Battle of Meiktila / Mandalay

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Battle of Central Burma
Part of Burma Campaign
Date January - March, 1945 Location Central Burma Result Decisive Allied Victory
Combatants
British Fourteenth Army	Japanese Burma Area Army
Commanders
William Slim	Hyotaro Kimura
Casualties
2,307 killed 15,888 wounded and missing	6,513 killed 6,299 wounded and missing

South-East Asian campaign
Malaya – Prince of Wales & Repulse – Thailand – Singapore – Indian Ocean – Andaman Islands – Burma – Chindits – Imphal – Kohima – Central Burma – Dracula

The concurrent Battle of Meiktila and Battle of Mandalay were decisive battles near the end of the Burma Campaign. Despite logistical difficulties, the Allies were able to deploy large armoured and mechanised forces in Central Burma, and also possessed air supremacy. Most of the Japanese forces in Burma were destroyed during the battles.

Contents 1 The Situation in 1945 1.1 The Japanese situation 1.2 The Allied Situation 1.3 Intelligence 2 Opening movements 3 Movements in January 4 Crossing the Irrawaddy 4.1 Japanese order of battle 4.2 Allied order of battle 5 Capture of Meiktila 6 Japanese siege of Meiktila 7 Fall of Mandalay 8 End of the battle 9 Bibliography

[edit] The Situation in 1945

[edit] The Japanese situation

In 1944, the Japanese had sustained several defeats in the mountainous frontiers of Burma. In particular, at the Battle of Imphal and Battle of Kohima, the Japanese Fifteenth Army had suffered disastrous losses, mainly due to disease and starvation.

On September 1, 1944, Lieutenant General Hyotaro Kimura was appointed commander of Japanese Burma Area Army, succeeding Lieutenant General Masakazu Kawabe whose health had broken down. At this stage of the war, Japan was in retreat on all fronts and was concentrating its resources for the defence of the homeland. Kimura had been Vice Minister for War, and had held other posts with responsibility for mobilising Japanese industry for the war effort. It was hoped that he could use the rice fields, factories and oil wells of Burma to make the Japanese forces there logistically self-sufficient.

As Kimura's Chief of Staff, with day to day responsibility for operations, Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka was appointed. He had formerly commanded the Japanese 18th Infantry Division in Northern Burma, and had a reputation for inflexible determination. (In an odd reversal of roles in the aftermath of the Imphal disaster, Kawabe's former Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Eitaro Naka, was transferred to command the 18th Division.)

Japanese losses in Burma in 1944 had been catastrophic. They were made up with drafts of conscripts, many of whom were not of the best physical categories. Most divisions in Burma numbered only 10,000. (Their paper establishment was nearer 25,000). Furthermore, they lacked anti-tank weapons. To face massed Allied armour, they would be forced to deploy their field artillery in the front line, which would affect their ability to give concentrated fire support to the infantry. Expedients such as lunge mines (an explosive charge on the end of a long pole), or suicide attacks by men wearing explosive charges, were not effective if the enemy tanks were properly supported by infantry. The Japanese 5th Air Division, deployed in Burma, had been reduced to only a few dozen aircraft. Their 14th Tank Regiment possessed only 20 tanks.

Kimura accepted that his forces stood little chance against the numerically and materially superior Allies in open terrain. He therefore intended that while Twenty-eighth Army defended the Arakan province, and Thirty-third Army continued to fight rearguard actions against the American and Chinese forces which were trying to open a land route from India to China, the Fifteenth Army would withdraw behind the Irrawaddy River. He hoped that the Allies would be overstretched trying to overcome this obstacle, perhaps to the point where the Japanese might even attempt a counteroffensive.

[edit] The Allied Situation

The Allied South East Asia Command had begun making plans to recapture Burma as early as June, 1944 (while the Battle of Imphal was still being fought).

