Battle of Dak To

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Battle of Dak To
Part of the Vietnam Conflict
The 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry battles for Hill 882, southwest of Dak To
Date 3 November - 22 November 1967 Location Dak To, Kontum Province, Republic of Vietnam Result Allied victory
Combatants
United States Republic of Vietnam	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Commanders
Maj. Gen. William R. Peers	General Nguyen Huu An
Strength
16,000	6,000
Casualties
289 US killed in action 985 wounded / 79 ARVN killed in action	1,200 to 1,455 killed in action

Vietnam War

Ap Bac – Binh Gia – Song Be – Dong Xoai – Ia Drang – Long Tan – Dak To – Tra Binh Dong –Ong Thanh – 1st Tet – Khe Sanh – 1st Saigon – Lang Vei – Hills 881 & 861 – 2nd Tet – Hamburger Hill – Binh Ba – Ripcord – Lam Son 719 – FSB Mary Ann – Easter '72 – An Loc – Kontum – Phuoc Long – Ho Chi Minh – Buon Me Thuot – Xuan Loc – 2nd Saigon – Barrell Roll – Rolling Thunder – Pony Express – Steel Tiger – Commando Hunt – Linebacker I – Linebacker II – Chenla I – Tiger Hound – Lima Site 85 – Tailwind – Chenla II – Cambodia

The Battle of Dak To was a major battle of the Vietnam Conflict that took place between 3 and 22 November 1967 in Kontum Province, in the Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam. The action at Dak To was one of a series of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) initiatives that began during the second half of the year. PAVN attacks at Loc Ninh (in Binh Long Province) and Song Be (in Phuoc Long Province) and at Con Thien and Khe Sanh, (in Quang Tri Province), were other actions which, combined with Dak To, became known as "the border battles."

Contents 1 The Camp 2 Preparing the Battlefield 3 Battle is Joined 4 Hill 875 5 The Bottom Line 6 Notes 7 Sources

[edit] The Camp

Main articles: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, CIDG, and Ho Chi Minh Trail

During the early stages of the US involvement in South Vietnam, a number of US Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps were established along the borders of the country in order to both maintain surveillance of PAVN/NLF infiltration and to provide support and training to isolated villagers, who bore the brunt of the fighting. One of these camps was built near the town and airstrip at Dak To. Since 1965, it had also been utilized as a Forward Operations Base by the highly-classified Studies and Observations Group (SOG), which launched reconnaissance teams from there to gather intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail across the border in Laos.

Dak To itself lies on a flat valley floor, surrounded by waves of ridgelines rising into peaks(some as high as 4000 feet) stretching westward and southwestward towards the tri-border region where South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia meet. Double and triple-canopy rainforests cover the area, and the only open areas were filled in by bamboo groves whose stalks sometimes reached eight inches in diameter. Landing Zones (LZs) large enough for helicopters were few and far between, which meant that most movement would only be possible on foot. Temperatures in the mountains of Kontum Province could reach 95 degrees Fahrenheit during the day and could drop to 55 in the evenings.

Throughout the middle of 1967, Dak To was a magnet for several PAVN spoiling attacks, and it appeared that the North Vietnamese were paying an increasing amount of attention to the area. On 17 June, two battalions of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were moved into Dak To and began sweeping the jungle-covered mountains. Five days later, Alpha Company of the 503rd Airborne Infantry was ambushed and isolated by the 6th Battalion of the 23rd PAVN Infantry Regiment. Two more companies of the 503rd were fed into the cauldron, but they were unable to reach the cut off company until the next day, when the bodies of 76 paratroopers were discovered.^[1]

One week later, the rest of the 173rd moved into the area, along with the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The American units were supported by the 5th and 8th Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Airborne Battalions and a battalion of the ARVN 42nd Infantry Regiment to conduct Operation Greeley. Throughout the summer there were sporadic, but violent, clashes with PAVN units. On the 16th, Greeley was folded into Operation MacArthur, when the 1st Brigade of the US 4th Infantry Division, supported by the 4th Battalion of the 173rd's 503rd Infantry (4/503), were air-lifted into Dak To. The remainder of the 173rd returned to their Base Camp at Tuy Hoa and the ARVN airborne brigades (which had also seen heavy contact) were sent back for rest and refitting.

