Anti-Iranianism

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A man holding a sign during a protest of the Iranian hostage crisis in Washington, D.C. in 1979. The sign reads "deport all Iranians" and "get the hell out of my country".
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A man holding a sign during a protest of the Iranian hostage crisis in Washington, D.C. in 1979. The sign reads "deport all Iranians" and "get the hell out of my country".

Anti-Iranian sentiments (ایرانی ستیزی; otherwise known as Anti-Iranianism, Anti-Persian sentiments, or Anti-Persianism) are feelings or actions of discrimination, hostility, hatred, or prejudice against Iran, the Persian people, or various specific groups of Iranian peoples. Anti-Iranianism can range from a personal hatred to a mindset common to an entire culture, region, or country. The phenomenon first appeared in the United States during the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. It saw a sharp increase after the September 11, 2001 attacks and the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president of Iran. Since then, the phenomenon has widened in scope and dimension, and deepened in complexity.

Contents

[edit] Definitions

Prior to 1935, "Iran" was called "Persia" by Western countries, and "Iranians" referred to as "Persians" (as for example the Safavid Azeris were referred to as "Persian"). [1]

Hence the article inclusively treats "Persia" and "Iran" as one before 1935, but refers to the political nation-state, after 1935. It also refers to the nomenclature Ajam, which was primarily used to refer to this group, by Arabs as discussed further below.

For a more lengthy discussion on the particular ethnic groups, see the articles Anti-Arabism, Anti-Kurdism, and Anti-Turkism.

[edit] In early times

[edit] The Greeks and Romans

The term "barbarian" was used by the Greeks to refer to those that were "not Greek". Initially, they did not despise alien cultures. In fact, they were aware of the greater antiquity of the much more developed civilizations of Egypt, the Levant and Mesopotamia and Persia from whom they borrowed extensively.

A change however occurred in the connotations of the word after the Greco-Persian Wars in the first half of the 5th century BC. Here a hasty coalition of Greeks defeated a vast Persian empire. Indeed in the Greek of this period 'barbarian' is often used expressly to mean Persian. In the wake of this victory, the Greeks began to see themselves as superior militarily and politically. A stereotype developed in which hardy Greeks live as free men in city-states where politics are a communal possession, whereas among the womanish barbarians everyone beneath the Great King is no better than his slave. This marks the birth of the cultural view termed "orientalism".

In spite of this all, such Greek connotations (also shared by their successors the Romans), were not perceived by the Persians at all. The Greeks, save for Alexander, were never able to amass an invasion of Persia on any grand scale, whilst the Persian campaigns in the Mediterranean were merely matters of foreign policy for the royal house and army that hardly if ever involved the common Persian-folk directly.

[edit] Alexander of Macedonia

To most Zoroastrians and many Persians, Alexander of Macedonia is remembered as the destroyer of their first great empire and as the destroyer of Persepolis. In general, historical sources are written with an agenda of either glorifying or denigrating Alexander. And this can also be seen among Persians themselves as well: Although some Persian historians convey a negative perspective of Alexander's conquest of Persia, most medieval writers hold a different and more positive view. These perhaps stem from some of Alexander's decisions and policies after bringing down the Achaemenid empire.

H. Pir Nia, for example states that Alexander adopted local customs instead of imposing his native Macedonian ways during ceremonies, continued using the same administrative system of Darius I, Started dressing as an Achaemenid royalty and practicing their traditions while choosing the Persian city of Babylon as his capitol, allowed Persians to fill in senior ranks in his army, and married into Persian royal households e.g. Roxana of Bactria, Statira daughter of Darius III, and Parysatis daughter of Ochus. [2]

In medieval Persian literature, Alexander came to occupy not the mighty image of a conqueror, but rather an expeditious leader and traveler in search of wisdom and truth. Many Persian authors have written works on such topics, titled "Iskandarnama", such as Nizami Ganjavi. He was even believed to have been whom the Quran refers to as Dhul-Qaranayn.

[edit] The Mongolian era

In his memoirs, Edward Teller writes:

"An important example is the history of the wars of Genghis Khan—in particular, the destruction of Persia by the Mongols. More than half the population of the defeated country was killed, and Persia, the present-day Iran, has never recovered its great historic importance."[3]

So vast was the destruction of Persia by the invading hordes that started in 1219CE, that the streets of cities like Neishabur, the center of science and technology and cultural capital of Islam in the east, "turned into rivers of blood, as all persons were beheaded in the city". The severed heads of men, women, and children were neatly stacked into carefully constructed pyramids around which the carcasses of the city's dogs and cats were placed.[4] In a letter to King Louis IX of France, Hulegu alone took responsibility for only 200,000 deaths in his raids of Persia and the Caliphate. [5]

"There is no doubt that the destruction that happened on the emergence of the Mongol state and the general massacre that happened at that time, will not be repaired in a thousand years, even if no other calamity happens."[6]

It didn't take a thousand years, but it was until the mid 20th century when the population of Iran reached that of its pre-Mongol levels.[7] Some Persians commemoratingly even believe that the reason roses grow so red on Persian soil is because of the vast intensity of blood spilt during the Mongol raids. [8]

And yet, similar to Alexander, the conquerors eventually became the conquered. Before long, the Ilkhanate opened up to Persian culture and identity, and made it their own: they started converting to the local faith (e.g. Sultan Khoda-bandeh, Ghazan-Khan, etc), began embracing local customs and traditions (e.g. edifices such as Goharshad Mosque and Soltaniyeh were built under their patronage), and even took up ancient Persian names (e.g. Anushiravan, Shahrokh, etc). The Asiatic features on many Persian miniatures is a testament to this gradual mass conversion.

[edit] By colonial powers

Patrick Clawson writes:

"Since the days of the Achaemenids, the Iranians had the protection of geography. But high mountains and vast emptiness of the Iranian plateau were no longer enough to shield Iran from the Russian army or British navy. Both literally and figuratively, Iran shrank. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Azerbaijan, Armenia, much of Georgia, and Afghanistan were Iranian, but by the end of the century, all this territory had been lost as a result of European military action. Iran translated her territorial losses into a sense of both victimization and a propensity to interpret European action through the lens of conspiracy. This in turn has helped shape Iranian nationalism into the twenty first century."[9]

[edit] Imperial Russia

Colonel V. Liakoff was notorious for shelling the National Iranian Assembly in 1911.
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Colonel V. Liakoff was notorious for shelling the National Iranian Assembly in 1911.

Iran has lost more territory to the Russian Empire than any other colonial power.

The Russian attitude vis a vis her southern neighbor can readily be understood by reading the text of this cable, sent on July 6th 1945, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, instructing the local soviet commander in Soviet Azerbaijan to:

"begin preparatory work to form a national autonomous Azerbaijan district with broad powers within the Iranian state, and simultaneously develop a separatist movement in the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and Khorasan".[10]

While the Portuguese, British, and Dutch, competed for the south and southeast of a weakening Safavid Persia, Russia was largely left unchallenged in the north as it plunged southward to establish dominance in Persia's northern territories.

Plagued with internal politics, the Qajarid government found itself incapable of rising to the challenge of facing, if not even recognizing, its northern threat from Russia.

A weakened and bankrupted royal court, under Fath Ali Shah, was forced to sign the notorious Gulistan Treaty in 1813, followed by a second Turkmanchai treaty after efforts by Abbas Mirza failed to secure Persia's northern front.

With the Russia Empire continuously advancing south in the course of two wars against Persia, and the treaties of Turkmanchai and Golestan in the western frontiers, plus the unexpected death of Abbas Mirza in 1823, and the murdering of Persia's Grand Vizier (Mirza AbolQasem Qa'im Maqām), Persia lost its traditional foothold in Central Asia to the Russian Tsarist armies. [11] The Russian armies occupied the Aral coast in 1849, Tashkent in 1864, Bukhara in 1867, Samarkand in 1868, and Khiva and Amudarya in 1873. The Akhal Treaty was to top off the losses of Persia to the global emerging power of Russia.

By the end of the 19th century, Russia's dominance became so pronounced that Tabriz, Qazvin, and a host of other cities were occupied by Russia, and the central government in Tehran was left with no power to even select its own ministers without the approval of the Anglo-Russian consulates. Morgan Shuster, for example, had to resign under tremendous British and Russian pressure on the royal court. Shuster's book "The Strangling of Persia" is a recount of the details of these events, a harsh criticism of Britain and Russia.

