Talk:Argument from free will

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The rebuttal to the argument was followed by the following counter-rebuttal, which I cut out:

The argument should have been presented not in terms of time but in terms of causality, for time could not be discerned in a causal system at equilibrium. Whatever is not causal is random, so omniscience cannot extend beyond a causal network. For God to be omniscient, It must know the entire causal network. Therefore either there can be no options or God cannot know which path is selected, which proves the Christian ideal of God cannot exist.

While I can sort of understand where this is coming from, this business about of "causal networks" and a "causal system at equilibrium" needs to be reworded or clarified; without an explanation of what the terms mean, it reads like a bunch of mumbo-jumbo. If anyone would like to reformulate this passage in a more coherent manner and put it back in the article, feel free to do so. -Didactohedron 01:40, Nov 19, 2004 (UTC)

Contents

[edit] Causality does not mix well with omniscience

A causal network can be understood as a tree, where the trunk represents a starting state (for God, the beginning of time), and wach point at which a branch splits off represents a decision. The leaves represent all the possible outcomes.

A counter to the argument from free will is that it assumes God makes decisions at various times in history, while an omniscient God could have just as easily made all his plans at once. However, some scriptures describe people reasoning/arguing/bartering with God, in an apparent bid to get God to change his mind, with apparent success (e.g. Moses, Abraham @ Sodom). On the other hand, these do not prove that God did not know the outcome ahead of time. This line of reasoning implies that the debate with God was not of substance in his decision making, but held for the purpose of its effect on mankind.

As for the causal network problem posted previously, consider any node (decision). If God knows the outcome, then he knows his own decision before he has made it, and free will is meaningless, because he has no choices. This is a contradiction with the premise of a causal network, which assumes choices exist.

On the other hand, it is also possible that God's omniscience excludes his own choices, and in fact means knowing the entire causal network before choices have been made, allowing him to make the choices, determine a path through the causal network, and have free will.

Also, if one assumes that God created the universe, and that time is limited to the universe, then there is no before or after, or causality, or choice as we know it apart from the universe. God is then free to have planned the entirety of the universe from outside the universe, an dset it in motion. Note that this does not imply that God leaves the universe alone after its inception, merely that he acts based on decisions he has already made.

--Dave Merillat

There were some logical flaws and reaches that were in the article. I cleaned it up reasonably. -Homagetocatalonia

[edit] before

Since many theists hold God to be timeless (i.e. existent beyond the scope of what we consider to be time) the word "before" in the statement "because God's omniscience demands that he would know events before they happen" means nothing from a God-point-of-view. If God exists beyond the scope of the space-time continuum, and therefore able to not only see all events, but to exist while all events are taking place, then God doesn't know any event "before" it happens but rather "while" it happens. Since we humans are also capable of knowing events while they happen without having any effect on the free-will of the agent causing the event, God can likewise know an event while it happens without effecting the free-will of the agent causing the event. Therefore the coexistence of an omniscient God and free-will isn't oxymoronic.

