Battle of Cassinga
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| Battle of Cassinga | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the South African Border War | |||||||
 SADF paratroopers leaving Cassinga |
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| Combatants | |||||||
| South Africa | SWAPO, Cuba | ||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Ian Gleeson | Dimo Amaambo | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 370 | 1400 | ||||||
| Casualties | |||||||
| 4 | over 1000 | ||||||
The Battle of Cassinga (4 May 1978) was a South African airborne attack on a South-West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) base in the town of Cassinga, Angola. Conducted as one of the three major actions of Operation Reindeer, it was the South African Army’s first major airborne operation.
Contents |
[edit] Planning
The attack on Cassinga (codenamed "Moscow" by SWAPO) grew out of the plan for Operation Bruilof, which had envisaged attacking six SWAPO targets around the town of Chetequera. During the intelligence-gathering portion of the planning for Operation Bruilof, it became clear that the small, previously overlooked, one-time mining town of Cassinga was actually the SWAPO's main HQ for the region, and was being developed into their largest training base. Aerial photo-reconnaissance, the primary role of 12 Squadron at AFB Waterkloof, Pretoria, equipped with Canberra B12s, earlier in Spring of 1978 showed major military infrastructure including miles of zigzag trenches, concrete drive-in AFV emplacements covering road approaches and a star-shaped AA missile command-and-launch facility characteristic of Warsaw Pact SA-2 missile sites. It also - crucially - showed a school bus which had been hijacked from SA-controlled South West Africa/Namibia about 10 days earlier, the local schoolchildren onboard kidnapped. In response to this, the plan for Operation Bruilof was shelved and planning for a new operation, Operation Reindeer, began. Reindeer was composed of three main actions; the airborne assault on Cassinga, a mechanised assault on the Chetaquera complex - which also involved SAAF defence-suppression strikes - and an assault on the Dombondola complex by a light infantry force.
Among the considerations were clear indications that Cuban combat forces were building up their resources-in-theatre and that East German and Soviet 'military advisers' were actively involved, some of whom were subsequently captured at Cassinga. The South African Defense Force was also concerned over the strategic threat a SA-2 missile-guarded fortress would pose, because it could facilitate the support and development of the SWAPO guerrilla war into wide-spread armed insurgency and possibly military confrontation as per the standard Soviet military model of the time. ( See 'Low Intensity Operations' by General Sir Frank Kitson, and similar.)
The planners for the operation were faced with a significant problem. While the Chetequera and Dombondola complexes were only around 35 km from the border with South-West Africa/Namibia (then under South African control), therefore making conventional assault possible, Cassinga was 260 km from the border and deep inside Angola. This meant that any conventional assault force would have to fight its way in and out, and would almost certainly have given advance warning to the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army of Namibia - SWAPO’s armed wing) soldiers in Cassinga, allowing them and Dimo Amaambo (the PLAN commander-in-chief, then resident in Cassinga) to escape.
However, South African Defence Force (SADF) intelligence reports had ascertained that SWAPO - and probably its advisers - was lulled into a false sense of security due to Cassinga’s distance from the border. Intel briefings before the event indicated no awareness of any supportive infantry or armoured units to support the base against a ground assault, and although SWAPO was creating a sophisticated and comprehensive defensive network around the base consisting of a system of miles of trenches, AFV concrete revetments, pill-boxes and AAA gun and missile emplacements, they were certainly not prepared for a joint-arms airborne attack. The SADF had not previously demonstrated any such capability, giving military analysts no reason to suspect that such was available to the SA Defence Staff planners. This then gave the SADF planners the possibility of conducting a surprise attack on the base using only an airborne assault, without ground support. Earlier in that year, 12 Squadron had commenced training for a low-level strike role, utilising area defence-suppression weapons. Though a very risky plan, it was decided that the element of surprise would outweigh the disadvantage of having no supporting armour.
The decision was therefore taken to mount a large airborne assault on Cassinga (by now code-named "Alpha"), supported by South African Air Force (SAAF) fighter-bombers and a fleet of 17 medium-transport helicopters. Using an exercise already underway called Exercise Kwiksilver as a smokescreen, the army initiated a call up of the Citizen Force (reserve units similar to the US National Guard) parachute units. The paratroopers were then secretly taken to the De Brug Training Range near Bloemfontein, where they embarked on an intensive refresher training course, coupled with rehearsals for the attack on Cassinga.
