出来的翻译问题、只好将错就错的去挑藤本正行翻译时发生的错误、缺漏出来讲”的情况。）

　　而从当天三方的记载综合来看，事实上，小幡队的“骑兵前进”情况是有充分理由可以说明的： 由于当天织德联军的最主要战略就是“使用反覆诱敌战术钓出武田军，然后在乱军之中动员狙击指挥官（只有指挥官骑马）”， 在这种情况下，如果小幡信贞一个人骑着马、带着大量步兵出战的话，简直不啻是自己冲出去充任织德联军的活动靶。

　　从信长公记的记载来看，当天小幡队是武田军唯一一只 “出战时把防弹盾牌（即身かくし）安排在战线第一线”的部队， 换句话说，从信长公记的描述、以及最后的事实（小幡信贞生还，信长公记中小幡信贞战死的记载确定为误记）： 我们可以推论出这样的基本结论： 在出战时，小幡信贞已经察觉到织德联军“狙击大将”的意图，因此他选择把盾牌队安排到第一线、而且还带着大量的骑兵“一起前进”， 毕竟大量的靶子、跟“单一而孤立的靶子”比起来要难打得多，在有大量“其他骑兵”的掩护下，敌军狙击成功、打死小幡信贞的机率， 当然也会跟着低很多。

　　所以在这里，笔者一则不把“马入る”翻译成 “冲锋”， 二则认为这种“骑兵团体移动”有其他用意存在， 绝对不是单纯的“要带着骑兵到第一线冲锋陷阵”这么单纯。 : 而且前面“...阵取りの前に 马防ぎの为 栅を付けさせられ...”的文字 不是也可以作为"马是需要防御的对象"的佐证? （刚刚提过了：如果采信甲阳军鉴的说法的话， 就会自动把这里的“防马”解释是信长方的“藉口”。）

　　别的地方笔者还不敢打包票，，不过对于信长公记在这里“阵取りの前に 马防ぎの为 栅を付けさせられ”的记载， 笔者可以直接讲结论：信长公记的作者在这里“刻意”隐瞒了很多事实不报。 （信长公记是优质史料，可不代表信长公记绝对正确无误。在信长公记里头“最有名”的错误，当推桶狭间会战那一段： 如果依照信长公记的写法，桶狭间会战足足早了八年爆发。）

　　1.当天织德联军的“栅栏”绝对不是只建在南方战线， 北方、中央战线都有“三层栅栏”的存在。 （武田方、德川方史料皆如此记载，相较之下，反倒是“信长公记”成了异数。）

　　2.当天织田军建筑的防御工事，可不是区区弄几层栅栏就了事： 藤本正行自己曾经去长篠会战现场考察，发现“织德联军布阵地一带有极为大量的防御工事遗迹”， 里头甚至有“曲轮”、“土堤”、“壕沟”等建筑遗迹的存在。而在查阅德川方、武田方史料的时候， 我们也清楚的发现织德方的防御工事绝对不简单， 武田胜赖跟甲阳军鉴的作者甚至都以“阵城”（野战筑城）称之，可见太田牛一在写这部份记录的时候， 曾经无意、或是刻意把织德联军的防御工事给轻描淡写的带过去了。

　　3.从目前可考的一些军记物语、以及江户时代的军学流派传授内容看来， 栅栏、土堤等一连串的野战防御工事，与其说是“拿来防骑兵”，倒不如说是“拿来供我军远距离攻击部队射击时使用”的， 从整个宏观的“日本战史”概念来看，真要找“马防栅”这个概念，就只有一场战斗有：就是“长篠设乐原会战”（陆军参谋本部语）。

　　4.从当时武田军的军役状看来，武田军的骑兵人数少得可怕， 加上当时下马步战是一种常识，在这两个因素交相影响之下， 很显然的，武田军根本没有办法凑出足以“冲锋”的骑兵队。

