Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays

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Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] Al Tay's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 162. The Department of Defense reports that Al Tays was born on June 1, 1977, in Sada, Yemen.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home.  The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair.  The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair.  A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely.  In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press.  Three chairs were reserved for them.  In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held.  And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret.  In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.
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Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[2]

[edit] allegations

The allegations against Al Tays were:

a The detainee is a member of al Qaida:
  1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to receive weapons training for a tribal war in Yemen in 2001.
  2. While awaiting transportation from Kandahar to Al Farouq, the detainee stayed at Al Nabrass, an al Qaida safehouse.
  3. The Al Nabrass safehouse was frequented by Usama Bin Laden.
  4. The detainee attended the Al Farouq training camp in 2001.
  5. At the Al Farouq training camp, the detainee received training on the AK-47 rifle.
  6. The detainee fled the Al Farouq training camp to the Tora Bora Mountains in September 2001.
  7. Pakistan Authorities held the detainee at the Pakistani/Afghan border, when attempting to flee the Tora Bora region in October 2001.

[edit] testimony

The Tribunal President explained the Tribunal process to Al Tays.[3] He then asked him if he had any questions. Al Tays asked where they got the information on which they based the allegations, which, he said, were "all lies". The Tribunal President then asked Al Tays if he wanted to make a statement. Al Tays replied that they had all the statements. The President seemed to conclude that Al Tays had not understood the process after all. Both the President, and the Personal Representative tried to explain that the Tribunal had not seen any of the evidence yet, and this was Al Tays's opportunity to explain himself.

When the first allegation was repeated, saying he had traveled to Afghanistan for training, so he could fight in a tribal war in Yemen, he expressed confusion, asserting that it was not the concern of the United States, since he was not an enemy of the United States.[4]

After the Tribunal President explained that, in and of itself it did not indicate he was an "enemy combatant", when considered with the other allegations, it might.[5] Al Tays then acknowledged that the first allegation was correct.

One of the Tribunal members asked the President if he could try and explain the Tribunal process to Al Tays.

Al Tays acknowledged staying at Al Nabrass while awaiting transportation from Kandahar to Al Farouq.[6]

Al Tays expressed confusion over the third allegation, that the place where he stayed had been frequented by Osama bin Laden. The Tribunal moved on to the next allegation without getting an answer to the third allegatioo.

Al Tays acknowledged both attending the Al Farouq training camp, and receiving AK47 training there.

Al Tays denied fleeing Al Farouq for Tora Bora in September 2001.[7] He denied that he had been held at the border by Pakistani authorities in October 2001.

When the allegations were exhausted the Tribunal Recorder asked Al Tays when he left Al Farouq, and under what circumstances.

Al Tays answered: "The took us from there and I didn't know where we were going. They took me to another place to finish my training."

The Tribunal members then started asking their questions:

  • He went to Afghanistan for Weapons training because he could get training there immediately, whereas he would have to wait years for training in Yemen.
  • He said he had never heard of Al Qaeda until he arrived in Cuba.
  • He said he had heard of the Taliban.
  • When asked if he had known that the Taliban controlled Afghanistan he said he had known that they controlled a part and that Al Masood had controlled a part, but he had not realized that they were at war.
  • He said he hadn’t been captured, that he had voluntarily turned himself in to Pakistani authorities. He said he thought they would help him contact the Yemeni embassy.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Al Tays were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.[8]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee admitted he voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan to receive weapons training for use in a tribal war in Yemen in 2001.
  2. The detainee stated during previous interviews that he had gone to Afghanistan to fight jihad.
b. Connections and Associations
  1. The detainee stayed at Al Nabrass, and al Qaida safehouse known to be frequented by Usama Bin Laden, while awaiting transportation from Kandahar, Afghanistan to al Farouq training camp.
  2. The detainee admitted he relinquished his passport when he arrived at the house (Al Nabrass) in Kandahar, Afghanisan. He stated "when you arrive you are suppose [sic] to hand it over to someone."
  3. The detainee trained at al Farouq, a known al Qaida training facility near Kandahar, AF.
c. Intent
  1. The detainee stated he received training on the AK-47 at al Farouq.
  2. Al Farouq offered basic training; anti-aircraft and mountain combat tactics courses.
  3. The detainee stated he went to the Tora Bora region with others and witnessed the bombing in that area.
d. Other Relevant Data
  • The detainnee was combative, angry and defiant during the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). The Tribunal panel found him to be evasive in his statements.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

  • The detainee stated in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal "My leaving Yemen and going to Afghanistan has nothing to do with Al Qaida or fighting"[sic]
  • The detainee stated at the end of an interview "If I were al Qaida would I have helped protect British and American people.[sic] Would I have helped escort Canadian and foreign delegations when they came to visit my tribe?"

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Summary of Evidence (.pdf) from page 19 of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  3. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from page 11 of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  4. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from page 12 of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  5. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from page 13 of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  6. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from page 14 of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  7. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from page 15 of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  8. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Ali Husayn Abdullah Al Tays Administrative Review Board - page 95