These, and a series of climaxing events such as the Russian shelling of Mashad's Goharshad Mosque in 1911, and the shelling of the Persian National Assembly by the Russian Colonel Liakhoff, led to a surge in widespread anti-Russian sentiments across Iran.

One result of the public outcry against the ubiquitous presence of Russia in Persia was the Constitutionalist movement of Gilan. The rebellion, headed by Mirza Kuchak Khan led to an eventual confrontation between the Iranian rebels and the Russian army, but was disrupted with the October Revolution in 1917.

Russian involvement however continued after the Bolshevik seizure of power with the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1920, followed by the short-lived Republic of Mahabad, the last effort by Soviet Union to establish a communist republic in Iran.

The end of World War II brought the start of American dominance in Iran's political arena, and with an anti-Soviet Cold War brewing, the United States quickly moved to convert Iran into an anti-communist bloc, thus ending Soviet influence on Iran for years to come.

During the Iran-Iraq war, it was the Soviet Union that became Saddam Hussein's largest supplier of conventional arms.

[edit] British Empire

The British have been involved in the politics of Persia longer than any other European power. (See Iran-Britain relations) The involvement quickly developed into one of colonialism with policies vested against Persia in the interests of the British East India Company. With Russia's involvement as an adversary, this arena came to be known as The Great Game.

Caption from a 1911 English cartoon lampooning The Great Game reads: "If we hadn't a thorough understanding, I (British lion) might almost be tempted to ask what you (Russian bear) are doing there with our little playfellow (Persian cat)."
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Caption from a 1911 English cartoon lampooning The Great Game reads: "If we hadn't a thorough understanding, I (British lion) might almost be tempted to ask what you (Russian bear) are doing there with our little playfellow (Persian cat)."

On numerous occasions, the British government acted against Iran, either as a nation-state, or against her interests. The Gulistan Treaty of 1813, followed by the Turkmanchai treaty were both prepared by the notorious Sir Gore Ouseley with the aid of the British Foreign Office in London. In fact, Iran's current southern and eastern boundaries were determined by none other than the British, after deafeating Nasereddin Shah in Herat in 1857. The British government assigned Frederic John Goldsmid of the Indo-European Telegraph Department to determine the borders between Persia and India during the 1860s.[12]

Many British policies against Iran such as concessions of the 70 year contract of Persian railways to be operated by British businessmen (such as Baron de Reuter) became increasingly visible and threatening to the Iranian public. In 1872, the Shah signed an agreement with Baron Julius de Reuter, which George Nathaniel Curzon (who was one of the greatest statemen of his day) called:

"The most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that have ever been dreamed of..."[13]

The Reuter Concession was immedialtey protested by all ranks of businessmen, clergy, and nationalists of Iran, and the concession was quickly forced into cancellation.

Such negative visibility became particularly pronounced again during the famous "Tobacco fatwa", decreed by Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, which spiked popular resentment against the British presence in Persia in lieu of a diplomatically decapitated and apathetic Qajar throne. Other similar incidents were the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 in which Britain openly proposed the partitioning of Iran to Russia, as well as the discovery of oil in Masjed Soleiman in 1909 and the establishment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with the inking of the "D'Arcy Concession".

By the end of the 19th century, Britain's dominance had become become so pronounced that Khuzestan, Bushehr, and a host of other cities in southern Persia were occupied by Great Britain, and the central government in Tehran was left with no power to even select its own ministers without the approval of the Anglo-Russian consulates. Morgan Shuster, for example, had to resign under tremendous British and Russian pressure on the royal court. Shuster's book "The Strangling of Persia" is a recount of the details of these events, a harsh criticism of Britain and Imperial Russia.

The British are even viewed by Iranians as directly involved in bringing the Pahlavi dynasty to power via a coup d'etat in 1921, and the ousting of Iran's elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953. Figures such as General Ironside gained a notorious reputation among Iranians.

The popular view that the British were involved in the 1921 coup was noted as early as March 1921 by the American embassy and relayed to the Iran desk at the Foreign Office [14] A British Embassy report from 1932 concedes that the British put Reza Shah "on the throne". For sources on this matter see [15]

One of the architects of Iran's partitioning was Bernard Lewis, who in fact first unveiled a project for the separation of Khuzestan from Iran during the Bilderberg Meeting in Baden, Austria, on April 27-29, 1979. There, he formally proposed the fragmentation and balkanization of Iran along regional, ethnic and linguistic lines especially among the Arabs of Khuzestan (the Al-Ahwaz project), the Baluchis (the Pakhtunistan project), the Kurds (the Greater Kurdistan project) and the Azerbaijanis (the Greater Azerbaijan Project). [16]

British footprints can also be seen when exploring the origins of the Iraqi invasion plan of Iran in 1980, which were reported in a New York Times article early in the Iran-Iraq war. [17]. The report was largely ignored by the mainstream press and media. The points of this report are summarized as follows:

  1. A detailed invasion plan had been prepared for the Iraqi armed forces in 1950 by the British Military advisors for Iraq, a full 30 years before the invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein.
  2. The main draft of the plan had been in preparation by the British since 1937. The main axes of advance detailed in the plan corresponded exactly to the Iraqi invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980.
  3. The main objective of this war plan "...called for Iraqi forces to occupy Khuzistan province and then negotiate an armistice with the Iranian government that would include the relinquishment of the province to Iraq...also liberate the Arab-speaking people living in Khuzistan". Significantly, successive changes in the Iraqi government over the next thirty years did not alter the major objectives of the British plan; these were simply updated as time progressed.

The alleged British plan for Iran's invasion indicates that even before the Bernard Lewis Plan was unveiled in the Bilderberg Conference, detailed British plans for eliminating Iran as a state have been in place long before 1979, and thus claims of foreign support in instigating ethnic unrest in Iran are not totally unfounded. Nevertheless, Bilderberg meetings are informal and are held in camera, without minutes - a situation that has attracted much criticism for lacking transparency and accountability (see). Consquently, the veracity of such reports is a matter of considerable debate, with many "insider" reports remaining unproven. What does remain certain however is that "the British would regularly toy with the idea of partitioning Persia, usually as a temporary response to a crisis". [18]

However, there is no evidence that the present British government is planning an invasion of Iran, with Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett denying plans for a military strike on Iran.[3] However "Blair has been more circumspect, saying publicly that one should never take options off the table" [4], refusing "to rule out a British military invasion of Iran".[5][6]

[edit] Claims of involvement in Khuzestan

See: this section of article.

[edit] By pan-Turkists of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan

Pan-Turkists and their supporters are active in the area of history revisionism, especially when it comes to the history of Iran. See Dr. Kaveh Farrokh's article on pan-Turkist revisions and attacks against Iran. They are also involved in creating civil unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan.

[edit] By the United States

Poster depicting Uncle Sam preparing to attack Iran.
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Poster depicting Uncle Sam preparing to attack Iran.

The first anti-Iranian move by the United States was the deposition of Iran's elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953 via the infamous Operation Ajax.

After the revolution, Iran and the US were inevitably led to a collision course with the US making every effort to destabilize Iran with repeated allegations of Iran being a major if not the largest "state sponsor of terrorism", culminating with George Bush labeling Iran as the "Axis of Evil".

[edit] Iran-Air incident

While issuing notes of regret over the loss of human life in the tragic event of Iran Air Flight 655, the U.S. government never admitted any wrong-doing or responsibility in the tragedy, nor apologised, but continues to blame Iranian hostile actions for the incident. The men of the Vincennes were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Commander Lustig, the air-warfare co-ordinator, even won the navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" having enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure."[19] According to a 23 April 1990 article in The Washington Post, the Legion of Merit was presented to Captain Rogers and Lieutenant Commander Lustig on 3 July 1988. The citations did not mention the downing of the Iran Air flight at all. It should be noted that the Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.

