Talk:Analytic/Anglophone and Continental Philosophy

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[edit] Continental Philosophy is Practiced In...

The countries mentioned in the header as well as Slovenia, Austria (at least historically, not so sure about contemporary) and Argentina at the absolute minimum.

Also, I'm given to understand that there's a pretty strong group of Analytic philosophers practicing in Israel.

I must find sources, but if consensus dictates, I would like to add these countries to the header. While it may serve to complicate the geographic question, I, for one, feel that it should be complicated. 66.222.62.214 23:38, 11 December 2006 (UTC)


"...and to some extent Ireland." So-called continental philosophy is practiced, more than to some extent, in Britain and the United States too. Analytic philosophy is widely practiced in France and Germany. KD

I agree. Indeed, if a 'continental philosopher' calls themselves a continental philosopher or makes a big deal about the analytic-continental split it is a safe bet that they are either from Britain or the US or in close company with Anglo-American philosophy. The standard short intro to 'continental philosophy' was written by an American. Anyway, im going to add Israel to the list of countries where analytic philosophy is practiced, and think a little more about countries that would make good additions to the list of 'continental' countries. Really though, the whole thing is ridiculous. I mean, jeez, there are 'continental philosophers' from more or less any place in the world where there are philosophers and there are at least a handfull of analytic philosophers in every first world country. 66.222.62.214 19:58, 13 December 2006 (UTC)

Do not get hung up on the geographic terms. Let us not try to cover all 200 countries in willing a division. Enough to say the division is doubtful but clear in certain countries, as to Isreal, well just guess which philosophy they pretend to do, ok, add it. The words in a language tell us where they are from, but not how important the matter is. Of course continentals are concerned about his split, it is probably the very reason why they rejuse Analytics. --Lucas

[edit] Marx and Deleuze as empiricists or as science-friendly

The following passage has been inserted recently:

in the 19th century, continental philosophers such as Hegel and Marx described their form of criticism as "science," continental philosophy, in general, tends to adopt a critical view of Enlightenment science. However, some recent philosophers, in particular Deleuze and Badiou, have a positive attitude to science and mathematics

Firstly it is misleading to say Hegel and Marx "were 19C continental philosophers", since here you allow it to be confused with a merely geographically sense, there was no such thing as a continental philosopher (in the context of this article) in the 19th Century.

What had been in the article on Marx and Deleuze was that they were empiricists. Now this has been replaced by indirection to what only Hegel and Marx referred to as "science" (with quotes). Firstly I dont think Hegel should be mentioned here. Secondly it would be better to just say Marx was empiricist since saying that he thought what he was doing was something he describes as "science" does not reveal the way he is fully empiricist, in that he finds materialism, and sense reality, at the basis of everything (including the spiritual, religion, and much philosophy, much like an arch-scientist like Dawkins). It also, unfortunately, seems to imply that, unlike Hegel and Marx, the article writer knows what real science (without the quotation marks) is about. Similarly Deleuze may or may not have a friendly attitude to Mathematics and science but he is, self-declaredly, deeply empiricist. --Lucas

Marx certainly wasn't an empiricist; Marx thought that material reality, not sense-data, was fundamental. But, as you point out, he wasn't really a continntal philosopher, either, so his empiricism or lack of it probably needn't be mentioned in the article. As regards Deleuze, whether or not he was an empiricist is a topic of some controversy. He called himself an empiricist, but, to quote the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1]:
One can see that [his] definition of empiricism differs sharply, at least apparently, from the traditional understanding canonised by Anglo-American histories of philosophy. Such a history would have us believe that empiricism is above all the doctrine that whatever knowledge that we possess is derived from the senses and the senses alone - the well-known rejection of innate ideas. Modern views of science embrace such a doctrine, and apply it as a tool to derive facts about the physical world. Deleuze's empiricism is both an extreme radicalisation and rejection of this sense-data model.
So I think it would be problematic to simply assert in the article that Deleuze was an empiricist (though a more naunced discussion of his version of empiricism might be useful).
More generally, I'm not sure how the discussion of empiricism relates to that section, which attempts to characterize the analytic/continental split as in part a descriptive/critical split. The issue here wouldn't be empiricism per se, but positivism, i.e., an emphasis on positive knowledge versus an emphasis on criticism as negative (this is, for example, the Frankfurt School's criticism of analytic philosophy). I'm not sure whether or not the fact that Deleuze called himself an empiricist is relevant here (it might be, if one thought that Deleuze's empiricism meant that he had a different account of the relationship between description and critique than other continental philosophers). VoluntarySlave 21:59, 19 November 2006 (UTC)
I'm impressed by your reply, often on here I see alot of ad hominems without any actual matter.
As for Marx being a materialist yet not giving "sense-data" the basis for his materialism, this is quite a fine division, one might first think of material, in this sense, as nothing other than the stuff of sense experience. I think that what we try to say here is that he was anti-idealist and was against German idealism that vaunted such things as Hegel's absolute spirit and philosophy over and above the everyday life of experience. He also has a positivism about science. Of course science itself, especially the social ones, can be critical. As to not being a continental philosopher, we can say he was not one, but that he is within the canon of continental philosophy but not considered in Analytic (especially during the cold war)..
As for Deleuze, I think we have a problem here as you suggest, however, of course we should avoid giving either analytic or continental the last word on what empiricism means. We could say he is a "self-described empiricism" and/or indicate his relation to Hume. I myself, would be inclined to call him empiricist, innate ideas being subborned by him to the mind stretching phenomena of the world.
As to the section title, changing it to "Positivism Vs Critique" may be a little contentious, I prefer the word "descriptive" to "positivism", but change it if you think it is better. These are broad characterisations of course since there are exceptions on both sides and it may be better not to use your more pointed term. Including a description as you gave above would still be good, but both deal in positive and negative (or critical), knowledge. Positivism also has an association with reductionism that is not necessarily Analytic since reductionism is still a question within Analytic philosophy, but it may be Deleuzian. Problematically, phenomenology also originally (before Crisis) had a descriptive role, but we don't need to drop the word "descriptive", if we consider continental and phenomenology to have undergone a "turn" toward a critical mode and that it is still broadly and in the main more critical than descriptive.
As to having a positive attitude to science, this is one issue, it is second to the idea that analytic tends to model itself on science, here we might also refer to Locke's comment about philsoophy as being the under-laborer to science. I dont think Deleuze and Badiou would be of the same opinion as Locke. I dont have a problem using the word empiricsm since it gets across part of this idea of descriptive Vs critical.
In addition it might be good to include exceptions on the Analytic side. On the continental side I think there is a good deal missing on the idea of history and how it is considered over and above nature as the thing that shaped our world, that is, how historical philosophical concepts, in a sense, created our contemporary world.
Also it is an idea to see the pages Analytic Philosophy and Continental Philosophy since there you find much that that falsely characterises the other (school?) and needs to be removed (or moved here and modified) .
--Lucas

