Battle of Khalkhin Gol

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A destroyed Soviet armoured car of the type BA-10 during the Battle of Khalkhin Gol

Date	May 11 - September 16, 1939
Location	Khalkhin Gol, Mongolia
Result	Decisive Soviet victory
Territorial changes	status quo ante bellum

Combatants

Commanders

Michitaro Komatsubara

Strength

57,000

30,000

Casualties

6,831 killed, 15,952 wounded

8,440 killed, 8,766 wounded

Manchuria
Lake Khasan – Khalkhin Gol

The Battle of Khalkhin Gol, sometimes spelled Halhin Gol or Khalkin Gol after the Halha River passing through the battlefield and known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident (after a nearby village on the border between Mongolia and Manchuria), was the decisive engagement of the undeclared Soviet-Japanese Border War (1939), or Japanese-Soviet War. It should not be confused with the conflict in 1945 when the USSR declared war in support of the other Allies of World War II and launched Operation August Storm.

1 Background
2 Prelude
3 The battle
4 Japanese conclusions
5 Aftermath
6 Weapons employed in the battle
- 6.1 Japan
- 6.2 Soviet Union and Mongolia
7 Influence on World War II
8 References
9 Sources and External Links

[edit] Background

After the occupation of Manchukuo and Korea, Japan turned its military interests to Soviet territories. The first major Soviet-Japanese border incident (Battle of Lake Khasan) happened in 1938 in Primorye. Conflicts between the Japanese and the Soviets frequently happened on the border of Manchuria.

In 1939, Manchuria was a client state of Japan, known as Manchukuo. The Japanese maintained that the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia was the Halha River (also known in Mongolian as the Halhin Gol, or the Khalkhin Gol), while the Mongolians and their Soviet allies maintained that it ran some 16 kilometres (10 miles) east of the river, just east of Nomonhan village.

In the Nomonhan region of West Manchuria, the Japanese and the Manchukuoans contended that the border line ran along the Halha River, known to the Russians as the Khalkhin-gol, which flows into Lake Buir Nor.The Soviets and the Outer Mongolians insisted, however, that the frontier lay about 30 kilometers east of Nomonhan.

Nomonhan appears to be a village west of the Holsten River (NS at that point) just before it crossed the Soviet claimed boundary (NW-SE at that point).Holsten rises in Lake Abutara a few miles inside Soviet claimed territory, and flows into the Halha river (Khalkhin Gol).

The principal occupying army of Manchukuo was the Kwantung Army of Japan consisting of some of the best Japanese units in 1939. However the western region of Manchukuo was garrisoned by the newly formed IJA 23d Division at Hailar, under General Michitaro Komatsubara and several Manchukuoan army and border guard units.

Red Army forces consisted of the 57th Special Corps, forward deployed from the Trans-Baikal Military District responsible for the defense of the border between Siberia and Manchuria.

[edit] Prelude

The incident began on 11 May 1939, when a Mongolian cavalry unit of some 70-90 men entered the disputed area in search of grazing for their horses, and encountered Manchukuoan cavalry who drove them out of the disputed territory. Two days later the Mongolian force returned and the Manchukoans were unable to evict them.

The Kwantung Army considered this action to be a violation of the Manchukuoan frontier, and repelled the raiders in conformity with the current Border Defense Guide regulations mentioned above. The Outer Mongolians, however, received reinforcements, re-crossed the river, and attacked again.

At this point the Japanese Kwantung Army became involved -- a reconnaissance unit under Lt. Col. Yaozo Azuma was sent to engage the Mongolians on 14 May, but they retreated west of the river with few losses. Joseph Stalin ordered STAVKA, the Red Army's high command, to develop a plan for a counterstrike against the Japanese. To lead the attack, Georgy Zhukov, a young officer of promise, was chosen.

The Mongolians and Soviets continued to build up forces in the area, and Azuma's force returned a week later. This time the Japanese forces were surrounded by superior numbers of Soviet and Mongolian infantry and tanks, and on 28-29 May the Azuma force was destroyed, suffering 8 officers and 97 men killed and one officer and 33 men wounded, with 63% casualties.