　　: 如果马前面永远都有步兵慢慢跑 那又何必为防马而设栅？ 在这里，笔者个人倾向解释为“信长公记在这里的确乱掰”， 因为综观日本战史可考的记载，栅栏本来就不是被拿来“防马”用的。

　　再讲白一点的话，以当时的客观环境看来，这骑兵冲锋战法根本都不可能付诸现实。 先讲前者这种“制度面上打死不可能让这种战法付诸现实”的理由：在集团战争的时代里头，“大将生死”比“士卒生死”还要重要得多， 毕竟下级士兵死了，后备队、非战斗员可能可以拿起备用武器冲出来充任，但是指挥官死了，战场上哪那么凑巧、 刚好有个“怀才不遇、满腹文韬武略”的非战斗员或是士卒可以上来递补？不用说源平时代，从室町时代（日本战史正式进入集团战斗时代）开始， 除非我军总溃败、或者是情势逼不得已，不然我们几乎看不到指挥官“上第一线厮杀”的记载， 绝大部分的大名家族甚至认为“士兵死了没关系，指挥官逃回来就好了”。（不然“旗本”、“母衣众”这种特殊部队根本不会出现）

　　在这种情况下，武田家何以独排众议、会让中高级军官一起冲锋？难道武田家嫌自己家里头指挥官太多、所以愿意让指挥官上第一线送死？ 用一个现代一点的观念来讲，可能会更加清楚：从二十世纪以来，总统（皇帝、首相）可能身兼三军统帅之职， 问题是在真的爆发大规模战斗的时候，请问有多少人看过身为三军统帅的总统（皇帝、首相）冲上战场跟人火拼？

　　叫“指挥官”上第一线冲锋，就犹如动用洲际飞弹来打麻雀一样， 根本是大材小用、浪费人力的行为， 要培育一个将领是非常不容易的，不用说武田家， 以当时所有“大名家族”的客观情况看来， 笔者不认为有那个大名家族可以这么大手笔的、叫指挥官去第一线冲锋。

　　第二个作法则是“以武田家当时客观状况根本不可能付诸实行”的问题： 武田家并不是个典型的战国大名，所谓的“武装部队”， 并不完全直属胜赖、而分别属于那些带兵参战的将领， 在这种情况下，试问：有那个将领可以负担得起“编组纯骑兵部队”的恐怖花费？

　　或许有人会说：那叫胜赖下令“把全军的骑兵集合起来、统一运用就好啦！” 话是没错，问题是在武田家的惯例里头，家督可以征兵、可以决定“征兵人数多寡与兵种比例”的问题， 却没有硬是拆散别人带来的编组、自己重组成另外一只部队的权力。在这种情况下，只要武田胜赖下令征调部队打算硬干， 下一瞬间那些带兵参战的将领可能就会翻桌而起，在这种情况下，武田胜赖如何有办法“编成一只纯骑兵的部队”？ （至于“直属于武田胜赖的骑兵部队”，这种部队的确存在，不过那种部队的名称叫做“亲卫队”、又名“旗本”， 是菁英中的菁英，必须以自己的生命护卫大名本人， 原则上不到最后关头，绝对不上战场。）

　　不用说史料价值尚有争议的“甲阳军鉴”， 就连德川方确定“具有基本可信度”的史料也不支持信长公记的说法； 更何况“骑兵冲锋说”的最主要问题，不是卡在战国时代史料记载、 而是卡在“骑兵的定位”跟“日本马天生能力问题”上头：

　　如果说骑兵真的会冲锋、真的只是一种“兵种”的话， 那么为什么我们可查的、从平安时代一直到江户时代的资料里头， 白纸黑字、字字句句都明示、暗示的告诉我们 “骑兵是专业武士才能编成的兵种，等于是专业武士、大将的象征”？

　　如果说骑兵真的会冲锋的话，那么战国时代的日本土马， 是不是通通“天赋异禀”？ 不然以现在实验出来“日本土马冲刺秒速不到三公尺”的这种数字， 这种“骑兵冲锋”能够发挥多少快速震撼的效果？

