Battle of Mantinea (418 BC)

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Battle of Mantinea
Part of the Peloponnesian War
Date 418 BC Location Mantinea Result Spartan victory
Combatants
Sparta Arcadian allies of Sparta Tegea	Argos Athens Mantineia
Commanders
Agis II	Laches † Nicostratus† Thrasyllus
Strength
About 9000	About 8000
Casualties
About 300	About 1100

Peloponnesian War
Sybota – Potidaea – Chalcis – Naupactus – Tanagra – Olpae – Pylos – Sphacteria – Delium – Amphipolis – Mantinea – Sicilian Expedition – Syme – Cynossema – Abydos – Cyzicus – Notium – Arginusae – Aegospotami

The Battle of Mantinea took place in 418 BC between Sparta and its allies, and an army led by Argos and Athens.

Contents 1 Prelude to the battle 2 The battle 3 Aftermath 4 References

[edit] Prelude to the battle

After the conclusion of the alliance between the Argives, the Achaeans, the Eleans and Athens, the humiliation of the Spartans in the 420 Olympic Games and the invasion of Epidaurus by the allies, the Spartans were compelled to move against them, in fear that their alliances with Corinth and Boeotia would be dissolved and that the whole of the Peloponnese would soon be against them. An army was assembled, comprising the Boeotians, the Corinthians and the other allies of Sparta and placed under the command of Agis II, son of Archidamus, one of the Kings of Sparta. The army moved against Argos, but at a point when the Spartan army had the advantage and was ready to strike a decisive blow on the Argives, Agis concluded a truce with the them. This decision was very unpopular with the troops and the allies, for that army was according to Thucydides 'the best army ever assembled in Greece to that time'. It was also proved to be wrong by the fact that immediately after the truce, the Argives captured the key town of Orchomenus. Agis was on the verge of being fined 10000 Drachmas and have his house destroyed, but he promised to redeem himself with a victory elsewhere. However, the Ephors placed ten advisors, the xymbouloi, who needed to give their consent to whatever military action Agis was to take.

[edit] The battle

Late in 418, the Argives and their allies marched against Tegea, where a faction was ready to turn the city over to the Argive alliance. Tegea was a very important place, as it controlled the exit from Laconia. Enemy control of the town would mean that the Spartans would be unable to move out of their home city and would effectively mean the demise of the Peloponnesian coalition that fought the Archidameian war.

Agis marched the whole of the Spartan army, together with the neodamodeis and everyone who was able to fight in Sparta out to Tegea where he was joined by his allies from Arcadia, and he sent for help from his northern allies, Corinth, Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris. However, the northern army could not arrive quickly to the scene, as they had not expected the call and would have to pass through enemy territory (Argos and Orchomenus). On the whole, the army of the allies of Sparta would have numbered around 9000 hoplites.

In the meantime, the Eleans saw it fitter to attack Lepreum, a contested border town with Sparta. So, they chose to withdraw their contingent of 3000 hoplites. Agis took advantage of it and sent a sixth of his army, with the youngest and the oldest hoplites home to guard Sparta proper. They were called back soon after, as Agis or the xymbouloi realized that the Eleans would soon be back on the side of the Argives, but did not arrive in time for the battle.

Agis could have bided his time inside the walls of Tegea, waiting for his northern allies. However, he was already discredited and could not show the slightest sign of shying away from battle. So, he invaded and ravaged the territory around Mantinea, about ten miles north of Tegea and a member of the Argive alliance, in order to force a pitched battle with the Argives and their allies. The Argive Army, however, was situated on ground 'steep and hard to get at' and would not be drawn in battle, probably because the grain harvest had already been stored (the battle probably took place in the end of September 418). Agis, who was desperate for a victory to redeem his embarrassment at Argos, charged ahead anyway, but when the armies closed to a distance equal to the throw of a stone, an old hoplite or, according to Diodorus, the xymboulos Pharax, called him not to cure one evil with another and lead his army to certain defeat. The Spartans retreated and went off to find a way to draw out the Argive army to a battle. So, they diverted the Sarandapotamos River to the bed of the smaller Zanovistas river, or, they just filled up the sinkholes in which Zanovistas flowed, in order to flood the Mantinean territory.