The concept of "timeless" is an ad hoc creation for the sake of debate, and it has no solid foundation based on human knowledge about the universe.
Additionally, according to the Bible, God apparently did/does things SEQUENTIALLY, and the Bible uses days, years, etc. to describe what God did first, and what God did later.
Most importantly, the Christians say the God PREDICTED the coming of Messiah in the Old Testament, and THEN came Jesus in New Testament.
If God is timeless, how did/does He PREDICT things, which tells what will happen in the FUTURE, and FUTURE is a concept of TIME. --Roland 04:52, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
The concept of "timeless" or "out side of time" does have solid foundation based on human knowledge about the universe. The generally accepted theory of how the universe started in mainstream science today involves the Big Bang. Following the idea of Big Bang, and also one of the concept in the theory of Relativity (that extreme mass can warp time), it is concluded that "time" begins at Big Bang. Steven Hawkings stated in his book that "...the question 'What's before the Big Bang' is meaningless, because there's no concept of time before Big Bang." If we are following the idea that God created the universe, obviously his existence would have to be independent of time. Thus the concept of "timeless" does exist in mainstream science today, and is generally accepted, we just don't (and probably can never) understand it. Time is a dimension, just like the other spatial dimensions we know. Beings can exist in all, some, or maybe even none in these dimensions that we know.
Further, things certainly happened sequentially and "prophecies" were made - in our prespective. Tell me, can anyone explain the interaction between a timeless being and time(-ful?) beings? If time exists for one side of the interaction but not the other side, how do we think about that? I certainly can't imagine; We don't even have the language or mental capability to consider that. Casuality or sequence of events exist only in time. If a timeless being acts on dimensions in time (or even the time dimension itself), we have no idea how we would observe that and conclude from that.
Our logic is based on causality, which, in term, requires time. If something transcends time, then it would, by definition, transcends logic as we know. The being might still adhere to logic in a time-less fashion, but logic as we know will not be able to speculate or analysis such being. Allan Lee 18:06, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
I agree that if something transcends time then it is outside of our understanding. However, in this particular case we are discussing the predetermination of human beings, who exist inside of time. Although it is conceivable that God exists outside of time, his knowledge of events that occur within time must also include knowledge of when that event will occur, as otherwise his knowledge is not complete and he cannot be declared to be omniscient. That God is timeless does not mean that his knowledge is also timeless, and as we are time-constrained beings that knowledge would predetermine us. Anria 22:08, 14 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] By Definition

The following statement is incorrect: "By definition, no being can be all-knowing if there is free will (different possible futures). This shows that omniscience and free will are logically contradictory."

It is certainly not "by definition" true that no being can be omniscient while free-will exists. I'm not saying that this is the case, but if there are different possible futures what would prevent an omniscient being from knowing all of them. And I did read the statements that were already on the page, and the ideas I presented were not all on the page. The fact that some hold that God exists outside of time was quickly presented, but the contention of His existence at all points in time simultaneously was certainly not addressed, and is not properly addressed now that most of my comments have been cut away. I presented the information at the end instead of chopping-up the already existing info that was previously posted. But I guess I could have integrated it into the pre-existing post. This was my 1st post and I wasn't aware of the ettiquette.

I believe the logic breaks down at #3: "By the definitions of "knowledge" and "choice", if one knows for certain what choice one will make in the future, one will not be able to make the opposite choice." Using the word "future" is another case of trying to shoe-horn an atemporal being/idea into a temporal framework. If the omniscient being is simply existing and observing the choice as it is being made, said being is not effecting the outcome of the choice any more that us temporal beings would effect it by our observation.

You're forgetting that abrahamic God is said to have given the beginning to the Universe, thus effecting the outcome of events ultimately. And as said before, omniscience requires the knowledge of "when" to be complete. So apparently God could determine what would happen "after". MaybeNextTime —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 83.27.30.185 (talk) 17:36, 8 December 2006 (UTC).

I believe this entry, as it is currently written, is not neutral point-of-view, but is baised toward an unbelief in the possibility that an omniscient being can co-exist with free-will, by entering in to the discussion with the aforementioned pre-supposition. Unfortunately, I won't have the time after today (since I'm on vacation today only) to continue with this discussion and keep reposting rebuttals.

I do, however, appreciate that some of my comments were kept, and that the site's maintainer did at least consider my statements.

One more point to consider... just because I know something is going to happen doesn't mean I'm affecting that event. i.e. when my wife and I go to dinner I know whe's going to choose to get turkey because she always does. I'm not forceing her to get turkey, she's exercising her free-will and getting what she wants, and what I know she will get beforehand. So since I can know something will happen without negating the free-will of the agent making the choice, an omniscient being can similarly know something will happen without negating free-will.

There's no problem with you knowing what your wife is going to do before she does it, because there is no contradiction inherent in the possibility of you being wrong. For an omniscient being, however, their knowledge is necessary and thus cannot be wrong. If that knowledge cannot be wrong, then your wife is not free to change her mind. Anria 07:48, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

The point here shouldn't be to try to prove that free-will and omniscience do or do not co-exist, but rather to present both sides of the argument (i.e. non-biased point-of-view) and allow the reader to determine the truth for themselves.