The then Vice-President George H. W. Bush declared a month later:

"I will never apologise for the United States of America, ever. I don't care what it has done. I don't care what the facts are."[20][21][22][23]

[edit] Siding against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war

Donald Rumsfeld meeting Saddām on 19 December – 20 December 1983. Rumsfeld visited again on 24 March 1984; the same day the UN released a report that Iraq had used mustard gas and tabun nerve agent against Iranian troops. The NY Times reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name." NSA Archive Source
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Donald Rumsfeld meeting Saddām on 19 December20 December 1983. Rumsfeld visited again on 24 March 1984; the same day the UN released a report that Iraq had used mustard gas and tabun nerve agent against Iranian troops. The NY Times reported from Baghdad on 29 March 1984, that "American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with Iraq and the U.S., and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been established in all but name." NSA Archive Source

[edit] Tensions and threats of military actions in 2005-2006

[edit] US refusal to grant visas to Iranians for United Nations activities

In September 2005, U.S. State Department refused to issue visas for Iran’s parliamentary speaker and a group of senior Iranian officials to travel to US to participate in an International parliamentary meeting held by the United Nations. According to UN rules, US has to grant visas to the senior officials from any UN member states, irrespective of their political views, to take part in UN meetings.

[edit] Claims of threats of a military attack on Iran by the US

The United States' official position on Iran is that "a nuclear-armed Iran is not acceptable" and that "all options" - including the unilateral use of force and first-strike nuclear weapons - are "on the table". [24] However, they have denied that the United States is preparing for an imminent strike. This came while three European countries, the United Kingdom (UK), France and Germany (the "EU-3") attempted to negotiate a cessation of nuclear enrichment activities by Iran, and American claims that these activities are aimed at producing nuclear weapons. [7]

As of 2006, the United States has either a large or significant military presence or a history of several decades of tight military cooperation in four other countries bordering Iran: Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

An American journalist, Seymour Hersh, claimed in January 2005 that U.S. Central Command had been asked to revise the military's war plan, providing for a maximum ground and air invasion of Iran and that the "hawks" in the U.S. government believed the EU3 negotiations would not succeed, and the Administration will act after this became clear. A former high-level intelligence official told him "It's not if we're going to do anything against Iran. They're doing it." [25]

Scott Ritter, former UN weapons of mass destruction inspector in Iraq, 1991-1998, claimed in April 2005 that the Pentagon was told in June 2005 to be prepared to launch a massive aerial attack against Iran in order to destroy the Iranian nuclear program. He claimed in June 2005 that the US military was preparing a "massive military presence" in Azerbaijan that would foretell a major land-based campaign designed to capture Tehran. He also claimed that the US attack on Iran had "already begun" (see below).[26]

In his article published March 27, 2006, Joseph Cirincione, director for non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, claimed that "some senior officials have already made up their minds: They want to hit Iran." and that there "may be a coordinated campaign to prepare for a military strike on Iran."[27] Joseph Cirincione also warned "that a military strike would be disastrous for the United States. It would rally the Iranian public around an otherwise unpopular regime, inflame anti-American anger around the Muslim world, and jeopardize the already fragile U.S. position in Iraq. And it would accelerate, not delay, the Iranian nuclear program. Hard-liners in Tehran would be proven right in their claim that the only thing that can deter the United States is a nuclear bomb. Iranian leaders could respond with a crash nuclear program that could produce a bomb in a few years."

Professor at the University of San Francisco and Middle East editor for the Foreign Policy in Focus Project, Stephen Zunes, also claims that a military attack on Iran is being planned.[28]

[edit] Claims of plans for use of nuclear weapons against Iran

In March 2005 US revised its doctrine on when to use nuclear weapons to include preemptive or possibly preventive use on non-nuclear states.

In August 2005, Philip Giraldi, a former CIA officer, claimed that US Vice President Dick Cheney had instructed STRATCOM to prepare a contingency plan to be employed in response to another 9/11-type terrorist attack on the United States... [including] a large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons... not conditional on Iran actually being involved in the act of terrorism directed against the United States. The reason cited for the attack to use mini-nukes is that the targets are hardened or are deep underground and would not be destroyed by non-nuclear warheads.[29]

Claims that the US plans to use nuclear weapons in an attack on Iran have also been made in 2005 and 2006 by Jorge Hirsch[30] [31], in January 2006 by Michel Chossudovsky [32], and by the Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention on Iran[33] and in April 2006 by Seymour M. Hersh [34].

On April 18, 2006, on CSPAN, in response to a journalist's questioning, "Sir, when you talk about Iran, and you talk about, how you have to have diplomatic efforts, you often say all options are on the table. Does that include, uh, the possibility of a nuclear strike, is that something that your administration has plans about?", US president George W. Bush replied "All options are on the table".[35]

[edit] Claims of Iranian facilities which would be attacked by the US

Cities likely to be targets according to the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies [36], the Oxford Research Group [37] and Michael Keefer[38] include towns with a total estimated population (1999-2006) of about 23 million (including metropolitan areas). These include:

[edit] The role of Iran's nuclear program in US-Iran tensions

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Since 2003, the United States has alleged that Iran has a program to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is aimed only at generating electricity.

In June 2005, the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice said IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei should either toughen his stance on Iran or fail to be chosen for a third term as IAEA head.[39] Both the United States and Iran are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States (and other official nuclear weapons states) were alleged during the May 2005 month-long meeting on the NPT to be in violation of the NPT through Article VI, which requires them to disarm, which as of 2006 they have not done, while the IAEA has stated that Iran is in violation of a Safeguards Agreement related to the NPT, due to insufficient reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use.[40]. Under Article IV, the treaty gives non-nuclear states the right to develop civilian nuclear energy programs.[41]

From 2003 to early 2006, tensions between the US and Iran have successively mounted even while International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of sensitive nuclear industry sites in Iran have continued, in line with an Additional Protocol to the NPT which Iran voluntarily adhered to.

On March 8, 2006, US and EU-3 representatives noted that Iran has enough unenriched uranium hexafluoride gas to make up to 10 atomic bombs if it were to be highly enriched, and adding it was "time for the Security Council to act".[42] The unenriched uranium cannot be used either in the Bushehr reactor, which is a pressurized water reactor, nor in atomic bombs, unless it becomes enriched. .

[edit] The role of crude oil and other strategic reasons in US-Iran tensions

Stephen Zunes stated that the Republican and Democratic Parties of the USA have

an urge to punish, isolate, and militarily threaten an oil-rich country [Iran] that refuses to sufficiently cooperate with U.S. economic and strategic designs in the Middle East.[43]

[edit] The role of the Iranian Oil Bourse and the euro in US-Iran tensions

There are numerous indications that Iran plans to create a new International Oil futures exchange, whose formal name is uncertain, but may be called the Iranian Oil Bourse, trading oil priced in euros and possibly other currencies, rather than dollars, which all other other oil markets currently use for trade. Some fear that this would have significant negative impact on the strength of the US Dollar on international currency markets. The opening of the exchange had been planned for March 20, 2006, but has been delayed.[44]

[edit] The role of electoral reasons in the USA in US-Iran tensions

In November 2005, Michael Klare, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, alleged that a major factor motivating the George W. Bush administration to attack Iran would be its desire to distract attention from domestic political difficulties and to increase popularity for the President. US popular support for Bush increased by about 10% when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and only dropped back to its previous level several months later.[45]

[edit] The role of electoral reasons in Iran in US-Iran tensions

Remarks made by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been interpreted by analysts such as Ali Ansari as having national electoral aims internally in Iran,[46] and by others such as the Israeli government as constituting threats to attack Israel.[47]

Religious-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president of Iran in 2005.

In October 2005, he made remarks to domestic audiences agreeing with Ayatollah Khomeini's statement that the occupying regime in [Israel/Palestine should vanish from] from the page of time, citing in his speech that the regime of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Soviet Union as a State and Saddam Hussein's government of Iraq, had similarly been removed from power.

On December 8, 2005, he made remarks doubting the Holocaust though a week later, on December 14, he made a similar statement no longer literally denying the Holocaust.

These remarks are generally considered to be in line with his populist voting base - 19% of voters chose him in the first round of the 2005 presidential election.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Juan Cole claim that the remarks have been mistranslated and misinterpreted in the Western media, who claimed that Ahmadinejad stated that Israel should be "wiped off the map", and that his aim is only to support democracy in Palestine.

Independently of whether or not his remarks were misinterpreted, the international reaction to his perceived statements was extremely negative.

Seema Mustafa in the Asian Age claimed that Ahmadinejad's remarks relating to Israel and the Holocaust are now used as a major reason for an attack against Iran, stating that:

A campaign to demonise [Ahmadinejad] to rally around international opinion against Iran has been very effectively unleashed. He has, in fact, been carefully inducted as a key component in the propaganda war against Iran...

and that this argument was presented to journalists in Delhi by German-French-UK representative Dr Michael Schaefer and US undersecretary Nicholas Burns when they were requesting Indian representative to accept IAEA referral of Iran to the UN Security Council[48].

