Armoured warfare
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Armoured warfare in modern warfare is understood to be the use of armoured fighting vehicles as a central component of the methods of war.
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[edit] History
[edit] First World War
Modern armoured warfare began with the development of the tank during the First World War. British Mark I tanks first went to action in Somme, September 1916, but did not manage to break the deadlock of trench warfare. In Battle of Cambrai British tanks were more successful, and broke a German trenchline system, the Hindenburg Line. After the disastrous final German offensive, tanks were used at the Battle of Amiens ending the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front and effectively ending the war. Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools.
[edit] The inter-war period
After the Great War, various commanders who had been associated with the development of the tank were involved in developing the new ideas. Liddell Hart wrote extensively on tank warfare and the theories of Colonel Fuller. The British War Office sanctioned the creation of the Experimental Mechanised Force which was formed on May 1, 1927, under Colonel R. J. Collins. The units were entirely mobile and consisted of reconnaissance tankettes and armoured cars, a battalion of 48 Vickers medium tanks, a motorized machine gun battalion, a mechanized artillery regiment, which had one battery of fully tracked self-propelled guns capable of acting as conventional or anti-aircraft artillery (Birch guns), and a motorized company of field engineers. The unit carried out operations on Salisbury Plain and was observed by the other major nations, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Although its performance was recognised it was disbanded in 1928. The US would then create their own Experimental mechanised force. The British Army began the conversion of its Cavalry from horse to tanks. Although there were differences on where British military strength should be developed with the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy being favoured by some in power, all but a few regiments were fully converted by 1939.
[edit] Second World War
Modern armour warfare doctrine was developed and established during the run up to World War II. A fundamental key to conventional warfare is the concentration of force at a particular point. Concentration of force increases the chance of victory in a particular engagement. Correctly chosen and exploited, victory in a given engagement or a small number of engagements is often sufficient to win the battle.
For example, visualize a straight defensive line composed of two infantry and two armoured divisions, deployed equally along the length of the line. A numerically equivalent attacker can win by concentrating his armour at one point (with his infantry holding the rest of the line), thus guaranteeing the forcing of the line, then passing through, turning the flank of the two halves of the defensive line and rolling them up.
The defensive line could attempt to counter-attack, but it is not strong at any point and although the combined infantry/armour attack of the defenders is stronger than an infantry only attack, it is not very much stronger (since the divisions are spread out along the entire line) and it is in general much easier to defend than attack.
A major aspect of all warfare is the simple formula, known as the Lanchester Square Law, that the combat power of a combat unit relative to the relative combat power of an enemy of a given size is the square of the number of members of that unit:
- One tank obviously has the combat power of one tank. (12 = 1)
- Two tanks have four times the relative combat power of a single tank. (22 = 4)
Basically, twice as many tanks will quadruple the relative firepower — relative that is, to the amount of firepower the enemy has per member of the friendly unit; one could also express this by saying that their relative punishment from enemy action is reduced four times, which is the same thing — as not only their own absolute number is doubled, but the number of enemy tanks relative to each of their own, is thereby halved also.
Thus, concentrating two divisions into one point and attacking generates a far greater force than is achieved by spreading two divisions into a line and pushing forward on a broad front.
Concentration of force requires mobility (to permit rapid concentration) and power (to be effective in combat once concentrated). The tank embodies these two properties and so is the primary weapon.
Prior to World War II, horse mounted Cavalry performed what is now the tank role; breaking past and attacking the enemy in the rear. In all armies there was a great deal of resistance to the introduction of the tank (due to the concomitant replacement of the horse), in particular as Cavalry units were regarded as the elite and had a lot of influence within the army.
[edit] German Doctrine
By the time of World War II, the German Military had developed a more flexible doctrine to that of the Allies and their concentrated Panzer divisions in 1940 strategically exploited breaches in the allied defensive lines, made by their infantry and airforce, to great effect.
[edit] British and French Doctrine
In the deserts of North Africa, the British developed the alternate approach of combining the armored, infantry and artillery together to form a 'balanced, combined arms team'; the Italian army, ill-armed and-led, folded.
The arrival of the German Afrika Korps highlighted the weaknesses of the British approach: the small number of Infantry and Artillery to each armored division was sufficient when attacking the immobile uncoordinated Italians, but against the highly mobile, well-coordinated Germans under Erwin Rommel, the undermanned British formations were insufficient.
