Argument from nonbelief
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The argument from nonbelief, also known as the argument from divine hiddenness, is a recently-developed argument against the existence of God. Summarized, it states that if God exists (and wants humankind to know so) he would have brought about a situation in which everyone believes in him, but there are unbelievers, so God does not exist. It is similar to the classic argument from evil in that it affirms inconsistency between the world which is and the world which would be if God had certain desires combined with the power to see them through.
[edit] The argument
A formal presentation follows:
- If God exists, God:
- wants all humans to believe he exists before they die;
- can bring about a situation in which all humans believe he exists before they die;
- does not want anything which would conflict with and be at least as important as his desire for all humans to believe he exists before they die; and
- always acts in accordance with what he most wants.
- If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).
- But not all humans believe God exists before they die.
- Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).
The argument was the subject of J.L. Schellenberg's 1993 book Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason and has been addressed by other philosophers, including Theodore Drange.
[edit] Summary of proposed resolutions
- Some theists dispute premise 1.3, arguing that God's desire for a free willed belief in him is more important than the desire for all humans to believe that he exists before they die.
- Others argue against premise 3 by saying that everyone does in fact believe in God, even atheists. Some say humans are born with the God-given "faith of a child" — a faith of trust, love and absolute purity — which is corrupted, but not lost, through contact with a world of evil, pain, selfishness, and harm. According to this argument, everyone retains their faith, even if they don't realize it, so unbelief doesn't truly exist.
- A common response is to assert that anyone calling the atheist an unwitting (or unacknowledged) theist may be an unwitting atheist oneself, given the same uncertainty. As such, the rebuttal is a tu quoque, though not necessarily invalid.
- One popular theodicy is fideism. This states that if God revealed himself he would take away our freedom to believe or not believe. Or, in the same vein, God wants our choice to follow and worship him to be genuine and one not motivated by blind fear of hell. This brings point 1.3 into question. The usual responses are that:
- having strong evidence for a proposition doesn't deprive us of freedom, it only gives us good reason to believe;
- post-revelation worship could and would often still be quite genuine (think of non-Christians just waiting for the right evidence to come along);
- belief and worship are not the same thing, and compelled belief in God is not equivalent to compelled worship.
- Another possibility is that faith in and of itself is something God wants humans to develop without divine prodding, meaning point 1.3 is false. Faith may be some valuable power that is not just a means whereby we can obey God. (This is a tenet of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, for one.)
- God might allow conversion after death. If that's so, whether people come to believe in him before or after death is irrelevant, so point 1.1 is untrue.
- Open theists, who do not hold God to be omnipotent, would likely contest point 1.2. It might be too great a challenge for God to bring about a situation in which everyone believes in him.