　　就算我们撇开这些问题，回头去看长篠会战当天的记载， 说实话：就算当天武田军所有骑兵全部“上马作战”，那也根本没有意义可言。 武田军在长篠会战时的“总人数”一直众说纷纭， 不过“最多人说”的，应该是两万余人 （三河物语、德川实记等德川方史料）。

　　在此，我们采用最大整数、亦即“两万人”说， 而且完全不留半个人在鸢巢山等地“驻扎”或“当后备队”，让他们全员前往主战场准备跟织田军决一死战； 除此之外，我们还假设，让武田胜赖一起“列阵”（史实中他带着三千旗本留守后方），这样一来，武田军最精锐的旗本一开始就可以加入“列阵冲锋”的行列。

　　在这种最理想情况下，依照“武田军编成比例”来计算的话，此时武田军的骑兵人数最多最多不会超过两千人，那我们依旧取最大整数、算成“两千人”， 看起来似乎真的还满像一回事的。问题是长篠会战主战场南北长度接近三公里， （甲阳军鉴作“三里”，那更可怕， 因为当时一里约等于现代的三点九公里左右。）换句话说：就算我们取最大整数， 这些“骑兵”每个人之间的距离，大概也不会低于十公尺。 每个骑兵之间距离超过十公尺、骑兵“冲锋秒速”不到三公尺，试问一下：这样的骑兵队有什么“冲锋威力”可言？

　　撇开主观的臆测、翻译这种东西不看， 不论是现存的状况证据、抑或是日本马的生理条件， 在在不支持日本发展“大规模骑兵冲锋战术”， 在这种充满各种恶劣条件的情况下，笔者并不认为日本真的可以排除万难、 发展出俗说、肯定说里头那种“大规模骑兵冲杀”的阵仗

Contents

[edit] Cavalry Justification

Stephen Turnbull addresses the issue of the smaller, slower Japanese horses in his "War in Japan 1467-1615," while justifying the reality of the Takeda cavalry charge.

It is also important to note that the horses of those days were different... height to the shoulder was 120cm, and its weight was estimated as 250kg, which compares to 160cm and 500kg for a modern thoroughbred, so the shock of a charge hitting the enemy ranks would have been much less. The speed of a modern thoroughbred would also be greater, and as the Sengoku horse had to bear an armoured horseman, its pace would be further reduced. As noted above, they were usually accompanied by soldiers and attendants on foot, running as fast as they could, and who could not be left behind, so a Sengoku cavalry charge cannot have been as severe as it is popularly depicted.[1]

Not "as severe as it is popularly depicted"; but it did actually happen. On the previous page, Turnbull describes the innovations in cavalry tactics introduced by the Takeda:

Some mounted archers were retained, operating as mobile sharpshooters, but the majority of samurai now carried spears fitted with blades that were every bit as sharp as their swords. ... Yabusame (mounted archery) was replaced by spear techniques from the saddle, and for the first time in Japanese history a samurai army could deliver something recognisable as a cavalry charge. (emphasis added) Takeda Shingen was the greatest exponent of the new style of mounted fighting, ... At Uedahara in 1548 and Mikata ga Hara in 1572 the Takeda cavalry rode down disorganised infantry missile units. ... At Mikata ga Hara, Ieyasu's samurai could not withstand what was described in all the chronicles as a cavalry charge ... If horsemen charged the enemy on their own they could deliver a reasonable impact, but in reality, for a complete backthrough on the battlefield, they went into the attack on foot alongside the ashigaru.[1]

==Again, I would like to point out that at Mikata Ga Hara, Ieyasu's force was disorganized by the specialised Takeda stone thrower units before the so called charge.