Indeed, it was only towards the later years of the war, with the invasion of the European mainland, that the Allied Armies began to properly practise armoured warfare. In 1942 and 1943, the Allies consistently lost armoured battles in the North African desert due to improper tactics; in particular, running armoured formations into opposing anti-tank positions.
In the UK and in France, armour was accepted into the Army, but using a division of labour: some as infantry support weapons, others as cavalry replacements. As such, British and French infantry tanks were heavily armoured but as a consequence too slow, whereas British cavalry ("cruiser") tanks were swift and as a result poorly armoured. German tanks were designed for independent mobile operations and as all-around tanks: lighter, considerably more mobile but more weakly armed and armoured than the infantry tanks; tanks were not yet seen to be a primary anti-tank weapon. When the German tanks actually had to fight the British infantry tanks they were severely discomfited--but recovered to drive the British army out of continental Europe. At the start of the German invasion, the French possessed more tanks and, in one-to-one terms, better tanks, than the Germans; but what mattered was how the tanks were used, and the French distributed half of theirs amongst independent tank battalions for infantry support, rendering them impotent. The Germans in 1940 concentrated all their tanks into Panzer divisions and used them for a strategic envelopment, smashing their way through the French defensive line and onto The Channel.
To counter such attacks, a mobile anti-tank forward must be held in reserve and moved to meet the attack. The French had no strategic reserve at all; let alone a highly mobile reserve as their three Cavalry armoured divisions had already been committed in the Low Countries, which was crucial in the French failure to counteract the German penetration.
[edit] US Doctrine
The United States Army was influenced by the perceived actions of German tanks in the 1939 Polish Campaign. The popular conception in the US was that tanks had been used boldly as part of a new system of war called Blitzkrieg. Under General Jacob L. Devers, Chief of the Armored Force, doctrine evolved into a combined arms operational force consisting of primarily infantry, artillery, and tanks with tanks being the major maneuver component. Under this doctrine, U.S. tank crews of both armored divisions and GHQ tank battalions were taught to fight tanks in tank on tank engagements. Armored Force personnel during and after the war criticized the infantry for using the GHQ tank battalions assigned to infantry divisions strictly as infantry support. For more information on this subject see: "Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of the U.S. Armored Forces," Gen. Donn A. Starry and George F. Hofmann, editors.
The US Combined Arms team included air support, artillery, engineers, and a tank component supplemented by the Tank Destroyer concept. The latter is most closely identified with the Chief of Army Ground Forces, General Leslie McNair who believed towed 57 mm AT guns, hand-held Bazookas and thinly armoured Tank Destroyers to be superior to friendly tanks for fighting enemy tanks. Under this doctrine, tanks were supposed to avoid tank-vs-tank combat as much as possible, leaving enemy tanks to the tank destroyers. In actual combat, McNair's doctrine led to US tanks having weaker guns and less armor protection than their German counterparts, and in the narrow confines of much of the terrain in Normandy, they could not avoid one-on-one encounters with German tanks.
[edit] Arab-Israeli wars
Both sides in the Arab-Israeli series of conflicts have made heavy use of tanks and other armoured vehicles. Up until the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli armoured units typically had the advantage, mainly due to good tactics and unit cohesion. In 1973, Israel failed to understand the importance of the introduction of anti-tank guided missiles. Hundreds of AT-3 Sagger man-portable anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) supplied to the Egyptians by the Soviet Union inflicted heavy losses on Israeli tanks. Since then, ATGMs have played an important role with Israeli forces too. They are some of the leaders in the development of missile-based "tank destroyers". When an Israeli infantry unit moved up to engage the anti-tank missiliers, they were able to easily defeat them - strong evidence that tanks operating on their own have some severe weaknesses.
Today, Israeli Merkava-class Main Battle Tanks were developed against the role of anti-tank weapons. Special "spaced armour" protects the critical points of the tank such as the engines, fuel and ammo compartments. The heavily armoured tank is one of the most advanced in the world. Its design and technology includes strong armour on its front, sides and top, making the Merkava one of the most protected MBTs in existence. Also, the Merkava-class MBT has rear doors, giving its crew an exceptionally high chance of survival when faced with even the strongest anti-tank weapons and tactics. Furthermore, Israel is currently developing the TROPHY Active Protection System, and claims that as a major development in weapons design it will greatly increase the protection provided to the Merkava MBT and its crew.
[edit] NATO and Warsaw Pact
During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact assumed armoured warfare to be a dominant aspect of conventional ground warfare in Europe.
