Abdul Qadeer Khan

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Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (Urdu: عبدالقدیر خان )(b. 1935) is a Pakistani Scientist and Metallurgical Engineer widely regarded as the founder of Pakistan's nuclear programme and also credited as the father of the Pakistani nuclear black market. (His middle name is also, occasionally, rendered as Quadeer, Qadir or Gadeer and his given names are often abbreviated to A.Q.). In January 2004, he confessed to having been involved in a clandestine international network of nuclear weapons technology proliferation from Pakistan to Libya, Iran and North Korea. On February 5, 2004, the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, announced that he had pardoned Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. Despite this political scandal he is still regarded as the Hero of the Nation by virtually all Pakistanis.

In a August 23, 2005 interview with Kyodo News General Pervez Musharraf confirmed that Dr. A.Q. Khan had supplied gas centrifuges and gas centrifuge parts to North Korea and, possibly, an amount of uranium hexafluoride gas.[1]

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[edit] Early career

Abdul Qadeer Khan was born in 1935 into a middle-class Pathan Muslim family in Bhopal, India, which migrated to Pakistan in 1952. He qualified as an engineer at the University of Karachi, Pakistan, and after graduation went to West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium for further studies, earning a Ph.D. from the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium in 1972.

That same year, he joined the staff of the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, or FDO, in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. FDO was a subcontractor for URENCO, the uranium enrichment facility at Almelo in the Netherlands, which had been established in 1970 by the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Netherlands to assure a supply of enriched uranium for European nuclear reactors. The URENCO facility used Zippe-type centrifuge technology to separate the fissionable isotope uranium-235 out of uranium hexafluoride gas by spinning a mixture of the two isotopes at up to 100,000 revolutions a minute. The technical details of the centrifuge systems are regulated as secret information by export controls because they could be used for the purposes of nuclear proliferation.

In May 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb (Smiling Buddha) to the great alarm of the government of Pakistan. Around this time, Dr. A.Q. Khan had privileged access to the most secret areas of the URENCO facility as well as to documentation on the gas centrifuge technology. A subsequent investigation by the Dutch authorities found that he had passed highly classified material to a network of Pakistani intelligence agents; however, they found no evidence that he was sent to the Netherlands as a spy nor were they able to determine whether he approached his government about espionage first or whether they had approached him. He left the Netherlands suddenly in January 1976 and was put in charge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme with the support of the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The former Dutch Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, revealed in early August 2005 that the Netherlands knew of Dr. A.Q. Khan stealing nuclear secrets but let him go on two occasions after the CIA expressed their wish to continue monitoring his movements.[2]

[edit] Development of nuclear weapons

Dr. A.Q. Khan established the Engineering Research Laboratories at Kahuta, Rawalpindi, in Pakistan in July 1976, subsequently renamed the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) by then-ruler General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, which became the focal point for developing a uranium enrichment capability for Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme. KRL also took on many other weapons development projects, including the development of the nuclear weapons-capable Ghauri ballistic missile. KRL occupied a unique role in Pakistani industry, reporting directly to the Pakistani Prime Minister's office, and having extremely close relations with the Pakistani military. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto has said that during her term of office, even she was not allowed to visit the facility.

Pakistan, very rapidly, established its own uranium enrichment capability and was reportedly able to produce highly enriched uranium by 1986.[3] This progress was so rapid that international suspicion was raised as to whether there was outside assistance to this programme. It was reported that Chinese technicians had been at the facility in the early 1980s, but suspicions soon fell on Dr. A.Q. Khan's activities at URENCO. In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by an Amsterdam court for attempted espionage; the sentence was later overturned on appeal on a legal technicality. Dr. A.Q. Khan rejected any suggestion that Pakistan had illicitly acquired nuclear expertise: "All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle," he told a group of Pakistani librarians in 1990. "We did not receive any technical know-how from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection."[citation needed]