The final hurdle was to be the politicians in the South African cabinet, who were hesitant about authorising such an operation in case it generated adverse international reactions. There were a number of delays because of this, but finally on 2 May 1978 the Prime Minister, John Vorster, gave his authority for the operation to commence on 4 May.
[edit] Composition of Forces
[edit] South Africa
Due to the secrecy involved in the operation, and the commitment of most of the permanent force conscripts of 1 Parachute Battalion in other operations, it was decided to use 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions, both Citizen Force, in the operation. However, the need for secrecy meant not enough Citizen Force soldiers could be called up to fill both Parachute Battalions. As a result, the two Battalions were temporarily merged into a single Composite Parachute Battalion, which was commanded by Colonel Jan Breytenbach.
The final composition of ground forces for the attack on Cassinga was therefore the following:
The entire operation was run by Major General Ian Gleeson, who commanded the SWA Tactical HQ (set up specially for Operation Reindeer).
Overall control of the airborne forces was given to Brigadier M.J. du Plessis, who commanded the Parachute Brigade HQ. The units under his command were the Composite Parachute Battalion under Colonel Jan Breytenbach which was composed of A, B, C and D companies (all under-strength), an independent rifle platoon, a mortar platoon and an anti-tank platoon; the Helicopter Administration Area (HAA) protection force under Major James Hills, consisting of two Hawk Groups (10 man sections of rapid-reaction paratroopers) from 1 Parachute Battalion; an Airborne Reserve under Captain Wesley de Beer, consisting of a company from 2 Parachute Battalion airborne in a C.160 to be used in the event of reinforcements being required, and the Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) under Commandant James Kriel, which consisted of five SAAF personnel to set up and run the HAA. All the paratroopers were equipped with the R1 7.62 mm assault rifle.
The South African Air Force contribution consisted of four C-130 Hercules and five C.160 Transall transport aircraft. The helicopter component of the operation consisted of 13 Pumas and six Super Frelons.
The air attack component provided by the SAAF consisted of four Canberra B-12 bombers, each carrying 300 Alpha anti-personnel bombs; five Buccaneers carrying eight 1000 lb bombs each, as well as a sixth carrying seventy-two 68 mm rockets, and lastly four Mirage III fighter aircraft, armed only with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and their 30 mm cannons fitted with high-explosive fragmentation shells.
One crew from the Canberra squadron was tasked with acquiring further photo-reconnaissance imagery, some to be used in the preparation of photo-strip maps for the Tactical Low Flying (TLF) legs that the various aircraft types would undertake - there being inadequate conventional mapping of much of the region - and additional imagery of the Cassinga environs for Parabat DZ and Buccaneer target planning purposes. It was during this that a serious error was made, with potentially serious consequences. The targeting imagery was taken from 23000 feet instead of the briefed 33000 feet, the pilot unaccountably misreading his altimeter. The navigator/sensors operator was unaware of this, and the post-flight data sheet accompanying the reels of processed imagery went off to the Photo-Interpretation Centre indicating the higher height. This material found its way to the Hercules Squadron, where planners unwittingly miscalculated areas and distances - using the erroneous height data - including the crucial ground positions for the jump 'Go' order to the sticks of Parabats. Consequently, many overshot their intended DZs. One or two very experienced Herc pilots modified their drop-plan in the last moments of their approach-to-drop, on their 'sight picture' alone. This sequence of errors and communication failures was 'covered up' in the euphoria of success at the time.
Playing a supporting role was a single Cessna C-185, which flew in the target area and acted as an observation post as well as a radio relay aircraft. In addition there was a single DC-4 Strikemaster fitted out as an EW and ELINT aircraft flying over the SWA/Namibia border with Angola. The purpose of this latter aircraft was to both intercept all Angolan, Cuban and SWAPO radio transmissions, before jamming their communications networks at the appropriate time. The successful jamming of the SWAPO, Angolan and Cuban communications network is one of the reasons for the late reaction by either of the latter two in responding to the attack.
[edit] SWAPO
PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO, was a guerrilla army and therefore did not have a traditional command and control structure. As such, it is impossible to determine a composition of units inside Cassinga. All that can be ascertained is Cassinga was a headquarters base for PLAN. The overall commander of PLAN, Commander Dimo Amaambo, was resident in the town, and used it to co-ordinate all PLAN actions in Southern Angola, including incursions into South West-Africa/Namibia. As such as a headquarters Cassinga was second in importance only to Lumbango, which was the overall SWAPO military headquarters in Angola. In Cassinga itself there were approximately 1400 civilian refugees, PLAN guerillas, both male and female, attired mostly in Cuban-style uniforms.