[edit] The role of increasing democracy in the Middle East in US-Iran tensions

In political speeches following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush has claimed (after weapons of mass destruction could not be found) that his administration's goal in the invasion was to bring democracy to countries in the Middle East and to oppose "islamofascism".

The World Tribunal on Iraq and others have doubted the sincerity of this motive, pointing to a systematic campaign against academia in Iraq during the US occupation of Iraq.

Robert Dreyfuss, author of Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam, claims that the US actions in the region have in fact supported, and are continuing to support, "islamofascism" rather than oppose it.[49]

On February 5, 2006, Iranian blogger Persian Majeed listed a number of alleged human rights violations by the US in Iran and alleged attacks by the US against Iranian democracy of the preceding half-century, requesting judicial enquiries and appropriate compensation payments to Iranians. His judgment of the severity of the US actions against democracy in Iran concludes with the request that the US should be referred to the United Nations for sanctions. [50]

[edit] Iranian fears of attack by the US

Paul Pillar, former CIA official who led the preparation of all National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Iran from 2000 to 2005 in his role as national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, told the InterPress Service that all of the NIEs on Iran during that period addressed the Iranian fears of U.S. attack explicitly and related their desire for nuclear weapons to those fears and stated "Iranian perceptions of threat, especially from the United States and Israel, were not the only factor, but were in our judgment part of what drove whatever effort they were making to build nuclear weapons." Another former CIA official, Ellen Laipson, said that the Iranian fear of an attack by the United States has long been "a standard element" in NIEs on Iran.[51]

[edit] 2003-2006 alleged US violations of Iranian sovereignty

Several claims have been made that the US has violated Iranian territorial sovereignty since 2003, including the flying of drones[52][53][54], sending US soldiers into Iranian territory[25], and the use of former or current members of the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK or MKO)[55] and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK)[56] to carry out provocations such as bombings on Iranian territory in order to provoke pre-existing ethnic tensions.

[edit] Claimed flights of US drones over Iranian territory

Since 2003 the U.S. has been flying unmanned aerial vehicles, launched from Iraq, over Iran to obtain intelligence on Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program, reportedly providing little new information.[52]The Iranian government has formally protested the incursions as illegal. A U.S. RQ-7 Shadow and a Hermes UAV have crashed in Iran.[53]

In June 2005, Scott Ritter claimed that US attacks on Iran had already begun, including US overflights of Iran using pilotless drones.[54]

[edit] Claims of US armed forces present on Iranian territory

Seymour Hersh has claimed that the US has also been penetrating eastern Iran from Afghanistan in a hunt for underground [nuclear weapons development] installations.[25]

[edit] Claims of US using proxies

See also: People's Mujahedin of Iran#Alleged MEK Activity In Iran

Scott Ritter also claimed that CIA-backed bombings had been undertaken in Iran by the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK or MKO), an opposition group listed by the United States Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.[54]

In April 2006, The Raw Story cited an unnamed UN source "close to" the United Nations Security Council stating that former MEK members had been used as a proxy by the US for "roughly a year" inside of Iranian territory. An intelligence source quoted by The Raw Story said that the former MEK members were made to "swear an oath to Democracy and resign from the MEK" before being incorporated into US military units and retrained for their operations in Iran.[55]

See also: Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan

Following the killing of 24 Iranian security forces in Iran in March 2006 by the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK), an opposition group closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is listed by the U.S. State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, Dennis Kucinich claimed in a letter to George W. Bush on April 18, 2006, that PEJAK is being supported and coordinated by the US, since it is based in Iraq, which is under the de facto control of US military forces.[56]

[edit] Decisions of US courts against Persian heritage artifacts

[edit] By Arabs

Anti-Ajam sentiments (عجم ستیزی) also (ایرانی ستیزی) is a phenomenon that first rose among victorious Arabs during the Islamic Conquest of Persia, in particular the Umayyid era. It also surfaced once again during the 20th century when Gamal Abdel Nasser championed Pan-Arab nationalist views as a political tool.

anti-Iranianism among Arabs is not a universal phenomenon, and is usually only advocated by fringe elements of Arab nationalists. Many of today's Arabs in fact virulently oppose Arab chauvinism. These include Samir el-Khalil as well the late George Hourani. Samir el-Khalil has attacked pan-Arab chauvinism and has reminded Arabs of the legacy of Persia in their culture as well as in Islam. Khalil was for years a hunted man by the Saddam Hussein regime. The late Arab scholar, George Hourani, not only appreciated the Iranians for their role in helping the Arabs form their civilization, but was rigorous against politically motivated attempts to re-name the Persian Gulf as the "Arab Gulf". And Richard Nelson Frye regarding this matter unequivocally stated that:

"Arabs no longer understand the role of Iran and the Persian language in the formation of Islamic culture. Perhaps they wish to forget the past, but in so doing they remove the bases of their own spiritual, moral and cultural being…without the heritage of the past and a healthy respect for it…there is little chance for stability and proper growth." [57]

Many Arabs continue to disregard the anti-non Arab sentiments exhibited by such extremist groups. And many Iraqis have even dismantled Saddam's anti-Iran propaganda props from their streets and monuments after the US invasion - this was done in order to destroy Saddam's legacy of hate against Iran.

The anti-Iranianism exhibited by the Arab extremists has varying degrees and can be investigated from several different angles that will now follow.

[edit] "Ajam"

According to Encyclopedia Iranica, the word "ajam", in Arabic "is applied especially to Persians" and means "to mumble, and speak indistinctly"[58], which is the opposite of the meaning of speaking "chaste and correct Arabic language."[59]

"The distinction of Arab and Ajam is already discernable in pre- and early Islamic literature Cf. the Ajam Temtemī ("stuttering barbarian")." [60] (also mentioned in [61])
"In general, ajam was a pejorative term, used by Arabs conscious of their social and political superiority, in early Islam."[62]

Dehkhoda Dictionary also verifies this, stating the meaning as "one who mumbles" (کند زبانان). For another detailed discourse on this subject see:

  • Ignaz Goldziher, 'Arab und 'Agam. Muhammedanische Studien I. Halle. 1889-1890. I p.101. tr. London 1967-1971, I, p.98 C. E. Bosworth.

[edit] Anti-Iranianism in early Islam

[edit] By sources

Patrick Clawson states that "The Iranians chafed under Umayyid rule. The Umayyids rose from traditional Arab aristocracy. They tended to marry other Arabs, creating an ethnic stratification that discriminated against Iranians. Even as Arabs adopted traditional Iranian bureacracy, Arab tribalism disadvantaged Iranians."[63] Contemporary Islamist thinker Morteza Motahhari writes:

"If we pay a little attention to the prejudice and discrimination practised by some of the caliphs with regard to their attitude towards their Arab and non-Arab subjects and to Ali ibn Abi Talib's defence of the criteria of Islamic equality and impartiality concerning Arabs and non-Arabs, the truth of the matter will become completely clear."[8]

Contrary to popular perception, conversion to Islam was discouraged, if not actually forbidden for Iranians, in the days of early Islam. The caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab in fact sought to restrict conversions to Islam only to Arabs. One tradition for example claims that he stopped the victorious Arabs from invading the Iranian plateau after the battle of Jalula' because he did not wish to see Persians converted to Islam. See: [64]

The conquest of Persia and beyond was thus seemingly intended to raise new revenues, and the native population naturally did not appreciate this exploitation. Many Arab Muslims believed that Iranian converts should not clothe themselves as Arabs, among many other forms discrimination that existed.[65]

The inhumane treatment of Iranians by the victorious Arab forces are also documented. See:[66]

Mu'awiyah, in a famous letter addressed to Ziyad ibn Abih, the then governor of Iraq, wrote:

Be watchful of Iranian Muslims and never treat them as equals of Arabs. Arabs have a right to take in marriage their women, but they have no right to marry Arab women. Arabs are entitled to inherit their legacy, but they cannot inherit from an Arab. As far as possible they are to be given lesser pensions and lowly jobs. In the presence of an Arab a non-Arab shall not lead the congregation prayer, nor they are to be allowed to stand in the first row of prayer, nor to be entrusted with the job of guarding the frontiers or the post of a qadi.[9]