Three main options were proposed. One option was to capture Northern Burma only, to allow the Burma Road, linking India with China, to be completed. This was rejected, as it could use only a fraction of the available forces and fulfilled only an out-of-date strategic aim. A second option was to capture Rangoon, the capital and main seaport, by a seaborne invasion. This was also impractical, as it would require landing craft and other resources which would not be available until the end of the War in Europe. By default, the plan adopted was for an offensive into Central Burma by the British Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant General William Slim, to recapture Burma from the north. The operation, originally codenamed Operation Capital, was renamed Operation Extended Capital to encompass a pursuit to Rangoon.

Most of Slim's divisions were on a mixed Animal and Mechanical Transport establishment, which allowed them to operate in difficult terrain. In anticipation of fighting in the open country of Central Burma, Slim reorganised two of his divisions (Indian 5th Infantry Division and Indian 17th Infantry Division) as partly Motorized infantry and partly Airmobile infantry formations.

At this stage of the war, few British infantry reinforcements were available. The strength of Fourteenth Army's British formations, and of the British units in its Indian formations was dropping, and as a result Indian and Gurkha units were increasingly to bear the brunt of the actions which followed.

The chief problem which Fourteenth Army would face was logistics. The advancing troops would need to be supplied over crude roads stretching for far greater distances than were ever encountered in Europe. Although expedients such as locally constructed river transport and temporary all-weather coverings for roads were to be used, transport aircraft were to be vital to supply the forward units. Threats to deprive Fourteenth Army of these were to be a constant concern for Slim during the forthcoming battles.

[edit] Intelligence

In the coming campaign, both the Allies and Japanese were to suffer from lack of intelligence about the enemy, and make incorrect assumptions about enemy intentions.

The Allies had undisputed air superiority. In addition to the results of aerial reconnaissance, they also received reports from behind enemy lines from the reconnaissance unit V Force, and the resistance organisation Force 136. On the other hand, they lacked the detailed information available to commanders in Europe through ULTRA radio intercepts, partly because Japanese radio security seems to have been good (until near the end of the battle, when their signal and staff arrangements largely collapsed), and partly because Japanese linguists were lacking at all headquarters levels.

On the other hand, the Japanese were almost blind. They had very few aircraft with which to fly air reconnaissance missions, and they would receive little information from the Burmese population which was becoming disillusioned and restive under Japanese military control. Some formations had set up their own intelligence organisations; for example, Twenty-Eighth Army had created the Hikari Kikan, whose agents lived deep under cover in the frontier regions of Burma. However, these agents could not acquire or report information quickly enough to be tactically useful in a fast-moving mechanised battle.

[edit] Opening movements

As the monsoon season ended in late 1944, Fourteenth Army had established two bridgeheads across the Chindwin River. Based on past Japanese actions, Slim assumed that the Japanese would fight in the Shwebo Plain, as far forward as possible between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy Rivers. On November 29, Indian 19th Infantry Division launched Indian IV Corps's attack from the northern bridgehead at Sittaung, and on December 4, Indian 20th Infantry Division under Indian XXXIII Corps attacked out of the southern bridgehead at Kalewa.

Both divisions made rapid progress, with little opposition. 19th Division in particular, under Major General "Pete" Rees was approaching the vital rail centre of Indaw, 80 miles (128 Km) east of Sittaung, after only five days. It was at this point that Slim realised that his earlier assumption that the Japanese would fight forward of the Irrawaddy was incorrect. As only one of IV Corps's divisions had so far been committed, he was able to make major changes to his original plan. 19th Division was transferred to XXXIII Corps, which was to continue to attack towards Mandalay. The remainder of IV Corps, strengthened by Fourteenth Army's reserve divisions, was to advance down the Gangaw Valley west of the Chindwin, cross the Irrawaddy near Pakokku and seize the vital logistic and communication centre of Meiktila by a rapid armoured thrust.

[edit] Movements in January

To allow the main body of their divisions to retreat across the Irrawaddy, the Japanese had left rearguards in several towns in the Shwebo Plain. 19th Division and British 2nd Infantry Division cleared Shwebo, while 20th Division had a hard battle to take Monywa, a major river port on the east bank of the Chindwin. The Japanese rearguards were largely destroyed.

