Talk:Battle of Cannae

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[edit] Casualties

Right, some people don't have a very good understanding of some terms. So I'll make it 100% clear okay. A casualty DOES NOT MEAN SOMEONE WHO HAS DIED!!!!!! A casualty is a person who is dead, wounded or missing. Somme's first day might have had more casualties that Cannae, Somme about 60k casualties, cannae about 50k-80k depending who you talk to. BUT!!!!!! almost every casualty at the battle of cannae was also a fatality!!! Only around 20k of the 60k casualties at the first day of the somme were fatalities So, recap. 20,000ish Died at the first day of the somme, 60,000ish at Cannae. NEXT!!!! Borodino Borodino had 66,500-125,000 casualties according the wiki article on here. BUT ONLY 25%-33% were fatalities. So thats 20,000ish to 45,000ish. The highest possible fatalities at that battle, 45,000 is lower than the lowest possible number at Cannae 50,000 So, recap again. 20,000-45,000 died at Borodino, and at least 50,000 at Cannae, probably more!! So before you edit this article again. Please make sure you have a full grasp of the differences between a casualty and a fatality ---OOPSIE- 17:38, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

The key point here is that its unknown how many Roman's fought, how many died, and how many were captured. The estimate's very widely on how many were actually killed.--Cannae 20:19, 10 January 2006 (UTC)

Your numbers need work. You mention the Roman army fielded 80,000 men at Cannae - which is generally seen as correct. How, then, did the Romans suffer between 70,000 and 80,000 casualties *and* have 16,000 survive to escape? 96,000 is a higher number than 80,000 in most numerical systems.

I have heard that the battle of Cannae had the greatest number killed in a battle in one day in all of history, more even than the first day of the Somme. Is this true? If so, this should be given a mention. Gingekerr 21:43, 14 Mar 2004 (UTC)
Highly unlikely. In the ancient world perhaps, but my sources don't even make that claim. Stan 14:02, 15 Mar 2004 (UTC)
User:-OOPSIE just added that to the page. However, Hiroshima may have seen 80,000 deaths when it was bombed, which probably exceeds this. The Battle of the Somme (1916) had 57,000 British casualties, but only about 19,000 deaths. I note that above and below, the casualty numbers are debated. So, perhaps that sentence should be reverted.... This is not my area of knowledge, so I defer. --Habap 6 July 2005 16:56 (UTC)
I'm pretty new to wikipedia, so sorry if I mess up. Cannae had 50,000 to 60,000 deaths, the first day of the somme had only 19,000. And Hiroshima wasn't really a battle to the way I see the meaning of battle, since it was more of a moment of slaughter, than two armies battling against each other.-OOPSIE- 6 July 2005 17:20 (UTC)
As noted on User Talk:-OOPSIE-, I get it now. --Habap 6 July 2005 19:06 (UTC)

The Battle of Plataeai (Plataea according to wikipedia, yikes) was most likely deadlier, even by conservative accounts. I will not edit, but if anyone is interested in looking into it, it would be nice. Further, the Battle of Mycale may have taken place on the same day, hence this might be the deadliest day in history by far. cangelis 02 (12:47 GMT+02:00) Aug 2005

If I'm not mistaken, at Platea Mardonius had more soldies (2.5k) than Hannibal and Rome had at Cannae combined. Cannae might be the single bloodiest day percentage wise for the percent killed of those deployed (60-70% Roman/10-30% Hannibal).--Cannae 22:30, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

I would like to note that this page is inconsistent as to the number of casualties with the page Second Punic War. In particular, that page claims that less than a hundred Romans survived. Pmetzger 19:16, 3 Aug 2004 (UTC)T

No one here has mentioned The Battle of Salamis, which may have had as many as 100,000 casualties, nearly all of which were fatal drownings.

I do believe drownings are always fatal. ;-)

[edit] Roman Forces

I think the number about Roman Forces should be revised. As far as I know, there are two versions on that:

1 - Romans had 2 "standard" Consular armies, each consisting of 2 legions, for a total of 4 legions.

2 - Romans had 2 "augmented" consular armies, each consisting of 4 legions, for a total of 8 legions.

This should set the Roman forces at 6000x4=24000 or 6000x8=48000 legionary infantry, plus the cavalry and auxiliary troops.

Moreover, during the early republic there were no legions formed entirely by Italic allies. Instead, every single legion was formed by approximately the same number of Roman and Allied men, organized in manipuli.