Instead of allowing Mantinea to be flooded, the Argive army moved quicker then the Spartans anticipated, as the Argive hoplites were very angry at their generals for not pursuing the Spartan army and accused them of treason. They surprised their enemies by drawing up as the Spartans emerged from a nearby wood. The Spartans quickly organized themselves, with no time to wait for their other allies. Brasidas' veterans (Brasidas himself had been killed at the Battle of Amphipolis), and the Sciritae (an elite unit of Spartan troops) formed the left wing, the Spartans, Arcadians, Heraeans and Maenalians in the centre, and the Tegeans, who were fighting for their homeland took the postion of honour on the right wing. The Argive lines were formed by the Mantineans on the right, the Argives in the centre, and the Athenians on the left. Thucydides did not know the exact numbers of men on each side, but estimated that there were about 9000 men on the Spartan side (the Spartan army must have numbered about 3500, with 600 Sciritae, about 2000 neodamodeis and Brasideans and about 3000 Arcadians on the whole) with somewhat fewer men on the Argive and Athenian side (about 8000), according to Donald Kagan. Other scholars, such as V.D. Hanson, give slightly bigger numbers.

As the battle began, each side's right wing began to outflank the other's left, due to the erratic movements of each hoplite trying to cover himself with the shield of the man beside him. Agis tried to strengthen the line by ordering the Sciritae and his left to break off contact from the rest of the army and match the length of the Argive line. To cover the void created, he ordered the companies of Hipponoidas and Aristocles to leave their positions in the center and cover the line. This however was not achieved, for the two captains were unable, or unwilling to complete these manoeuvres on such short notice. This kind of manoeuvre was unprecedented in the history of Greek warfare. Donald Kagan considers it a most ill-advised move and gives credit to the two captains for disobeying orders that would have probably lost the battle for the Spartans. Others consider it a move that could have succeeded.

In any case, the Mantineans and the right part of the Argives, the elite Argive Thousand entered the gap and routed the Brasideans and the Sciritae and pursued them for a long distance. In the meantime, the Tegeans and the regular Spartan army routed the Athenians and the Arcadians that formed the left part of the Argive army. Most of them 'did not even stand to fight, but they fled as the Spartans approached; some were even trampled in their hurry to get away before the enemy reached them'.

Then, the Spartans turned left and broke the Argive right which fled in total disarray. The Spartans did not pursue the enemy for long after the battle was won.

[edit] Aftermath

The Argive side lost about 1100 men (700 Argives and Arcadians, 200 Athenians and 200 Mantineans) and the Spartans about 300.

The Spartans sent an embassy to Argos and the Argives accepted a truce by the terms of which they gave up Orchomenus, all their hostages and joined up with the Spartans in evicting the Athenians from Epidaurus. They also renounced their alliance with Elis and Athens. After deposing the democratic government of Sicyon, the Argive Thousand staged a coup against the democratic rule of Argos, where the democrats' morale was low, because of the bad performance of the common army and the Athenians in the battle.

In more general terms, the battle was a considerable boost to the Lacaedemonians morale and prestige. For, after the disaster at Pylos, they had been considered cowardly and incompetent in battle. Their success at Mantinea marked a reversal of the trend and a realization of the Greeks of the near-invincibility of the Spartans in hoplite combat.

[edit] References

• Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Athens, Philippos Pappas, Nikolaos Philippas; Athens, Papyros. 1953.
• Kagan, Donald. (2003). The Peloponnesian War. New York: Viking Press. ISBN 0-670-03211-5.
• Victor Davis Hanson A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. Random House, October 2005.