Throughout June, however, there were continuing reports of Soviet and Mongolian activity on both sides of the river near Nomonhan, and small-scale attacks on isolated Manchukoan units. At the end of the month the local Kwantung commander, Lt. Gen. Michitaro Komatsubara, was given permission to "expel the invaders". The Japanese operation started on 1 July and was initially successful in crossing the Halha river. However, by the evening of 3 July the attack stalled and the Soviet forces, led by Zhukov, threw the Japanese back over the river. The front then stabilized with only minor actions for the rest of the summer.

The conflict expanded into a battle and both countries deployed large forces including tanks and airplanes along the Khalkhin river in the north of Manchuria. Japan sent a tank group, commanded by Major General Masaomi Yasuoka, which had two tank regiments, 3rd and 4th Tank Regiment commanded by Colonel Yoshimaru the first (26 Type 89 Medium Tanks,4 Type 97 Medium Tanks and 15 Type 94 Tankettes) and Colonel Tamada the second (8 Type 89 Medium Tanks,36 Type 95 Light Tanks and 4 Type 94 Tankettes). This battle is called the Nomonhan Incident in Japan.

Japanese artillery units (13th Field Artillery Regiment, under Col. Ise, 3rd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade HQ led by Major Gen.Hata, 1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment under Col.Mishima, 7th Independent Field Heavy Artillery Regiment led by Col.Takatsukasa, Muling Heavy Artillery Regiment led by Lt.Col.Someya and 1st Independent Field Artillery Regiment led by Col.Miyao)was also deployed to the Nomonhan area also.

The Army air force involved in Nomonhan success was the 2nd Hikoshidan, commanded by General Tetsuji Giga .

[edit] The battle

[edit] The land battle

Finally, in mid-August Zhukov decided it was time to break the stalemate. He deployed approximately 50,000 Russian and Mongolian troops of the 57th Special Corps to defend the east bank of the Halhin Gol River, then crossed the river on 20 August to attack the elite Japanese forces with three infantry divisions, massed artillery, a tank brigade, and the best planes of the Soviet Air Force. Japanese forces at the time of the Soviet counterattack had crossed the river and held the Khalkin Gol mountain ranges nearest the river. However, within days of the Soviet attack, Japanese forces were obliged to abandon their foothold across the river due to a lack of adequate anti-tank weapons. The Soviets had three infantry divisions and five mechanized brigades (430 tanks and the same number of armored cars), while the Outer Mongolians possessed two cavalry divisions.

Kwantung Army forces were built around Lieutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara's 23d Division whose headquarters had been at Hailar, capital of Hsingan, Manchu province, over 100 miles from the site of the fighting.

On 27 August the Japanese attempted to break out of the encirclement, but failed. When the surrounded forces refused to surrender, Zhukov wiped them out with artillery and air attacks. The battle ended 31 August with the complete destruction of the Japanese forces. Remaining Japanese units retreated back across the river.

Japanese doctrine relied heavily upon close infantry tactics which remained the primary doctrine of the Japanese army from their 1905 field manual and again in the 1938 updated manual. Japanese forces were supposed to make contact with the enemy main body with armored cars. Infantry forces would then assemble in a triangular attack pattern with artillery in the rear and light tanks acting as support for the infantry. This battle formation turned out to be a disaster for the Japanese Imperial Army.

Soviet doctrine relied upon using mass concentrations of armor in the shape of a box. Light tank units would be the front of the box with medium tanks such as the T-28 constituting the rest of the formation. Behind the main box, the Soviet forces followed on with infantry supported by heavy tanks also arranged in a box configuration. Unfortunately for the Japanese, they did not possess any significant anti-tank weapons to stop the masses of Soviet armor. Due to the desert climate of the region, Soviet tank gunners were generally able to see their opponents at long range and shell the Japanese with impunity.

During the Nomonhan incident, the Kwantung Army, following their doctrine, used an armored force (the "Yasuoka Detachment"), composed of two light and medium tank brigades to support infantry assaults. These were severely handled by Soviet infantry with heavy artillery and armored support.

