Battle of Ap Bac
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Battle of Ap Bac | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Vietnam War | |||||||
 |
|||||||
|
|||||||
| Combatants | |||||||
 Viet Cong |
 South Vietnam United States |
||||||
| Commanders | |||||||
| Bui Dinh Dam John Paul Vann |
|||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 350 | 1,400 | ||||||
| Casualties | |||||||
| 18 dead 39 wounded |
83 dead 108 wounded |
||||||
| Vietnam War |
|---|
| Ap Bac – Binh Gia – Song Be – Dong Xoai – Ia Drang – Long Tan – Dak To – Tra Binh Dong –Ong Thanh – 1st Tet – Khe Sanh – 1st Saigon – Lang Vei – Hills 881 & 861 – 2nd Tet – Hamburger Hill – Binh Ba – Ripcord – Lam Son 719 – FSB Mary Ann – Easter '72 – An Loc – Kontum – Phuoc Long – Ho Chi Minh – Buon Me Thuot – Xuan Loc – 2nd Saigon – Barrell Roll – Rolling Thunder – Pony Express – Steel Tiger – Commando Hunt – Linebacker I – Linebacker II – Chenla I – Tiger Hound – Lima Site 85 – Tailwind – Chenla II – Cambodia |
The Battle of Ap Bac was a small-scale action early in the Vietnam War that resulted in the first major combat victory by Viet Cong guerrillas against regular South Vietnamese forces. The battle took place on January 2, 1963, near the hamlet ("ap" in Vietnamese) of Bac, 65 kilometers southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta. Forces of the 7th Division of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN), equipped with armored personnel carriers (APCs) and artillery and supported by helicopters, faced off against an entrenched battalion of Viet Cong.
Contents |
[edit] Background
Small scale combat in what would develop into the Vietnam War started in the late 1950s when the South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem had instituted an anti-communist purge publicly aimed, ostensibly, at rooting out "left behind" Viet Minh forces. At that point in time the North Vietnamese were quite worried about inciting the U.S. into supporting the South in force, and had recommended a policy of avoiding combat at all costs. However the purge was too successful to allow the forces to do nothing, and small scale actions broke out across the country. The North remained worried about U.S. involvement and refused any sort of military support, forcing the remaining Viet Mihn to retreat into inaccessible areas in the hills and river estuaries. A stalemate of sorts followed, as the South's ARVN forces took so long to reach these areas that the guerrilla fighters were able to retreat with little difficulty.
American support started in the early 1960s with the arrival of large numbers of Special Forces troops to help in the field, and a joint U.S.-Vietnamese air force, although the later was essentially a U.S. force in all but name. The arrival of helicopters changed the nature of the battle considerably, allowing the ARVN forces to quickly fly to almost any point in the country, leaving little time for a retreat, and nowhere to hide on a permanent basis. Throughout 1962 the combined forces were increasingly effective in routing VC forces time and time again. These tactics, combined with the use of APCs, took a heavy toll on Viet Cong forces. The lightly-armed guerrillas had no weaponry capable of stopping the armored carriers, and inevitably were forced to flee, taking heavy casualties.
The most successful South Vietnamese force had been the 7th Division, commanded by Col. Huynh Van Cao. His advisor was Lt. Col. John Paul Vann, who orchestrated much of the unit's activity in concert with his planner, Capt. Richard Ziegler. They had scored the biggest successes of the pacification campaign thus far, killing thousands of Viet Cong and leaving the guerrillas in their part of the country on the brink of collapse. However, the ARVN officers were chronically reluctant to take any casualties – in operation after operation, Cao's forces would be in excellent position to trap and wipe out whole battalions of Viet Cong, but he would fail to close the trap on one pretext or another and allow remaining enemy forces to escape.