So, the cavalry charges were not as powerful as in Europe, and not exclusively using mounted warriors, but they did happen. Remember, though there was certainly more danger in sending lieutenants and the like into the front lines, there was also more honor and glory. That's a key element in feudal warfare anywhere. If King Harold Godwinson of England hadn't rode into battle alongside his knights, he would never have received an arrow in the eye and been killed by the forces of William of Normandy (William the Conqueror). LordAmeth 15:43, 5 September 2006 (UTC)

  1. ^ a b Turnbull, Stephen (2002). 'War in Japan: 1467-1615'. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. pp16-17.

===Actually, I seem to recall Harold fought on foot with his men in the traditional Saxon style- he didn't mount up (if at all) until the end of the day; was one of the reasons he lost, as he couldn't gain a wide view of the battle. But that's by the by ;) 172.188.214.14 12:15, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

==There is question whether the Takeda family can actually order a cavalry charge. You have to remember a Fedual warlord do not have the power to order his vassals to give up command of his men. But for Takeda to have a cavalry charge, he would need his vassals to give up their mounted men. Not a likely scenario.Centralk 18:06, 5 September 2006 (UTC) ==More importantly, the now romantized Bushido is something that didn't exist in the Segoku era considering the frequency of betryals. Honour meant nothing to the samourai of the day. One of the tactic the Nobunaga forces employed at battle of Nagashino was simply concentrating to kill the officers and generals.

Also like to point out, in the Chinese text I post above, it was noted in one of Takeda's general's account of the war spoke against this cavalry charge's existence. 高阪昌信　　“武田武者马をいるゝと云仪、それも虚言也。 长篠合战场马を十骑とならべてのる所にてなし。” Loosely translated. "The battlefield could not allow ten horses to ride together"Centralk 18:06, 5 September 2006 (UTC)

Okay, so basically you're challenging that this ever happened at all? You're saying that most Japanese historians are wrong, that the Takeda never had any sort of special tactical innovation that allowed them to win at Uedahara and Mikata ga Hara? LordAmeth 18:42, 5 September 2006 (UTC)
Yes.I would argue that Japanese records at the time did not support such a charge even happened in Battle of Nagashino.Centralk 18:11, 6 September 2006 (UTC)
(Disclaimer: I'm not terribly familiar with Japanese tactics during this period.)
There are only so many things cavalry can do on a battlefield; and a "charge" is not necessarily the classical European armored-knight-with-lowered-lance-at-a-gallop affair. If Japanese cavalry did not "charge"—and assuming that we are talking about massed cavalry, rather than individual officers on horseback—how did they attack? Kirill Lokshin 18:54, 5 September 2006 (UTC)
Officers do not attack. They more likely command the battle from behind. The CHinese text above indicated in this battle, the Takeda generals and officers DISMOUNTED before they go into fighting. Centralk 18:11, 6 September 2006 (UTC)
高阪昌信 ? How do you read this? Takasaka Masanobu? He was one of Takeda's men? I'm assuming that the alleged "BBS conversation" centered around what Takasaka wrote, is that correct?
Kousaka Masanobu, not "takasaka". --Kuuzo 20:44, 11 November 2006 (UTC)
Also, it's not a good idea to mix Japanese texts with Simplified Chinese texts. Can you at least fix the Japanese text to use Japanese kanji only (instead of Simplified Chinese)? Also, it would help if some of it were translated by Centralk to some extent.--Endroit 16:20, 6 September 2006 (UTC)
Will try.Centralk 18:11, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Nagashino in question

An unpublished manuscript by Dr. Paul Varley (Oda Nobunaga, Guns, and Early Modern Warfare in Japan) that I have here states: The Shinchokoki states that the combined Tokugawa-Oda army had 1000 guns (not 3000 as claimed in the standard version of the battle). The Takeda army attacked in five seperate waves and the "majority" (kahansû) of attackers in each wave were cut down exclusively by gunfire. There is no mention in the Shinchokoki of the use of any weapons other than guns by the Tokugawa-Oda army. There is also no mention of the gunners "(firing) in volleys so as to maintain a constant barrage," as Geoffrey Parker puts it in his description of the battle of Nagashino quoted earlier. The shinchokoki speaks of the Takeda as skillful horsemen and refers to thier use of horses in battle. But we cannot assume that all or even most of the Takeda attackers were mounted. In view of the composition of contemporary armies in terms of calvalry and infantry, as already discussed, it seems likely that most of them were on foot.