Mistreatment of Persians and other non-Arabs during early Islam is well documented. To begin with, the Umayyids did not recognize equal rights of a Mawali, and believed that only "pure Arab blood" was worthy of ruling. [67] Neither did they make any effort to mend relations with the Mawali after making declarations like:

"We blessed you with the sword (referring to the conquests) and dragged you into heaven by chains of our religion. This by itself is enough for you to understand that we are superior to you." [68]

Many similar norms have been reported in various sources:

"The Mawali were not allowed to lead the prayers or receive booty even if they had participated in battles and distinguished themselves. They were not allowed to ride horses, marry into Arab families, or administer governmental or religious affairs. Even the offspring of mixed marriages were not exempt. The Mawali did not have the right to walk alongside an Arab; if a Mawali met an Arab carrying a load, he had to carry that load to the Arab's home without expecting any payment. If a Mawali were riding a horse and saw an Arab, he had to dismount and allow the Arab to ride instead. In fact, he had to take the Arab to his destination. Furthermore, the Mawali did not have the right to marry their daughters without prior permission from their Arab masters. Even in death rituals, there was a distinction. As a rule, Arabs did not participate in funerals held for the Mawali and the Mawali were not allowed to perform funeral prayers for a deceased Arab."[10]

The Umayyid Arabs are even reported to have prevented the Mawali from having surnames, as an Arab was only considered worthy of a surname.[69] They were required to pay taxes for not being an Arab:

"During the early centuries of Islam when the Islamic empire was really an 'Arab kingdom', the Iranians, Central Asians and other non-Arab peoples who had converted to Islam in growing numbers as mawali, or 'clients' of an Arab lord or clan, had in practice acquired an inferior socio-economic and racial status compared to Arab Muslims, though the mawali themselves fared better than the empire's non-Muslim subjects, the ahl al-dhimma ('people of the book'). The mawali, for instance, paid special taxes, often similar to the jizya (poll tax) and the kharaj (land tax) levied on the Zoroastrians and other non-Muslim subjects, taxes which were never paid by the Arab Muslims."[11]

[edit] Toponymical anti-Iranianism

Arabs also started a wave of changing the Persian toponyms into Arabic, to mention a few:

  • The Persian capital Ctesiphon received the Arabic name "al-Mada'in" (The cities).
  • The Persian name of the city of Nokard in Iraq was translated into Arabic as al-Haditha.
  • Budh-Aadashir was doped Mausil.
  • Suristan became Kufa.
  • Shahrban became Miqdadiya.
  • The city of Anbar became Falluja
  • Arvandrud became Shatt al-Arab.
  • Asheb became Imadiyya.

etc. As a result much of the Persian toponyms of Mesopotamia is wiped off the map today.

Source: محمدی ملایری، محمد: فرهنگ ایران در دوران انتقال از عصر ساسانی به عصر اسلامی، جلد دوم: دل ایرانشهر، تهران، انتشارات توس 1375.: Mohammadi Malayeri, M.: Del-e Iranshahr, vol. II, Tehran 1375 Hs.)

[edit] References in Persian literature

Zarrinkoub in his book "2 centuries of Silence" presents a lengthy discussion on the large flux and influence of the victorious Arabs on the literature, language, culture, and society of Persia during the two centuries following the Islamic conquest of Iran. See: [70]

As an example, he recounts the following from the writings of a Zoroastrian referring to the calamities of his time:

که رود و بگوید به هندوان
"Who will go and tell the Indians
که ما چه دیدیم از دست تازیان
what misfortune these Arabs have brought upon us?
(Note: After the conquest, the Zoroastrian community of Persia largely fled to India as a result of the intolerances against them, forming what later became known as India's famous Parsees community.)
با یک گروه دین خویش پراکندند و برفت
They came and brought their faith upon us,
شاهنشاهی ما به سبب ایشان
they came and brought death to our kingdom
نه به هنر نه به مردی بلکه به افسوس و ریشخند
Not by genuine effort, nor by fortitude and forthright, but by mockery and transgression.
بستدند به ستم از مردمان
They took away by force from the people,
زن وخواسته شیرین, باغ و بوستان
women and sweet desires, gardens and property.
جزیه بر نهادند و پخش کردند بر سران
A tax levied on us they did.
بنگر تا چه بدی در افکند این دروغ به کیهان
Look at what evil this calamity brought the world,
که نیست بدتر از آن چیزی به جهان
For nothing worse than it has this world seen yet."[71]

[edit] Persian language suppressed

After the Islamic conquest of the Persian Empire, during the reign of the Ummayad dynasty, the Arab conquerors imposed Arabic as the primary language of the subject peoples throughout their empire. Hajjāj ibn Yusuf, who was not happy with the prevalence of the Persian language in the divan, ordered the official language of the conquered lands to be replaced by Arabic, sometimes by force. [72]

In Biruni's From The Remaining Signs of Past Centuries (الآثار الباقية عن القرون الخالية), for example it is written:

وقتی قتبیه بن مسلم سردار حجاج، بار دوم بخوارزم رفت و آن را باز گشود هرکس را که خط خوارزمی می نوشت و از تاریخ و علوم و اخبار گذشته آگاهی داشت از دم تیغ بی دریغ درگذاشت و موبدان و هیربدان قوم را یکسر هلاک نمود و کتابهاشان همه بسوزانید و تباه کرد تا آنکه رفته رفته مردم امی ماندند و از خط و کتابت بی بهره گشتند و اخبار آنها اکثر فراموش شد و از میان رفت
"When Qutaibah bin Muslim under the command of Al-Hajjaj bin Yousef was sent to Khwarazmia with a military expedition and conquered it for the second time, he swiftly killed whomwever wrote the Khwarazmian native language that knew of the Khwarazmian heritage, history, and culture. He then killed all their Zoroastrian priests and burned and wasted their books, until gradually the illiterate only remained, who knew nothing of writing, and hence their history was mostly forgotten." [73]

It is difficult to imagine the Arabs not implementing anti-Persian policies in light of such events, writes Zarrinkoub in his famous Two centuries of silence [74], where he exclusively writes of this topic. Reports of Persian speakers being tortured are also given in [75]

[edit] Ali vs. Umar ibn al-Khattab

Predominantly Shia Iran has always exhibited a sympathetic side for Ali and his progeny. Even when Persia was laregly Sunni, this was still evident as can be seen from the writings remaining from that era. Rumi for example, praises Ali (in a section entitled "Learn from Ali"), which recounts Ali ibn Abi Talib's explanation as to why he declined to kill someone who had spit in his face as Ali was defeating him in battle. Persian literature in praise of Ali's progeny is quite ubiquitous and abundant. These all stem from numerous traditions regarding Ali's favor of Persians being as equals to Arabs.

In Bihar ul Anwar (vol.9, bab 124), a tradition quoted from Usul al-Kafi reads:

"One day a group of the Mawali (Iranian clients of Arab tribes) came to Amir al-Mu'minin 'Ali and complained about the conduct of the Arabs. Tbey said to him that the Messenger of God did not make any distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs in the disbursement of public funds (bayt ul-mal) or in the matter of marriage. They added that the Prophet distributed public funds equally among Muslims and let Salman, Bilal and Suhayb marry Arab women, but today Arabs discriminated between themselves and us. 'Ali went to the Arabs and discussed the matter with them, but it was to no avail. The Arabs shouted, "It is quite impossible! Impossible! "'All, annoyed and angered by this turn of affairs, returned to the Mawali and told them with utmost regret, "They are not prepared to treat you equally and as Muslims enjoying equal rights. I advise you to go into trade and God will make you prosper."

Several sources speak of a dispute arising between an Arab and an Iranian woman. Referring the case to Ali for arbitration, Ali reportedly did not allow any discrimination between the two to take place. His judgement thus invited the protest of the Arab woman. Thereupon, Ali replied: "In the Quran, I did not find the progeny of Ishmael (the Arabs) to be any higher than the Iranians."[76]

Again, Ali was once reciting a sermon in the city of Kufah, when Ash'as ibn Qays, a commander in the Arab army protested: "Amir-al-Momeneen! These Iranians are excelling the Arabs right in front of your eyes, and you are doing nothing about it!" He then roared: "I, will show them who the Arabs are!"