The Soviets had been massing a major armoured force in the form of three tank (4th,6th and 11th) and two mechanized (7th and 8th) brigades (mechanised brigades were armoured car units with attached infantry support). This force was allocated to the Soviet left and right wings.

Once the Japanese were pinned down by the advance of the Soviet center units, the armoured units swept around the flanks and attacked the Japanese in the rear, cutting lines of communication. Soviet artillery smashed the surviving remains of the Japanese frontal assault group. During one such strike the regimental commander's vehicle was hit and Colonel Yoshimaru was killed.

In these engagements Japanese units also experienced their first tank vs. tank battles. The 45mm guns mounted on Soviet tanks could easily penetrate the thin armor of Japanese tanks at long range distance, while the short-barreled guns on Japanese tanks were only effective against Soviet tanks at short range. The Yasuoka Detachment lost 40% of its tanks in ten days of battle and was ordered to withdraw.

Such plans were devised by Georgy Zhukov and he introduced these types of tactics with overwhelming success in WW2. This success was presaged by its triumph in the Nomonhan fighting where the Soviets destroyed nearly all of the Japanese "Yasuoka Detachment" armored group and 6th Army infantry forces. The assault and the type of combined arms fighting received little attention at the time but was a portent of the nature of armored warfare in World War II.

After that the Soviets took to the offensive with large forces and routed Japanese from Nomonhan. Japanese armored forces were totally defeated in the battle of Nomonhan. Before the arrival of Kwantung Army reinforcements, the Soviet Army launched an offensive on August 20 and inflicted severe losses upon the Japanese.

The Russians employed encircling tactics and made skillful use of their superior artillery and armor. Of the 15,140 men in the Komatsubara Force, of which the 23d Division was the core, 11,124 were killed or wounded in action. During the period between July 1 and September 16 which covers most of the fighting at Nomonhan-casualties totalled no less than 73%, as a percentage of the force engaged. Most of these losses were incurred during the Soviets' August offensive.

[edit] Soviet-Japanese Artillery engagements

Amongst such defeats during the Nomonhan Incident, Japanese artillery forces (13th Field Artillery Regiment-24 Type 38 75mm Field Guns 12 Type 38 12cm Howitzers under led of Col. Ise, 3rd Field Heavy Artillery Brigade HQ by led of Major Gen.Hata,1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment-16 Type 96 15cm Howitzers under command of Col.Mishima, 7th Independent Field Heavy Artillery Regiment-16 Type 92 10cm Cannons guided by Col.Takatsukasa, Muling Heavy Artillery Regiment-6 Type 89 15cm Cannon led by Lt.Col.Someya and 1st Independent Field Artillery Regiment-8 Type 90 75mm Field Guns commanded for Col.Miyao) was involved in an artillery duel with the Soviets. The result was the defeat of the Japanese. Japanese artillery were outranged by the Soviet artillery and the terrain was disadvantageous to the Japanese. However, the key problem was the supply of ammunition. Japanese artillery forces had used up most of their stockpiled ammunition in three days and they could not continue an artillery duel any longer. On the other hand, Soviet artillery continued the heavy bombardment with an abundant supply of ammunition and defeated the Japanese artillery.

In the war against China the Japanese did not experience a large artillery battle. They had forgotten the lessons of the Port Arthur siege. The result of the Nomonhan battle revealed the problems of Japanese artillery forces. However, while they were not improved upon Japan was driving toward the war in the Pacific.

[edit] Air operations

The Japanese Army air force involved was the 2nd Hikoshidan, commanded by General Tetsuji Giga. At the time of the August offensive it consisted of 4 scout planes attached to air force headquarters, 15 Mitsubishi Ki-15 serving with the ground troops, and two combat wings with 125 aircraft: 12th Hikodan with 88 fighters. Three fighter groups took part in the offensive, all of which later saw combat against the American Volunteer Group in Burma: 1st Sentai ; 11th Sentai; and 64th Sentai. A fourth group, the 24th Sentai, evidently did not take part in the offensive. 9th Hikodan with 24 Mitsubishi Ki-30 and 13 Mitsubishi Ki-21. The combat units included one squadron of the 10th Sentai Kawasaki Ki-32s plus 2 Mitsubishi Ki-15, three squadrons of the 16th Sentai (Mitsubishi Ki-30), and one squadron of the 61st Sentai Mitsubishi Ki-21 and Ki-1s commanded by. Japanese ground commanders tended to discount verbal reports of aerial reconnaissance. Photos were rare because aerial cameras were difficult to operate.