"The term 'legion' was apt to mean one Roman and one allied legion, nearly ten thousand men. Thus the usual consular armies was really two Roman and two allied legions, eighteen to twenty thousand men, of which eighteen hundred were horsemen."-Dodge pg. 57. Furthermore almost every Roman legion was augmented in some way or another, either with more foot or horse. In the standard 'blueprint' legion, there was supposed to be of both 1,200 velites, principes and hastati (1200 x 3 = 3600). Their were supposed to be 600 triarii and 300 horse (600 in allied legions). This all adds up to about (3600 + 300 + 600 = 4500) to about 4,500 soldiers in a standard Roman Legion and 4,800 in a standard Allied Legion. As I said before, almost every legion was augmented in some way, varying in size from the standard 4.5 k to upwards of 6,000. Aemillius Paullus had 6,00 per legion while in Macedon. Scipio had 5,200 per legion at Zama. At this stage in the Republic it was well established custom that Rome and its Allies fought as seperate legions, but alternated positions in battle line, i.e. Horse | Roman | Allied | Roman | Allied | Horse.--Cannae 23:19, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Roman Tactics

Like many people, I've always wondered how this battle came to be such a disaster. How do you surround a larger force with a smaller one? If Hannibal had his weakest troops in the centre, why weren't the Roman legionaries able to break through them like they did at Trebia and Trasimene?

This isn't so hard to understand if you think about the geometry. Assuming roughly constant spacing between men, the number of troops in each unit should be roughly proportional to its area. The area of the surrounded unit rises as a square law with its size, while the surrounding unit is only circumference x thickness of cordon, which can be linear. Thus the larger and larger the two forces are, the less effectively the surrounded unit can apply its combat power, and the less relevant is its numerical advantage. Here are some concrete figures for illustration: let us assume 1m2 per man, and that the Romans, at their most desperate plight, were forced into a circle. Then the 70,000 actually on the field would be in a circle 300 m in diameter, with just 938 on the circumference in a position to fight. They could, in principle, be surrounded by as few as 944 men; the Carthaginians actual 50,000 could have formed a cordon up to 46 men deep. In such a configuration they would have fought roughly one on one, with the Carthaginian's superior training and experience counting for more, and the Roman's 7:5 advantage totally negated. None of this discussion is meant to be an analysis of the actual tactics, just to point out that it is actually perfectly feasible for a smaller force to surround a larger one, and advantageous too. -- Securiger 07:39, 2 August 2005 (UTC)
I agree with that from a mathematical perspective (I double-checked the figures and they look right to me) but I wasn't really talking from a mathematical perspective. There are two problems as I see it - how do you get your enemy into this nice, neat circle, and how do you kill them once they are there. To answer the first one, you've got to explain what was different about this battle rather than the ones that came before it. One of the sources (from memory I think it was Polybius) suggests that in the year before Cannae strenuous efforts were made to improve the training of the legionaries, which was viewed as a failing at the previous battles. So I don't think simple "the Carthaginians were better soldiers and Hanibal was a genius" statements explain the difference. Equally, once troops start to retreat, it is very, very difficult for them to stop. So what caused the Carthaginian centre to hold, contrary to all experience? I've suggested one (admittedly far fetched) possibility - another is that the river was behind the Carthaginian centre and that caused it to hold. But to me the idea that the barbarian troops in the centre executed a careful retreat until just the right point is the most far-fetched of all.
OK, so assume that by whatever method, you have your Romans arranged in a nice neat circle. How do you get rid of them? I'm not very convinced by the idea of a long series of one to one combats where the superior weapons handling skill of the Carthaginian allowed them to butcher the Romans for negligible casualties. The normal method for causing large casualties in an ancient battle was to get your opponents to run, and then mow them down with your cavalry (see Xenophon). In contrast, forcing them into a position where they have nowhere to retreat is likely to nullify the better training and morale of you own troops rather than taking advantage of it (see Sun Tzu). People who have no choice tend to fight pretty well...
Modern experience tells us that a large crowd of panic stricken people in a constrained area will lead to people being crushed to death (see football tragedies, the Hajj). In fact, Livy provides a lot of evidence for this being the case here - those people who dug themselves into the ground were definitely panicking, and the behaviour sounds like someone trying to escape a fatal crush.
Interesting discussion, though! Mike Moreton 15:10, 21 July 2006 (UTC)


Here's the only theory I can come up with.

Trasimene and Trebia were both heavy defeats for the Romans. It's just possible that in the recriminations that must have followed, someone blamed the legionaries who cut their way out for not staying to help their colleagues.

So maybe, when the Carthaginian centre began to collapse, it was actually someone in the van of the Roman army who gave the order to halt. With that huge depth of legionaries behind, some of whom were beginning to be pressed from the sides and behind, utter confusion would have been caused. The retreating Carthaginian centre would have seen their foes halted and in confusion, and would have counter-attacked.

At this point the entire Roman army would have been in panic, and it's possible that the majority of them were killed by crushing, not by Carthaginian weapons.

Just a theory...