[edit] Preparing the Battlefield

Main article: Vo Nguyen Giap

By early October, US intelligence reported that PAVN was withdrawing regiments from the Pleiku area to join those in Kontum Province, thereby dramatically increasing the strength of the local forces to that of a full division. In response, the 4th Infantry, began moving in more forces. On 29 October, the remainder of the 173d Airborne Brigade was brought in as reinforcement. They were joined by more ARVN units.

On 3 November, Sergeant Vu Hong, an artillery specialist with the PAVN 66th Regiment, defected and was able to provide the US forces with detailed information on the disposition of North Vietnamese forces and their objectives, both at Dak To and at the new CIDG base at Ben Het, some 18 kilometers to the west. PAVN had fed approximately 6,000 PAVN troops into the area, most of which made up the PAVN 1st Division, which was composed of the 66th, 32nd and 174th Infantry Regiments, and the independent 24th infantry Regiment. In addition, the division was assisted by the 40th Artillery Regiment as well. The goal of these units was the taking of Dak To and the destruction of a "large American unit."

This intelligence was bolstered by other means. The actions around Dak To were part of an overall strategy devised by the PAVN leadership, primarily that of General Vo Nguyen Giap. The goal of North Vietnamese operations in the area, according to a captured document from the B-3 Front Command, was "to annihilate a major US element in order to force the enemy to deploy as many additional troops to the western highlands as possible."^[2]

As the Americans quickly discovered, the area had been well prepared by PAVN. The number and elaborateness of defensive preparations found by US troops indicated that some had been prepared as much as six months in advance. As the commander of US forces in the area:

"Nearly every key terrain feature was heavily fortified with elaborate bunker and trench complexes. He had moved quantities of supplies and ammunition into the area. He was prepared to stay."^[3]

After contact with the North Vietnamese on the 4th and 5th of the month, Brigadier General Leo H. Schweiter, commander of the 173rd, moved the rest of his brigade back to Dak To. The immediate goal of the 173rd was to bolster the defenses of Ben Het. Simultaneously, most of the elements of the 4th Infantry, moved into the Dak To area. The division was commanded by Major General William R. Peers who was given overall operational control of Operation MacArthur. The town of DaK To had by now become a major logistical base, supporting an entire US division and airborne brigade and six ARVN battalions. The stage was set for a major pitched battle.

[edit] Battle is Joined

Fighting erupted on 3 and 4 November when companies of the 4th Infantry bumped into PAVN defensive positions. Two days later the same thing occurred to elements of the 173rd. The American and South Vietnamese troops soon applied a methodical approach to the fighting. They combed the hills on foot, ran into fixed PAVN hill-top defensive positions, applied massive firepower, and then launched attacks to force the North Vietnamese off. From ridgeline to ridgeline, the infantrymen humped, fought, killed, and died.

In all of these instances, PAVN troops fought stubbornly, inflicted casualties, and then pulled back. To expand the coverage of supporting fires, the 4th Battalion of the 173rd was ordered to build an artillery firebase on hill 823, south of Ben Het. Dense foliage forced the unit to land only one company at a time. Unfortunately, the hill was not unoccupied. Fifteen minutes later the enemy had been pushed back, but seven Americans of B/4/503 lay dead and another 13 were wounded.