[edit] Key Moments in the Schism - suggsted deletion(s)

Cassirer was certainly not an analytic philosopher, so suggest deleting that entry.

Would also argue that Chomsky is a philosopher only in a very loose sense, and not committed to the analytic school, so would delete that too.

KD

You are right Cassiser was not Analytic, I'll remove any mention that he is. Showing a break in Continental with Kantianism however, may be useful. Just as showing the break that Analytic made in Anglophone depts. with Idealism is also important.

Chomsky has commented on certain Continental philosophers, though he would probably class himself more as a linguist, he is still important in the Analytic "philosophy of language", I believe.

Are there any better replacements for these suggested removals?

Lucas

Well Chomsky just is a linguist. There might be an argument that he has become a political philosopher, but I would be staggered to find any authoritative citation for the claim that he is an analytic philosopher.

The Cassirer/Heidegger debate did not signal a break with Kantianism. It was a dispute over which of the philosophers had advanced the better interpretation of Kant.

KD

Chomsky, I agree, refers to his earliar work as linguistics and distances it from his later political work. However, his cultural-DNA, the "universal grammar" that one finds in all languages, is used much in the Analytic philosophy of language, especially in arguments about universal translation and ontological relativity. In the t.v. debate Chomsky appealed to the idea of a definable, and universal, human, much like the idea of a universal grammer. Foucault, on the other hand, thought humanism, in the sense of enforcing a universal category on each person on the planet, was dead.

Cassirer debate was a break not from Kant but from the main form of Kantianism at the time. Heidegger preferred to see Kant as doing Ontology and not epistemology. This breaks with Kantianism but you are right, it is another Kantianism.

Anyhow, what other events are there? Perhaps, the refusal of Derrida's honourary degree at Cambridge?

Lucas

The Cassirer entry has been expanded? Cassirer is still not an analytic philosopher, and the description of his work in that section hardly well represents a writer whose main work was on the way in which any grasp of reality is filtered through symbolic forms, such as myths.

In addition, the entry on Derrida and Austin is wrong. "Searle responds to a review of one of Derrida's books with accusations of obfuscation. Derrida replies with accusations of mis-reading." No "book" was involved here. Derrida wrote a paper about ordinary language philosophy. Searle responded with a paper aimed at rebutting Derrida; Derrida responded again with a longer paper. Both Derrida's papers are collected in the book Limited Inc, Searle having refused permission for his paper to be included. This is just to correct it; I don't agree that it's an important event in any schism. The Rorty quote, which I gave you for a different purpose, doesn't consitute a "key monent". This section is worthless if we can't find any actual such moments. I am surprised no-one has suggested Wittgenstein waving a poker at Popper.

KD

This is not important in any schism. What do you think is important then or is everything just the same? The poker waving is some picture of seriousness appropriate only for Analytic, I dont see what it has to do with the ideology of the schism. --Lucas

[edit] Photograph and The Split

Why is this photograph at all relevant to this entry? It seems to imply that the separation between Analytic and Continental Philosophy has something to do with a split between Plato and Aristotle. Which is pretty absurd. 209.81.165.176 05:04, 12 December 2006 (UTC)

I quite like the photo and of course those who think modern philosophy is just a footnote to plato might also consider it as stemming from the up/down split of plato and aristotle given in the painting.

Anyhow, I think the idea of philosophy as represetned in the school of athens as this open and protected meeting of various opinions is perhaps an opinion an artist might still have of philosophy, but with the situation now that there are two buildings instead of the one in the painting.

--Lucas

Unless you have a replacement photo please leave it there. I have no problem with the rough style of the 'X' it is like the one drawn on the monalisa and that is a valuable artword. In any case it doesnt represent a split between the two figures in the centre, remember more than plato and aristotle are in it. It looks more like cracks in the edifice.