Why can't some people just accept that on the day of battle the Carthaginians were better soldiers lead by Hannibal an ackowledged millitary genius of all times? The carthaginian Army was as much a mercenary army and more professional at that point than the Roman army which in the early early repblic was not a professional force. That made part of the difference. Now by the end of the second punic war those men who survived cannae, transimene etc were hardy veterans looking for revenge led by Scipio Africanus who was at least as good of a general as Hannibal. Hannibals army of carthaginans that he raised to conter Scipio (in the last battle of the Second punic war fought just outside Carthage) was mostly inexperenced.

Dont believe me here is a source. http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/army-carthage.htm

--68.164.231.3 20:04, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Not all of Hannibal's army was as good as the Romans. His well trained Africans and Spaniards who were armed with Roman plunder were most likely far better than the standard Roman legionary, but the Gauls and Italics were most likely far worse vis a vis equiptment, tactics and training. His Cavalry, it goes without saying, was vastly superior. Rome's tactics depended upon the mass of the legionaries, as well as their discipline, to simply step forward and shatter the weaker elements of Hannibal's line. The only reason that this did not happen was 1.) Hannibal's convex line, 2.) Hannibal's retention of his African's on the flanks, and 3.) Hannibal's enormous cavalry victory and subsequent deployment of the cavalry and his flank 'reserve'. The discipline and skill of Rome's army was shown by the savage battle that still raged in the center after they lost both consuls (one to flight) and were penned in. While they were somewhat ill-trained, they were still soldiers from one of the most martial societies ever.--Cannae 22:41, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Wrong info about the battle's execution

To the above poster - this battle was the most people killed in one day UNDER THE COMMAND of one field general. so, patton for example, never kllled that many people in one day. ya know?

to the other above poster - The weak Gallic center did not break 1) because the Gauls were fierce warriors who wanted revenge for their own war with Rome and 2) because the Romans could not even swing their swords because they were being crushed together by the elite african phalanxes. Roman spearmen were usually in the rear of the army to deal with cavalry or for emergency situations... the romans in the front were short sword carriers and the roans couldn't break out of the sides because the punic infantry used phalanx discipline and romans were short swords probably couldnt even TOUCH them. Also keep in mind that Hannibal himself was behind the Gauls and his presence must have inspired the center to hold fast.

The dusty wind also blew in the Roman front line's direction with a strong gust - thus "Pushing" the gauls into the Romans and giving them an advantage on the field.

Now, the major inaccuracu in the article is that Hannibals cavalry only fought and won on Hannibal's left flank. the numidian light cavalry and the roman light cabalry were waiting around not doing much of anything. the spanish/gallic heavy cavalry won against the outnumbered romans, then charged across the back of the roman lines in a show of great discipline and rode towards the roman light cavalry. the roman light cavalry werer young pretty boy nobles, and when they saw the spears of the heavy cavalry instead of the lighter weapons of the numidian cavalry, they ran. in fact, the carthaginians pointed their spears upwards towards the roman youths' faces to scare them from potential scars.

You're mixing up stories, Caesar at Pharsalus commanded his soldiers to slash Pompey's noble cavalry in the face or near it, so they'd shie back. According to most historians, including Dodge, the Roman left was allied cavalry while the right was Roman. Rome is notorious for its bad cavalry so there is some reason to think the allied contingent was the stronger, but neither would be termed 'light' cavalry. I have read a few books on the subject of Hannibal, but never have I seen it credited that the wind "pushed" the Gauls into the Romans. I have read that is blinded and disheartened them, a morale rather than physical force. And to invoke Gallic hatred of Rome as a valid argument for the Carthaginian center is rather silly. The center could have broken, the key word is key, we do not know. If it did break, the break obviously would have been small and hard to exploit 1) because of Rome's enormous front and 2) because Hannibal backed his army on the river. Most sources agree that the line held, but it was a rather tenuous position at best. Hannibal's subsequent deployment of his Africans halted the Roman advance. A further point which seems to be missing from this talk page is the fact that Varro effectively merged his first and second lines, destroying one of Rome's best weapons, its versatility/mobility. By pushing the Principes' maniples into the gaps between the Hastati's maniples, Varro eliminated about 2/3rds of his reserve capabilities which would have been used to deal with the threat of the Africans.--Cannae 23:03, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] measures

the article mentions "three and a half measures" of gold / gold rings...? how much is this ? can this number be related to talents or another measure of currency?