The 2nd Hikoshidan was worn down by August. In July, the Japanese had claimed 481 Soviet planes while losing 14 of their own. In August they claimed 134 while losing 23. On the Soviet side, Soviet Air Force officer A. B. Vorozheikin states the loss ratio was 4 Soviet to 1 Japanese in May but improved to 1:3 in June, 1:4 in July, and 1:10 in August.

The Nomonhan fighting used up most of Nakajima's production of Ki-27 fighters. The crews were exhausted and replacement pilots untrained. Constant flying led to fatigue: "An air staff officer remembers the drawn faces, glazed eyes, and hollow cheeks of Japanese aviators. Scout pilots ...were having difficulty with their respiratory systems."

Prior to the August offensive, 52 airmen were killed and 24 wounded, including Col Katsumi Abe commanding the 15th Sentai, killed by Russian strafing on August 2. Lt. Col. Rjiro Matsumura commanding the 24th Sentai was shot down on August 4 by Russian veterans of the Spanish Civil War the undersides of their wings had been painted violet.. He was pinned by the tail of his own plane, his flight suit set afire, and lost all the fingers on one hand, but was rescued by another pilot who landed, pulled him free, and bundled him into his one-seater fighter. In all, 80% of Japanese squadron commanders were killed or wounded- 70 percent of JAAF pilots had upwards of 1,000 hrs flight time.

[edit] The big push - 21 August 1939

In July, Kwantung Army HQ at Hsinking urged the Imperial Army High Command for permission to launch an air offensive against the Soviet-Mongol strongpoint at Tamsag. This was approved on Aug 7th. "Operation S" was set for dawn Aug 21. The estimated Soviet air strength was 80-90 fighters, 30-40 larger planes. Says Giga had eight groups with 88 fighters, 24 light bombers, 13 heavy bombers, 21 scouts. 16th Sentai had light bombers, and a 6-plane squadron took off at 4:20 a.m. Bombers in two tiers escorted by 50 fighters flew across Halha for Tamsag airfield 60 km south-west of Higashi-watashi crossing. First squadron dropped their bombs at 6 a.m. While it was still dark, they could see the outline of the airfield. On the return leg, they encountered anti-aircraft fire. Second squadron saw 16 large planes on the airfield, encountered 20 I-16s Polikarpov single-wing open cockpit fighters when returning and took some hits. Third squadron could not find their target and instead bombed tank formations. From 10th Sentai light bomber squadron, 6 planes saw 10 Tupolev SB-2 twin-engined bombers on the airfield north-east of Tamsang, bombed them and claimed 2 destroyed. Escorting 12th Fighter Wing met no planes.

The second wave attacked at 11 a.m. The squadron from 16th Sentai claimed they bombed and destroyed five out of eight large aircraft. Another squadron from the same group was intercepted by fighters, so it turned for home and attacked ground installations. It lost one plane and claimed 3 fighters downed. 61st Sentai Mitsubishi Ki-21s with 12 planes met eight fighters at southern airstrip and claimed two downed. On the way home they claimed three more. 12th Fighter Wing met 50-60 enemy planes, claimed 27 fighters and 1 bomber, while losing 3 of their own. In the afternoon, they supported Japanese ground forces by bombing tanks and vehicles near Fui Heights, where they encountered enemy planes. 16th Light Bomber claimed 6 out of 30 I-16s, losing one man killed and two wounded. Escorting 11th Sentai fighters claimed 11 out of 40-50 I-15 Polikarpov biplane fighters and I-16s. In the evening, 10th Sentai squadron bombed 3 fighters taking off from a concealed aistrip west of Hara Heights. Escorting fighters engaged 50 enemy fighters, claimed 9 and lost 1 from 64th Sentai. Still, they had failed to neutralize enemy air power, and so scheduled followup for next day.

