Battle of Lake Trasimene

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Battle of Lake Trasimeno
Part of the Second Punic War
Date June 24, 217 BC Location Lake Trasimeno, Italy Result Carthaginian victory
Combatants
Carthage	Roman Republic
Commanders
Hannibal	Gaius Flaminius †
Strength
30,000 soldiers	30,000-40,000 soldiers
Casualties
1,500 soldiers	15,000 killed or drowned 15,000 captured

Second Punic War
Saguntum – Lilybaeum – Ticinus – Trebia – Cissa – Lake Trasimene – Ebro River – Cannae – 1st Nola – Dertosa – 2nd Nola – Cornus – 3rd Nola – 1st Capua – Silarus – 1st Herdonia – Syracuse – Upper Baetis – 2nd Capua – 2nd Herdonia – Numistro – Asculum – Tarentum – Baecula – Grumentum – Metaurus – Ilipa – Crotona – Utica – Bagbrades – Cirta – Po Valley – Great Plains – Zama

The Battle of Lake Trasimeno (June 24, 217 BC, April on the Julian calendar) was a Roman defeat in the Second Punic War between the Carthaginians under Hannibal and the Romans under the consul Gaius Flaminius. The battle is perhaps one of the largest and most successful ambushes in military history.

Contents 1 Prelude 2 Battle 2.1 Tactical Disposition 2.2 Events 3 Aftermath 4 Trivia 5 References

[edit] Prelude

The Romans, greatly alarmed and dismayed by Tiberius Sempronius Longus’ defeat at Trebia, immediately made plans to counter the new threat from the north. Sempronius returned to Rome and the Roman Senate resolved to elect new consuls the following year in 217 B.C. The two new consuls were Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Gaius Flaminius. The Senate commissioned Servilius to replace Publius Cornelius Scipio and take command of his army, while Flaminius was appointed to lead what remained of Sempronius’s army. Since both armies had been weakened by the defeat at Trebia, four new legions were raised, and these new forces, together with the remains of the former army, were divided between the two consuls ^[1]. After the battles of Ticinus and Trebia, Flaminius' army turned south to prepare a defense near Rome itself. Hannibal immediately followed, but marched faster and soon passed the Roman army. Flaminius was forced to increase the speed of his march in order to bring Hannibal to battle before reaching the city. Another force under Servilius was due to join Flaminius.

Before this could happen, Hannibal decided to lure Flaminius into a pitched battle, by devastating the area he had been sent to protect. As Polybius tells us, “he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country but would spontaneously follow him ... and give him opportunities for attack.” ^[2]. At the same time, he tried to sever the allegiance of Rome’s allies, by proving that the Republic was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to goad Flaminius into battle, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thereby executing the first deliberate turning movement in military history). Still, Flaminius stubbornly remained in camp with his army. Hannibal decided to march on Apulia, hoping that Flaminius might follow him to a battlefield of his own choosing.

Flaminius, too eager to exact revenge for the devastation of the countryside, and facing increasing political criticism from Rome, finally decided to march against Hannibal. Flaminius, like Sempronius, was impetuous, over-confident and lacked self-control. His advisors suggested that he send only a cavalry detachment to harass the Carthaginians and prevent them from laying waste to any more of the country, while reserving his main force until the other consul, Servilius, arrived with his army. However, it proved impossible to argue with the rash Flaminius. “Though every other person in the council advised safe rather than showy measures,” writes Livy, “urging that he should wait for his colleague, in order that joining their armies, they might carry on the war with united courage and counsels ... Flaminius, in a fury ... gave out the signal for marching for battle.” ^[1]

