Battle of Imphal
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| Battle of Imphal | |||||||
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| Part of Burma Campaign | |||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||
| Indian IV Corps | Japanese Fifteenth Army | ||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Geoffrey Scoones | Renya Mutaguchi | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| rising to: 4 Infantry Divisions 1 Armoured Brigade 1 Parachute Brigade |
rising to: 3 Infantry Divisions 1 Tank Regiment |
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| Casualties | |||||||
| 12,603 | 54,879 | ||||||
| South-East Asian campaign |
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| Malaya – Prince of Wales & Repulse – Thailand – Singapore – Indian Ocean – Andaman Islands – Burma – Chindits – Imphal – Kohima – Central Burma – Dracula |
The Battle of Imphal took place in the region around the city of Imphal, the capital of the state of Manipur in North-East India from March until July 1944. Japanese armies attempted to destroy the Allied forces at Imphal and invade India, but were driven back into Burma with heavy losses. Together with the simultaneous Battle of Kohima on the road by which the encircled Allied forces at Imphal were relieved, the battle was the the turning point of the Burma Campaign, part of the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II.
Contents |
[edit] The situation
In 1942, the Japanese Army had driven the British, Indian and Chinese troops out of Burma. The retreat of the Allied Burma Corps stopped at Imphal, which lay in a plain on one of the few practicable routes through the ranges of jungle-covered hills which formed the border between Burma and India.
Over the following year, the Allied troops slowly improved their training, equipment and morale, and increased the capacity of the lines of communication to the Assam front. At the start of 1944, the Allies were poised to invade Burma on several fronts.
Late in 1943, the Japanese command in Burma had been changed. A new headquarters, Burma Area Army was set up under Lieutenant-General Masakasu Kawabe. One of its subordinate formations was 15th Army, whose new commander was Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi.
By design or chance, Mutaguchi had played a major part in several Japanese victories, ever since the Marco Polo Bridge incident. His natural instinct was to mount an offensive against Imphal. He may also have been goaded by the first Chindit expedition launched by the British under Orde Wingate early in 1943. Wingate's troops had apparently easily traversed terrain which Mutaguchi had earlier claimed would be impassable to the Japanese 18th Division which he commanded at the time. The Allies had widely publicised the successful aspects of Wingate's expedition while concealing their losses to disease and exhaustion, possibly misleading Mutaguchi and some of his staff as to the difficulties they would later face.
A spoiling attack to disrupt Allied plans was standard Japanese practice. Mutaguchi had larger ambitions. He planned to exploit the capture of Imphal by advancing to the Brahmaputra River valley, thereby cutting the Allied supply lines to their front in northern Burma, and to the airfields supplying the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek over "The Hump".
Mutaguchi's plan was at first rejected by the staff at Burma Area Army. However, the headquarters for all the Japanese forces in South East Asia, Southern Expeditionary Army Group were in favour of it. Kawabe's staff persuaded Southern Expeditionary Army that there were severe logistical risks with Mutaguchi's plan, only to find that the Japanese Imperial Army HQ in Tokyo now supported it. To some extent, Mutaguchi and War Minister Hideki Tojo were persuaded by Subash Chandra Bose, who led the Indian National Army, a force of former Indian prisoners of war now fighting under the Japanese, that a victory such as Mutaguchi anticipated would lead to the collapse of British rule in India.
In the end, the various intermediate headquarters allowed the plan (given the name U-GO) to proceed, because mere passive defence of Burma would require as many reinforcements as the attack on Imphal. Also, if U-GO were successful, almost all the Allied attacks on Burma would have to be abandoned.
U-GO can perhaps be translated as Operation C, as U was the third symbol in one reading of the formal syllabary used by the Japanese Army in radio and telegraph communications.
[edit] The Japanese plan
Imphal was held by the Indian IV Corps. Because the Allies were planning to take the offensive themselves, its units were thrown forward almost to the Chindwin River. Mutaguchi intended to cut off and destroy the Allied units in their forward positions and then capture Imphal.
In detail, under U-GO:
- The Japanese 33rd Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Motoso Yanagida would destroy the Indian 17th Infantry Division at Tiddim, then attack Imphal from the south.
- Yamamoto Force, formed from units of the Japanese 33rd and 15th Divisions under Major-General Tsunoru Yamamoto, would destroy the Indian 20th Infantry Division at Tamu, then attack Imphal from the east.
- The Japanese 15th Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Masafumi Yamauchi would envelop Imphal from the north.
- In a separate subsidiary operation, the Japanese 31st Infantry Division under Lieutenant-General Kotoku Sato would isolate Imphal by capturing Kohima, then exploit to Dimapur.