[edit] August 22

61st Sentai heavy bombers was attacked by 30 I-16s, claimed 6 enemy fighters for 1 of their own bombers with the entire crew of 5. Fighters met 30 enemy planes, claiming 3 with 1 lost from 1st Sentai to anti-aircraft fire. Scouts attached to the 23rd Division reported that Soviet armor was threatening Japanese positions, so Giga called off the air offensive to support the ground forces. Anti-aircraft fire shot down a scout from 10th Sentai, and captain Koji Motomura , 11th Sentai squadron leader, was shot down while single-handedly battling 30 I-16s strafing ground forces north of 23rd Division HQ. Though claiming 109 Soviet aircraft in two days, the Japanese had actually lost air supremacy. These were the worst losses since the outbreak of Nomonhan fighting, with approximately 8 planes lost on the first day, and 6 on the second, with a total of 22-24 killed or wounded. Japanese airmen were exhausted, but ordered to keep flying.

Soviets reinforced their air forces, and in the climax of the battle on 28-31 of August, the Soviet Air Force reported four engagements with JAAF, downing 4 bombers and 45 fighters. There was a major battle on the 31st of August, when 126 Soviet fighters repelled 27 Japanese bombers and 70 fighters, shooting down 22. The Japanese claimed 20 Soviet planes that day, losing 3 planes and 4 men. Altogether, the Japanese claimed 108 Soviet aircraft shot down for 29 of their own with 20 airmen killed and 32 wounded from the 23rd through the 31st of August. After the 5th of September, there were major changes in the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service. Operational strength was down from 160 planes on Aug 29 to 141 planes on the September 5th.

The 31st Sentai and 64th Sentai had come up from China in July and August. More reinforcements began to move on 1 Sep. Giga's 2nd Hikoshidan absorbed by Koihiro Ebashi increasing air strength at Nomonhan by 50% with 9 new squadrons -- 6 fighter, 1 recon, 2 light bomber -- to a total of four wings (hikodan?) with 34-37 squadrons and up to 325 planes. Russians likewise reinforced air units at the front. On 13 Sep, Ebashi gave go-ahead. 225 planes airworthy; fighters and some light bombers deployed to forward bases. Weather improved on 14 Sep.

Maj Tadashi Yoshida's 1st Sentai (Ki-27) bounced about 28 Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters in afternoon, claiming 3. Weather still fair on 15 Sep, and Ebashi sent all Ki-27s and two light bombers groups plus scouts -- total 200 planes -- to hit enemy airfields. 20 Nates from Lt Col Isaku Imagawa's 59th Sentai engaged 50 Russ fighters, claimed 11. But one squadron followed Russ to south, was ambushed, and lost six Nates and their pilots, inc. s/l Mitsugu Yamamoto. 24th Sentai under newly arrived Capt Toshio Sakagawa claimed 13 Russ fighters; Sakagawa wounded but lost not planes. Total Japanese claims: 39 in air, 4-5 on ground; lost 9, with 8 pilots killed incl 2 squadron leaders, plus three lt bombers damaged. Russ say six air battles: 1, 2, 4, 5, 14, and 15 Sept, the last being the biggest, with 102 Japanese planes engaging 207 Russ. Russ claimed 20, lost 6. Altogether for Sept, Russ claimed 70, lost 14; Japaneses claimed 121, lost 24.

[edit] The aftermath

JAAF casualties 141 killed, including 17 officers squadron leader or higher, w/ highest ranking being Col Katsumi Abe , c/o 15th Sentai. One-third of losses were over enemy lines. Plus 89 wounded. 10% of casualties in May and June, 26 percent in July, 50 percent in August, 14 percent in September. Russia returned bodies of 55 Japanese airmen from west side of the Halha. In one PW compound, the Russians held 500-600 Japanese prisoners, including a Imperial Japanese Army Air Service colonel. The released [bodies?] included Maj Fumio Harada, 1st Sentai c/o shot down 29 July, possibly by Senior Lt V. G. Rakhov, who claimed to have shot down a Japanese "ace" that day, who bailed out, tried to commit suicide, but was captured alive. As Rakhov told the story, the Japanese prisoner asked to meet the Russian pilot who defeated him, then bowed "in tribute to the victor"

Also [the body of?] 1st Lt Naoyuki Daitoku of 11th Sentai. The Russians sent him to Shintan hospital at Kirin, with MPs guarding the train and toilet doors always kept open, to prevent suicide attempts. Tight security also at hospital, where most of the orderlies were actually MPs. As the story was told, two coffins were carried into the hospital the day before a six-hour "trial," after which guards were forbidden to go into the officers' rooms. They duly shot themselves, Harada supposedly after being given a loaded pistol and a Japanese publication describing his "heroic death in action" .