In 1987, a British newspaper reported that Dr. A.Q. Khan had openly confirmed Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. This article quoted him as confirming that the U.S. intelligence report "about our possessing the [nuclear] bomb is correct and so is speculation of some foreign newspapers" and criticised Pakistan's detractors, who had "told the U.S. that Pakistan could never produce the [nuclear] bomb and they now know we have done it."[citation needed] Dr. A.Q. Khan's statement was, subsequently, disavowed by the Government of Pakistan and Dr. A.Q. Khan, himself, initially, denied giving it, although, he, later, retracted his denial. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported in October 1991 that Dr. A.Q. Khan repeated his claim at a dinner meeting of businessmen and industrialists in Karachi, which "sent a wave of jubilation" through the audience.[citation needed]

During the 1980s and 1990s, Western governments became increasingly convinced that covert nuclear and ballistic missile collaboration was taking place between China, Pakistan, and North Korea. According to the Washington Post, "U.S. intelligence operatives secretly rifled Dr. A.Q. [Khan's] luggage ... during an overseas trip in the early 1980s to find the first concrete evidence of Chinese collaboration with Pakistan's [nuclear] bomb effort: a drawing of a crude, but highly reliable, Hiroshima-sized [nuclear] weapon that must have come directly from Beijing, according to U.S. officials." The activities of the Khan Research Laboratories led to the United States terminating economic and military aid to Pakistan in October 1990; following this, the Pakistani government agreed to a freeze in its nuclear weapons development programme. According to the Federation of American Scientists, this came into force in 1991. However, Dr. A.Q. Khan, later, claimed in a July 1996 interview with the weekly Friday Times that "at no stage was the programme [of producing nuclear weapons-grade enriched uranium] ever stopped".[4]

The American clampdown may have prompted an increasing reliance on Chinese and North Korean nuclear and missile expertise. In 1995, the U.S. learned that the Khan Research Laboratories had bought 5,000 specialized magnets from a Chinese government-owned company, for use in the Uranium enrichment equipment. More worryingly, it was reported that Pakistani nuclear weapons technology was being exported to other states aspirant of nuclear weapons, notably, North Korea. In May 1998, Newsweek magazine published an article alleging that Dr. A.Q. Khan had offered to sell nuclear know-how to Iraq, an allegation that he denied. United Nations arms inspectors apparently discovered documents discussing Khan's purported offer in Iraq, which Iraqi officials claimed were legitimate but that they had not agreed to work with Khan, fearing it was a sting operation.[3] A few weeks later, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests (Pokhran-II and Chagai-I, respectively) that, finally, confirmed both countries' development of nuclear weapons. The event was greeted with jubilation in both countries and Dr. A.Q. Khan was feted as a national hero. The President of Pakistan, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, awarded a gold medal to him for his role in masterminding the Pakistani nuclear weapons development programme. The United States immediately imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan and publicly blamed China for assisting the Pakistanis.

[edit] Investigations into nuclear proliferation

Dr. A.Q. Khan's open promotion of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities became something of an embarrassment to Pakistan's government. The United States government became increasingly convinced that Pakistan was trading nuclear weapons technology to North Korea in exchange for ballistic missile technology. In the face of strong U.S. criticism, the Pakistani government announced in March 2001 that Dr. A.Q. Khan was to be dismissed from his post as Chairman, KRL, a move that drew strong criticism from the religious and nationalist opposition to the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf. Perhaps in response to this, the Pakistani government instead appointed Dr. A.Q. Khan to the post of Special Science and Technology Adviser to the President of Pakistan with a ministerial rank. While this could be regarded as a promotion for Dr. A.Q. Khan, it removed him from hands-on management of KRL and gave the government an opportunity to keep a closer eye on his activities.

Dr. A.Q. Khan came under renewed scrutiny following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. and the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan to oust the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It emerged that al-Qaeda had made repeated efforts to obtain nuclear weapons materials to build either a radiological bomb or a crude nuclear bomb. In late October 2001, the Pakistani government arrested three Pakistani nuclear scientists, all with close ties to Dr. A.Q. Khan, for their suspected connections with the Taliban.