Using the word "future" is another case of trying to shoe-horn an atemporal being/idea into a temporal framework. - no, because WE live IN time. God's omniscience affects US too, (we apparently have free will), not only himself.
just because I know something is going to happen doesn't mean I'm affecting that event. - but you don't know FOR SURE. God DOES know for sure, though. Infinity0 talk 16:39, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
These points are already in the paragraph directly below the argument; you should try to extend that, instead of adding stuff at the bottom. Infinity0 talk 16:40, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

I'm pretty good with the wording now as it stands. I believe that it represents both sides without trying to force a view on the reader. I'm willing to go with what we have now if you are.

Yeah, I'm fine with the general structure of the article as it stands. I think it should be extended to something like the format of Problem of Evil, with sources and famous philosophers' views of this argument, but I don't know enough about this to do anything substantial. Infinity0 talk 20:13, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Organization

As it is now, this article starts out in a promising way, but decays into a repetitive around-and-around debate in the section below the numbered list, culminating in a sentence that bizarrely reiterates the whole point of the argument as if it were a new, additional point. I would like to edit the whole section, but since I am sure that that would open a can of worms, I'll post it here first. I suggest replacing everything after the numbered list with:

Most monotheistic religions hold both that God is omniscient, and that humans have free will. (For
example, they often include a concept of reward and punishment -- Heaven and Hell -- which logically requires human
free will in order to be meaningful.) Many proponents of the argument from free will (AFFW) therefore hold that AFFW
is an effective refutation of such religions. AFFW has been used in support of atheism, and as a basis for Deism and
various other non-omniscient religious philosophies.

== Criticisms ==

A common criticism of AFFW argues that the apparent contradiction arises from an attempt to attribute temporal
attributes to an atemporal idea or being. In this view, God exists beyond the constraints of linear time, and
the temporal terminology used by AFFW is meaningless when applied to him: God doesn't need to know any
event "before" it happens but rather is capable of knowing/experiencing it "while" it happens.

AFFW proponents respond that the above criticism does not eliminate the contradiction. They claim that
omniscience by definition means that God has knowledge of all human events in all human times, even if
God's own relationship to time is entirely different from ours.

Any objections?

(By the way, the whole article is of course badly lacking references to reputable sources.) - Mglg 21:41, 14 June 2006 (UTC)

I'm going ahead with the edit. - Mglg 02:41, 16 June 2006 (UTC)


The only problem I still have is with point 3. It seems to say that it's not possible for a reasonable person to believe that omniscience to exist in addition to free will. I have to disagree with this and say that it is certainly not true "by definition." Many, including myself, contend that just because someone/something knows that an event is going to occur does not negate the free will of the person/thing choosing to act in a certain way.

 I would like to add something to the article stating something to that effect to make it more NPOV, as it currently seems to slant heavily toward the viewpoint of those who adhere to an AFFW stance.
The thing is that abrahamic God is said to create the world. With omniscience He knew the outcome boforehand and thus affected it.

[edit] Logical Flaws?

Where is the proper place to point out logical flaws in the main proof? I don’t think it makes sense to change the proof itself, since that proof as written is indeed used in an attempt to refute omniscience coincidental with free will. However, I think that the proof is logically unsound, and would like to propose a corrected, sound proof. So where would be the proper place for that correction? 17.201.116.248 20:14, 19 September 2006 (UTC)