In addition to this there were an undetermined amount of SWAPO sympathisers and recruits undergoing training to become guerillas.
Post-operation debriefings suggested around 2500 personnel, in varying degrees of effectiveness. Aside from the system of trenches and bunkers, defensive equipment included a few anti-aircraft guns, including two ZPU-4 14.5 mm guns, one ZU-23-2 23 mm gun, and around one or two ZSU 12.7 mm guns. These were capable of being used in a ground attack role.
[edit] Cuba
The nearest Cuban presence was 15 km south of Cassinga, at the village of Tetchamutete. It consisted of a reinforced mechanised battalion of at least four T-34 tanks, 17 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, seven trucks and four anti-aircraft guns, accompanied by around 400 troops. Embarrassingly, this unit was completely unknown to SADF Intel, until it made an 'no-notice operational crash-out' deployment within an hour of the first bombs dropping - a capability of which many NATO units would have been proud. Pre-strike briefing by SAAF Chief of Staff (Int) was that there was an "African police detail at this village - about a dozen indigenous constables, with a truck, of no consequence." It was later explained that all Humint sources and overflight surveillance had been embargoed for a couple of weeks or more, to reduce the risk of exposure of the plans. That unit must have been moved up during that period, to act as a screening force for the developing fortress that was Cassinga. Certainly, it was admitted, had that force been identified before the operation, the operation would not have been launched.
[edit] The Attack
[edit] 04h00 - 09h00
The first to move on the morning of the attack were the paratroopers of the Composite Parachute Battalion, who got up at 04h00 and began fitting their weapons, equipment and parachutes.
At 05h19, the four Buccaneers bombers took off from AFB Waterkloof, followed at 05h43 by the faster Canberra. The heavily-laden 'Bucs' could transit only at medium level, so their True Air Speed (TAS) was considerably lower than that of the 'Cans', transiting over 10,000 feet higher. One of the Buccaneers went to an air force base nearer to the border in order to refuel and act as a Close Air Support (CAS) aircraft, while the fifth aircraft of the Buccaneer strike force was delayed due to a brake problem, leaving four Buccaneers available for the initial strike.
At 06h00 the eight transport aircraft carrying the paratroopers became airborne. Two of the C.160 Transalls, carrying the reserve company of 116 paratroopers, peeled off and entered an orbit just south of the border so as to be available to drop reinforcements during the battle. The remaining six transports continued on towards a holding point some miles east of Cassinga.
At about 06h30, the ELINT/EW DC-4 became airborne, orbiting just south of the border. At the same time, a flight of two Puma helicopters, under the command of Major John Church, took off from 'a jungle night-stop' to fly to a clearing 22 km east of Cassinga in order to set up a Helicopter Administration Area (HAA), where the helicopters used in the operation could refuel. On board the two helicopters were Commandant James Kriel, the commander of the South African Air Force's Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT) and his signaller, as well as Major James Hills, commander of Bravo Company, 1 Parachute Battalion, along with one ten-man section from the two Hawk Groups he would be using to protect the HAA. Also in the two helicopters were six 200-litre drums of helicopter fuel, and, to the consternation of Hills, the Chief of the South African Army, Lieutenant-General Constand Viljoen.
The MAOT set up their radios and navigational beacons at the HAA, by now code-named Whisky-Three, and signalled the all-clear for the rest of the force, consisting of the rest of the Hawk Group protection element (31 paratroopers), six medical personnel, two more members of the MAOT and eighty-six 200-litre drums of helicopter fuel, all onboard a fleet of five Super Frelon and ten Puma helicopters. The HAA was then completed, and the 17 helicopters refuelled and waited for the call to extract the paratroopers after the completion of the attack.
Also at around 07h00 a solitary Cessna 185 took off and began flying towards Cassinga. Its role in the operation was to be an airborne observation post, directing the bombers into the target and giving the all-clear for the paratrooper drop, as well as being a radio-relay aircraft (known as "Telstar duty" in the SAAF). It would later be forced to withdraw due to sustained anti-aircraft fire. At around 07h50 two Mirage III fighter aircraft took off, heading straight for Cassinga. There was initially no role for air superiority fighters in the plan, but Staff Officer ( Fighters) was not to be denied.