The Bush administration continued to investigate Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation, ratcheting up the pressure on the Pakistani government in 2001 and 2002 and focusing on Dr. A.Q. Khan's personal role. In 2002, the Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistani Government officials" as conceding that Dr. A.Q. Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S. government's suspicions of his involvement in nuclear weapons technology transfers with North Korea. It was alleged in December 2002 that U.S. intelligence officials had found evidence that an unidentified agent, supposedly acting on Dr. A.Q. Khan's behalf, had offered nuclear weapons expertise to Iraq in mid-1990, though Dr. A.Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation and the Pakistani Government declared the evidence as "fraudulent". The United States responded by imposing sanctions on KRL, citing concerns about ballistic missile technology transfers.

Virtually all of Khan's overseas travels, to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Niger, Mali, and the Middle East, were on official Pakistan government aircraft which he commandeered at will, given the status he enjoyed in Pakistan. Often, he was accompanied by senior members of the Pakistan nuclear establishment. In all likelihood, many if not most of Khan's overseas trips were combining proliferation with personal business. His extensive and well documented travels in PAF aircraft cast grave doubts on the credibility of the Pakistan government's continued denials of complicity.

After being accused of dealing in nuclear technology, Khan lashed out at his critics; his letter to the editor in response to a negative article (written by a Hindu author) in the British Observer includes

"The article on Pakistan … was so vulgar and low that I considered it an insult to reflect on it. It was in short words a bull-shit, full of lies, insinuations and cheap journalism for money and cheap publicity. Shyam Bhatia, a Hindu bastard, could not write anything objective about Pakistan ... insinuated as if Holland is an atomic bomb manufacturing factory where, instead of cheese balls, you could pick up 'triggering mechanisms.' Have you for a moment thought of the meaning of this word? Of course not because you could not differentiate between the mouth and the back hole of a donkey." Source

[edit] Revelations from Iran and Libya

In 2003, Libya gave up nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges that were acquired from Pakistan's AQ Khan nuclear "black market".
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In 2003, Libya gave up nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges that were acquired from Pakistan's AQ Khan nuclear "black market".

In August 2003, reports emerged of dealings with Iran; it was claimed that Dr. A.Q. Khan had offered to sell nuclear weapons technology as long ago as 1989. The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the United States and the European Union to make a full disclosure of its nuclear programme and, finally, agreed in October 2003 to accept tougher investigations from the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA reported that Iran had established a large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the "stolen" URENCO designs, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1987." The intermediary was not named but many diplomats and analysts pointed to Pakistan and, specifically, to Dr. A.Q. Khan, who was said to have visited Iran in 1986. The Iranians turned over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's, the model developed by Dr. A.Q. Khan in the early 1980s. Two senior staff members at the Khan Research Laboratories were subsequently arrested in December 2003 on suspicion of having sold nuclear weapons technology to the Iranians.

That same month, on December 19, Libya made a surprise announcement that it had weapons of mass destruction programmes which it would now abandon. The Libyan government officials were quoted as saying that Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistani nuclear scientists. In particular, the U.S. officials who visited the Libyan uranium enrichment plants shortly afterwards reported that the gas centrifuges used there were very similar to the Iranian ones.

[edit] Khan's dismissal, confession, and pardon

The Pakistani government's blanket denials became untenable as evidence mounted of illicit nuclear weapons technology transfers. It opened an investigation into Dr. A.Q. Khan's activities, arguing that even if there had been wrongdoing, it had occurred without the Government of Pakistan's knowledge or approval. Although he was not arrested, Dr. A.Q. Khan was summoned for "debriefing". On January 25, 2004, the investigators reported that Dr. A.Q. Khan and Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at KRL, had provided unauthorised technical assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s and early 1990s, allegedly in exchange for tens of millions of dollars. General Mirza Aslam Beg, a former Chief of Army Staff at the time, was also said to have been implicated; the Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. government officials as saying that Dr. A.Q. Khan had told the investigators that the nuclear weapons technology transfers to Iran had been authorised by General Mirza Aslam Beg.[citation needed] On January 31, Dr. A.Q. Khan was dismissed from his post as the Science Adviser to the President of Pakistan, ostensibly to "allow a fair investigation" of the nuclear weapons technology proliferation scandal.