I've reverted your addition, as it reeks of POV to me. Your use of a numbered argument seems to be a straw man, as you state that the original argument assumes its conclusion but then reword the argument entirely in order to prove this and call that rewording a more accurate version. (If that wasn't what you meant, apologies, but in that case it would still need a rewording to make that clearer.) Certain phrases such as "clearly possible", "simply assumes" and "the original proof makes the mistake" indicate bias. Could you try rewording it with more neutral language? Also, can you demonstrate that this is not original research? Your phrasing here and in the amendment indicate to me that this is something you have come up with on your own - please forgive me if that is not the case, but if it isn't the case please cite your sources.
On a more general note, I believe your criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the original argument. To be omniscient means that you must know all factual information, have a perfect understanding of that information, and be infallible in that information. For God, this means that he must know everything that has ever happened, is happening, and will ever happen and must know everything about that situation. Thus he must know what choice we will make before we even contemplate making a choice, and his knowledge will contain every single factual piece of information about that choice such as what it involves and when we make it. As in order to be omniscient he cannot be wrong, this removes the possibility of choice from our future actions. In order to be able to make a choice, we must be able to pick more than one thing. As God cannot be wrong or else he is not omniscient, then in order for his omniscience to be maintained we can only ever have one option and he must know what that option will be ahead of time. The original argument does not assume its conclusion; if the explanation I just gave isn't clear enough, let me know. I'm trying to rewrite the article to make it clear to start off with, but I don't have much time on my hands at the moment. Anria 21:02, 25 September 2006 (UTC)
Edited my comment; parts of it were harsher on a reread than I intended them to be. Sorry about that. Anria 21:23, 25 September 2006 (UTC)
I disagree with your removal of my counter-proof. If the argument belongs here, then counter-arguments also belong here. Basically you’re saying that it’s okay to have an argument against the existence of free will, but a rebuttal to that argument is somehow POV? The only POV problem I see here is your removal of the counter-proof. As for numbering my points, that’s how proofs are written. I can’t really reword the counter-argument with “more neutral language,” since the whole point of the counter-argument is that it is disproving the original argument. Why is the original argument unbiased, but any argument against it is biased?
As for your comments that I don’t understand the proof, yes, I do understand it. Its essence boils down to the sentence you wrote above: “As in order to be omniscient he cannot be wrong, this removes the possibility of choice from our future actions.” That is the point to be proven by the argument, but instead it is assumed (specifically, in point 3). Thus, the logic of the argument is invalid. And again, what is the problem with pointing out flaws in logic?
“In order to be able to make a choice, we must be able to pick more than one thing.” No, you can’t pick more than one thing; you can only pick one thing from a set of choices. For example, you can not choose to go left and go right at the same time. You have a set of choices, but there is only one choice that you WILL make. So it is true that at a certain point in time, you will make a certain choice X. Again, this is true whether or not an omniscient being exists. So if you assume that an omniscient being exists, and you assume that you will make choice X at time T (gee, this would be a lot easier if I could number my points!), then logically, an omniscient being would know that you will make choice X at time T. This in no way limits your choices. X can be “go left” or “go right” or “eat a pizza” or “go see a movie” or “do nothing.” But whatever choice you make, coupled with the existence of an omniscient being, leads to the conclusion that said being will know the choice.
I guess the expression seems a bit ambiguous to you. It's meant to mean "we must be able to pick from more than one thing", in other words - have an alternative, which is not the case if God is omniscient and creates the Universe. MaybeNextTime
The mistake in the argument from free will is that correlation leads to causation. You might as well argue that since you have a picture of someone doing something, that means they had no other choice at that time, because if they did, your picture would be wrong. But in truth, if they did something different, then the picture would be different. The action leads to the picture, not the other way around.
I will be restoring the original edits, unless you can demonstrate how a counter-argument is POV. 17.201.116.236 20:52, 28 September 2006 (UTC)
I've taken your response paragraph by paragraph, as I felt that it was easier to respond in that manner. Sorry if it reads a bit oddly because of that.
In response to paragraph one - that was not what I said, and it is perfectly clear that that is not what I said. I feel that the argument you have presented is a potentially valid counter-argument, even though I disagree with it personally, but the specific wording you have chosen is not neutral. It states that this counter-argument is true, not that it is merely one possible objection. The distinction is that you have written "it is the case that", instead of "it can be argued that". The latter is neutral; the former is not. You have decided that your counter-argument is fact when it can and has been argued that that is not the case. Thus, I have once again reverted your edit. I am perfectly happy to leave the counter-argument in if you reword it to remove the implication that your counter-argument is the be-all and end-all proof that this argument does not work, as with philosophy in particular it has hardly, if ever, been the case that there is a be-all and end-all proof of anything.
In response to paragraph two - there is no problem, so long as the wording is neutral and you are prepared to admit that there is a possibility that you are wrong and that there are counter-arguments to your counter-argument. Thus far, you do not appear to be prepared to do that. Also, I still believe that you are missing a point, but I have addressed it below.
In response to paragraph three - apologies for the poor wording on that sentence; what I meant is precisely what you said, that we must be able to pick one thing from a set of choices.