The defence-suppression bombing attack by the Canberras was two minutes late, occurring at 08h02 instead of 08h00 as originally planned, due to the lead navigator failing to maintain effective timing-adjustment during the 200nm low-level approach phase. This made no difference to the intended effect. As the bombing had been timed to co-incide with SWAPO's daily roll-call on the parade ground, most of the guerrillas in the camp were standing out in the open when the Canberras initiated their low-level FRA attack from the north. Each of the four Canberras - flying in loose 'line abreast' at 500 feet and 300 knots ( an airshow display profile ) - dropped 300 "Alpha" anti-personnel bombs, which were small 10 kg finless fragmentation bombs like '10-Pin Bowling' balls, designed to bounce up to 10 m into the air before detonating. A zone of some 800 metres by 500 metres was carpeted, each aircraft having its own 'bomb line'. These weapons sowed havoc amongst the assembled guerrillas in the open, destroying vehicles, POL storage tanks and soft buildings.
Immediately after the Canberras came the Buccaneers, from the west, who flew their dive-bombing runs along a generally east-west axis. Photography from one Buc cockpit, showing the graphic lines of the 'Alpha' bomb strikes, was released to the SA press the following day. Of the total of thirty-two 1000 lb (450 kg) bombs dropped by the four Buccaneers on the identified 'hard points', 24 scored direct hits, causing an immense amount of damage. Finally, the two Mirage IIIs conducted a strafing run on the base, using their 30 mm high explosive cannon rounds. All the aircraft except for the solitary Buccaneer on CAS duty then flew back to air bases in SW Afrika/Namibia to refuel and re-arm to cockpit readiness 'in case of need' - the Mirages to AFB Ondangwa, the Canberras, Buccaners and C-130/C-160s to AFB Grootfontein, where their support teams and materiel had been ferried up from Pretoria during the morning. The Canberras and Bucs were used for a later strike on the Chetequera complex.
After the attack aircraft had finished their bombing runs the six transports, which had been orbiting in wait some miles to the east, commenced their formation run towards Cassinga at 200 feet (60 m). Shortly before reaching the base, the six aircraft climbed to 600 feet, the drop height, and lined up for the drop. However, needed visual 'tracking and distance' co-ordination markers were obscured by smoke from the bombing run, the DZ box scaling and drop point distances were incorrect - due to the reconnaissance scaling errors - and the drop was a shambles with nearly all the paratroopers being dropped off-target, some into tall maize where they had problems linking up. The resultant confusion resulted in numerous delays, ruining the schedule of the 'Drop-to-contact' plan, and much of the benefit of surprise. The disastrous drop also meant that it would be nearly an hour before C-Company was able to move into position on the eastern side of the camp and seal off the escape routes, with the result being that a number of top PLAN commanders, including Dimo Amaambo (one of the principle targets of the attack) were able to escape.
The two independent rifle platoons, No.9 and No.11, were dropped quite accurately to the north. They immediately went into action, moving through a tented camp to the north-west of Cassinga, beyond the bombed areas. Resistance was fierce but short-lived, and a total of 54 bodies were counted by the platoons before they took up their position along the northern end of the base to seal off that escape route.
Of the four main paratrooper companies, D-Company had experienced the most accurate drop, though they were still 500 m from their intended Drop Zone (DZ). Regrouping quickly, they moved to attack structures which had been identified in the aerial reconnaissance photos as engineering buildings. However, during the assault on these buildings several of them exploded, perhaps due to ammunition stores within, injuring several paratroopers. There was also a brief blue-on-blue engagement as D-Company paratroopers were mistakenly fired upon by their fellow soldiers from B-Company, which by then had reached the base, but there were no casualties. After completing the assault of the engineer complex, D-Company moved south to set up a stop-line and prevent any guerrillas from escaping via that route. It also dispatched the anti-tank platoon to lay a tank ambush on the road to Techamutete.
[edit] 09h00 - 12h00
By 09h00, A and B Companies had regrouped and were ready to commence the main assault on Cassinga. Instead of attacking eastwards as initially planned, the two companies instead attacked the base in a northerly direction. Initially, they encountered very little resistance, though this changed dramatically once the paratroopers neared the centre of the base. Heavy sniper fire was directed at the paratroopers from a number of trees inside the base, they were subjected to B-10 recoilless anti-tank rifle fire, and some SWAPO guerrillas had regrouped, using houses as cover from which to fire at the paratroopers, critically wounding two paratroopers.
However, the paratroopers faced their greatest challenge when they were fired upon by a number of ZPU-4 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns used in the ground role. This brought both companies to a complete halt, as they were unable to move under the accurate, and close, fire of the guns, and the Buccaneer on CAS duty could not conduct a strike on the guns for fear of hitting the paratroopers close by.