On February 4, 2004, Khan appeared on Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) and confessed to running an international ring for nuclear proliferation. He was pardoned the next day by Pakistani President Musharraf, but has since then remained under house arrest.
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On February 4, 2004, Khan appeared on Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) and confessed to running an international ring for nuclear proliferation. He was pardoned the next day by Pakistani President Musharraf, but has since then remained under house arrest.

In early February 2004, the Government of Pakistan reported that Khan had signed a confession indicating that he had provided Iran, Libya, and North Korea with designs and technology to aid in nuclear weapons programs, and claimed that the government had not been complicit in the proliferation activities. The Pakistani official who made the announcement said that Khan had admitted to transferring technology and information to Iran between 1989 and 1991, to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997 (U.S. officials at the time maintained that transfers had continued with Libya until 2003), and additional technology to North Korea up until 2000.[5] On February 4, 2004, Khan appeared on national television and confessed to running a proliferation ring; he was pardoned the next day by Musharraf, the Pakistani president, but held under house arrest.[6]

The full scope of the Khan network is not fully known. Centrifuge components were apparently manufactured in Malaysia with the aid of South Asian and German middlemen, and used a Dubai computer company as a false front. According to Western sources, Khan had three motivations for his proliferation: 1. a defiance of Western nations and an eagerness to pierce the "clouds of so-called secrecy," 2. an eagerness to give nuclear technology to Muslim nations, and 3. money, acquiring wealth and real estate in his dealings. Much of the technology he sold was second-hand from Pakistan's own nuclear program and involved many of the same logistical connections which he had used to develop the Pakistani bomb.[7] In Malaysia, Khan was helped by Sri Lanka-born Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir, who shuttled between Kuala Lumpur and Dubai to arrange for the manufacture of centrifuge components.[6] The Khan investigation also revealed how many European companies were defying export restrictions and aiding the Khan network as well as the production of the Pakistani bomb. Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976, and a German company exported facilities for the production of tritium to the country.[8]

Neither Khan nor any of his alleged Pakistani collaborators have yet to face any charges in Pakistan, where he remains an extremely popular figure. Though he remains gagged and under house arrest, he is still seen as an outspoken nationalist for his belief that the West is inherently hostile to Islam. In Pakistan's strongly anti-U.S. climate, tough action against him poses political risks for General Pervez Musharraf who already faces accusations of being too pro-U.S. from key leaders in his Army. An additional complicating factor is that few believe that Dr. A.Q. Khan acted alone and the affair risks gravely damaging the Pakistani Army, which oversaw and controlled the nuclear weapons development programme and of which General Pervez Musharraf is still the Commander-in-Chief.[9] The same investigation also exposed South African businessman Asher Karni as having sold nuclear devices to Dr. A.Q. Khan's associates. Karni is currently awaiting trial in a U.S. prison. Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir was arrested in Malaysia in May 2004 under a Malaysian law allowing for the detention of individuals posing a security threat.[6]

It is speculated that the reason Dr. A.Q. Khan was pardoned (and not executed as was the case with a previous Pakistani political leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) was because he had information hidden overseas with people he could trust that would undermine or severely embarrass the current Pakistani leadership (see material below regarding his daughters).[citation needed]

[edit] U.S. reaction to the pardon

The cover of U.S.-based Time magazine from February 2005 branding him the "Merchant of Menace" is reflective of many mainstream U.S. attitudes towards Khan.
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The cover of U.S.-based Time magazine from February 2005 branding him the "Merchant of Menace" is reflective of many mainstream U.S. attitudes towards Khan.

The United States government had no choice but to leave the fate of Dr. A.Q. Khan in the hands of General Musharraf, imposing no penalties on the Pakistani government or on individuals. U.S. government officials explained that in the War on Terrorism, it was not their goal to denounce or imprison people but "to get results." The White House chose not to impose sanctions on Pakistan or to demand an independent investigation of the Pakistani Military as US troops were still waging a war in Afghanisthan and support from Pakistan in the form of usaage of military bases would almost disappear. "It's just another case where you catch more flies with honey than with vinegar," a U.S. government official explained.[citation needed]

However, in a speech to the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush proposed to reform the International Atomic Energy Agency: "No state, under investigation for proliferation violations, should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors—or on the new special committee. And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules."[10] The Bush proposal was seen as targeted against Pakistan which, currently, serves a regular term on the IAEA's Board of Governors. It has not received attention from other governments.