The following morning Bravo Company was relieved by C/4/503, supported by two companies of D/1/503. Task Force Black (as the combined unit was known) left Hill 823 and moved out on patrol. Before 0800 on 11 November, the force was ambushed by the 3rd Battalion, PAVN 174th Regiment^[4] and had to fight for its life. C/4/503 drew the job of going to the relief of task force. They encountered fire from all sides, but they made it, reaching the trapped men at 1537. US losses were 20 killed, 154 wounded, and two missing. The commanding officer reported an enemy body count of 80, but was told to go out and count again. He then reported back that 116 enemy soldiers had been killed. He later stated that "If you lost so many people killed and wounded, you had to have something to show for it."^[5]

From the enemy occupied hills overlooking the sprawling Dak To base camp, it must have been an inviting target. On 15 November, a PAVN mortar barrage landed squarely upon the airfield, destroying two C-130 transport aircraft, and then walked on to the ammunition and fuel storage areas. Both detonated simultaneously, sending a fireball and mushroom cloud high into the air. Engineer Lieutenant Fred Dyerson thought "it looked like Charlie had gotten hold of some nuclear weapons."^[6] Fortunately, this was as close as PAVN would get to taking Dak To. The rapid deployment of allied forces had thrown the North Vietnamese onto the defensive. Previous action had battered the 66th and 33rd PAVN Regiments and they began a southwesterly retreat, covered by the 174th Regiment. The Americans and the ARVN then began to run into tenacious rearguard actions. To prevent a repetition of the mortar barrage against the base camp, troops of 3/12 Infantry were ordered to take Hill 1338, which had an excellent view of Dak To, only six kilometers away. For two days the Americans fought their way up the steep slope and into the teeth of the most elaborate bunker complex yet discovered, all of which were connected by field telephones.

At the same time, on Hill 1416, the elite, all-volunteer ARVN 3rd and 9th Airborne Battalions were fighting toe-to-toe with the PAVN 24th Regiment. The ARVN paratroopers took the hill after a four day battle in which 247 enemy troops were killed. The PAVN 174th Regiment had slipped west past Ben Het and took up positions on a 875 meter-high hill to cover the withdrawal of the 66th Regiment. On 19 November, Colonel Schweiter was informed that a Special Forces Mobile Strike Force company had run into heavy resistance on Hill 875. He then ordered his 2/503 to take the hill.

[edit] Hill 875

That morning, 2/503, 173rd Airborne Brigade, moved into jumpoff positions from which to assault Hill 875. Charlie and Delta companies moved up the slope in two columns while Alpha Company remained behind at the bottom to cut out an LZ. About half way up the hill, PAVN machine gunners opened fire on the advancing paratroopers. Then B-40 rockets and 57-mm recoiless rifle fire were unleashed. The Americans were only 100 meters from the crest when the enemy infantry opened up with small arms and grenades. The advance was halted and the men went to ground, finding whatever cover they could. The North Vietnamese then launched a massed assault on Company A at the base of the hill. Unknown to the Americans, they had walked into a carefully prepared ambush by the 174th PAVN Regiment.

Alpha Company retreated up the slope, followed closely by the enemy. All that halted the PAVN onslaught from overrunning the entire battalion was the heroic efforts of men who stood their ground and died to buy time for their comrades. Soon, air strikes and artillery fire were being called in, but they had little effect due to the dense foliage. It was then that one of the worst friendly-fire incidents of the conflict took place. A US fighter-bomber dropped a 500-pound bomb into the middle of the perimeter, where the command group, the wounded, and the medics were located. It killed 42 men and wounded 45 more, including the last two company commanders (Alpha company's commander had been killed in the retreat up the slope).

The next morning the 4/503rd was chosen to set out to relieve the men on Hill 875. Due to sniper and mortar fire (and the terrain) it took until nightfall to reach them. On the morning of the 21st, both battalions moved out to take the crest. During fierce, close-quarters fighting, some of the paratroopers made it into the PAVN trenchline, but they had to pull back as darkness fell.

The next day, 22 November, was spent in launching airstrikes and a heavy artillery bombardment against the hilltop, totally denuding it of cover. the 2nd and 4th Battalions of the 503rd (now supported by the 1/12th Infantry of the 173rd, which assaulted 875 from the south) attacked again on the 23rd, Thanksgiving Day.^[7] This time they gained the crest, but the enemy had already gone, leaving only a few charred bodies and weapons. The battle of Hill 875 had cost the two battalions 158 killed and 402 wounded. Combined with noncombatant losses, this represented one-fifth of the 173rd Airborne Brigade's strength.^[8] For it's combined actions at Dak To, the 173rd received the Presidential Unit Citation.