In the end, Colonel Breytenbach ordered the commander of D-Company to take some men and work up towards the guns by attacking the trenches to the west of Cassinga. Breytenbach also ordered the mortar platoon to begin attacking the guns.
Upon entering the trenches, the men from D-Company were surprised to find a number of civilians, being used as human shields by the guerillas shielding inside them. The guerillas opened fire on the paratroopers, leading the paratroopers to enter what they described later as a mode of "kill or be killed", in which preventing the deaths of the civilians in the trenches was impossible. Though a number of civilians were killed in those trenches, as the paratroopers moved forward they began to encounter less and less civilians until nearer the guns all those in the trenches, male and female, were wearing SWAPO's Cuban-style uniforms. In the meantime, 9 Platoon had entered the trenches from the north, though were making slow progress as they came under the attention of the gunners.
It was during this period that the paratroopers gained a respect for the bravery of the SWAPO gunners that would last them a lifetime. Each time the crew of one of the guns was wiped out by mortar or machine-gun fire from the paratroopers, those in the nearby trenches would scramble up to replace them, continuously firing the anti-aircraft guns. Finally, after a combination of the attack through the trenches and the mortar fire, the guns were silenced. The toll was a terrible one; there were at least 95 SWAPO guerillas dead inside the trenches and around the guns, and two paratroopers had been killed.
After the fall of the guns, all major resistance in Cassinga ended. The odd snipers and corners of hopeless resistance were all that remained, and the mopping up process was soon finished. The paratroopers immediately set up the battalion headquarters and Regimental Aid-Post (RAP) next to the SWAPO hospital, and began treating the worst of the injured. Overall, three paratroopers had been killed, and eleven wounded, two of them critically. In addition, a fourth paratrooper was found to be missing, presumed killed. It was later assumed that he had drowned after being dropped in the river during the parachute jump.
By now the attack was two hours behind schedule, with the first helicopter extractions having been planned for 10h00.
[edit] 12h00 - 18h00
At around 12h00, Colonel Jan Breytenbach was informed of a signal from one of the Buccaneers on CAS duty which indicated what turned out to be a Cuban reinforced mechanised battalion was moving up the road from Techamutete to Cassinga.
The Buccaneer had spotted an advancing column of around 30 assorted AFVs, APCs and other vehicles advancing slowly up the road from Techamutete. It immediately opened fire on the column, destroying three BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers in the process, but then had to return to AFB Grootfontein to re-arm and refuel, leaving the paratroopers temporarily unprotected. All that stood between them and the advancing armoured column were the 22 men of the anti-tank platoon, armed only with 10 RPG-7 rocket launchers and five anti-tank mines which they had planted in the road.
In response, Breytenbach called in a first wave of 12 Pumas to extract approximately half the paratroopers. In the meantime, he ordered the remaining paratroopers to continue with mopping up operations, as well as to collect any and all documents of intelligence value. At this time however, there was a serious breakdown in command and control, and a number of fundamental errors were made. The shuttle of helicopters to and from Whisky-Three, the HAA, as well as the order in which paratroopers were embarked, was improvised and initially unco-ordinated and disorganised. It wasn't made initially clear to the commander of the helicopter extraction force quite what the problem - and the sudden urgency - was.
The lead tank was destroyed by one of the anti-tank mines, and the paratroopers destroyed four of the BTR-152s using their RPG-7s. They also killed approximately 40 of the Cuban troops before making their retreat back along the road towards the Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) where Breytenbach was organising the remaining paratroopers for final extraction. In the face of the oncoming armoured column, Breytenbach ordered a thin defensive line, but realised the lightly-armed paratroopers stood little chance against the armoured vehicles and prepared to fall-back to an emergency HLZ while calling urgently for air support.
The apparent success of the mission now looked like turning into a disaster for the SA troops, with the prospect of being over-run by armoured forces, 150 miles into enemy territory.