Ali immediately retorted: "While fat Arabs rest in soft beds, the Iranians work hard on the hottest days to please God with their efforts. And what do these Arabs want from me? To ostracize the Iranians and become an oppressor! I swear by the God that splits the nucleus and creates Man, I heard the prophet once say: Just as you strike the Iranians with your swords in the name of Islam, so will the Iranians one day strike you back the same way, for Islam." [77]

When the Sassanid city of Anbar fell to the forces of Mu'awiyeh, news reached Ali that the city had been sacked and plundered spilling much innocent blood. Ali gathered all the people of Kufah to the mosque, and gave a fiery sermon. After describing the massacre, he said: "If somebody, hearing this news now faints and dies of grief, I fully approve of it!" [78] It is from here that Ali is said to have had more sympathy for Iranians while Omar highly resented them.[79]

The following traditions are also recorded in Safinat al-Bihar [80]:

Mughirah, comparing Ali with 'Umar, always used to say, " 'Ali showed greater consideration and kindness to the Mawali, while 'Umar, on the contrary, did not like them."
A man came to Ja'far al-Sadiq and said, "People say that one who is neither a pure Arab nor a pure mawla is of base origin." The Imam asked him, "What do you mean by 'pure mawla'?" The man replied, "It is a person whose parents were slaves earlier." The Imam asked again, "What is the merit in being a pure mawla?" The man answered, "That is because the Prophet said that a people's mawla is from themselves. Therefore, a pure mawla of Arabs is like Arabs. Hence the man of merit is one who is either a pure Arab or a pure mawla associated with Arabs." The Imam replied, "Haven't you heard that the Prophet declared that he was the wali (guardian) of those who have no wali? Didn't he also say, 'I am the wali of every Muslim, whether he be Arab or non-Arab'? And doesn't a person whose wali is the Prophet therefore belong to the Prophet?" He then added: "Of these two which is superior: the one who is related to the Prophet and is from him or the one related to a boorish Arab who urinates over his feet?" Then he said: "One who embraces Islam out of his free choice, willingly is far more superior to him who has embraced Islam due to fear. These hypocritical Arabs were converted to Islam because of fear, while the Iranians came to the fold of Islam willingly and with pleasure.

[edit] The capturing of Shahrbanu by Umar ibn al-Khattab

Shia sources recount the following (with the emphasis as it appears in the references sources):

When returning to Madinah from their famous victorious battle against Persia, Omar's army brought with them many prisoners. Many of them were women. Among the prisoners captured at Ctesiphon were members of the Persian royal family, including the princess and her sister. People flocked in masses to see the captured daughter of the fallen mighty King of Persia.
Omar the caliph soon arrived and demanded the daughter of the King of Persia to be shown to him. The soldiers brought her to Omar. Omar then approached her and reached out to lift her veil to see the woman. The princess pulled herself back and cried out in Farsi: "The face of Hormoz darkens from indignity!" ("Vay! Rooye Hormoz siyaah shod!")
Omar, thinking that the princess had offended him, angrily shouted: "This woman insults me!" and pulled his sword out to behead her. Ali intervened and said: "You do not know her language. She called on her ancestor and did not insult you."
Omar then declared that he who paid the most will have her as a slave. But Ali again interrupted and said: "You do not have that right!" The crowd fell silent under Ali's aura. Ali then asked the princess: "Do you wish me to find you a husband?" The princess did not reply. Trying to prevent the auction from taking place, Ali said: "Her silence is a sign of approval." Facing Omar, Ali continued: "Why don't we let HER choose a person from amongst this crowd as a husband, and we will pay for her dowry from the public treasury?" Omar agreed.
Scanning through the crowd around her, the princess suddenly stopped and froze as her eyes fell on a man amongst the crowd. "I have seen this man in a dream before" she reportedly said. Tracing her look, the entire crowd turned around and looked at Hossein, son of Ali. Ali went up to Hossein and said: "Oh Hossein! From this girl, the most noble of humans shall be born."
Ali, then came up to the princess and asked: "What is your name?" The princess replied: "The daughter of Jahan-shah". Ali said: "and so Shahr-Banuyeh you will be called" ("the bride of the land").
To prevent the rest of the prisoners from being sold as slaves in the auction, Ali then declared: "These Iranians are respected and learned people... I, along with the Bani Hashem tribe have decided to set them free." Omar replied: "Ali today went forward and nullified my decision about the Iranians. So be it."

The following sources give similar descriptions of the same account or parts of the same account:

  • "Aldarajat ol Rafi'" p215.
  • "Mo'jem ol Baladan" Vol 2 p196.
  • "Nahj ol Balagheh" letter 45.
  • "Nahj ol Balagheh" Sobh-i Saleh sermon 209.
  • "Nafs Al-Rahman" p139.
  • "Managhib ebne shahr ashub" Vol 4, p48.

[edit] Modern times

It was in Baghdad where the first Arab nationalists, mainly of Palestinian and Syrian descent, formed the basis of their overall philosophies. Prominent among them were individuals such as Mohammad Amin al-Husayni (the Mufti of Jerusalem), and Syrian nationalists such as Shukri al-Quwatli and Jamil Mardam. Satia Al-Husri, who served as advisor to the Ministry of Education; and later Director General of Education, and Dean of the College of Law was particularly instrumental in shaping the Iraqi educational system. Other prominent Pan-Arabists were Michel Aflaq, the racist Khairallah Talfah, as well as Sati' al-Husri, Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Zaki al-Arsuzi, and Sami Shwkat (brother of Naji Shawkat). These individuals formed the nucleus and genesis of true pan-Arabism, and unfortunately, ushered in the basis of anti-Iranian thinking in mainstream Arab education and mass media.

Anti-Persian thinking can be seen in the legacy of Satia Al-Husri.[12] Of special interest is one of Husri's works entitled "Iranian Teachers who caused Us (Arabs) Big Problems". His campaigns against schools suspected of being positive towards Persia are well documented. One dramatic example is found in the 1920s when the Iraqi Ministry of Education ordered Husri to appoint Muhammad Al-Jawahiri as a teacher in a Baghdad school. A short excerpt of Husri's interview with the teacher is revealing ([81]):

"Husri: First, I want to know your nationality.
Jawahiri: I am an Iranian.
Husri: In that case we cannot appoint you."
[13]

Husri was eventually overruled by the Iraqi ministry and Jawahiri was appointed instead. Jawahiri was in fact an Arab. Yet like many Arabs of his day and the present, Jawahiri saw no reason to follow Husri's bigoted anti-Iranian racialism. (see source)

It has been said that Arab racism attained its most vulgar form in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. A prime example is the tract by Saddam's maternal uncle, Khairallah Talfah, entitled Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies. Talfah's writings were widely distributed in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule. Even more incredible is the following description by Said Aburish (in [82]):

"...the (Saddam) government offered 'pure Iraqis' married to anyone with Iranian blood 2500$ reward for anyone divorcing them."

Saddam in fact expelled thousands of people of Persian origin from Iraq in the 1970s, many of whom live in Iran today.[14]

[edit] The Iran-Iraq war

Saddam built many monuments like this: The Hands of Victory gates. 5000 helmets of killed Iranian soldiers lie at the base of two hands holding Arabic swords reminiscent of the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah.
Enlarge
Saddam built many monuments like this: The Hands of Victory gates. 5000 helmets of killed Iranian soldiers lie at the base of two hands holding Arabic swords reminiscent of the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah.

Early on in his carerr, Saddam Hussein and pan-Arab ideologues targeted the Arabs of southwest Iran in an endeavour to have them separate and join “the Arab nation”. Saddam made no effort to conceal Arab supremacist tones from mixing into his war against Iran (which he called "the second Battle of al-Qādisiyyah). An intense campaign of misinformation and propaganda during his reign produced many schoolchildren that grew up thinking Iran had invaded Iraq, contrary to the established fact. (note items 6, 7, and 8 of the UN Secretary General's report to the UN Security Council on Dec 9, 1991: [15][16][17]) For a full discussion on anti-Persian propaganda in Arab schools see [83]

Saddām on numerous occasions alluded to the Islamic conquest of Iran in propagating his anti-Persian position against Iran. For example, on 02 April 1980, a half-year before the outbreak of the war, in a visit by Saddām to al-Mustansiriyyah University in Baghdad, drawing parallels to the 7th-Century defeat of Persia in the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah he announced:

"In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere we tell those [Persian] cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of Al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their attempts." [84]

Saddam also accused Iranians of "murdering the second (Umar), third (Uthman), and fourth (Ali) Caliphs of Islam", invading the three islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the "Arabic Gulf", and attempting to destroy the Arabic language and civilization. [85]

Saddam was ideologically backed by his Arab brethren. King Khalid of Saudi Arabia for example wrote to Saddam to "crush these stupid Iranians" (این ایرانیهای احمق را له کنید) as Saddam pushed on with the invasion of Iranian territory.[18] It has often been claimed that Iraq recruited non-Iraqi arabs during the war to balance the far superior number of Iranian forces on the ground.[86]

[edit] The Persian Gulf dispute

Starting 1960s, following Charles Belgrave who first coined the phrase [19], some Arab states started referring to Persian Gulf as the "Arabian Gulf". In Iran, this continues to be seen as an act of anti-Iranianism by Arabs. Since then the disputed over the name of the gulf has been one of the most heated discussions and among Iranians it is considered to be a sign of Arabs dislike of them.

