Anything In Anything

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Internet protocol suite

5. Application layer

DHCP • DNS • FTP • HTTP • IMAP4 • IRC • MIME • POP3 • SIP • SMTP • SNMP • SSH • TELNET • TLS/SSL • RPC • RTP • SDP • SOAP • …

4. Transport layer

TCP • UDP • RSVP • DCCP • SCTP • …

3. Network layer

IP (IPv4 • IPv6) • ARP • BGP • ICMP • IGMP • IGP • RARP • …

2. Data link layer

ATM • Bluetooth (PAN-Profile) • DTM • Ethernet • FDDI • Frame Relay • GPRS • Modems • PPP • Wi-Fi • …

1. Physical layer

Bluetooth RF • Ethernet physical layer • ISDN • Modems • RS232 • SONET/SDH • USB • Wi-Fi • …

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Anything In Anything or AYIYA is a draft tunneling protocol. The protocol addresses the following problems:

Tunneling of any protocol in any protocol

This is where the name is derived from

Security

The tunneled packets should not be spoofable or replayable

NAT awareness

The tunnel should work over a NAT

Mobility

The endpoint of at least, one of the two hosts should be able to change

The draft itself covers the deep details on how this is accomplished and how the protocol works in detail. Below are some scenarios on how this protocol can be used to solve some problems.

1 Using AYIYA for Tunnel Brokers
2 Using AYIYA for mobility
3 Packet Format
4 Implementations

[edit] Using AYIYA for Tunnel Brokers

Many users are currently located behind NATs which prohibit the usage of proto-41 IPv6 in IPv4 tunnels RFC 3056 unless they manually reconfigure their NAT setup which in some cases is impossible as the NAT cannot be configured to forward proto-41 RFC 1933 to a specific host. There might also be cases when multiple endpoints are behind the same NAT, when multiple NATs are used or when the user has no control at all over the NAT setup. This is an undesired situation as it limits the deployment of IPv6 RFC 3513, which was meant to solve the problem of the disturbance in end to end communications caused by NATs, which where created because of limited address space in the first place.

This problem can be solved easily by tunneling the IPv6 packets over either UDP, TCP or even SCTP. Taking into consideration that multiple separate endpoints could be behind the same NAT and/or that the public endpoint can change on the fly, there is also a need to identify the endpoint that certain packets are coming from and endpoints need to be able to change e.g. source addresses of the transporting protocol on the fly while still being identifiable as the same endpoint. The protocol described in this document is independent of the transport and payload's protocol. An example could be IPv6-in-UDP-in-IPv4, which is a typical setup that can be used by IPv6 Tunnel Brokers.

[edit] Using AYIYA for mobility

AYIYA could be used in a mobility situation for tunneling it's Home Address back to the Home Agent, thus acting as a normal tunnel situation and for the Remote Host it seems the communication is happening directly. In this case the remote host doesn't need to support AYIYA. When the Remote Host does support AYIYA, it could also directly setup a tunnel with the mobile host, circumventing that traffic is sent over the Home Agent. The Remote Host can determine if a host supports AYIYA by looking up properties in DNS and use a Public/Private Key algorithm to authenticate the packets without prior information, e.g. the keys, needing to be available. The following diagram illustrates this.

+-------------+             +------------+         ,~~~~~~~~.         +-------------+
| Mobile Host | <--AYIYA--> | Home Agent | <----> { Internet } <----> | Remote Host |
+-------------+             +------------+         '~~~~~~~~'         +-------------+

Using AYIYA to provide IPv6 for an endhost is in effect already providing mobility for that endhost as it can take it's IPv6 address along anywhere it wants to go as it signals the Home Agent when the tunnel endpoint changes so that the Home Agent knows where to send new packets.

[edit] Packet Format

	Bits 0 - 7	8 - 15	16 - 23	24 - 31
0	Identity Type	SignatureType	Next Header	Reserved
32	Epoch Time
	Identity
	Signature

For IPv6 over IPv4-UDP operation, as in general use, the Identity is the IPv6 Address of the endpoint (16 bytes) and the signature is a SHA1 hash (20 bytes). The header is then a total of 32 + 16 + 20 = 68 bytes.

More details on the SixXS site: AYIYA and of course in the draft.