JAAF Master Sgt Shiko Miyajima , Ki-27 pilot of 24th Sentai, bellied in 22 June, wandered 4 days without food or water, captured by a Mongol patrol and imprisoned under harsh conditions for 10 months, returned to Japanese forces in 1940, tried, and sentenced to two years and 10 months for "desertion under enemy fire." Released 31 Dec 1942. Gen Giga in August 1940 made commander of a bomber basic training school, then retired in Oct 1941 at age of 56 and spent most of WWII as a farmer. unit citations to Col Noguchi's 11th Sentai for air battles in May, Lt Col Matsumura's 24th Sentai for combat in June. Also to all three wings and to a squadron of 16th Sentai. Russ I-16 fighters used 82 mm rockets to attack Japanese ground positions, and some claim of using air-to-air missiles against Japanese planes. I-16 saw service on Western front until 1943, and in Spanish service under 1952. Says it was replaced at Nomonhan by the retractable-gear I-153 Chaika fighter-bomber, much more powerful than the I-15.

JAAF had trained only 1,700 pilots in 30 years; losses at Nomonhan crippled it. By December 1941, army flight schools graduating 750 pilots a year.

[edit] Japanese conclusions

The Nomonhan Incident gave the Japanese Army an opportunity to realize the actual ability of the Soviet Army. Seeing was believing

The bulk of the Soviet ground forces-artillery and armor-were far superior to the Japanese Army in terms of fire power and mechanized equipment.
The Japanese were exceedingly surprised by Soviet capability of transporting and storing war materiel at a battlefront 600 kilometers away from a railroad terminal.^[1]
Having rid itself of the inflexibility which characterized the old Czarist forces, the Soviet Army proved able to change tactics from battle to battle. At the beginning of the Incident, for example, most of the Soviet tanks were ignited by gasoline-bottles hurled at them by Japanese troops. A month later, however, the Russians were using crude-oil fuel, or were covering the tank chassis with wire nets. Other cases of Soviet field improvisation were numerous.
The Soviet Army was more tenacious than had been expected.

After the end of the Nomonhan fighting, the Army High Command set up a committee to investigate the whole Incident. The commission was to evaluate the abilities of the Soviet Army, and to re-examine the performance of Japanese armaments and operations against the Russians.

Where military equipment was concerned, Japanese fire power proved far inferior. Heated debates ensued about the two basic alternatives: whether to effect a thoroughgoing reorganization, or whether to go only as far as reinforcing current fire power materiel. The second alternative was selected.

Lurking in the background of the controversy was the problem of abandoning the principle of hand-to-hand fighting, a tradition of the Japanese infantry. The High Command did not awaken to the remarkable progress of material potentials in modern warfare, but instead continued to esteem the superiority of spiritual fighting strength. This attitude could perhaps be traced to the fact that the Japanese Army did not progress beyond comprehending fire power at the levels of 1904-05. It had never received a baptism of fire on the modern scale of World War I.

Now the second World War had just broken out. Japanese military authorities, admiring the brilliant successes of German Army operations, began to cherish a desire to learn from German experience rather than from that of the Nomonhan Incident. This desire crystallized into the dispatch of the Yamashita Military Inspection Team to Germany.

After the negotiation of the Nomonhan armistice, the newly appointed Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, Yoshijiro Umezu, took immediate steps to prevent further border troubles. He pulled back Japanese troops somewhat behind the frontiers where demarcation lines were not precise.