This behavior initially mystified Vann, who was attempting to build Cao into an aggressive commander. Unknown to Vann, Diem was allergic to military casualties, and would reprimand or demote any officer who lost too many men, no matter how successful the operation. Diem believed that an earlier coup attempt had been initiated due to casualties on offensive operations, and was more interested in using the military to protect his regime than take on the Viet Cong. Ironically, it is believed that the real cause for the attempted coup was due to Diem's failure to act aggressively when ARVN commanders saw the need to nip the growing insurrection in the bud. His "solution" was to fill ARVN with family and friends like Cao, who had little military capacity but were unlikely to attempt another coup.
After one action that resulted in a small number of ARVN casualties, Cao was called to Saigon and was personally dressed down by Diem in a several-hour diatribe. Upon his return, Vann and his group of advisers were forced from the joint planning sessions that had been so successful earlier, and action essentially wound down in their region. Cao used the excellent military intelligence network they had developed to find areas devoid of VC and planned operations only in those areas. In many other cases operations were executed on paper only, in order to be able to report an increasing tempo of operations that simply didn't exist.
In 1962 Diem decided to split the command of the area in the south around Saigon into two, the former III Corp area being reduced in size to cover the area northeast of Saigon, and the newly-created IV Corps taking over the west and southwest. Cao earned a promotion to General and assumed command of the new IV Corps, which included the area of operations of his 7th Division. Command of the 7th passed to Cao's chief of staff, Col. Bui Dinh Dam. Dam himself expressed concerns about his own abilities in terms of military command when the promotion was first presented to him by Diem. Nevertheless he took Cao's former position and welcomed Vann's advisers back into the planning effort. Despite the change in leadership, the same problems continued to manifest themselves in 7th Division. The force's timidity, coupled with the infantry's relatively poor training, would prove disastrous.
[edit] Prelude
Shortly after Christmas in 1962, intelligence located a Viet Cong radio transmitter near Tan Thoi, 1.5 kilometers northwest of Bac. It was believed that a single company, about 120 men, were in the area. Dam and Vann quickly planned an operation to destroy the guerrillas.
The plans called for a three-pronged pincer attack, carried out by 7th Division forces aided by regional units commanded by the province chief, Major Lam Quang Tho. One of the 7th's infantry battalions of 330 men would land just north of Tan Thoi in helicopters, two of Tho's battalions would approach Bac in parallel columns from the south, and 13 M113 APCs carrying an infantry company would approach from the west. These forces would be supported by artillery, air bombing, and two infantry companies held in reserve at base. The fields to the east and northeast of the village would be left open, to allow the guerrilla forces an escape route where they could be engaged by artillery and air support when they were forced to flee.
The Viet Cong forces actually consisted of a full battalion of 320 men, assisted by 30 local guerrillas. The unit was well-equipped with captured U.S. weaponry. Most of the soldiers were armed with M-1 rifles. Additionally, each of the three companies in the battalion had a .30 caliber machine gun, and each of the battalion's dozen platoons had a pair of BAR light machine guns. A single 60mm mortar was also available. Nevertheless, the Viet Cong would be outnumbered more than ten to one by the 7th Division and its attached units.
Vann advised Dam to move as quickly as possible, but Dam delayed the operation until January 2 so that the American chopper pilots could recover from New Year's Eve celebrations. However, the Viet Cong learned of plans for an operation, and began preparing defensive positions and digging fox holes. They placed themselves in Tan Thoi to the north, southeast along a tree-lined creek to Bac, and in short spurs running to the west and south of Bac. The Viet Cong positions, concealed by trees and shrubs, made them difficult to see from both the ground and the air, and afforded them a clear field of fire across the surrounding rice fields.
[edit] Battle
At 0700 on January 2, 10 CH-21 Shawnee "flying banana" helicopters began airlifting the 7th Division infantry battalion to the area north of Tan Thoi. Due to the onset of heavy fog, the helicopters were only able to make one trip, dropping off one company. The lifts to transport the two remaining companies were delayed till 0930. In the meantime the single company on location had to hold its position.