Another aspect of this dispute aside from the naming of the Persian Gulf can be seen in cultural relations between Iran and the Arab states. One notable example was the 2002 World Cup qualifiers. Bahrain, which had no hopes of qualifying, managed to upset the group top-seed Iran 3-1 in their home turf. What was interesting was that a victory for Bahrain would not qualify Bahrain but would eliminate Iran and instead enable runner-up Saudi Arabia (which had lost to Iran) to qualify.

Iranian viewers were stunned when Bahraini fans and players after the game started waving the flag of Saudi Arabia (instead of their own national flag) declaring their victory over Iran as a "gift" to Saudi Arabia. [20] Riots broke out in Tehran [21] and angry racial exchanges broke out over the internet with Iranians accusing Bahrainis of being a sell-out, and playing for the Saudis instead of playing for themselves [22]. Numerous petitions and protests to the Asian Football Confederation followed in the succeeding months.[23]

[edit] Arabs of Khuzestan

The Iranian government has accused foreign governments of encouraging Iranian Arabs(mainly living in khuzestan province) to rise up against Iran's government and claim independence. In April 2005, the government banned Aljazeera television after it quoted a leader of a pro-autonomy group, claiming the station was responsible for a subsequent uprising in the province.

However, the Iranian government has not provided any evidence to support its allegations and has not broken off relations with the British government, which it claims is the chief culprit of the unrest. The British government has also denied any involvement in Khuzestan.

Nevertheless, some representatives of Western governments have met with such groups. An example is June 31st 2005, when Pierre Pettigrew (Canadian Minister of Foreign affairs) met Rafiq Abu-Sharif, a separatist representative of the Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front.[24] According to the Al-Ahwaz website, Abu-Sharif "submitted a detailed letter to Pettigrew…detailing the nationalities under oppression…in Iran", and "also met with Canadian parliamentaries to further discuss the matter".[25] (picture of meeting)

A number of commentators have speculated that Arab unrest is a prelude to further military action by Western governments, notably the UK and the US, but many of these claims lack substantive evidence. And yet many reports suggest that Western governments have paid a great interest in the politics of ethnicity in Iran:

Other commentators claim the unrest is not inspired by foreign governments but the policies of the Iranian government, which have been described as discriminatory with some accusing the authorities of "ethnic cleansing" (see Anti-Arabism in Iran). Many however disagree. Professor Bernard Lewis in fact first unveiled a project for the separation of Khuzestan from Iran during the Bilderberg Meeting in Baden, Austria, on April 27-29, 1979. There, he formally proposed the fragmentation and balkanization of Iran along regional, ethnic and linguistic lines especially among the Arabs of Khuzestan (the Al-Ahwaz project), the Baluchis (the Pakhtunistan project), the Kurds (the Greater Kurdistan project) and the Azerbaijanis (the Greater Azerbaijan Project). [87]

[edit] Claims of Arab historical revisionism

Another point of friction that often stirs much animosity is the ongoing wave by some Arab authors and historians that continue to claim Persian scientists as Arab in their writings. For example, Ahmed al-Jabbar, the Algreian ex-Minister of Culture, in his book "the history of Arabic knowledge", has a list of 150 "Arab" historians such as Jamshid Kashani that have been Arabized as "al-Kashani", with no credit whatsoever given even to the name "Persia" or "Iran". On April 22 2006, in a lecture organized by L'Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris on the same topic, Jabbar's lecture was met with stiff criticism by Persian protesters among the audience. [88] The event has led to protests in the Iranian press and the filing of petitions:[26]

[edit] By the media

The media continues to have a profound effect on how Iran is seen by the public. Often, the media is even used to test the waters for imminent national policies.

And more than often, the media is even used as a platform for inducing ideas and events, instead of reporting them.

For example, Jonathan Hoenig of Fox News participated in a roundtable discussion on June 5, 2006 on Your World with Cavuto where he suggested to bomb Iran in order to help improve the stock market:

"I think when it comes to Iran the problem is we haven't been foreceful enough. Frankly, if you want to see the Dow go up, let's get the bombers in the air and neutralize this Iranian threat. We've gone to the negotiating table, we've danced around with these people and that's not going to help this country nor this stock market."[27]

In his new book "Never Quit the Fight", Ralph Peters has a map of what some Americans think Iran should become. See map