Meanwhile, IV Corps began its advance down the Gangaw Valley. Its leading formation, Indian 7th Infantry Division, was screened by the East African 28 Infantry Brigade and the Lushai Brigade. Where these lightly equipped units met Japanese resistance at Pauk, the town was heavily bombed by Allied aircraft to soften up the defenders.

The route required upgrading in several places to allow heavy equipment to pass. At one point, the trail of vehicles stretched from Pauk to Kohima, 350 miles to the north by road. To persuade the Japanese that IV Corps was still moving on Mandalay, a dummy corps HQ was set up near Sittaung. All radio traffic to 19th Division was relayed through this installation.

[edit] Crossing the Irrawaddy

Main article: Battle of Pokoku and Irrawaddy River operations

19th Division slipped units across a narrow stretch of the Irrawaddy, 40 miles north of Mandalay, as early as January 14. The crossings downstream would require more preparation. The assault boats, ferries and other equipment for the task were in short supply in Fourteenth Army, and much of this equipment was worn out, having seen service in other theatres.

Slim planned for 20th Division of XXXIII Corps and 7th Division of IV Corps to cross simultaneously on February 13, so as to further mask his ultimate intentions. On XXXIII Corps's front, 20th Division crossed 20 miles (32 Km) west of Mandalay. It successfully established small bridgeheads, but these were counter-attacked nightly for almost two weeks. Orbiting patrols of fighter-bombers knocked out several Japanese tanks and guns. Eventually 20th Division expanded its footholds into a single firmly-held bridgehead.

In IV Corps's sector, it was vital to seize the area around Pakokku and establish a firm bridgehead quickly. 7th Division's crossing was made on a wide front. Both the main attack at Nyaungu and a secondary crossing at Pagan (the former capital, and the site of many Buddhist temples) were initially disastrous as boats broke down and Japanese machine-gun fire swept the river. Eventually, support from tanks of the Gordon Highlanders firing across the river and massed artillery forced the defenders at Nyaungu to give way. At Pagan, the garrison proved to be a unit of the Indian National Army, which soon surrendered itself and helped the attackers (1/11th Sikh Regiment) to cross. By chance, Pagan was the boundary between two Japanese armies, which delayed Japanese reaction to the crossing.

Starting on February 19, Indian 255 Armoured Brigade and the motorised infantry of 17th Division began crossing into 7th Division's bridgehead. To further distract Japanese attention from this area, British 2nd Division began crossing the Irrawaddy only 10 miles west of Mandalay on February 23. This crossing also threatened to be a disaster due to leaky boats and faulty engines, but one brigade crossed successfully and the other brigades crossed into its bridgehead.

[edit] Japanese order of battle

At this point, the Japanese were hastily reinforcing their Central Front with units from the northern front (where the American-led Northern Combat Area Command had largely ceased its operations) and with reserve units from Southern Burma. Their full order of battle was:

Burma Area Army (lieutenant General Hyotaro Kimura)

2nd Division (on orders from higher command, this division was being withdrawn from Burma to Thailand)

49th Division (moving to from Southern to Central Burma)

14th Tank Regiment

4th Artillery Regiment

Fifteenth Army (Lieutenant General Shihachi Katamura)

15th Division (north of Mandalay)

31st Division (west of Mandalay)

33rd Division (Myingyan)

53rd Division (in local reserve, south of Mandalay)

Twenty-eighth Army (Lieutenant General Shozo Sakurai)

54th Division (Arakan)

55th Division (Arakan and Southern Burma)

72nd Independent Mixed Brigade (Lower Irrawaddy Valley)

Thirty-third Army (Lieutenant General Masaki Honda)

18th Division (moving to Central Burma)

56th Division (Shan States)

24th Independent Mixed Brigade (withdrawing to Moulmein)

[edit] Allied order of battle

Opposed to them was:

British Fourteenth Army (Lieutenant General William Slim)

Indian 5th Infantry Division (motorised/airmobile) (in reserve, joining IV Corps)

Indian IV Corps (Lieutenant General Frank Messervy)

Indian 7th Infantry Division

Indian 17th Infantry Division (motorised/airmobile)