Again, I feel that you're missing the point somewhat. You're assuming that the existence of an omniscient being does not limit your choices, and the only way that would be possible is if we were fully determined in the first place. I think where you're coming from (please correct me if I am wrong) is that we can only ever make one choice, and that choice can be about anything, and this means that an omniscient being must know that we will make one choice but would not know what that choice would be. And in that case, that being is not omniscient. Omniscience, as I said before, is knowing all factual information, having a perfect understanding of that information, and being utterly incapable of being wrong. If an omniscient being does not know precisely which action I am going to take at time T - be it "go left", "go right", "eat a pizza", etc. - then that being's knowledge is not complete and they cannot be said to be omniscient. It's merely a redundant truth (except in quantum physics, granted) that only one action can occur at time T in place Y. To then say that an omniscient being does not know what that action is is to not have understood what "omniscient" means, and to have defeated your own argument.
The only way that I can see your argument working is if it includes a particular concept of time and God's place in it, which is that the future is something which has not been written and that God is constrained by time. That particular view has been rejected by most academic theists over the years, as it means that God is changeable (don't ask me why that's a bad thing; I only know the cynic's reason) as his knowledge changes as time progresses, and as he must change as time progresses he must also be constrained by time which means that God had a beginning and will have an end. Granted, those specific attributes go above and beyond what is specified in "omniscient God", but the fact that the word "God" is used instead of "being" indicates that certain background assumptions have been brought in to the argument.
In response to paragraph four - I see your point, particularly on the correlation/causation thing, but it's missing a crucial distinction. A picture does not depict the future. It cannot, as a picture of an event occurs after that event. An omniscient being, however, particularly if they are held to be outside time in the manner that God is, must "depict" the future, as its knowledge of an event occurs before that event. I realise that that is merely a repetition of what has already been said, but hopefully now you can see why I believe your argument to be incorrect.
Finally, you have not made any mention of whether or not this was original research. If it is not, please cite your sources. If it is, find some sources. I am perfectly happy to leave your counter-argument in so long as it is worded neutrally and so long as you have sources you can reference, although whether you reference them at this particular point in time is not as important as getting neutral wording. To make this as clear as I can, my objections to your counter-argument are also a side-issue to getting neutral wording. I don't want to get (further) into a revert war, so I hope that you now understand my position. Anria 12:35, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
Thank you for specifically noting which parts of the counter-argument you believe are not neutral. I will make the necessary corrections and re-submit that section (although I am curious why you chose to revert the entire section, instead of just making the necessary edits yourself).
As for the argument, I think you misunderstand the point I was making, and I think your misunderstanding stems from assuming the conclusion. My argument is not “that we can only ever make one choice.” I am trying to put my argument in the simplest possible terms to make the proof easier, so I am limiting it to one specific choice at one particular point in time. Instead of discussing all events, I am simply discussing one choice X made at time T. From the conclusions of that event, you can extrapolate the existence or non-existence of free will for all events at all points in time.
Oh, and as for your statement, “the fact that the word ‘God’ is used instead of ‘being’ indicates that certain background assumptions have been brought in to the argument,” you will notice that you were the first person to use the term “God,” not me. But since you started with it, I will continue for simplicity’s sake.
So the problem with the proof is that it takes the statement “God knows I will do X at time T” and then uses that to disprove free will. The problem is, you can’t start with “God knows I will do X at time T,” because that is actually the logical conclusion of two previous assumptions: “An omniscient God exists” and “I will do X at time T.” The proof then claims that since you can’t choose to do Y at time T, then the existence of an omniscient God must force you to do X. But it’s not the existence of God that keeps you from doing Y; it is the fact that we have already assumed “I will do X at time T” as part of the proof.
As for the difference between an omniscient being’s knowledge of an event, and a picture of an event, I submit to you that they are essentially the same thing. Using the argument from free will, you could say, “I have a camera that perfectly captures an image of an event. The images that I take with this camera are always completely accurate. Now I have a picture of you doing X at time T. Therefore, I have proven that you did not have free will at that time, because if you did Y instead, then my picture of you doing X would not be perfectly accurate. Therefore, the existence of my perfect camera is incompatible with free will.” Now of course, any logical person would realize that that proof is not correct, because if you did Y, then the perfect camera would end up with a picture of Y instead of a picture of X. It’s the same thing with omniscience. Omniscience is the perfect knowledge of all events. The camera is perfect picture of all events. If I have a picture of you doing X, that doesn’t prove that you had to choose to do X. So if God knows you will choose X, how does that prove you can only do X? If you instead choose to do Y, then God knows (and always has known) that you will choose to do Y. God’s knowledge is a result of your choice, not the cause of it. 17.201.116.248 18:23, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Anria did not use it in the first place - the article does use it first (the very beginning).
The correct way to say this is:
We assume that:
1. Abrahamic God exists (He is omniscient, omnipotent, atemporal).
2. He creates the Universe and for He is omniscient and atemporal He depicts the future, the outcome of the Act of Creation before it happens.
3. By the definitions of "knowledge" and "choice", if one knows for certain what choice one will make in the future, one will not be able to make the opposite choice.
4. Omniscience and free will are logically contradictory.
5. Either nobody has free will, or nobody is omniscient.
As you see we do not assume that "one will do X", we assume that God is bound to see what will happen after He creates the Universe.
Your methaphor is flawed because you did not take the picture in advance which is the case with God.
Your whole argument is based on the false assumption that either God did not create the Universe (on purpose) or that He was not omniscient before He did so - we're arguing abrahamic God, remember? He is said to know the event "while" they happen but also which happen in what order, how else could He predict certain things? MaybeNextTime