--Lucas

[edit] Analytic/Anglophone - Title Changed

Did the title of the article just change? If so, it's a big backward step. I would be surprised to find any philosopher describe him or herself as a member of an Anglophone school or as someone practising/studying "Anglophone" philosophy.

Analytic philosophy is not English language philosophy. Frege, Popper, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Cassirer (not analytic, but according to the article he is), etc, etc - these philosophers were not writing in English.

It might well be that more analytic philosphy is published in English than in any other language today, but that is because more philosophy of all kinds is published in English. There is no essential connection between analytic philosophy and the English language.

As I have said elsewhere, I think the article as a whole is based on a misunderstanding and should go - but in any case, the heading is hopeless. KD Nov 27

You will find references to this division of Analytic and Continental in both these areas of philosophy, so it is not a misunderstanding; it is even part of how both these areas define themselves. This division exists for most, as far as I know, though, as the article states, not everyone agrees with it. I presume you are denying that there is this division of philosophy? Are you taking these words "Analytic" and "Continental" too literally? In the end, they are just handy ways of referring to this split.
That some Analytic philosophers were German or that some English philosophers do Continental is also mentioned in the article. The terms Analytic and Continental are taken mainly from Anglophone philosophy, however, from the Continental point of view Analytic is better known as Anglophone philosophy, in order to ensure balance, this page ought not use terms that come from from only one side. Note, neither would a Continental Philosopher call herself that. The point is that in most universities in the English speaking world there is a strong predominance of Analytic that is not found in other countries.
Frege, Popper, Wittgenstein, Carnap all had reputations made mainly in either Britain or the US (but not only. Some lived there too) or also within some form of scientific positivitism. I would not be able to neutrally say, as you do, that most philosophy today takes place in English, since for a Continental, this is often not philosophy but something more regional, something more akin to one of the sciences. Of course when one thinks of "Great Philosophers" one doesnt think of only, or even mostly, of English-writing ones.
--Lucas
Analytic philosophers define themselves as such, and acknowledge that they are members of the analytic school. I have never heard of any philosopher describing him or herself as "continental". I am open to examples. Assuming I am right, there is no equivalence in the terms. "Contintental" is used by analytic philosophers to gesture at philosophy they find non-analytic. Analytic philosophers are united by methodology, by subject matter, and by their debt to Frege. It is simply wrong to suggest that, for example, Kierkegaard, Sanguinetti and De Man are members of the same philosophical school.
Although Russell and Moore are of historical interest in the development of analytic philosophy, their influence is negligible compared with Frege. He fathered the school. I have shown that major figures in the school did not write in English (it doesn't matter where they lived). Do you have any authoritative source which uses the term Anglophone philosophy in the sense you suggest? KD Nov 28
Ok so Analytic uses the term for themselves and Continentals don't, tell me again though, are you suggesting that this division doesnt work or that Analytic is just one "school" around and all others are just non-Analytic or other various "schools"? Or that there is no division. Denial is not a river in Egypt. Though one might try argue it is mistaken, as you do perhaps, but even if it is a mistake it is still there in our lexicon, just check the vast diference of say Yale philosophy department and the Sorbonne. By the way, both wiki pages on Analytic and Continental counter-define themselves.
Rorty, for one, uses the term Anglophone, as does Derrida. The Frankfurt school also uses these terms.
Kierkegaard is not Continental as such, but is read in the Continental tradition more so than in the Analytic. You will find references to Kierkegaard amongst many Continentals but not all and maybe not Sanguinetti, but, unlike Analytics, he will refer to Marx (as is mentinoed in the article).
Frege was influential and wrote in German, but his influence was mainly on the plains of British and the U.S. philosophy departments. Other English-speaking countries, in contrast to Spanish, French, or even Chinese-speaking countries, tended to replicate this Frege-Russell-Moore influence. Nor would it change it if the US philosopher, Peirce, happened to have founded the Continental tradition. The article does say that it is not just a geographic division. Though you might argue for a better term than Continental, as for example Rorty does, he calls it "Conversational," but we must wait to see if this changes our entrenched lexicon and re-baptises Continental.
--Lucas
1. A lot of people use the term "Anglophone philosophy" to mean philosophy written in English. This is the correct use. Here's a citation in which Rorty is reported to be using it correctly - distinguishing Anglophone from analytic:
"The schism dates back to the 1940s and 1950s, when analytic philosophy took over at American universities, Rorty said. Before then, anglophone philosophy departments -- those in the United States, Britain and Scandinavia -- and non-anglophone schools -- in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and other European countries -- both focused on the study of philosophy from a historical perspective."[2]
You need to produce a convincing example of the term being used your way. I am going to assume Derrida and others use it correctly too, absent evidence.
2. I do not contend that Kierkegaard is Continental, as I am suggesting that there is no such school. However, you will find him referred to as a continental philosopher by analytic philosophers - thus supporting my point. The rest of your point is mysterious. Of course Sanuinetti was a neo-Marxist. I know that. The point is that he doesn't form a school with all the other "continentals" thrown together here - in the way, for example, that Austin and Quine and Davidson and Dummett, etc - DO form a school.
3. That Frege influenced primarily US/British philosophy is a distortion. He certainly influenced Wittgenstein and Carnap, for example, decisively - but it is accidents of history which drew these German speaking philosophers to English speaking countries. Analytic philosophy is widely practised throughout Europe.
In summary, I am not arguing against having an entry on "Continental philosophy" which defines it accurately as a term used of a wide variety of philosophies by analytic philosophers. The current entry implies that there are, in fact, two such schools, thus taking sides on the issue.
KD Tries Again

Anglophone philosophy does mean philosophy written in English, it so happens that most, not all, Anglophone philosophy is Analytic, and so US and UK philosophers are characterised as such by Continentals. Similarly most, not all, Philosophy in Europe (except UK) is not written in English and is not Analytic. Again, I'd love if there were better terms but this is our lexicon.