[edit] Against Iranian scientists

[edit] By Pashtuns

[edit] Anti-Anti-Iranianismin Afghanistan

[edit] Attempts to replace Persian with Pashto

[edit] Against the Tajiks

[edit] History of Anti-Iranianism in Central-Asia

[edit] Soviet rule and Turkification of Central Asia

[edit] Oppression of Iranian-speakers in Uzbekistan

[edit] The Taliban and anti-Tajik policies

[edit] References

  1. ^ Browne, Edward G., A Literary History of Persia, Vol. 4, p. 14
  2. ^ H. Pir Nia, Abbas Eghbal Ashtiani. History of Persia. 2002 ISBN 964-6895-16-6 p.141-142
  3. ^ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory "Science and Technology Review". July/August 1998. Link: [1]
  4. ^ Mackey, S.. The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the soul of a nation. 1996. ISBN 0-525-94005-7. p.69.
  5. ^ Ibid. p. 70
  6. ^ Morgan, David. Medieval Persia 1040-1797. London. Longman. 1988. ISBN 0-582-49324-2. p.79
  7. ^ Mackey, S. The Iranians: Persia, Islam, and the soul of a nation. 1996. ISBN 0-525-94005-7. p.69.
  8. ^ Mackey, Sandra. The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. April 1998. ISBN 0-452-27563-6. p.71
  9. ^ Patrick Clawson. Eternal Iran. Palgrave. 2005. Coauthored with Michael Rubin. ISBN 1-4039-6276-6 p.31-32
  10. ^ Decree of the CC CPSU Politburo to Mir Bagirov, CC Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, on "measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran". Translation provided by The Cold War International History Project at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
  11. ^ Nasser Takmil Homayoun, Kharazm: What do I know about Iran?. 2004. ISBN 964-379-023-1, p.78
  12. ^ Frederic John Glodsmid's Eastern Persia: An account of the journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission. 1870-1871-1872. London. Macmillan and Co. 1876.
  13. ^ George Nathaniel Curzon. Persia and the Persian question. Vol.I London. Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 1966. p.480
  14. ^ Zirinsky M.P. Imperial Power and dictatorship: Britain and the rise of Reza Shah 1921-1926. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 24, 1992. p.646
  15. ^ Sources:
    • FO 371 16077 E2844 dated 8 June 1932.
    • The Memoirs of Anthony Eden are also explicit about Britain's role in putting Reza Khan in power.
    • Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran since 1921. Longman. 2003 ISBN 0-582-35685-7 p.26-31
  16. ^ Robert Dreyfuss (with Thierry LeMarc). Hostage to Khomeini. New York: New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing Company. 1980. ISBN 0-933488-11-4 p.157
  17. ^ "British in 1950, Helped Map Iraqi Invasion of Iran" by Halloran, R. in The New York Times, Thursday, Oct.16, 1980.
  18. ^ Ingram, Edward. Britain’s Persian Connection 1798-1828: Prelude to the Great Game in Asia. 1993. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-820243-1 p.41.
  19. ^
  20. ^ CNN transcript, Paula Zahn now.
  21. ^ "Newsweek", August 15, 1988.
  22. ^ Ghasemi, Shapour (2004). Shooting Down Iran Air Flight 655 [IR655]. Retrieved on 2006-03-31.
  23. ^ Blum, William. War and Terror: The World's Only Superpower. Retrieved on 2006-03-31.
  24. ^ Blair's Next War, May 04, 2005, Dave Wearing
  25. ^ a b c http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050124fa_fact
  26. ^ Sleepwalking To Disaster In Iran, April 01, 2005, Scott Ritter
  27. ^ Fool Me Twice, March 27, 2006, Joseph Cirincione, Foreign Policy
  28. ^ The United States, Israel, and the Possible Attack on Iran, Stephen Zunes, May 2, 2006, ZNet
  29. ^ Deep Background, August 1, 2005, Philip Giraldi, The American Conservative
  30. ^ A 'Legal' US Nuclear Attack Against Iran, Jorge Hirsch, November 12, 2005
  31. ^ America and Iran: At the Brink of the Abyss ,Jorge Hirsch, February 20, 2006
  32. ^ Nuclear War Against Iran, Michel Chossudovsky, January 3, 2006
  33. ^ Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention on Iran
  34. ^ The Iran plans, Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker Mag., April 8, 2006
  35. ^ http://www.geocities.com/jorgehirsch/nuclear/bushoptions.mov, CSPAN interview archived by Jorge E. Hirsch
  36. ^ A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences, September 9, 2004, Sammy Salama, Karen Ruster, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies
  37. ^ Iran Body Count: Iran: consequences of a war, February 2006, Paul Rogers
  38. ^ Petrodollars and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Understanding the Planned Assault on Iran, Centre for Research on Globalization, Michael Keefer, February 10, 2006
  39. ^ US agrees to back UN nuclear head, June 9, 2005, BBC
  40. ^ Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, IAEA
  41. ^ http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/
  42. ^ US demands drastic action as Iran nuclear row escalates, Ian Traynor, The Guardian, March 9, 2006
  43. ^ The U.S. and Iran: Democracy, Terrorism, and Nuclear Weapons, August 31, 2005, Stephen Zunes, Foreign Policy in Focus
  44. ^ A frenzied Persian new year, March 22, 2006, Asia Times
  45. ^ Wag the Dog: Crisis Scenarios for Deflecting Attention from the President's Woes, November 16, 2005, Michael T. Klare
  46. ^ Denying the Holocaust for Political Advantage?, Michael Scott Moore, Der Spiegel, December 14, 2005
  47. ^ Iran biggest threat since Nazis, says Israel as Ahmadinejad provokes new outrage, Conal Urquhart, Ian Traynor, the Guardian, April 25, 2006
  48. ^ Our Bomb, Your Bomb: On India, Iran, and the Nuclear Bomb, January 22, 2006, Seema Mustafa, Asian Age
  49. ^ Political Islam vs. Democracy: The Bush Administration's Deadly Waltz with Shiite Theocrats in Iraq and Muslim Brotherhood Fanatics in Syria, Egypt, and Elsewhere, November 29, 2005, Robert Dreyfuss
  50. ^ Let's rewrite Iranian history: The past 50 years, blog, February 5, 2006, Persian Majeed, iranian.com
  51. ^ Fear of U.S. Drove Iran's Nuclear Policy, Gareth Porter, February 10, 2006, InterPress Service
  52. ^ a b U.S. Uses Drones to Probe Iran For Arms, February 13, 2005, Washington Post
  53. ^ a b Iran Protests U.S. Aerial Drones, November 8, 2005, Washington Post
  54. ^ a b c The US war with Iran has already begun, June 21, 2005, 2005, Scott Ritter
  55. ^ a b On Cheney, Rumsfeld order, US outsourcing special ops, intelligence to Iraq terror group, intelligence officials say, by Larisa Alexandrovna, April 13, 2006, The Raw Story
  56. ^ a b Kucinich Questions The President On US Trained Insurgents In Iran: Sends Letter To President Bush, Dennis Kucinich, April 18, 2006
  57. ^ R. N. Frye, The Golden Age of Persia, London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1989, page 236
  58. ^ Encyclopedia Iranica, p.700.
  59. ^ ibid.
  60. ^ ibid
  61. ^ Goldziher. Muhammedanische Studien I. p.103. tr I, p.99
  62. ^ Encyclopedia Iranica, p.700
  63. ^ Patrick Clawson. Eternal Iran. Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. ISBN 1-4039-6276-6, p. 17.
  64. ^ Tabari. Series I. p.2778-9
  65. ^ "Ignaz Goldziher. Mohammedanische Studien". Vol 2. p.138-9
  66. ^ The following sources:
    • "Ansab al Ashraf" or "Futuh al-Buldan" by Baladhuri. p.417.
    • Tabari. Series II p1207.
    • "Tarikh-i Sistan". p82.
    • "Tarikh e Qum". p254-6.
  67. ^ Momtahen, H. Nehzat-i Shu'ubiyeh..., p.145. (ممتحن ، حسینعلی ، نهضت شعوبیه جنبش ملی ایرانیان در برابر خلافت اموی و عباسی ، تهران : باورداران ، چاپ دوم ، 1368)
  68. ^ ibid. p.146
  69. ^ Jurji Zaydan, p.228 (زیدان، جرجی، تاریخ تمدن اسلام ، ترجمه علی جواهرکلام، تهران: امیرکبیر ، چاپ نهم ، 137)
  70. ^ Zarrinkoub, Two centuries of silence, Chapter 4, ISBN 964-5983-33-6
  71. ^ Also found in the following sources:
    • For the text in Pahlavi language see Jamasp-Asana (متون پهلوی, جاماسپ)
    • For the Persian translation see: Mohammad Taghi Bahar in:
      • Mehr (مهر) No. 5
      • Sokhan (سخن) No. 2
    • For another Persian translation see: Sadeq Hedayat in:
      • Sokhan (سخن) No. 2
    • For an English translation see Herbert W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971
  72. ^ Cambridge History of Iran, by Richard Nelson Frye, Abdolhosein Zarrinkoub, et al. Section on The Arab Conquest of Iran and its aftermath. Vol 4, 1975. London. p.46
  73. ^ Biruni. From The Remaining Signs of Past Centuries (الآثار الباقية عن القرون الخالية). p.35, 36, 48
  74. ^ Zarrinkoub, Two centuries of silence, Chapter 4, ISBN 964-5983-33-6
  75. ^ al-Aghānī (الاغانی). Abū al-Faraj al-Isfahāni. Vol 4, p.423.
  76. ^ See the following sources:
    • "Algharat" Vol 1 p70.
    • "Tarikh-i Yaghubi" Vol 2 p183.
    • Bihar-ol-Anwar Vol 41 p137.
  77. ^ See the following sources:
    • Safinat-ol Bihar by Shaykh 'Abbas al-Qummi. Vol 2. p693.
    • Sharh Nahj-ul Balaghih Ebn Abi-alhadid Vol 19, p124.
  78. ^ Nahj ol Balagheh. Sobhi Saleh. Sermon 27
  79. ^ Abtahi, S. Nureddin. Iranian dar Quran va rivayat. p75.
  80. ^ Shaykh 'Abbas al-Qummi, (under wali), c.f. al-Kay.
  81. ^ Samir El-Khalil, Republic of Fear, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, p.153-154
  82. ^ Saddam Hussein: The Politics of revenge, London: Bloomsbury, 2000, p.123
  83. ^ Tallal Etrisi in: Arab-iranian Relations, edited by: Khair El-Din Haseeb. 1998. ISBN 1-86064-156-3
  84. ^ Saddām, 'Address given'. Baghdād, Voice of the Masses in Arabic, 1200 GMT 02 April 1980. FBIS-MEA-80-066. 03 April 1980, E2-3.)
  85. ^ Tallal Etrisi طلال عتریسی in: Arab-iranian Relations, edited by: Khair El-Din Haseeb. 1998. ISBN 1-86064-156-3
  86. ^ See the article میراث پان عربیسم in the journal مجله سیاسی-اقتصادی No. 209-210, p.12
  87. ^ Robert Dreyfuss (with Thierry LeMarc). Hostage to Khomeini. New York: New Benjamin Franklin House Publishing Company. 1980. ISBN 0-933488-11-4 p.157
  88. ^ Shargh Newspaper. Article by Pejman Akbarzadeh. May 16, 2006. Link: [2]

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