Battle of Paardeberg

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Date	18 February- 27 February 1900
Location	Paardeberg Drift, Orange Free State
Result	British victory

Combatants

The British Empire

Boers

Commanders

Sir John French
Colonel Kelly-Kenny

Piet Cronje

Strength

15,000 men

5,000 men

Casualties

258 dead
1,211 wounded
86 captured

100 dead
250 wounded
4,096 captured

Second Boer War
Talana Hill – Elandslaagte – Belmont – Modder River – Stormberg – Magersfontein – Colenso – Spion Kop – Bloody Sunday – Paardeberg – Ladysmith – Sanna's Post – Mafeking

The Battle of Paardeberg was a major battle during the Second Anglo-Boer War. It was fought near Paardeberg Drift on the banks of the Modderrivier ("Mud River") in the Orange Free State.

The battle started on 18 February 1900, when the British forces under command of Lord Horatio Kitchener surrounded the Boer forces, under General Piet Cronje, at Paardeberg.

Cronje had hitherto proved one of the Boers' most successful generals. Although he had failed to halt the British crossing of the Modder river, he had fought them to a standstill at Magersfontein 10 days later. In doing so he had not only inflicted a large number of casualties but had effectively halted the British advance that sought to lift the siege of Kimberely. Cronje's position was however made redundant when a British mounted column outflanked Magersfontein and lifted the siege of Kimberley.

On the 15th of February Cronje's men, some 5,000 Transvaalers and Freestaters, finally moved off. Their position was redundant and they were in danger of being outflanked. They successfully evaded the British 6th Division however, by the 17th the British cavalry managed to catch the Boers at Paardeberg Drift.

Cronje then inadvisedly decided to form a laager and dig in on the banks of the Modder river. His reason for doing to are unclear. The British now outnumbered his force significantly and enjoyed overwhelming superiority in artillery. All the British would have to do was lay siege to the Boer position and bombard them at their leisure. On the other hand, the British had insufficient cavalry and it would have been an easy matter for Cronje to brush them aside and link up with De Wet's Commando who were only 30 miles away to the north.

General Kelly-Kenny of the British 6th Division had a sound plan to lay siege to Cronje and bombard them into surrender. This would almost certainly have proved successful and cost the British very few casualties. Kitchener had different plans however, and over-ruled Kelly-Kenny.

It is likely that Kitchener was alarmed by the news that De Wet was advancing on Paardeberg to rescue Cronje. Possibly as a result, he decided that Cronje's position must be taken by storm immediately, before De Wet coulds intervene. Kitchener then proceeded to throw his infantry and his precious cavalry into a series of uncoordinated frontal assaults against the Boer laager.

This despite the fact that the cost of frontal assaults against entrenched Boers had been demonstrated time and again the preceding months. It was no different this time. The British were shot down in their droves. It is thought that not s single British soldier got within 200 yards of the Boer lines. By nightfall some 24 officers and 279 men were killed and 59 officers and 847 men wounded. Judged by British casualties it was the most severe reverse of the war and became known as Bloody Sunday.

Kitchener had not only squandered the lives of his soldiers, he had also squandered his strategic position. Kelly-Kelly had warned him not to leave "Kitchener's Kopje" underfunded. Possession of the kopje was essential to guard the south-east of the British position and prevent Cronje's escape. But kitchener, in his zeal for an all-out attack, had left the kopje defended by only a handful of Imperial Infantry (volunteer British colonists). De Wet was therefore able to take the kopje with minimal resistance. The strategic picture had no changed dramatically. De Wet could now make the British position on the south east bank of the Modder untenable, the Boers now commanded a swathe of front stretching from the north east right through to the south east. As darkness fell, Kitchener ordered his troops to dig in where they were. Few received these orders and fewer still obeyed them. Desperately thirsty and exhausted, the surviving British trickled back into camp. Rescue for Cronje now seemed the likely outcome.

But seen from the Boer side, things were also bad. Cronje and his men had been in headlong retreat for several days with the British snapping at their heels. While casualties from the bombardment had been reduced to around 100 dead and 250 wounded by the soft bank of the Modder, the horses, oxen and wagons had no trenches in which to shelter. Many wagons were destroyed. Ammunition exploded and stores were ruined. For many of the Burghers, these wagons carried the sum total of their worldly possessions. The loss of their horses was even worse, for the horse was almost as important to the fighting ability of a Boer as his Mauser. The morale in Cronje's laager was desperate.

The sun came up and General Roberts (GOC South Africa) now arrived on the scene. He initially urged a resumption of the frontal assaults but fortunately for the British, Cronje requested a cease-fire to bury the dead. The British refused (to their shame, as the Boers has allowed such truces in the past) and Cronje replied "If you are so uncharitable as to refuse me a truce as requested, then you may do as you please. I shall not surrender alive. Bombard as you will" The truce communications had taken up the rest of the day and there was no time for any more assaults.

The following day Roberts and Kitchener again planned to launch more assaults but were firmly resisted by the rest of the British senior officers. By the Wednesday, Roberts had lost his nerve and was intent on withdrawing. To do so would have allowed Cronje to escape and would thus have been one of the great blunders in a war made famous by its sheer scale of military idiocy. Fortunately for Roberts, it was De Wet whose nerve failed first. Faced with an entire British division who might be re-inforced at any time, and fearing for his mens' safety, he withdrew his Commando from the south east. Cronje had inexplicably refused to abandon his laager. Now De Wet would abandon Cronje.

Cronje surrendered with some 4,019 men and 50 women. It was the first (and some would argue only) great British victory of the war, around 10% of the Boers' entire army were now British prisoners. Cronje had done something extraordinary. He had outblundered the British. If his initial decision to form a defensive enclave from which he could not hope to escape seems strange, then his refusal to extract himself from this position when the option was handed to him is even more bizarre. Kitchener on the other hand should also be judged harshly. He quite recklessly squandered the lives of his men and his strategic and terrotorial advantage. Kitchener, who had once been hailed as the hero of Khartoum and nicknamed 'Kitchener of Khartoum' or 'K of K', was thereafter referred to by some as 'K of C' for Kitchener of Chaos.

The Battle of Paardeberg also marked the first ever deployment of the Canadian Army. The Royal Canadian Regiment suffered nearly 100 casualties.