East African 28th Infantry Brigade

Lushai Brigade (being withdrawn to India)

Indian 255th Armoured Brigade (M4 Sherman tanks)

Indian XXXIII Corps (Lieutenant General Montagu Stopford)

British 2nd Infantry Division (motorised)

Indian 19th Infantry Division

Indian 20th Infantry Division

Indian 268th Infantry Brigade (motorised)

Indian 254th Armoured Brigade (Grant and Stuart tanks)

[edit] Capture of Meiktila

17th Indian Division under Major General David Cowan, with the bulk of 255th Armoured Brigade, sallied from the Nyaungu bridgehead on February 20, and by February 24 were at Taungtha, halfway to Meiktila.

Ironically, on this date, a Japanese high-level staff meeting was taking place in Meiktila, to discuss the possibility of a counter-attack north of the Irrawaddy. The Japanese command was undoubtedly surprised by the Allied attack. An agitated officer on Mount Popa signalled that 2000 vehicles were moving on Meiktila. Staff at 15th Army or Burma Area Army assumed this to be a mistake and deleted one of the zeroes, thinking that the attack was merely a raid. Burma Area Army had also ignored an earlier air reconnaissance report of a vast column of vehicles moving down the Gangaw Valley.

On February 26, the Japanese became aware of the true size of the threat, and began preparing Meiktila for defence. The defenders were the bulk of Japanese 168 Regiment from the 49th Division, and anti-aircraft and line of communication troops, totalling about 4000. While they attempted to dig in, 17th Division captured an airstrip 20 miles to the west at Thabutkon. The airmobile Indian 99th Brigade were flown in, and petrol dropped for the armoured brigade.

Three days later, on March 1, 17th Division attacked Meiktila from all sides. Cowan had the Corps commander (Lieutenant General Frank Messervy) and General Slim watching anxiously over his shoulder, both worried that the Japanese might hold out for weeks. In the event, in spite of desperate resistance, the town fell in less than four days. Lack of anti-tank weapons gravely handicapped the defenders. In "Defeat into Victory", Slim described watching two platoons from 1/7th Gurkha Rifles supported by a single M4 Sherman tank overrun several Japanese bunkers and eliminate their defenders in a few minutes, with only a few casualties to themselves. In an attempt to improvise anti-tank defences, some Japanese soldiers crouched in trenches, clutching 250 Kg aircraft bombs. When an enemy tank loomed over the trench, they were to strike the detonator. Most were shot by an officer of 255 Brigade and Indian soldiers.

[edit] Japanese siege of Meiktila

The Japanese troops hastening to reinforce Meiktila were dismayed to find that they now had to recapture the town. The Japanese forces engaged were:

49th Division

106 Infantry Regiment

168 Infantry Regiment (remnants only)

49 Artillery Regiment

18th Division

55 Infantry Regiment

56 Infantry Regiment

18 Mountain Artillery Regiment

214 Infantry Regiment (attached from 33rd Division)

119 Infantry Regiment (attached from 53rd Division)

"Naganuma Artillery Group" (attached)

4 Infantry Regiment (from 2nd Infantry Division)

"Mori Special Force" (a battalion-sized long-range raiding force)

Many of the Japanese regiments, especially those under 18th Division, were already weak after heavy combat in the preceding weeks. They totalled perhaps 12,000 men with 70 guns. The divisions had no contact with each other, and lacked information on the enemy and even proper maps. In Meiktila, 17th Division mustered 15,000 men, about 100 tanks and 70 guns, and were to be further reinforced during the battle.

Even as the Japanese forces arrived, columns of motorised Indian infantry and tanks sallied out of Meiktila and attacked concentrations of Japanese troops, while attempting to clear a land route back to Nyaungu. There was hard fighting for several villages and other strongpoints. The attempt to clear the roads failed, and 17th Division withdrew into Meiktila.