A fundamental principle designed to prevent border incidents was General Umezu's order that, in the event of Soviet or Outer Mongolian penetration of a disputed area, only the Commander of the Kwantung Army himself could decide whether Japanese troops might counterattack. The new measures represented a fundamental revision of the old border defense principles. Bold and positive front-line attacks against the enemy, which had been formerly stressed, were not to be sanctioned now. As a result, a more peaceful atmosphere thereafter prevailed in the vicinity of the frontiers.

[edit] Aftermath

Following the battle, the Red Army attacked what remained of the Japanese forces and drove them back into Manchukuo. On 16 September the Japanese asked for a cease-fire. Still awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, the Kwantung Army girded for a counteroffensive, but on September 15 an armistice was arranged in Moscow. The troops stopped fighting the next day. Nearly two years later, on April 13, 1941, the parties signed a Neutrality pact, in which they agreed to abide by the existing border.

Among Japanese military authorities, the most widespread opinion was that the Nomonhan Incident had been a maneuver instigated by the Soviet Union in order to restrain the Japanese Army from disposing of the China Incident.

Some sources^{[citation needed]} have suggested that Stalin had been informed by Germans that Germany had no hostile intentions against the USSR at the time. This allowed for the temporary redeployment of some elite units of the Red Army to the east. Stalin took the chance and relocated all the few already existing fully mechanized units to the eastern theatre for deployment against the Japanese whose forces of tanks and armored cars were considerably weaker. The Japanese were surprised by the highly mechanized status of what they believed to be "local command troops", and some even took these just emerging mechanized units as an already generally existing standard of the Red Army.^{[citation needed]} The devastating outcome of this "testing of Red Army strength" in the end convinced the Japanese Army to choose the "southern strike" (attacking the more promising and comparatively more weakly defended South East Asian areas), and to dismiss the "northern strike" option. As known, Soviet spy Richard Sorge informed his superiors of the Japanese decision to "go south". As he had already correctly predicted the German attack of June 22, Stalin could redeploy his Siberian elites and throw them into the battle for Moscow in December, 1941.

Of the 30,000 troops on the Japanese side, 8,440 were killed and 8,766 wounded. The Red Army committed 57,000 infantry, 498 tanks, and 346 armored cars to the battle, and claimed total losses (killed and wounded) of 9,284 men.^[2] After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, new documents about the battle changed the numbers considerably. The actual number of casualties in the battle was 23,926, of whom 6,831 were killed, 1,143 reported missing and 15,952 wounded. While the Red Army did win the battle, it was not as one-sided a battle as previously believed.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Weapons employed in the battle

[edit] Japan

Aircraft

Kawasaki Ki-10 "Perry"
Nakajima Type 91 (NC)
Nakajima Ki-27 "Nate"
Kawasaki Type 88(KDA-2)
Kawasaki Ki-3
Kawasaki Ki-32 "Mary"
Mitsubishi Ki-1
Mitsubishi Ki-21 "Sally"
Mitsubishi Ki-30 "Ann"
Mitsubishi Ki-2
Kawasaki Ki-3
Nakajima Ki-4
Nakajima Ki-4
Mitsubishi Ki-15 "Babs"
Nakajima Ki-34 "Thora"
Tachikawa Ki-36 "Ida"

Tanks

The Type 94 TK tankette.
The Type 95 Ha-Go light tank.
The Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank.
The Type 89 Chi-Ro medium tank.

Artillery

75mm field guns.
105mm field howitzer Type 1.
25mm anti-tank guns.
Type 94 37 mm Anti-Tank Gun
Type 92 70mm Infantry Gun
Type 98 20 mm AA Machine Cannon
Type 38 75mm Field Gun
Type 38 12cm Howitzer
Type 96 15cm Howitzer
Type 92 10cm Cannon
Type 89 15cm Cannon
Type 90 75mm Field Guns

Infantry weapons

Type 38 Arisaka carbine
Type 99 Arisaka rifle
The Type 1 Heavy Machine Gun
Type 10 and Type 89 50mm grenade dischargers.
Type 97 20mm AT Rifle