Infantry fighting vehicles were first developed in the 1960s with the Soviet Union's BMP-1.
Rotary-wing aircraft were built and theorised as "flying tanks."
[edit] Present
Tanks rarely work alone; the usual minimum unit size is a platoon (or troop) of four to five tanks. The tanks of the platoon work together providing mutual support: two might advance while covered by the others then stop and provide cover for the remainder to move ahead.
Normally, multiple platoons would coordinate with mechanised infantry and utilise their mobility and firepower to penetrate weak-points in enemy lines. This is where the powerful engines, tracks and turrets come into play. The possible turret rotation of a full 360 degrees allows for coordinated movement within and between platoons, while defending against attacks from multiple directions and engaging troops and vehicles without stopping or slowing down. When defensive, they would wait in prepared positions or use any natural terrain elements (such as small hills) for cover. A tank sitting just behind a hill crest ("hull-down") exposes only the top of its turret, with the gun and sensors, to the enemy - providing the smallest possible target while allowing it to engage almost anything on the other side of the hill. Tanks are usually able to depress the main gun below the horizontal since contemporary kinetic energy (KE) rounds have fairly flat trajectories. Without this they would be unable to exploit such positions. However upon cresting the hill, the tank will expose its thinly-armored underside to enemy weapons.
Without tanks and infantry working together, problems can arise. During the Yom Kippur War, Israeli tanks operating alone in large numbers were decimated by Egyptian infantry with anti-tank guided missiles. When Israeli infantry and artillery were brought in to help the tanks, the tables were turned and the Egyptian units were suppressed with reduced losses to the Israeli troops. This is an extreme example but exemplifies what has been fairly thoroughly documented since the second World War: tanks and infantry work best by taking advantage of each other's strengths and combining to minimise the weaknesses. In many conflicts, it was usual to see infantry riding on the back of tanks, ready to jump off and provide support when necessary. Unfortunately, the design of many modern tanks makes this a dangerous practice. The M1 Abrams, for example, has such hot exhaust gas that nearby infantry have to be careful where they stand. Tanks can also be very vulnerable to well aimed artillery; well-coordinated air support and counter-battery artillery units can help overcome this.
The deposition of armour around a tank is not uniform; the front is typically better armoured than the sides or rear. Accordingly, normal practice is to keep the front towards the enemy at all times, the tank retreats by reversing instead of turning around. Driving backwards away from an enemy is even safer than driving forwards towards them since driving forwards over a bump can throw the front of the tank up in the air, exposing the thin armour of the underside and taking the gun off the target due to its limited angle of depression.
The tracks, wheels and suspension of a tank are outside the armoured hull and are some of the most vulnerable spots. The easiest way to disable a tank (other than a direct hit in a vulnerable area with a full-power anti-tank weapon) is to target the tracks for a "mobility kill" (m-kill). Once a tank is disabled it is easier to destroy. This is why side-skirts are an important feature; they can deflect heavy machine-gun bullets and trigger the detonation of HEAT rounds before they strike the running gear. Other vulnerable parts of a typical tank include the engine deck (with air intakes, radiators, etc.) and the turret ring, where the turret joins the hull.
When used defensively, tanks are often sunk into trenches or placed behind earth berms for increased protection. The tanks can fire off a few shots from their defensive position, then retreat (reversing) to another prepared position further back and drive behind the berms or into the trenches there. These positions can be constructed by the tank crews, but preparations are better and quicker if carried out by combat engineers with bulldozers. Overhead protection, even if it is fairly thin, can also be very useful since it can help pre-detonate artillery shells and avoid direct hits from above which can be deadly to tanks, by striking them at their thinnest armour. In short, tank crews find as many ways as possible to augment the armour on their vehicles.
Tanks usually go into battle with a round in the gun, ready to fire, to minimise reaction time when encountering an enemy. The US doctrine calls for this round to be a kinetic energy (KE) round, as the reaction time is most important when meeting enemy tanks, to get the first shot (and possibly the first kill). If troops or light vehicles are encountered, the usual response is to fire this round at them, despite it not being ideal - it is difficult and time-consuming to remove a round which is already in the breech. In this case, after the KE round is fired, a HEAT round would normally be loaded next to continue the engagement.