The Japanese 18th Division's first attacks from the north and west failed, with heavy losses. Its commander, Lieutenant General Eitaro Naka, now attacked the airfields east of the town from March 12 onwards. Cowan's division relied on supply through these. Indian 9 Infantry Brigade flew into the airfields from March 15. The landings were made under fire, but only two aircraft were destroyed, with 22 casualties. The Japanese fought their way steadily closer to the airfields and from March 18, Cowan suspended air landings (although casualties could still be evacuated in light aircraft) and supplies were parachuted to his division.

Meanwhile, on March 12, Kimura had ordered Lieutenant General Masaki Honda, commanding Thirty-third Army, to take command of the battle. Honda's HQ staff arrived, but without their signal units, they could not coordinate the divisions properly. Attacks continued to be disjointed. The Japanese were using their artillery in the front line with their infantry, which accounted for several British tanks, but also resulted in the loss of many guns. During a major attack on March 22 the Japanese attempted to use a captured British tank, but this was destroyed and the attack was repelled with heavy losses.

While Meiktila was besieged, the other unit of IV Corps, 7th Indian Division, was engaged in several battles to maintain its own bridgehead, capture the important river port of Myingyan, and assist East African 28 Brigade against counter-attacks on the west bank of the Irrawaddy. Towards the end of March, the leading motorised brigade of Indian 5th Division reinforced them, and began clearing the land route to Meiktila.

[edit] Fall of Mandalay

During late January, 19th Indian Division had cleared the west bank of the Irrawaddy. The Japanese 15th Division opposed to them was very weak and thinly spread, and General Rees launched an attack southwards from its bridgeheads in mid-February. By March 7, his leading units could see Mandalay Hill, crowned by its many pagodas and temples.

Lieutenant General Seiei Yamamoto, commanding the Japanese division, was opposed to defending the city, but received uncompromising orders from higher headquarters to defend Mandalay to the death. Kimura at Burma Area Army was concerned about the loss of prestige should the city be abandoned. Also, there were still large supply dumps south of the city, which could not be moved.

A Gurkha battalion (4/4th Gurkha Rifles), commanded by an officer who had served in Mandalay before the war, stormed Mandalay Hill on the night of March 8. Several Japanese held out in tunnels and bunkers underneath the pagodas, and were slowly eliminated over the next few days, although most of the buildings survived substantially intact.

Fighting their way further into the city, Rees's division was stopped by the thick walls of Fort Dufferin (as the ancient citadel was named), surrounded by a moat. Medium artillery and bombers failed to make much impression on the walls, and an assault via a railway tunnel was driven back. 19th Division prepared to make another assault via the sewers on March 21, but before it could be made, the Japanese abandoned the fort, also via the sewers. King Thibaw's teak palace, inside the fort, had burned down during the siege, only one of many historic buildings destroyed.

Elsewhere on XXXIII Corps's front, Indian 20th Division launched an attack southwards from its bridgehead. The Japanese 33rd and 31st Divisions, weakened by casualties and detachments to the battle at Meiktila, were thrown into disorder. Armoured and motorised columns of 20th Division reached almost as far south as the Meiktila fighting, before turning back north against the rear of the Japanese facing the bridgeheads. The British 2nd Division attacked Mandalay from the west. By the end of March, Japanese Fifteenth Army had been reduced to uncoordinated remnants trying to move southwards to regroup in the Shan States.

[edit] End of the battle

On March 28, Lieutenant General Shinichi Tanaka, Kimura's Chief of Staff, conferred with Honda at Thirty-third Army HQ. Honda's staff told him that the army had suffered 5,000 casualties, and had only 20 artillery pieces left. Tanaka accepted the responsibility of ordering Honda's army to break off the siege of Meiktila.

It was already too late. The Japanese armies in Central Burma had lost most of their equipment, and their cohesion. They would be unable to stop Fourteenth Army exploiting to within striking distance of Rangoon. Furthermore, with the loss of Mandalay, the Burmese population turned finally against the Japanese. Uprisings by guerilla forces and a revolt by the Japanese-sponsored Burma National Army would contribute to the eventual Japanese defeat.

[edit] Bibliography

• Louis Allen, Burma: The longest War, Dent Publishing, 1984, ISBN 0-460-02474-4
• Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory, (1956)