The quote from Rorty obviously aligns Anglophone and Analytic. Note also the wiki page for Anglophone philosophy.

So finally we see what your contention is: there is no such thing as non-Analytic philosophy, and whatever it is, it is not important and should not be given a name. It so happens, mistakenly or not, that Continental is the name used for that philosophy.

3. You think that Continentals do not form a "school" and analytics do. Well if that means reading one another I think you are wrong. Continentals read alot of one another, even to the point of learning another language. You think Sanuinetti is not read in Analytic philosophy but not in Continental, I don't think so.

4. That Frege influenced another two Analytic philsophers, Carnap and Wittgenstein is not surprising (though I'm not sure that Carnap was a philosopher, more of a philosophe really). Wittgenstein did all his stuff in England where he began philosophy, and Carnap, was very US orientated from the beginning even emigrated there as a young man. It is not just an accident of history, their take up was on the soil of British and US intellectual life of the 20s, 30s and 40s. I agree, some Analytic might be practised in Europe but it is not the major thing as it is in US and UK departments.

By the article saying there are two "schools" you suggest that it is taking sides. Perhaps you left a clause out of you statement, but how is this "taking sides", anyhow which side does it take? In any case, how would you even up the balance. You misrepresent the pages on analytic and continental, both say they are major contemporary traditions and do not say who gave them their names.

In summary I am not against having an article on Analytic philosophy even though, since Quine, it cannot define itself, nor am I against one on Continental even though it does not even call itself that. However, what is needed is an article that shows both of these issues.

--Lucas


Anglophone philosophy means philosophy written in English. Rorty discusses Anglophone philosophy departments adopting analytic philosophy, from which it follows quite plainly that Anglophone philosophy departments do not necessarily teach analytic philosophy at all. You are factually wrong about Carnap, who left Europe in his mid-forties with major works already published, but in any case my point was that the giants of analytic philosophy were NOT Anglophones. I don't know if Popper wrote in English in his later life, but Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap and the younger Popper at least wrote philosophy in German.
Of course continental philosophy exists, but it does not constitute a unified school, as analytic philosophy does. The latter is indeed defined by its members (see Dummett, Origins of Analytic Philosophy), and they acknowledge themselves to be analytic philosophers. Existentialism, structuralism, hermeneutics, phenomenology - these are schools with their origins in continental Europe. But they are not ONE school, as analytic philosophy is.
Once again - the term "continental philosophy" is used - usually pejoratively - by analytic philosophers to imply that all these other schoools are basically interchangeable and are doing the subject the wrong way. The article takes the analytic side by accepting the term. KD

[edit] Replies and Indented replies to some comments by Lucas

Well, let us say Carnap was young in comparison to Kant. In any case they were all taken up by US and British philosophy departments and not, in the main, by those on the Continent of Europe.
KD replies - third time, my point is that Carnap and the others, giants of analytic philosopher, were not Anglophones.

Lucas Replies -- For the third time they wrote much in English and German and so not 100% anglophones, but the important thing is that they had influence mainly, if not only, upon Anglophone philosophy.

Glad to hear you state that Continental Philosophy exists. But, I agree, it does not constitute as unified a school as Analytic or Science itself, but that is only in comparison. Being one school implies agreeing upon something, like most of philosophy before them, most, not all, continentals only agree that they are doing something called "philosophy", and that is their unity. In other words, their unity is that they do not declare themselves Analytic.
KD replies: It is not a matter of degree. There is an analytic school, there is no continental school. There is no "unity" between Hegelians, Marxists, Situationists, Existentialists, etc against analytic philosophy. Except in the eyes of analytic philosophers. Unless you can find one reference to a well-known philosopher agreeing that he/she does "continental philosophy", you have no case. For analytic philosophers, such statements are everywhere - I gave you the Dummett reference as an example.

Lucas replies -- Degree is everthing here, the article does not claim a water tight division, and really tried to point at remarkable similarities. Firstly, not all Analytics declare themselves so, they do not carry a membership card. Also there is alot of unity between the continentals, to give one example, Nancy was a student of Derrida, was a student of Foucault. Derrida was influenced by Heidegger, Levinas and Husserl. To say "There is no unity between Hegelians, Marxists, Situationists, Existentialists" is way off the mark, it might be hard to think of a more unified bunch (perhaps more unified than some Analytics, eg, how unified are Carnap and Quine?). Except perhaps for Existentialism, and here, really we can only talk of Sartre, but Sartre was also in his own way Hegelian/Marxist/Heideggerean.

I see no pejorative sense to the word "Continental", anymore than there is to "Analytic"; it all depends on which you think is worse. Would you care to explain why you think the use of the word Continental is pejorative? By the way, the pejorative uses of both Analytic and Continental are covered in the article itself.
KD replies: I have explained repeatedly. It is used - often, not always pejoratively - by analytic philosophers. It is not used by "continental" philosophers to describe themselves.