[edit] proper place

That was an issue I though about too, I didn't agree with the "proof" but it is what it is. The best place is to put it in the criticisms portion as you did. I like how you simplified it into a more mathematical looking proof to enhance its understandability (is that a word?).

[edit] Why the change?

I'm not sure why the previous mathematical-like proof was changed. I prefered the previous version as it seemed to be much clearer in describing the refutation of AFFW. Also I'm wondering why it was moved up from the bottom of the page to above the "timeless" argument?

[edit] Added counter

I went ahead and added the counter argument to the AFFW counter argument of "timelessness". Although I believe the statment can apply to both lines of thought presented. The statement added was: "God’s knowledge is a result of the free-will agent's choice, not the cause of it, and therefore no contradiction exists (whether God is temporal or atemporal)." Which I basically took from the other poster on here, and slightly modified. I tried to just state the counter-argument itself and to keep it NPOV, please let me know if it appears to slant either direction and I will try to modify.

For the nameless poster, do you still have a copy of your original post using the mathematical-style proof? I would like to get a copy of the original as I think it was more elegant than the current version. But perhaps the current version is necessary to keep it from appearing anti-NPOV?

You should be able to look at the page history to find the previous version. Yes, I changed it to make it more NPOV, and just to clarify it a bit. Oh, and I also moved it up above the timelessness argument because I think a more rigorous proof should be a little higher priority. I think the timelessness one is worded a little weakly. 75.18.166.193 05:49, 9 October 2006 (UTC)
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