This delay left the two regional battalions marching up from the south to make first contact with the enemy. At 0745, one battalion reached the west-east tree line south of Bac. The Viet Cong allowed them to get close before opening fire from the tree line and the creek running south to the right. One company commander was killed within a few seconds. The rest of the battalion hunkered down into a dike and spent two hours unsuccessfully trying to flank the guerrillas. Artillery support was misdirected because the fire control officer would not stand up to observe the fall of the rounds and the shells landed on the far side of the enemy positions or in the open fields in front of them. At 1000 the battalion commander was wounded and any attempt at maneuvering stopped.
Major Tho, the province chief in charge of the battalions, failed to send the second battalion in aid of the first, although the battalion commander repeatedly asked for permission to start a flanking maneuver. By this time the helicopters were done landing the 7th Division battalion to the north. Finally, giving up on Tho, Vann requested that Col. Dam fly the two reserve companies of the 7th into a rice field west of Bac, north of the tree line and thus behind the enemy position. Unknown to Vann, who was under the impression the fire from the southern line was from the entire VC force, this area was also defended by a company of VC regulars.
The CH-21s approached from the north, escorted by 5 UH-1 Hueys. Knowing only the enemy positions in the southern tree line, the helicopters recklessly flew south directly over Tan Thoi and along the creek to Bac, where they curved and landed only 200 yards west of the village, within range of light arms fire. All along this flight path the CH-21s received enemy fire, each chopper taking multiple hits. The Hueys began strafing runs along the enemy positions but the trees overhead and the deep holes the Viet Cong had dug shielded them from the attacks.
After unloading the infantry company, the helicopters took off, but one CH-21 was too damaged to get off the ground. Unwilling to leave the crew with the ARVN forces on the ground, the pilots sent another CH-21 down to rescue them. This helicopter too was damaged as soon as it landed. Finally one of the Hueys came in to pick up the two downed crews. While hovering, about to land, enemy fire struck its main rotor and the helicopter flipped over and crashed. Further away, a third CH-21 had been damaged and forced to land. The infantry company had found itself under heavy fire and had taken cover in a shallow irrigation ditch. Unwilling to maneuver, the ARVN forces were pinned down. It was 1030.
Vann then directed the APC squadron, several kilometers to the west of the village, to head to Bac immediately to rescue the infantry company and helicopter crews. Steep-banked canals blocked the way and the APC commander, Ly Tong Ba, felt that the Viet Cong forces would be long gone before he could get the M-113's over the canals. An argument broke out with Vann literally screaming into the radio in his plane, attempting to get Ba to start moving. Ba then delayed further while attempting to get the proper authority by radio, as he was under orders to not take commands directly from US forces. In the meantime another CH-21 attempting a rescue managed to land near the downed choppers, but due to heavy fire had to take off immediately. Damaged, it barely flew out of the combat zone before having to land. The Viet Cong had destroyed or disabled five helicopters, a new record for the war.
According to the account in A Bright Shining Lie, at this point the Viet Cong forces were facing problems of their own. The battalion of the 7th to the north at Tan Thoi was putting pressure on the VC forces there, although this was just an exchange of fire. The groups to the south of Bac appeared to be on the point of breaking, having received constant air and artillery fire, albeit ineffective. A small force exposed near the southern tree line were able to pull out, but instead of moving to Bac, ended up in Tan Thoi and refused to return south. But the respite caused by the delay in getting the APCs into action resulted in a slackening of fire, allowing ammunition to be passed up and the leaders to encourage their men. By the time the battle started again, some semblance of order had returned to their lines.
At 1345 the APCs finally reached the rice field west of the village. Approaching the guerrillas in the tree line to the east, they had difficulty seeing the enemy positions due to the heavy foliage. The Viet Cong poured heavy fire onto the vehicles, focusing on the machine gunner on top of each carrier. Two of the APCs were able to pull up beside the downed helicopters, but the driver of one was killed as he had been driving with his head out of the hatch. In previous encounters the Viet Cong troops had broken at the sight of the APCs and had not fired back, so the drivers had no reason to suspect this wouldn't happen again and left their machines open. While the recovery operations continued, Ba started forming up the remaining APCs for their traditional "charge" that had always broken the VC in the past. At this point Ba was knocked unconscious inside his carrier, and the APCs refused to move while he recovered.