All Mutaguchi's divisional commanders disagreed with the plan to some extent. Sato distrusted Mutaguchi's motives, and Yanagida openly derided him as a "blockhead". Yamauchi was already very ill and fatalistic. Their main reservations concerned supply. Mutaguchi had assumed success within three weeks. Adequate supplies after that period could be obtained only if the Japanese captured Allied supply dumps. Gambles such as this had worked in the past, but could no longer be relied upon to work given Allied air superiority and the improvement in morale and training of British and Indian troops.
Also, the Japanese assumed that the British would be unable to use tanks on the steep jungle-covered hills around Imphal. For the sake of ease of movement and supply, the Japanese were leaving behind most of their field artillery, their chief anti-tank weapon. As a result, the Japanese troops would have very little protection against tanks if these were in fact used against them.
Even as the Japanese prepared to launch their attack, on March 5, 1944 the Allies launched the airborne phase of the second Chindit expedition. Japanese officers such as Major-General Noburo Tazoe, commanding the Japanese Army Air Force units in Burma, urged Mutaguchi to divert troops from his offensive to secure the Japanese rear areas against the Chindits. Mutaguchi dismissed these concerns, claiming that in a few weeks he would have occupied the air bases from which the Chindits were supplied.
[edit] The battle
[edit] Opening phases
Indian IV Corps in Imphal was commanded by Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Scoones. (IV Corps in turn was part of Fourteenth Army under Lieutenant-General William Slim.) When they received intelligence that a major Japanese offensive was impending, Slim and Scoones planned to withdraw into the Imphal plain and force the Japanese to fight with their logistics stretched beyond the limit. However, they misjudged the date on which the Japanese were to attack, and the strength they would use against some objectives. The Japanese launched their troops across the Chindwin River on March 8, 1944. Scoones only gave his forward divisions orders to withdraw to Imphal on March 13.
The Indian 20th Division under Major-General Douglas Gracey withdrew without difficulty, mainly because two of Yamamoto's battalions from the Japanese 15th Division were delayed at Indaw in northern Burma by the Chindits and were unable to intervene.
The Indian 17th Division under Major-General Cowan was cut off by the Japanese 33rd Division. The Japanese 215 Regiment captured a supply dump at MS 109, twenty miles behind Cowan's leading outposts. The Japanese 214 Regiment seized Tongzang and a ridge named Tuitum Saddle across the only road, a few miles behind the Indian 17th Division's position.
At Tuitum Saddle, 214 Regiment were unable to dig in properly before they were hit by the Indian 48th Brigade on March 18. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties and were forced away from the road. Fighting around MS 109 was even more severe, but Cowan had taken steps to secure the most vulnerable point in the rear of his division, the bridge over the Manipur River. 17th Division crossed safely, demolishing the bridge behind them, and recovered the depot on March 25. They were forced to abandon large amounts of supplies, but removed most of the vehicles, food and ammunition. The Japanese were left only such items as clothing and blankets.
Scoones had nevertheless been forced to send the bulk of his only reserve, Indian 23rd Infantry Division under Major-General Ouvry Roberts, to the aid of 17th Division. The two divisions, now supplied by parachute drops from Allied aircraft, made their way back to the Imphal plain, which they reached on April 4
Meanwhile, Imphal had been left vulnerable to the Japanese 15th Division. The only force left covering the base, Indian 50 Parachute Brigade, was roughly handled at Sangshak by a regiment from the Japanese 31st Division on its way to Kohima. However, an earlier diversionary attack launched by Japanese 55th Division in Arakan had already failed. Slim was able to move the battle-hardened Indian 5th Infantry Division, including all its artillery and transport, by air from Arakan to the Central Front. The move was completed in only eleven days. Two of its brigades went to Imphal, and their leading troops were in action on April 3.
[edit] Stalemate
From the beginning of April, the Japanese attacked the Imphal plain from several directions:
- 33rd Division attacked from the south at Bishenpur, where they cut a secondary track from Silchar into the plain. Yanagida, its commander, was already pessimistic and depressed by the failure to trap Indian 17th Division. He had also been rattled by a garbled radio message which suggested that one of his regiments had been destroyed at MS 109. He therefore advanced cautiously. By doing so, he may have lost a chance to gain success while the Indian 17th Infantry Division was resting after its retreat and Bishenpur was held only by Indian 32 Brigade (from 20th Division). Mutaguchi removed him from command.
- Yamamoto Force attacked the Shenam Saddle on the main road from Tamu into Imphal. The Shenam Saddle was ideal defensive terrain. Despite using heavy artillery and tanks, Yamamoto could not break through Indian 20th Division's well-sited defences. Detachments from two brigades of the Indian National Army fought on the Japanese side in this sector. The initial enthusiasm of most INA soldiers soon waned, and they deserted and straggled in increasing numbers.