[edit] The Bottom Line

In the end, the North Vietnamese were forced to withdraw from the area and back into Laos and North Vietnam. Munitions expenditures matched the ferocity of the fighting: 151,000 artillery rounds, 2,096 tactical air sorties, 257 B-52 strikes, and 40 lost helicopters.^[9] The US Army claimed 1,644 North Vietnamese killed, but this figure was a source of dispute, even at the time. In his memoirs, General Westmoreland mentioned only 1,400 enemy casualties, while some of his staff only went as far as 1,200.^[10] US casualties numbered 289 killed and 985 wounded while the ARVN lost 73 men killed in action. Not all American commanders were happy with the comparison. Marine General John Chaisson questioned "Is it a victory when you lose 362 friendlies in three weeks and by your own spurious body count you only get 1,200?"^[11]

Without doubt three PAVN regiments had been so battered that they would play no part in the next phase of the winter-spring offensive. But were they supposed to? The 173rd Airborne Brigade and two battalions of the 4th Infantry were in no better shape. General Westmoreland claimed: "we had soundly defeated the enemy without unduly sacrificing operations in other areas. The enemy's return was nil."^[12] But was it? The border battles fought that fall and winter cost PAVN dearly, but they achieved their objective. By January 1968, one -half of all US maneuver battalions were drawn away from the cities and lowlands and into the border areas.^[13]

Several of Westmoreland's staff officers began to see an eerie resemblance to the Viet Minh campaign of 1953, when peripheral actions led up to the climactic Battle of Dien Bien Phu.^[14] General Giap even made claims to such a strategy in an announcement in September, but, to the Americans, it seemed a bit too contrived. Yet, no understandable analysis seemed to explain Hanoi's almost suicidal military actions. They could only be explained if a situation like that at Dien Bien Phu came into being.

Then, almost overnight, one emerged. In the western corner of Quang Tri Province, a US Marine outpost came under siege by PAVN forces that eventually numbered three divisions. Giap's strategy was coming to fruition, although in this case the Battle of Khe Sanh would not be the successful repeat of Dien Bien Phu, and would instead end as an almost repeat of Dak To.

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army, New York: Dell, 1985.
2. ^ Terrence Maitland, Peter McInerney, et al, A Contagion of War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983, p. 168.
3. ^ A Contagion of War, p. 169.
4. ^ Stanton, pps. 163-164.
5. ^ A Contagion of War, p. 175.
6. ^ Contagion of War, p. 175.
7. ^ Albert N. Garland, ed., A Distant Challenge. Nashville TN: Battery Press, 1983, pps. 37-40.
8. ^ Michael Casey, Clark Dougan, Denis Kennedy, Shelby Stanton, et al, The Army at War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987.
9. ^ Stanton, p. 168.
10. ^ William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976, p. 282. Maitland & McInerney, p. 183.
11. ^ Maitland & McInerney, p. 183.
12. ^ Westmoreland, p. 280.
13. ^ Edward F. Murphy, The Hill Fights. New York: Ballentine Books, 2003, p. 235.
14. ^ Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet. New York: Ballentine, 1984, p. 214-215.

[edit] Sources

• Casey, Michael, Clark Dougan, Denis Kennedy, Shelby Stanton, et al, The Army at War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987.

• Garland, Albert N., A Distant Challenge: The US Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972. Nashville TN: The Battery Press, 1983.

• Maitland, Terrence, Peter McInerney, et al, A Contagion of War. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1983.

• Murphy, Edward F. The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh. New York Ballentine Books, 2003.

• Palmer, Dave R, Sunmmons of the Trumpet. New York: Ballentine Books, 1984.

• Stanton, Shelby L., The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973. New York: Dell, 1985.

• Westmoreland, William C., A Soldier Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976.