Tanks can be decisive in city fighting, with the ability to demolish walls and fire medium and heavy machine guns in several directions simultaneously. However, tanks are especially vulnerable in urban combat. It's much easier for enemy infantry to sneak up behind a tank or fire at its sides, where it is most vulnerable. In addition, firing down from multi-story buildings allows shots at the soft upper turret armour and even basic weapons like molotov cocktails, if aimed at the engine air intakes, can disable a tank. Because of these limitations, tanks are difficult to use in city conflicts where civilians or friendly forces might be nearby, since their firepower can't be used effectively.
[edit] Airborne Threats and Tactics
Tanks and other armoured vehicles are vulnerable to attack from the air for several reasons. One is that they are easily detectable - the metal they are made of shows up well on radar, and is especially obvious if they are moving in formation. A moving tank also produces a lot of heat, noise and dust. The heat makes seeing them on a forward-looking infra-red system easy and the dust is a good visual clue during the day. The other major reason is that most armoured vehicles have thinner armour on the roof of the turret and on the engine deck, so an anti-tank guided missile (from an attack helicopter or ground-attack jet) hitting them from the top can be deadly even if it has a small warhead. Even machine guns and small automatic cannon are powerful enough to penetrate the rear and top sections of the engine compartment of a tank.
Certain airplanes have been developed to attack armoured vehicles. Most notable is the 'purpose-built' Fairchild-Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II, affectionately known as the 'Warthog' because of its shape in contrast to more aesthetically pleasing military aircraft. The 'Hog' may be blunt but is exceptionally effective in its purpose: hunt and kill enemy armor and vehicles and its reputation as an effective ‘Tankbuster’ is not unfounded. Although able to carry a number of different missiles and bombs (including anti-tank ordnance such as the AGM-65 Maverick), its main weapon is the 30mm GAU-8/A Avenger Gatling gun which is capable of firing 3,900 depleted uranium armor-piercing rounds per minute (a popular belief is that the plane was actually built around the gun and not vice-versa). Capable of low-velocity, low-altitude flight the A-10 is itself an airborne armoured vehicle with a titanium enclosure for the pilot, an airframe that can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles and triple redundancy in its flight systems, with mechanical systems to back up double-redundant hydraulics.
Similarly, a number of helicopter gunships have been designed mainly to engage enemy armoured vehicles. The AH-64 Apache, Westland Lynx, Mi-24 Hind,Eurocopter Tiger and Denel Aviation AH-2 Rooivalk are examples. Helicopters are very effective against armored vehicles for many reasons. The AH-64D (Longbow), for example is equipped with an improved sensor suite and weapon systems and the AN/APG-78 Longbow Fire Control Radar dome installed over the main rotor.
Airborne threats can be countered in several ways. One is air supremacy. This is what the United States relies on most, which is demonstrated by their distinct lack of effective short-range, mobile air defence vehicles to accompany armoured units. Most other countries accompany their armoured forces with highly mobile self-propelled anti-aircraft guns such as the Russian ZSU-23, short and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems such as the SA-6, SA-8 and SA-11, or combine both on the same vehicle (the ZSU-23 for example can also host SA-18 or SA-16 AA missiles).
[edit] Support
Armoured warfare is mechanically and logistically intensive and requires extensive support mechanisms.
Armoured Fighting Vehicles require armoured vehicles capable of working in the same terrain to support them. These are operated by the appropriate branches of the army e.g. recovery and maintenance vehicles by the REME and combat engineering vehicles by the RE in the British Army.
These include:
- Armoured Recovery vehicles (ARV)
- Many of these are based on the chassis for the vehicle they support. e.g. the ARV for the UK Challenger tank is a Challenger hull with winch.
- Armoured supply vehicles
- (armoured) Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEV)
- e.g. bulldozers
[edit] Future
While tanks have been integral to armoured warfare in the past, recent conflicts have put more emphasis on mobility, which main battle tanks cannot provide. It takes a few weeks to transfer tanks and their supporting equipment by air or sea, and tanks still require frequent maintenance.
[edit] See also
- Ancient warfare
- Blitzkrieg
- Combined arms
- Modern warfare
- History of the tank
- Lists of armoured fighting vehicles
- Armoured warfare theorists and practioneers:
[edit] References
[edit] Further reading
- Guderian, Heinz [1952] (2001). Panzer Leader, Da Capo Press Reissue edition, New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81101-4.
- Howard, Les (2006). Winter Warriors: Across Bosnia with the PBI 1995/1996. The Book Guild. ISBN 1-84624-077-8.
- von Mellenthin, Major General F. W. [1956] (1971). Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, First Ballantine Books Edition, New York: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-24440-0.