The U.S. has also refrained from applying further direct pressure on Pakistan for disclosure about Khan's activities largely due to a strategic calculation that such pressure may topple President Musharraf.

[edit] Renewed calls for IAEA access to Khan

Since 2005, and particularly in 2006, there have been renewed calls by IAEA officials, senior U.S. congressmen, EC politicians, and others to make Dr. A.Q. Khan available for interrogation by IAEA investigators, given lingering skepticism about the "fullness" of the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding Dr. Khan's activities. While the calls have been made by elected U.S. lawmakers rather than by the State Department, they may be interpreted as enjoying the tacit support of the White House; the calls are also interpreted as signalling growing discontent within the U.S. establishment with the current Pakistani regime headed by President Musharraf.

The U.S House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation held a hearing on May 25, 2006, titled, “The A.Q. Khan Network: Case Closed?” Recommendations posed by legislators and experts at this hearing included demanding that Pakistan turn over Khan to the U.S. for questioning as well as that Pakistan make further efforts to curb future nuclear proliferation.

On June 2, 2006, the Pakistani Senate, in a defensive response to the U.S House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation hearing, issued a unanimous resolution criticizing the committee, stating that it will not turn over Khan to U.S. authorities and defending its sovereignty and nuclear program.

In September 2005, Musharraf revealed that after two years of questioning Khan—which the Pakistani government insisted it do itself without outside intervention—that they had confirmed that Khan had supplied centrifuge parts to North Korea. Still undetermined was whether or not Khan passed a bomb design to North Korea or Iran that had been discovered in Libya.[11]

It has been speculated that Dr. Khan's two daughters, who live in the UK and are UK subjects (thanks to their part-British, part-South African mother Henny), are in possession of extensive documentation linking the government of Pakistan to Dr. Khan's activities; such documentation is presumably intended to ensure that no further action is taken against Dr. Khan.[12]

On August 22, 2006, the Pakistani government announced that Khan had been diagnosed with prostate cancer and was undergoing treatment. On September 9, 2006, Dr. A Q Khan was operated at Agha Khan hospital Karachi and according to doctors the operation was successful, but on October 30 of that year it was revealed that his condition had deteriorated and he was suffering from deep vein thrombosis. [2]

[edit] Involvement of the Government of Pakistan

In December 2006, the Swedish Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (SWMDC) headed by Hans Blix, a former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC); said in a report that Pakistan’s controversial nuclear proliferator A Q Khan could not have acted alone, “without the awareness of the Pakistani government”. [13]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ "Dr AQ Khan provided centrifuges to N. Korea", Dawn (25 August 2005), available online at http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/25/top3.htm.
  2. ^ "CIA asked us to let nuclear spy go, Ruud Lubbers claims", Expactica (9 August 2005), available online at http://www.expatica.com/source/site_article.asp?subchannel_id=1&story_id=22629.
  3. ^ a b
  4. ^ See http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/kahuta.htm.
  5. ^ David Rohde and David Sanger, "Key Pakistani is Said to Admit Atom Transfers", New York Times (2 February 2004): A1.
  6. ^ a b c Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the Bomb; How Pakistan's A.Q. Khan outwitted Western intelligence to build a global nuclear-smuggling ring that made the world a more dangerous place", Time Magazine (14 February 2005): 22.
  7. ^ William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network", New York Times (12 February 2004): A1.
  8. ^ Craig S. Smith, "Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe", New York Times (19 February 2004): A3.
  9. ^ Ron Moreau and Zahid Hussain, "Chain of Command; The Military: Musharraf dodged a bullet, but could be heading for a showdown with his Army", Newsweek (16 February 2004): 20.
  10. ^ The transcript of the speech is available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.
  11. ^ David E. Sanger, "Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear Exports," New York Times (13 September 2005): A10.
  12. ^ See, for example, http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/feb/16pak1.htm.
  13. ^ "A Q Khan did not act alone" says Hans Blix team[1]

[edit] See also

[edit] References and Links

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