Lucas replies -- Just because someone does not use a name to describe themselves does not mean that they can have no name, in fact, names are usually given by others. For example, Plato never said he was doing Greek or Ancient philosophy. As to the pejorative, I repeat, the pejorative uses of both Analytic and Continental are given in the article.

Calling Phenomenology or Genealogy, "Continental" does not mean that they are inter-changeable, nor that they are doing something the wrong way. Why do you suggest this? Is it because you think that there is only one way of doing something?
KD says: I said nothing even remotely resembling any of that.

Lucas replies -- no? this is what you said:

Once again - the term "continental philosophy" is used - usually pejoratively - by analytic philosophers to imply that all these other schoools are basically interchangeable and are doing the subject the wrong way. The article takes the analytic side by accepting the term

In accepting the term you imply that the article also accepts that these things are interchangeable. I disagree, both phenomenology and genealogy are continental, and nor are they interchangeable.

As to Rorty, I quote you:
Rorty discusses Anglophone philosophy departments adopting analytic philosophy, from which it follows quite plainly that Anglophone philosophy departments do not necessarily teach analytic philosophy at all
What was actually said in your prior quote from Rorty here, was that "analytic philosophy took over at American universities". So how is it plain that Analytic took over but was not taught?
--Lucas
KD replies: Go and look at the Rorty quote again. It's quite straightforward. Analytic philosophy took over at Anglophone departments, in other words it started being taught. You brought up Rorty. It is clear from the quote that he understands Anglophone departments have taught various kinds of philosophy OTHER THAN analytic - because analytic and Anglophone philosophy are NOT the same thing.
Indented Replies by KD

Lucas replies -- Let me agree, they are two different words and of course are not identical but let us say they are very close. And at the moment that they are almost identical. Obviously prior to the said takeover anglophone depts. were happily doing Hegelian or Transcendental Idealist philosophy. Takeover means that now most anglophone depts do mainly analytic and that they become synonymous, for the time being. Note, I added the quote from Rorty to the article, so hopefully it will make your argument apparent.

One further question, do you think the division itself is a one-sided creation of some pejorative Analytics? Or is it just the words "continental" and "anglophone" that you object to? Are you not missing something when you ignore that Analytic is predominant in the English-speaking academy but not so in others? How would you encyclopede this fact? Surely an encylopedia should give a full, and well-rounded, explanation of it, and so need to be outside of the individual, and possibly biased, articles for each side of this schism?

2nd Replies by Lucas

--- Okay, I think I get the point that discussion will not resolve this. It doesn't help the encyclopaedia much to debate this endlessly - it would be more helpful if you could provide any kind of cite or reference for your point of view. I have produced Rorty distinguishing Anglophone from analytic philosophy - you have produced no-one equating the two. Indeed, I now think you agree that they are not the same, but that there is merely a current preponderance of analytic philosophy in Anglophone departments. This is not sufficient to justify "Analytic/Anglophone" in the title of an encyclopaedia article. I have produced Dummett defining the analytic school and identifying himself and others as analytic philosophers - you have produced no equivalent for the supposed "continental school". If you're unable to do so, I think the article should be amended accordingly.

I'll deal with your points, as you went to the trouble of making them:
"not all Analytics declare themselves so, they do not carry a membership card. Also there is alot of unity between the continentals, to give one example, Nancy was a student of Derrida, was a student of Foucault. Derrida was influenced by Heidegger, Levinas and Husserl"
Never mind "all". Countless analytic philosophers unequivocally declare themselves to be such. You cannot produce one example of someone describing him or herself as a "continental" philosopher. The lines of influence you indicate among some European philosophers are obvious and uncontroversial. What you can't do, however, is point to a single root for all "continental philosophy". Analytic philosophy is rooted in Frege, which just some rough qualifications around the edges (because things are never that simple).
"Just because someone does not use a name to describe themselves does not mean that they can have no name, in fact, names are usually given by others."
It does not follow, of course, that the name you are giving to this specific group of philosophers is appropriate. Because a sub-set of philosophers does not use name MIGHT WELL MEAN that they do, in fact, have no collective name. Note, however, that the analytic school DOES call itself that.


"Lucas replies -- no? this is what you said:
Once again - the term "continental philosophy" is used - usually pejoratively - by analytic philosophers to imply that all these other schools are basically interchangeable and are doing the subject the wrong way. The article takes the analytic side by accepting the term

In accepting the term you imply that the article also accepts that these things are interchangeable. I disagree, both phenomenology and genealogy are continental, and nor are they interchangeable."

A complete misreading. I don't accept the term at all. That's my whole point. I said that the ARTICLE accepts and uses the term. It shouldn't.
As to your other points, the "schism" probably needs to be noted in the articles on Analytic and "continental" philosophy. As I said, to give it is own article, as if there are indeed two such schools, adopts the Analytic agenda. KD


This whole discussion has become difficult to keep track of, just above you quote me, quoting you, without any easy way of telling them apart. Endless discussion here does not seem to move much mainly because the changes you wish to make are not editorial and seem to be about the entire article. As to removing Anglophone from the title, this does not appear to be agreed. However, the compromise I made was to include your comment in the article. The Anglophone in the title actually serves to even up the one-sidedness you referrred to in the use of the word "Continental".

You say the article accepts the term Continental but you suggested this meant it took one side. The only indication you gave as to this sidedness was that you have heard it being used pejoratively. I deny this and consider the term as quite neutral and that using it does not imply taking sides.