[edit] Battle

[edit] Tactical Disposition

As Hannibal passed Lake Trasimene, he came to a place very suitable for an ambush, and hearing that Flaminius had broken camp and was pursuing him, made preparations for the next impending battle. To the north was a series of heavily forested hills where the Malpasso Road passed along the north side of Lake Trasimene. Along the hill-bordered skirts of the lake, Hannibal camped where he was in full view of any one entering the northern defile, and spent the night arranging his troops for battle. Below the camp, he placed his heavy infantry (Iberians, Celts, and Africans) upon a slight elevation. Here, they had been given ample charging ground from which they could rush down with effect, upon the head of the Roman column on the left flank, when it should reach the position ^[3]. His cavalry and Gallic infantry was concealed in the hills in the depth of the wooden valley from which the Romans would first enter, so that they could quickly sally out and close the entrance, and prevent a means of retreat for the Romans. Then he posted his light troops at intervals along the height overlooking the plain, with orders to keep well hidden in the woods until signaled to attack. In addition, the night before the battle commenced Hannibal had ordered his men to light campfires on the hills of Tuoro, at a considerable distance, so as to convince the Romans that his forces were farther away than they actually were.

[edit] Events

The next morning the Roman troops approached eastward, along the road running across the northern edge of the lake. Eager for battle, Flaminius pushed his men mercilessly and hurried up the column in the rear. Hannibal then sent a small skirmish force to draw their vanguard away from the front of the line, allowing the rest of the Roman army time to set up for an assault to the east. As soon as the Romans marched through a long, foggy and narrow valley and entered the plains, trumpets were blown, sounding the attack. The Carthaginian cavalry and infantry came down from the surrounding hills, sealed off the defile and engaged the unsuspecting Romans from all sides. Surprised and outmaneuvered, the Romans did not have time to draw up in the battle array to which they were accustomed and were forced to fight a hopeless hand-to-hand battle, in open order. The Romans were quickly split into three forces. The westernmost was attacked by the Carthaginian cavalry and forced into the lake, leaving the other two groups surrounded. The center, including Flaminius, stood its ground but was cut down by Hannibal's Gauls after three hours of heavy combat.

In a brief span of three hours, the entire Roman army was annihilated. The vanguard saw little combat throughout and, once the disaster to their rear became obvious, they cut their way through the skirmishers and out of the forest. Only 6,000 men barely managed to cut their way to safety, under the cover of the fog only to be captured the following day. Of the remaining thirty thousand, half were either killed or drowned (including Flaminius himself) and the other half captured. Hannibal's losses, on the other hand, did not exceed 1,500 men (a ratio of one Carthaginian for every ten Romans). But the disaster for Rome did not end there. Within a day or two, a reinforcement of four thousand Roman troops was intercepted and destroyed.

[edit] Aftermath

Hannibal, emerging from another brilliant victory, had successfully laid and achieved the greatest ambush in history ^[2]. The news of the defeat caused a panic in Rome once news reached the city. Quintus Fabius Maximus was elected dictator by the Senate and adopted a "Fabian strategy" of avoiding conflict until Rome could restore its military strength. Hannibal was left largely free to ravage Apulia for the next year, until the Romans withdrew the dictatorship and elected Paullus and Varro as consuls. The result would be the Battle of Cannae, perhaps the worst defeat the Romans would suffer throughout the Second Punic War.

[edit] Trivia

• Livy states that so terrible was the massacre at Lake Trasimene, that neither army was aware of the occurrence of an earthquake, which at the very moment of the battle “overthrew large portions of many of the cities of Italy, turned rivers, and leveled mountains with an awful crash” ^[3].
• An ancient tradition says that because of the blood, which for over three days filled the water, that the name of a small stream feeding the lake was renamed Sanguineto, the “Blood River” ^[4]. In the surroundings of Lake Trasimene, there are further areas which retain a particular meaning, including Ossaia ("Charnel House, Place of Bones"), Sepoltaglia ("Place of Burial"), Caporosso ("Cape red"), Piegaro ("Subdued Place), Preggio (from "Peggio", "Worse"), Pugnano ("Place of battles"), and Pian di Marte ("Field of Mars").

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} Cottrell, Leonard, Enemy of Rome, Evans Bros, 1965. ISBN 0-237-44320-1 (pbk)
2. ^ ^{a b} Liddell Hart, Basil, Strategy, New York City, New York; Penguin Group; 1967
3. ^ ^{a b} Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal, Cambridge, Massachusetts: De Capo Press, 1891 ISBN 0-306-81362-9
4. ^ “Hannibal Barca and the Punic Wars” By Hilary Gowen