Argument from Marginal Cases

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The Argument from Marginal Cases is a philosophical position regarding the moral status of animals. Its proponents hold that if animals do not have direct moral status, then neither do other members of society such infants, the senile, and the cognitively disabled.

Contents 1 Proponents 2 Criticism 3 See also 4 External links

[edit] Proponents

In recent times it has been famously put forward by Peter Singer however Daniel Dombrowski claims it can be traced back to Porphyry in the third century CE.

[edit] Criticism

The common counterargument is The Argument from Species Normality coined by David Graham and proposed by Tibor Machan in his book Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature's Favorite and by Ingemar Nordin in his paper "Animals Don't Have Rights: A Philosophical Study".

A counterargument of The Argument from Species Normality is presented by James Rachels as a reductio ad absurdum and could be called The Argument from Special Chimp.

[edit] See also

• Animal rights
• Daniel Dombrowski
• Ingemar Nordin
• James Rachels
• Peter Singer
• Tom Regan
• Tibor Machan

[edit] External links

• Animals and Ethics - The internet encyclopedia of philosophy
• Putting Humans First: Why We Are Nature's Favorite
• Animals don't have rights
• Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases
• Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
• Animal Liberation
• The Case for Animal Rights