The Rorty quote I believe supports the notion that Analytic is nowadays almost equivalent to Anglophone and that these two terms can be often used today interchangeably. You make the mistake of going only for the historic/etymologic rather than current real meaning of "anglophone philosophy". Both uses are explained in the article. And yes the article is not a "rigorous Analytic of" the division, it tries to capture these terms as they are used. The title tries to affirm this. You suppose that because Dummett says something and you interpret it, it is truer than anything I or you say, automatically. Rather than argue from authority we should try to compromise on the edit.

"All Analytic has a single root in Frege", you say (though I find little nowadays in Putnam about Frege). You seem to imply then that any group of philosophers must have a single root? As the article sugggests, Continental has many roots in Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche (Husserl too). But nor is Frege himself rootless. Nor are Russell and Moore only influenced by Frege (eg, Hume, Leibniz, Kant, McTaggart)

Again I point out that just because a philosophy does not identify itself with a certain name (as some Analytic Philosophers do) that it cannot be described and named. Examples, Aristotle as Greek Philosophy, Marx as Hegelian, medievals etc. Though if a certain philosopher attempts to reject a certain label I think this aught be taken into consideration. However, the use of the name Continental is self-ascribed by the minority of philosophers at US and British universities who study it. The fact that Continentals don't always refer to themselves as that, you suggest might mean that they are not of one grouping. Penguins don't use their name either, we have no difficulty ascribing it to them. If you wish to try and delete the name Continental from our lexicon might I suggest you contact all schools that offer "Continental" programs, all dictionaries that mention it, and encyclopedias. The book reference I included in the article is also ridled with the term "Continental Philosophy" and is written by eleven noted academics on both sides of the divide.

I could also invert you argument about self-ascribing the term Analytic: just because someone declares themselves Analytic does not mean that they are. In addition, the term Analytic itself has also been contended within Analytic philosophy.

In the end to remove the term Continental from wiki you should first try the main entry for that. Again, as noted before, wiki pages on both Analytic and Continental identify themselves in contradistinction to one another. And I agree, rather than Frege, as you suggest, some might argue that the most defining thing about Analytic is that it is not continental.

You refer suspiciously to an "Analytic Agenda". Their agenda being to name a school Continental when in fact there is not such grouping? If they had such an "agenda," what do they achieve by it? You could make a similar argument for uses of the word postmodern or any other new term. Languages change, sometimes a term is introduced as a handy target for abuse, later, the abuse can invert or disappear. However, I'm not even so sure about your contention that the term Continental came along just for that purpose. I think, like many a new word or ceoncept, it filled a vacuum in our lexicon.

As to explaining the schism not here but in both Analytic and Continental articles, I do not agree: 1. For such a schism, a neutral article place is better. 2. Both articles would duplicate alot of information. 3. Neither would seem to be unbiased.

In the end, I dont think you have made clear why an article on the schism plays into one side or the other. Since you do not deny such a schism I dont see how the article might mislead.

Lucas

We have reached an impasse. I offered Dummett, and could offer any number of other authorities, who define the analytic school and identify themselves as members. You can find authorities yourself by doing a simple search and checking some of the online philosophy encyclopaedias. I don't intend to do the chore, as you haven't provided an example of a continental philosopher who describes their own work as "continental". In truth, you know yourself that the analytic school is one school, but that "continental philosophy" is used to gesture at a host of schools, many of which have little in common. That's the difference. If you think you can establish otherwise, go ahead, but with citations please. KD