At 14h20, when the Cuban AFVs were already in sight of the beleaguered paratroopers, a Buccaneer and two Mirage IIIs suddenly appeared ahead, eliciting a ragged cheer from the paratroopers. An experienced Forward Air Controller (FAC) amongst the paratroopers then began to direct the three aircraft in strikes against the advancing Cuban armour. The Mirage IIIs, with their 30 mm cannons, destroyed 10 BTR-152s before running low on fuel and returning to AFB Ondangwa. The sole Buccaneer, with its hollow-charge rockets, destroyed at least two tanks, an anti-aircraft position and a number of other vehicles. Those rockets had been omitted from the original Operation Order, but the Buccaneer Squadron Commander had fortuitously included them in the kit that was ferried forward to AFB Grootfontein by C-130 Hercules, with his ground crews and maintenance spares. Co-incidentally, the Buccaneer ran out of ammunition at almost the exact time that the 17 helicopters in the second wave came flying in to extract the remaining paratroopers. In a desperate attempt to prevent the Cuban tanks from firing at the vulnerable helicopters and the assembling SA troops waiting to be picked up, the Buccaneer pilot dived his aircraft dangerously low, nearly hitting trees as he flew close over the top of the tanks, disorienting the crews and forcing them to break off their developing attack on the Parabats' positions.
Due to the disorganisation with the first wave of helicopters, there was nearly not enough space for all the remaining paratroopers on the second wave. In the ensuing scramble aboard the helicopters, 40 SWAPO prisoners, meant to have been taken back to South-West Africa for interrogation, had to be set free and left behind. Still, despite the disorderly extraction, no paratroops were left behind. The helicopters then extracted all the paratroops, followed by the group at the HAA, back to South-West Africa, the process finally being complete just before dark.
Throughout the rest of the day, to cover the extraction and dismantling of the HAA, the Buccaneers and Mirage IIIs continued to mount attacks on the Cuban vehicles in and around Cassinga. The result was that by nightfall nearly the entire Cuban battalion had been destroyed, killing around 160 Cuban soldiers.
[edit] Aftermath
In purely military terms, the attack on Cassinga was a complete success for the South African forces. Despite not capturing Dimo Amaambo, the destruction of the base and capture of so much significant documentation set SWAPO's insurgency back by over a year. The death toll of around 1000 guerillas meant that 1/3 of SWAPO's southern-Angolan force had been wiped out, including a number of senior field commanders. On the SADF side, the casualties were astonishingly low for such an attack, an important factor in South Africa where the public was intolerant of high casualty rates. The existing statistics of combat fatalities in airborne assaults - 'drops-to-contact' - suggested losses of 30% and upwards were to be expected. Nor did previous experience offer much comfort to the Parabats' commander when he was advised that the SA Air Force would conduct defence suppression strikes in support of his troops. In the event, however, a considerable and unanticipated military professionalism was displayed - and it carried the day.
Politically, the operation was a disaster for South Africa. The SADF allowed SWAPO to make the first announcements about the attack, as operations in the border areas were continuing. SWAPO crafted an elaborate propaganda story, describing the base as a refugee camp and claiming the SADF had slaughtered 600 defenceless refugees. Despite the huge volume of armaments found and photographed at Cassinga, and documents to the contrary, the International Red Cross stated that the camp was in fact both a refugee camp and a military base. The bodies were buried in two mass graves at Cassinga.
Due in part to South Africa's 'pariah' status and its incompetent press relations, the SWAPO version was the one preferred by much of the international media, allowing SWAPO to milk the event for great political gain, despite the fact that it had been a huge blow militarily to the organisation. The United Nations, at the time very much pro-SWAPO, lost no time in issuing resolutions condemning South Africa for attacking a "refugee camp".
In terms of lessons learned, it was realised after the battle that an improved command and control structure was needed for the South African Army's airborne units. To this end, 1, 2 and 3 Parachute Battalions were placed under the command of the newly-created 44 Parachute Brigade, therefore centralising command and control and logistics for the Army's airborne forces. The South African Defence Force also revamped the way it dealt with the media, though it was never able to erase the advantage in the propaganda arena that SWAPO enjoyed with its Soviet support.
Putting the lessons learned from Operation Reindeer into practice, the SADF emerged as an even more potent force, maintaining its edge right until the end of the Border War in 1989.
However, it is for the tactics used that the attack is admired most. It ranks as one of the largest and most audacious airborne assaults since World War II, and is possibly the only one without ground support to have succeeded. The SA airborne troops fought well, and were ably and creatively supported by the Air Force strike squadrons. It was noted by analysts that the techniques and standards employed by the Cans and Bucs were largely those of RAFG, and well up to NATO Bombing Competition standards. It should also be noted that the destroyed Cuban armoured battalion also performed above expectations. That the victory was so comprehensive is another factor that is often noted, and veterans of the various South African parachute battalions still celebrate Cassinga Day in remembrance both of the extent of the victory and of those who died that day.
See also: http://flecha.co.uk/CASSINGA%20II.html