[edit] Soviet Union and Mongolia

Aircraft

Kocherigin Di-6
Polikarpov-Grigorovich I-5
Polikarpov I-15(I-152)
Polikarpov I-153
Polikarpov I-16(Type 24)
Polikarpov R-5
Nyeman R-10
Polikarpov U-2(Po-2)
Tupolev TB-1(ANT-4)
Tupolev TB-3(ANT-6)
Tupolev SB-2/SB-2bis
Ilyushin DB-3B
Kalinin K-5
Tupolev ANT-9(PS-9)
Tupolev ANT-35(PS-35)

Tanks

T-37 light tank
BT-5 light tank
BT-7 light tank
T-26 light tank

Armoured Cars [1]

Artillery

150mm howitzer
105mm howitzer
76mm AT-zig anti-tank/infantry support gun
45mm anti-tank/infantry support gun

Infantry weapons

120mm mortar
80mm mortar

[1] BA Armoured cars with tank turrets were found to be easier to maintain and more mobile on the Mongolian plains than tanks. Mongol Armored Battalions had these vehicles exclusively and the Soviets had 3 Armoured Car Brigades against 2 Tank Brigades in this Campaign.

[edit] Influence on World War II

Although this engagement is little-known in the West, it had profound implications on the conduct of World War II. It may be said to be the first decisive battle of World War II because it determined that the two principal Axis Powers, Germany and Japan, would never geographically link up their areas of control (at least through the Soviet Union, there was still the possibility that they would link up via the Indian Ocean and the Middle East, but this, too, was impossible by mid-Spring, 1942), since the defeat convinced the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo that the policy of the North Strike Group, favored by the army, which wanted to seize Siberia as far as Lake Baikal for its resources, was untenable. Instead the South Strike Group, favored by the navy, which wanted to seize the resources of Southeast Asia, especially the petroleum and mineral-rich Dutch East Indies, gained the ascendancy, leading directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor two and a half years later in December 1941.

It was the first victory for the famed Soviet general Georgy Zhukov, earning him the first of his four Hero of the Soviet Union awards. The battle experience gained by the Siberian army was put to good use in December 1941 outside Moscow, under the command of Zhukov, when Siberian divisions spearheaded the first successful Soviet counteroffensive against the German invasion of 1941. The decision to move the divisions from Siberia was aided by the Soviet's masterspy Richard Sorge in Tokyo, who was able to alert the Soviet government that the Japanese were looking south and were unlikely to launch another attack against Siberia in the immediate future.

The after effects of the battle remained far reaching for Japan: expansion into Siberia remained checked for 1939 but the Imperial Japanese High Command still wished to invade Siberia in the near future. This meant that an offensive posture was assumed by the Kwantung army in Manchuria. Defense of Manchuria was kept at a minimum since the Japanese command assumed that eventually Mongolia and parts of Siberia bordering Manchuria would be taken. These views would be disastrous to Japan when the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria in 1945 during their Operation August Storm. Without defenses in place, Manchuria would easily fall to the USSR by September 1945.

Other effects from the battle included renewed Japanese interest in southeast Asia and China. The battle proved the failure of Japanese doctrine against Soviet doctrine. This finding would contribute to the Soviet Union declaring war on Japan in 1945 and invading Manchuria.

[edit] References

^ Erickson, The Soviet High Command, 1962, p.536
^ Nomanhan: Japanese-Soviet tactical combat 1939 by Edward Drea

[edit] Sources and External Links

Alvin D Coox, "Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939", ISBN 0-8047-1835-0
Erickson, The Soviet High Command 1918-1941, MacMillan, 1962
Combined Arms Research Library (U.S. Army) paper on the battle, analyses the struggle in great detail.
Nomonhan: The Second Russo-Japanese War by Timothy Neeno, M.A. at MilitaryHistoryOnline.com. Much more up to date/accurate in numbers/strategy analysis as the main article.
Part of discussion on historychannel.com, comments on Japanese HQ (Tokyo) strategy, which did not want to get in conflict with USSR while China war was running, but considered it the unwanted action of local commanders. Did not influence "North or South" strike decision, which was based on general evaluations etc. Well worth reading.
The Khalkhin-Gol Battle, 1939 Russian maps and statistics for the battle and an article on the battle with an Orbat for the Soviet and Mongolian forces.
Khalkhin-Gol Air Battles A listing of the Soviet air units, strengths and losses.