A fabricated "impasse", does not mean you can ignore the entire argument above. By the way, this is called the "talk page"! Well if you think you can just trot out the same demand each time and ask for citations as though a citation was a coin of the realm, forget it. An entire book, I cited and it is cited in the article, yet is not enough for you, it contains 11 noted scholars on this very issue. The book is called "A House Divided", get the hint! All you give me is a little quote from the internet from someone called Dummett.
As to self-description of a philosopher as analytic or continental that is, as I said above, not relevant. A Penguin does not self-describe itself. Plato never called himself an Ancient philosopher yet he is one. I'm sure, too, many dont describe themselves as "US Philosophers", yet they can be described, without objection, as such.
the little that the host of continental schools have in common, as you say, is this: they are not analytic. They are not anglophone, hence the divide, hence the problem and this article.
--Lucas
I don't think it's really controversial that philosophers working on non-analytic philosophy in English speaking countries refer to their work as "continental philosophy." A quick google turns up The Continental Philosophy Bibliography Project at SUNY Stony Brook, just to give a quick example. The term is an English-language term, to be sure, but this is the English-language Wikipedia, so it seems perfectly acceptable to use a term which is well-understood by English speaking philosophers, whether or not the term (or a cognate) is used by non-English speaking philsophers. I wouldn't particularly expect non-English speaking philosophers to refer to themselves as "continental" very often; but that is because there's little reason for French or German philosophers, say, to take much trouble to differentiate themselves from analytic philosophers. However, one French non-analytic philosopher who is interested in the relationship between non-analytic and analytic philsophy, namely Badiou, does use "continental philosophy" to refer to non-analytic philosophy (in the preface to Being and Event), and refers to non-analytic philosophers as his "continental colleagues." We could, I suppose, just use the term "non-analytic," but that just seems like wilful avoidance of a perfectly well-understood term. VoluntarySlave 07:31, 6 December 2006 (UTC)
Anayltic philosophers in all countries commonly refer to themselves as analytic philosophers. Badiou is a fair and pertinent example of a "continental" philosopher referring to his (and his colleagues') philosophy as such - but even there, it is the context of differentiation from analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophers do not call themselves "analytic" to distinguish themselves from anything: it describes what they do. The term "continental" is parasitic on analytic philosophy and it world view.
Lucas, I don't know if you are playing games, but a citation is not "a coin of the realm" - it is exactly what it says it is, and people use it to show that there is evidence for their assertions. If you don't know who Dummett is, you should recuse yourself from the discussion: and I didn't give you a "quote" from him, but a reference to his authoritative and first-hand account of the analytic movement. KD
All I'm saying is that surely the matter of self-description is the issue not citations. Again a Penguin does not self-describe itself as a Penguin. So, there is no point in presenting citations of philosophers self-describing their branch of philosophy.
Dummett is not of interest to me either. That the term "continental is parasitic" on analytic is also irrelevant, it does not deny the term's existence and common usage. I note here that your overall argument is non-substantial, since you keep reversing your argument. Previously you argued that the title, because of its use of the term Continental, was imbalanced toward Analytic.
Of course Analytic Philosophers also use the term Analytic to distinguish themselves from other kinds of philosophical activities, like Continental methods such as Phenomenology. They originally used this very Kantian word "Analytic" to distinguish themselves from British Idealists and Hegelians. So Analytic itself, to use your words, is "parasitic" upon Idealism.
Lucas
Well, I didn't come here to teach. If you are not interested in Dummett, that's fine, although it makes me wonder why you care about the article. If you think "analytic" derives from Kant's philosophy, you do need to go back and do some reading. My argument is stated clearly enough. Penguins, by the way, can't speak. I'd be interested to hear whether anyone else agrees or disagrees with me.  ::KD
Being involved with this article does not mean I'm interested in all Analytic and all Continental philosophers. Dummett happens to be one who is of little interest to me. I never said Analytic derives its philosophy from Kant I merely said it is a very Kantian word (notice the suffix -ian). He may have been the first to give a full definition of what that word means.
Your argument repeatedly relies only upon the fact that Continentals do not self-describe themselves as that. I gave Penguins just as an example and to make a point but you can apply it to many others. For example, Indians do self-describe themselves as Indian. Ancient Greek philosophers never called themselves that, nor medievals, nor Asians. U.S. people may describe themselves as Americans but others might call them (as in many European languages for example) "United States-ers" and reserve the word American for people from that land mass. Many non-Scottish people call them Scotch, a Scottish person will not say that however.
Lucas

Dummett is not only a leading member of the school, but he recently wrote a book about its origins, and it would be quicker for you to read it than for me to tell you what it says. He is an authority. Kant may have been the first to fully define the term "analytic". He may also have been a circus clown. He was neither. Your examples are irrelevant. What has the incorrect use of the term "Scotch" got to do with it? We are discussing a matter of historical fact, not a grammatical point. As I said before, it would be interesting to hear other views.  ::KD

Dummett, well I must get a copy of his history of the origins of analytic philosophy or whatever it is called, is it any good? At the same time, I usually prefer histories written by people at a slightly further distance from the subject.
About Kant. I said, in passing (and it wasnt part of my argument), that analytic was a very "Kantian" word. You then said that I thought "analytic" derived from Kant. I told you all I meant is that it sounded Kantian. You now say Kant may have been in the circus and what relevance is he. In their first use of this word by the founders of Analytic philosophy, they were making a direct link back to Kant, by-passing Hegel and other 19th Century philosophy. By leaving aside Kant's ideas about analytic's opposite, synthetic, they were also by-passing transcendentalism. What is amazing about Analytic is how fruitful it has been through dumping an amount of the canon.
My examples are an attempt to show you that a word need not be used in a self-descriptive way for it to apply to the person so named. And, because of all the other arguments above on the substantive issue, this is the only one you have left.
Using the word Scotch for a Scottish person is not incorrect, it is fine, so long as you are not in Scotland. My other examples were the terms "Ancient philosophers", medievals and Eastern philosophers, none of whom called or call themselves that. There are endless examples. The term "Continental philosophy", you may not like, but you cannot simply wish it away from our dictionary by fiat. Even Quine failed to get rid of the word analytic.

--Lucas


No matter what country you are in, "Scotch" is the name of a drink.

Yes a whiskey, but also if you say "He is Scotch" then you are talking about a person.

As to the rest, I am happy to stipulate that it is possible correctly to call a group of people by a name they themselves have not adopted. It does not follow that it is always correct to do so. This is why your examples are irrelevant. It is certainly correct to call Plato an "Ancient Greek", though he never called himself that, but it does not follow that it is correct to call him an "Ancient Italian" - another soubriquet he never applied to himself. This is an elementary logical point.

But your argument on self-description was the only one you had left. Now we have to talk about correctness?

Analytic judgments and synthetic judgments are not, in Kant, "opposites". You need to understand the difference between a prior and a posteriori judgments, as well as analytic and synthetic judgments, in order to follow what Kant is saying. Synthetic judgments were not "left aside" by the analyitic school. Synthetic judgments (in Kantian terms) include the whole class of empirical judgments, and the analytic school is strongly empirical throughout.