- 15th Division encircled Imphal from the north. Its 60 Regiment captured a British supply dump at Kangpokpi (also known as "Mission", from a church there) on the main Imphal-Dimapur road, but once again, the depot had already been emptied of food and ammunition. 51 Regiment seized a vital hill, Nungshigum, which overlooked the main airstrip at Imphal. This was a major threat to IV Corps, and on April 13, Indian 5th Division counter-attacked, supported by massed artillery and the M3 Lee tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers. The Japanese regiment had no anti-tank weapons, and their troops occupying Nungshigum were driven from the hill with heavy casualties.
[edit] Allied counter-attacks
By May 1, all the Japanese attacks were held. Slim and Scoones now began a counter-offensive against the Japanese 15th Division. This division was the weakest of the Japanese formations, and success against it would break the siege. Progress was slow. The monsoon had broken, and this made movement very difficult. Also, IV Corps was suffering some shortages. Although rations and reinforcements were delivered to Imphal by air, artillery ammunition was by now rationed. The steep ridges held by the Japanese were almost impregnable.
However, the Japanese were at the end of their endurance. Neither the Japanese 31st Division which was fighting at Kohima, nor 15th Division, had received adequate supplies since the offensive began, and their troops were starving. This allowed Indian XXXIII Corps to drive the Japanese from Kohima at the end of May, and advance south. The troops of Japanese 15th Division were forced to abandon their defensive positions, to forage for supplies in local villages. Mutaguchi dismissed the mortally ill Yamauchi, but this could not affect matters. The leading troops of IV Corps and XXXIII Corps met at Milestone 109 on the Dimapur-Imphal road on June 22, and the siege was raised.
Although there was now no realistic hope of success, Mutaguchi (and Kawabe) continued to order renewed attacks. 33rd Division, reinforced by battalions from the Japanese 53rd Division and 54th Division and under a new forceful commander, Lieutenant-General Nobuo Tanaka, broke into the Indian 17th Division's positions at Bishenpur, but failed to break through. Yamamoto Force also made repeated efforts, but by the end of June both formations had suffered so many casualties that they were unable to make any progress. 15th and 31st Divisions refused to make a renewed attack on Imphal from the North-East, and were in no condition to do so.
[edit] End
In fact, the Japanese had realised that operations ought to be broken off as early as May. At a meeting between Mutaguchi and Kawabe on June 6, both used hara-gei, an unspoken form of communication using gesture, expression and tone of voice, to convey their conviction that success was impossible. But neither of them wished to bear the responsibility of ordering a retreat. Kawabe subsequently became ill with dysentery and perhaps physically unfit for duty.
When he realised that none of his formations were obeying his orders for a renewed attack, Mutaguchi finally ordered the offensive to be broken off on July 3. The Japanese, reduced in many cases to a rabble, fell back to the Chindwin river, abandoning their artillery and transport, and those troops too sick to walk. The defeat at Kohima and Imphal was the largest defeat to that date in Japanese history. They had suffered 55,000 casualties, including 13,500 dead. Most of these losses were the result of starvation, disease and exhaustion. By contrast, the Allies suffered 17,500 casualties. Both Kawabe and Mataguchi were relieved of command.
[edit] Royal Air Force
By mid-1944, the Allied air forces had undisputed air supremacy over Burma. The last major effort by the Japanese Army Air Force had been over the Arakan in February and March, when they had suffered severe losses. During the Imphal and Kohima battles, they were able to make barely half a dozen significant raids.
IV Corps enjoyed close air support from fighter bombers and dive bombers. Allied fighter bombers and medium bombers shot up and bombed enemy concentrations, supply dumps, transport, roads and bridges all the way to the River Chindwin. The monsoon in no way diminished their activity. The Third Tactical Air Force (TAF) increased their sortie rate to 24,000 sorties during the worst four months of the monsoon, nearly six times the figure of the previous year’s record.
The Allies could fly men, equipment and supplies into the airstrips at Imphal so although cut off by land, the town was not without a life line. Allied aircraft could also parachute ammunition, rations and even drinking water to surrounded units.
No. 152 Squadron RAF was one of the squadrons of the TAF. It moved to Burma on 19 December 1943. During the Battle of Imphal, the squadron operated from front-line strips supporting the 14th Army during its final conquest of Burma.
[edit] Bibliography
- Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory, (1956)
- Don Moser and editors of Time-Life Books, World War II: China-Burma-India, (1978), Library of Congress no 77-93742
- Louis Allen, Burma: The longest War, Dent Publishing, 1984, ISBN 0-460-02474-4
[edit] Notes
- ↑ World War II: China-Burma-India, Bibliography, page 157