[edit] Strategy & Tactics

Aren't tactics used on a single battlefield and strategy in a campaign? Why would someone have changed it to be wrong? --Habap 17:26, 20 October 2005 (UTC)

[edit] mathematical analysis

"This isn't so hard to understand if you think about the geometry. Assuming roughly constant spacing between men, the number of troops in each unit should be roughly proportional to its area. The area of the surrounded unit rises as a square law with its size, while the surrounding unit is only circumference x thickness of cordon, which can be linear. Thus the larger and larger the two forces are, the less effectively the surrounded unit can apply its combat power, and the less relevant is its numerical advantage. Here are some concrete figures for illustration: let us assume 1m2 per man, and that the Romans, at their most desperate plight, were forced into a circle. Then the 70,000 actually on the field would be in a circle 300 m in diameter, with just 938 on the circumference in a position to fight. They could, in principle, be surrounded by as few as 944 men; the Carthaginians actual 50,000 could have formed a cordon up to 46 men deep. In such a configuration they would have fought roughly one on one, with the Carthaginian's superior training and experience counting for more, and the Roman's 7:5 advantage totally negated. None of this discussion is meant to be an analysis of the actual tactics, just to point out that it is actually perfectly feasible for a smaller force to surround a larger one, and advantageous too" the geographic and mathematic analysis of the battle above is extremely intresting perhaps it could be incorporated into the article.--Gary123 15:48, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] HOOK!

OF GAUUUUUUUUL! --Tykell 23:09, 29 January 2006 (UTC)


Why would you deliberately publish false information?--Hook of Gaul 06:44, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

OF GAUUUUUL!!!!!!!!!!! --Tykell 20:37, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Images

I miss images in this article, especially since the descriptions of formations are easier to understand if there is some form of drawings. I`m not too familiar with which pictures wikipedia can use, but I understand that american government material doesn`t have copyright. (Am I right?) What about United States Military Academy[1]? Can we use images like this[2]?Shauni 14:22, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

I just realised one thing about the image I put a link too: Why does it say 215 BC? Shauni 18:16, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

I agree. This article is in desperate need of images and diagrams. I'll put up a request. If I knew how to upload images, I would do it myself :-( --chub 03:05, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Images for the article

there are some very good (I think) images that could help this article at http://www.roman-empire.net/army/cannae.html , I just don't know if adding them to the article would violate any copyright restrictions...

Putting them in would normally violate copyright - but, why not write the author (they have an e-mail contact link on the page) and ask for permission? Then it is no longer a copyright violation - and the owner gets to specifically control the use in Wikipedia. - Vedexent 15:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Peer review?

You can probably take that banner off - there really wasn't a peer review - and the top of the page is getting crowded :) - Vedexent 15:59, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] GREAT Comprehensive ARTICLE!!!!!

I believe that sometimes we disregard the dual purpose of knowledge: to both inform and share. Despite its faults, this article is clear, comprehensive, and interesting. It is not consumed by academic jargon or ‘dumbed’ down to ignore critical facts. Moreover, I applaud the author’s continuous efforts to improve upon his work!!

[edit] Directions?

"In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face south, while they would face north. Not only would the morning sunlight face towards the Romans..." Ummm...didn't the sun rise in the east in Hannibal's time? The map shows the armies lined up east-west, so I'm going to reword it. Clarityfiend 23:30, 11 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Fatal casualties, Cannae vs Passchendaele

I know this has been referenced to Bradford, 1981 but I believe the claim "More men were killed at Cannae than in all the four months of the Battle of Passchendaele" is misleading. Estimates of casualties at Passchendaele are up to 700,000 or more, with approximately one-third killed. It is thus safe to say over 200,000 men were killed during Passchendaele, far more than the total at Cannae. Not all these bodies were recovered so many were listed as missing. In some sources the total reported toll of Passchendaele dead was about 75,000, with an equal number listed as missing. But the vast majority of those listed as missing would have been killed.

So basically the death toll at Cannae exceeds the death toll in the four months of Passchendaele ONLY if the HIGHEST estimate is used for Cannae and the LOWEST estimate used for Passchendaele. I believe this reference should be removed because it is far from conclusive. Regards, --203.213.7.130 00:38, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

If the statement is referenced, then it should remain. No matter if you perceieve it as inconclusive, it is validated by a source. If you feel the need to mention that the deaths at Passchendaele may be higher than what the article suggests, then by all means do so, but you would have to cite your soure as well. Chubdub 09:32, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Passchendaele, a battle fought in an era which reliable records were kept that can be checked. Cannae fought in an era where such book keeping was not remotely so reliable. Add to that the two figures we have for Cannae differ so wildly. The crucial point is that the Roman field army was destroyed as fighting force but how many actally lay dead on the field and how many just ran back to their farms is impossible to determine today - not withstanding the guesses of Livy and Polybus.Dejvid 13:24, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Fraustadt

I think the Battle of Fraustadt should be mention in the Historical significance section. The battles were very similar and to my knowledge the closest anyone has come to repeating Hannibal’s success. --Carl Logan 15:18, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Unclear sentence

"He placed his lowest quality infantry (Iberians, Gauls and Celtiberians) in the middle, alternating the two across the front line to strengthen it." What two? And how did it strengthen the line? Clarityfiend 05:51, 13 November 2006 (UTC)