If you are under the impression that the analytical school has focussed on discussing analytic judgments, to the exclusion of others - even that its name derives from the practice - then you really do need to do some work.

It is fun arguing with you, but I am left with the strong impression that you are unfamiliar with the subject under discussion.

--KD

Yes I feel the same, though you seem to be unfamiliar with argument in general. What has my, perhaps mistaken comments, about Analytic have to do with the issue we've be discussing? This is the third time you ask me to read or do homework etc., you would do better to concentrate on the issue than trying to formulate instructions for me.

On the main issue see my remarks above at the margin under your comments.

On this side issue of, "what is the difference between Analytic and analytic?" :

Yes Analytic has a resonance with Kant's idea of analytic and, no, it is not terribly empirical (just look at Russell's work in Logic and Math). It, Analytic, may try to ground empirical science but it itself need not be empiricist. If logic and empiric were two extremes which would Analytic be closest to?

You contradict me and say, synthetic is not the opposite of analytic? What then is, for Kant (or youreself), the opposite of analytic (small 'a')? For me, analytic stays within the concept, synthetic reaches to another, that seems pretty opposite to me.

As to Analytic philosophy moving away from the synthetic, what might be more correct would to say is, it de-empahsised dialectic method. But an emphasis on analytic entails a de-emphasis of its opposite, synthesis. However, Analytic philosophy is much more than its name might suggest and within it we also get synthetic, dialectic, metaphysics, and even forms of transcendentalism.

--Lucas

It can't be impossible to get this across. One more try. The analytic school is made up of philosophers who call themselves analytic philosophers and acknowledge that they are members of an analytic school. The term "continental philosophy" is a real and useful term, but does not designate a single school of philosophers. This is confirmed by the fact (and please provide evidence if you deny it) that continental philosophers do not (or very rarely) identify themselves as such. It does not follow, as you seem to think, that because the Ancient Greeks failed to identify themselves as Ancient Greeks, this proves that continental philosophers really are contintental philosophers. That's just a terrible muddle. The question is whether it is correct to identify a continental school on the same terms as an analytic school. In fact, of course, it is analytic philosophers who use the term "continental" to gesture at all the different kinds of schools out there which don't practice analytic philosophy.

Russell was an empiricist. I am unable to think of a major analytic philosopher who was not an empiricist. The Vienna Circle are renowned for their advocacy of empiricism. You are confusing two completely separate uses of the word "analytic". "Analytic" truths, if there are such things, are true by virtue of the definitions of their terms. In alanytic philosophy, however, the term "analytic" refers to the method - attempting to solve philosophical problems through analysis of propositions (or the thoughts expressed by propositions): INCLUDING empirical propositions.

Here ends today's lesson.

Just to be clear, in case anyone else is bothering to read this: my proposal is that a reference to the so-called "schism" be briefly mentioned in the respective articles on analytic and continental philosophy - it does not need its own article (and if it does, it needs an accurate one). KD

Mostly agree with KD, and would like to add that post Quine, I'd be hard pressed to think of a prominent analytic philosopher who defends the analytic/synthetic distinction. It's been added to the roster of meaningless words. Analytics share an empiricism in the sense that it is taken for granted in analytic philosophy (and is not in other kinds) that the only valid truth procedures are empirical observation and its extension via logic into proven fact. It is inconceivable that an analytic philosopher would be radically anti-empiricist, because at that point the very tools they use would become worthless. While not all or even many analytic philosophers are positivist in this day and age, all analytic philosophers are empiricists, and they would be the first to tell you. Jimmyq2305 18:52, 13 December 2006 (UTC)

Mostly agree with Jimmyq. Post Quine, the word analytic changed its meaning, if not that it was even obliterated from our vocabulary. However, Quine is not the last word. Empiric observation is for the most part just based on our existing common sense of what things are, and, what things should be observed. Philosophy might try to see beyond this inherited common sense, or, like everything else, absorb it. By the way, one of Russell's major projects was trying to find a logical foundation for mathematics, if one wanted to find something less empirical, it would be hard to find it. To quote KD, "Here ends the lesson", and I add, "but he is no teacher."

Continental is not just a word for everything else, but it is that and a good one too. The Schism is what talks about the huge change that occurred in the geography of philosophy in the 20th century. Neither Analytic nor Continental can cover this, they have their prejudices and are welcome to them. A separate and full article is needed. In all this discussion I've traced the argument: it started with denying that Continental philosophy existed. Then to saying that because Continentals do not call themselves Continental, that they are not Continental. It then side tracked to what Analytic and analytic meant, then to a denial that synthetic had anything to do with it. We are not going to answer these kinds of questions here. Finally the shifting argument moves from self-description as the acid test of a term, to correctness and schools, to quote KD again: The term "continental philosophy" is a real and useful term, but does not designate a single school of philosophers. " I agree. School's of philosophy are gone with the medievals, and good riddens to them. The term Continental is a grouping term and includes phenomenology, existentialism, critical philosophy, etc. Analytic also groups many divergent and styles: behaviourist (Ryle), historicist (Kuhn), Idealist (Quine), pragmatist (...) styles of philosophy.

No one ever said Continetal was one particular school, what we try to explain is what Rorty calls the "take-over" of UK an U.S. (not French, German, Italian, Spanish), philosophy departments, by Analytic philosophy And I also agree, Analytic refers to the method and includes empirical propositions. It does not, however, refer much to the synthetic method.

--Lucas

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