Talk:April Glaspie
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This page has a more than generous interpretation of what transpired between Glaspie and Iraq. Surely any reasonable person's interpretation of what Glaspie wrote would be that a blind eye was being turned by the USA to Iraq's intentions, which were and remain obvious. One notes that Saddam smiled. http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/ARTICLE5/april.html
- I consider myself a reasonable person and I don't think any such thing. As the article notes, there is no authentic transcript or account of the Glaspie-Saddam meeting, only versions issued by Iraq for their own purposes. It makes no sense for the US to give tacit approval for Iraq to attack Kuwait and then to turn around and oppose him when he did so. Adam 02:51, 2 Mar 2004 (UTC)
PBS has an interview with Tariq Aziz where he says:
- Q: So you knew from the beginning that America was likely to take action?
- Aziz: Yes, we had no illusions about that.
So at least the Iraqis do not seem to claim that they were trapped.—Eloquence
I notice claims the British reporters that went after Glaspie circa Sep 2 had a tape as well as a transcript. Regardless, her "nobody...thought that the Iraqis were going to take all of Kuwait" begged interesting questions (which she refused to answer). It was also lame, since Iraq's designs on Kuwait were no secret and as old as Iraq. (Also, Glaspie's was far from the only "green light" ... or non-red light if you prefer. Cheney seems to have dropped the only "no" and he was hushed.[1])
From article: "Saddam was a dictator who had never visited a western country, and who lived a in a world where disputes were routinely resolved by force." This sentence seems to imply Western countries do not resort to violence to resolve disputes. Where is this world you are living in? I'd like to move there (I'm currently living in U.S.). --bodhi 00:31, 9 May 2005 (UTC)
- That paragraph has problems - why don't you see if you can improve it and others? --Niku 03:00, May 9, 2005 (UTC)
This page casts far too much doubt on the transcripts. After the first few weeks, there has never been serious doubt of their veracity. They are based on tapes made surreptitiously by the Iraqis of the meeting which were provided to major western news outlets like the NYT, and the WaPo too IIRC.--John Z 11:10, 30 July 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Another more explicit Tariq Aziz interview on PBS
In another PBS interview of Tariq Aziz, broadcast on January 25, 2000, Aziz is even more dismissive of the idea that Glaspie's words were of any consequence or that the U.S. sent mixed signals.
- Q: Could you elaborate on the point about mixed signals sent by the U.S. during the run-up to the invasion of Kuwait? How did those influence your government's decision?
- A: There were no mixed signals. We should not forget that the whole period before August 2 witnessed a negative American policy towards Iraq. So it would be quite foolish to think that, if we go to Kuwait, then America would like that. Because the American tendency . . . was to untie Iraq. So how could we imagine that such a step was going to be appreciated by the Americans? It looks foolish, you see, this is fiction. About the meeting with April Glaspie--it was a routine meeting. There was nothing extraordinary in it. She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government. She did not ask for an audience with the president. She was summoned by the president. He telephoned me and said, "Bring the American ambassador. I want to see her." She was not prepared, because it was not morning in Washington. People in Washington were asleep, so she needed a half-hour
- To contact anybody in Washington and seek instructions. So, what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush. He wanted her to carry a message to George Bush--not to receive a message through her from Washington.
--Niku 15:31, May 6, 2005 (UTC)
TWO TRANSCRIPTS - they seem to be drastically different. Bad translations? - the US government must have at least one person who can read Arabic somwhat better than this. Ms Glaspie seems to have been unprofessional - an ambassadore not clearing with headquarters a threat of war ( you would think it would be of some interest at the State Dept, maybe not? ) - or she was part of a conspiracy to sucker Saddam into a trap ( no matter what Aziz says now - after awhile with US CIA he probably is an unreliable source ). She should have the Secretary's response in writing - her cavalier attitude about an imminent invasion seems a little too unbelieveable.
[edit] "First meeting?"
Quot the article:
It was in this context that Glaspie had her first meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on July 25, 1990.
This seems to imply that this was her first meeting w/Saddam ever, or at least her first as ambassador to Iraq. Since she had been appointed ambassador to Iraq in 1989 (presumably early in the year, as one of H.W. Bush's beginning-of-the-term ambassadorial appointment), it seems odd that she wouldn't have met the president until mid-1990. Since he was head of state, wouldn't she have had to have at least some kind of formal meeting to be officially accredited? --Jfruh (talk) 19:18, 3 December 2006 (UTC)