So it is apparent that the "common knowledge" version of Nagashino might be wrong (Dr. Varley goes on to state that the "current" version of Nagashino (volley fire and calvalry charges) comes from the Shinchoki (as opposed to the Shinchokoki), which was essentially an edo era romanticized dramatization of the Shinchokoki, and Japanese equivalent of a "best seller", and later historians used it as a source). Another book worth looking at is "Nobunaga no Sensô" by Masayuki Fujimoto (信長の戦争　『信長公記』に見る戦国軍事学) where he actively challenges all of the "common beliefs" of Oda Nobunaga's battles as glorified accounts written during the Edo period. He focuses on purely contemporary accounts (after-battle reports and other contemporary correspondence and other sengoku era records). He mentions (as one example) the difficult Uesugi problems in deploying guns and attempting volley fire at the battle of Osaka castle as partial evidence that the current views of Nagashino could be wrong, as well as the shinchokoki vs. the shinchoki, etc. --Kuuzo 21:05, 11 November 2006 (UTC)

Wow. Thank you very much for your work, Kuuzo. You want to go ahead and make whatever necessary changes to the article? LordAmeth 11:32, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
Well, the "accepted history" is pretty much as the article is written - maybe a sub-section that mentions that the actual events are in dispute? --Kuuzo 18:21, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
If you're interested in writing it, I think it'd be a fine addition to the article. (Of course, we can continue to survive without it.) I leave it up to you. LordAmeth 20:25, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
I have too much on my plate right now to put anything together, but I am in a position to contribute research (quotes/citations) for any sengoku related questions anyone may have (I am currently working on a very large research project, so I have a lot of general resources that I can easily flip through), just don't have time for any extra writing right now. --Kuuzo 21:04, 14 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Oyamada Nobushige

According to this article and the one under his own name (which was written in reference to this one, I suspect), Oyamada Nobushige appears to have died at the battle of Nagashino; however, he apparently got better, as he was the commander of the stronghold of Iwadono who refused Katsuyori entry in 1582, leading to the latter's suicide and the final defeat of the Takeda by Nobunaga and Ieyasu. According to Stephen Turnbull in the Samurai Sourcebook, Nobushige did indeed hold Iwadono castle, and while he is mentioned as having *fought* at Nagashino he isn't referred to as having *died* there (Turnbull isn't specific as to which of the 'Twenty-four Generals' did). I'd say this article, and the one on Nobushige, need to be fixed- unless there are sources supporting their version, in which case the Battle of Temmokuzan article needs to be altered... 172.188.214.14 12:05, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

According to the Sengoku Jinmei Jiten (戦国人名辞典), Oyamada Nobushige was killed by Nobunaga in the third month of 1582, even though he assisted Nobunaga in the destruction of the Takeda clan. While I hold suspect pretty much anything ST has ever written, the Sengoku Jinmei Jiten is considered authoritative. --Kuuzo 20:42, 11 November 2006 (UTC)

[edit] From the Japanese Wiki

http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%95%B7%E7%AF%A0%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84#.E6.AD.A6.E7.94.B0.E9.A8.8E.E9.A6.AC.E8.BB.8D.E5.9B.A3.E3.81.AF.E5.AE.9F.E5.9C.A8.E3.81.97.E3.81.9F.E3.81.AE.E3.81.8B

Over 90% of the Takeda Arm force are footman. Consider the Takedas were outnumbered two to one in this battle, a charge of less than 3000 riders against a well fortifid and entrenched enemy seems rather ridiculus. Also mentioned in the article, the cavalry's main advantage was its mobility, not its ability to shock.Centralk 10:34, 7 September 2006 (UTC)

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