Talk:Battle of Inkerman

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Is it Inkerman or Inkermann? - Zoe

Which side were the Brits on? or were they free agents in this one? -- Smerdis of Tlön 15:49, 28 Oct 2003 (UTC)~

For the entire war, there was an alliance of France, Britain, and the Ottomans fighting against the Russians. The Dark 15:54, 20 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Plea for a rewrite

This article is in dire need of attention. Currently almost all of it is a direct quote from McClellan and suffers because of it. Are there any Crimean War buffs out there who could rewrite this into a more readable form? Lisiate 04:31, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Lisiate:

I could rewrite this article, weaving in McClellan's obversviations with that of other sources. I have read a lot about Inkerman over the years and studied maps of the encounter as well.

I do not however want to offend the article's original author...I would want that person's permission before rewriting. Who wrote it?

One objection I have to the current article is that it calls the outcome a "decisive" Allied victory. Inkerman did not have a decisive ending. After being rebuffed by the Allies, the Russians withdrew back into Sevastapol, roughed up, but not decisively beaten.

Another issue I have with it is that it doesn't mention that a second Russian army, 30,000 troops strong, was lined up at a 90 degree angle relative to the original Russian line, almost hemming in the Allies between them. But for some bizarre reason the Russian commander didn't order this second army to attack...it just watched the affair passively.

Kenmore 02:03, 15 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

I agree with you, it was a allied victory, but not a decisive one. I will change it to allied victory. Carl Logan 20:05, 16 October 2006 (UTC)

Something else that would have benefited this article: a discussion of the weapons used by each side, and how the more modern Allied weaponry tilted the outcome of the combat in their favor.

My understanding is that that in the Crimean War, the Russians were still using the same models of muskets they had been equiped with in the Napoleonic Wars, while the Allies were using the latest generation of rifles. Only 4% of the Russian army was equipped with such modern rifles.

The Allies, then, were able to more than compensate for their inferior numbers at Inkerman by making effective use of their superior firearms. Even at close quarters, the British and French rifles gave them an advantage over the Russians.

The same holds true of the artillery in this battle. Russia's outdated cannon couldn't shoot as far or with as heavy a payload as could the cannon of the Allies.

Kenmore 05:23, 17 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore

I agree with this estimate. By the way, I would like to have a third opinion concerning this. --Ghirla ^-трёп- 15:14, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

I agree partly, it wasn't just the weapons but the Russian doctrine, which is best summed up by Suvorov: "The bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a fine chap." This worked in previous wars and against less technological advanced enemies, but by the Crimean war it was outdated. Carl Logan 18:42, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

The tactics used by the Russians in the Crimean War were the same used by all European armies during the Napoleonic Wars two generations earlier: large scale attacks by dense columns of infantry. I think the Russians attacked at Inkerman in this fashion because their only hope of success (i.e., of compensating for inferior weaponry) was to overwhelm the Allies with superior numbers of troops.

The Russians almost won at Inkerman. Had the Russians been better led and organized, their initial three-pronged attack on the Allied line would have been better conducted, and at the right moment, their large field army – held in reserve – would have intervened to end the affair.

But the operation was bungled…superior numbers in the end did not compensate for inferior weapons.

By the Crimean War, there were no more Suvorovs, Kutusovs, Barclays, or Bagrations leading the Russians. The fine Russian generals of 1812 were relics of history and nothing more. Their successors such as Gorchakov and Menshikov were mediocrities.

During the Napoleonic Wars, Russian artillery was regarded as either the best in Europe or the equal of the best guns fielded by other European armies. This is indisputable. By the 1850s, though, those same cannon could not shoot as far as the rifles used by the French and English.

Why did the Russian army stagnate in the 40 years between the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War? I don’t know for certain, but my impression is that the government of Nicholas I bungled the ongoing financing and modernization of the Russian army between 1825 and the 1850s. They did a poor job administratively.

I’ve read that as early as the 1840s the Russian government knew its army was being antiquated by the advances in weaponry and tactics devised in Western Europe. But for some reason the Russian government could not organize or finance the modernization of its army in time to meet the challenges of the next great European war.

Another reason for the Russian army’s descent into decrepitude was the personality of its overall commander: Field Marshal Paskevich. For most of Nicholas I’s reign Paskevich had full control over Russian military affairs…and he did not do a good job.

Kenmore 19:15, 17 October 2006 (UTC)kenmore