While the squadron stopped moving for the half hour until Ba recovered, the machine gunners on top continued to become casualties. As the job typically went to the sergeants who were leaders in the infantry, the ability of the company to function was crippled. Finally Ba was able to organize the squadron and resumed the attack, but at a very slow pace now that the drivers had "buttoned up" and had to use their periscopes for driving, something they were not used to. Just when they were nearing their objective and it seemed the enemy might break and run, a Viet Cong squad leader and his men jumped up and heaved grenades at the nearest APCs. Most of the attackers were killed, but the grenades hit their targets and added to the confusion. A final attack by the previously feared flamethrower-equipped APC petered out due to a poor mixture of the fuel, which was not thick enough to reach the tree line from their position 100 m away. At 1430 the APCs discontinued the attack and withdrew, their morale broken.
Cao, still in overall command at a local airbase, attempted to rescue the situation by calling in a paratrooper battalion from the reserve in Saigon. The American adviser at the base watched the preparations and realized that Cao was not going to drop them into the path of escape, where they might cause a panic, but was intending to drop them behind the APCs already in the field. He appeared to be up to his old tricks, refusing to close the trap in order to give the VC an escape route so they might simply leave the field instead of having to fight their way out. Vann was appraised of the situation and immediately flew to the base to try to convince Cao to change the drop, but Cao refused, saying he wanted to reinforce the troops already on the ground. Vann later remarked that that Cao was "reinforcing a defeat". Van continued to protest and Cao finally ended discussion by stating the drop was going in at 1600, and that was that.
In fact, Cao had requested the drop be made at 1800, just before dark, in order to ensure there would be little time for the paratroops to organize and make a real attack and thereby limiting any possibility of additional casualties. When the planes did not arrive at 1600 he claimed the problem was in Saigon. By the time they were on their jump run the VC were aware of the drop due to intercepted radio messages. When the planes arrived the flight line took them right over the line of VC troops between Bac and Tan Thoi, and to add to the confusion they dropped late, a third of a kilometer north, much closer to Tan Thoi. Here the fighting had remained desultory all day and the Viet Cong troops were fairly fresh. The paratroopers took fire in the air and on the ground and took heavy casualties.
The paratroopers were not a force to be taken lightly and attempted to organize attacks into the VC lines. There was no time for this, however, and soon afterward nightfall ended the fighting. As was standard practice, the guerrillas took the opportunity to safely withdraw from the area. Artillery was arranged to shoot into the withdrawal area to the east of Bac, but Cao limited the fire to only four rounds an hour.
[edit] Aftermath
The Viet Cong suffered 18 killed and 39 wounded. ARVN losses were 80 dead and 100 wounded, with 3 U.S. advisers killed in action and 8 wounded. 5 helicopters were lost.
Ap Bac represented a significant milestone in the war. The communist forces had their first big success of the war, fully exploiting their victory for propaganda purposes. More importantly, they had successfully developed tactics to counter the technology advantage the U.S. provided the South Vietnamese. With the success of Ap Bac, the North immediately began planning for a full-scale war in the south, forming an official revolutionary party structure and an associated armed force, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, or as they were known to the U.S., the Viet Cong.
The battle was also an indicator that the United States would eventually be compelled to escalate their presence and actively replace the insufficiently aggressive and poorly performing ARVN troops with their own ground combat forces. Advisors in the field suggested using U.S. military commanders in existing ARVN formations in order to give them "backbone", but to leaders in the U.S. this seemed like a new form of colonialism, an anathema. As the VC grew increasing powerful through 1963 and 1964, they eventually decided the only solution was the involvement of U.S. Army forces directly in the field. These plans were put into place starting in 1964, with the first full-sized combat units starting their missions in late 1965.
[edit] References
- Starry, Donn A. (1981). Armored Combat in Vietnam. Blandford Books. ISBN 0-7137-1166-3.
- Sheehan, Neil (1988). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House.
- Karnow, Stanley (1983). Vietnam: A History. Viking Press.
