Abdul Haris Nasution
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Abdul Haris Nasution (born Kotanopan, North Sumatra 3 December 1918 - died Jakarta 5 September 2000) was an Indonesian general who escaped an assassination attempt during the military coup in 1965.
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[edit] Early life
Nasution was born in Sumatra on 3rd December 1918. His father was a farmer but was also active in Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), a pro-Independence movement. Nasution recalled that as a child, he quickly developed a hobby in reading [1].
After completing his education in 1935, Nasution had originally chosen a teaching career. He graduated from teaching school in 1938 and had stints as a teacher in Bengkulu and Palembang. In 1942, he became interested in a military career and joined a military academy which was run by the Dutch colonial government in Bandung, West Java. His time did not last long as the Japanese took over and occupied Indonesia. Under Japanese occupation, Nasution continued to stay in Bandung and served as a civil servant.
[edit] The Indonesian National Revolution
[edit] Regional Commander of the Siliwangi Division
After Sukarno declared Indonesia's independence on 17th August 1945, Nasution joined the fledgling Indonesian Army which was then known as the People's Security Army (TKR) and was appointed Regional Commander of the Siliwangi Division, which looked after the security of West Java in May 1946.
In this position, Nasution developed the theory of territorial warfare which would become the defense doctrine of the Indonesian Army in the future [2].
In January 1948, the Indonesian Government and the Dutch Government signed the Renville Agreement. During this agreement, the Indonesian Government would recognize the territories which the Dutch Army had attacked as belonging to the Dutch. Because the territories included West Java, Nasution was forced to lead the Siliwangi Division across to Central Java.
[edit] Deputy Commander to General Sudirman
1948 would also see Nasution rise to the position of Deputy TKR Commander. Despite being only a Colonel this appointment made Nasution the most powerful person in TKR, second only to the popular General Sudirman. Nasution immediately went to work in his new role. In April, he assisted Sudirman in reorganizing the structure of the troops. In June, at a Commanders' meeting, his suggestion that TKR should fight guerilla warfare against the Dutch was approved.
Although not the Commander of TKR, Nasution gained experience on what it was like to become a Commander of an Armed Forces in September 1948 with the Madiun incident. During the course of the year, former Prime Minister Amir Syarifuddin had aligned himself with Musso of the Indonesian Communist Party. When they forcibly took over the city of Madiun in East Java, everyone knew that the matters could only be settled violently.
When the news reached the TKR Headquarters in Yogyakarta, a meeting was held between the top brass. Sudirman was anxious to avoid violence and wanted negotiations to be conducted. Sudirman then commissioned Lieutenant Colonel Suharto, to negotiate a deal with the communists. After taking his trip, Suharto returned to Nasution and Sudirman and reported that everything seemed to be peaceful. Nasution did not trust this report and with Sudirman down with illness, Nasution was left in charge [3]. Nasution then decided on a crackdown, sending troops to go after the Communists to put them down and end the rebellion.
On 19th December 1948, the Dutch launched a successful attack on Yogyakarta and occupied it. Nasution, together with TKR and the other Commanders, retreated into the countryside to fight a guerilla warfare. With President Sukarno and Vice President Mohammad Hatta caught by the Dutch, the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) was set up in Sumatra. In this interim Government, Nasution was given the position of the Army and Territorial Commander of Java.
Although all seemed lost in 1948, the tide would turn in Indonesia's favor in 1949. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX's 1st March General Offensive inspired soldiers all over Indonesia to continue the resistance and influenced the United Nations to pressure the Dutch to recognize Indonesian Independence. The Dutch finally stopped fighting in July and by December, recognized Indonesia's independence. As the PDRI returned its powers to Sukarno and Hatta, Nasution returned to his position as Deputy Commander to Sudirman.
[edit] Parliamentary Democracy Era
[edit] 1st Stint as Army Chief of Staff and the 17th October Incident
In 1950, Nasution took on his position as Army Chief of Staff, with TB Simatupang replacing Sudirman as the Commander of the newly dubbed ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia).
In 1952, Nasution and Simatupang decided to adopt a policy of restructuring and reorganization for ABRI. Under this arrangement, Nasution and Simatupang hoped to create a smaller Army but one that was expected to be more modern and professional[4] . It did not take long however, before factional interests comes into play. Nasution and Simatupang, who have both been trained by the Dutch Colonial Government wanted to sack the soldiers trained by the Japanese and integrate more soldiers trained by the Dutch Colonial Government. The Japanese-trained troops, led by Bambang Supeno, began speaking against this policy.
In adopting their policy, Nasution and Simatupang had the backing of Prime Minister Wilopo and Defense Minister Hamengkubuwono IX. However, Supeno managed to find support from among the opposition parties in the People's Representative Council (DPR). The DPR members then began making their disagreements on the restructuring of ABRI known. Nasution and Simatupang were not happy to see what they perceived to be interference of military affairs by civilians.
On 17th October 1952, Nasution and Simatupang mobilized their troops in a show of force. Protesting against civilian interference in military business, Nasution and Simatupang had their troops surround the Presidential Palace and point the tank turrets in the direction of the said building. Their demand to Sukarno was that the current DPR be dismissed. For this cause, Nasution and Simatupang also mobilized civilian protesters. Sukarno came out of the Presidential Palace and using nothing but his famed oratory skills, convinced both soldiers and civilians alike to go home. Nasution and Simatupang had been defeated.
Nasution and Simatupang was then put under interrogation by Attorney General Suprapto. In December 1952, they both lost their position in ABRI and was discharged from service.
[edit] Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare
During the time in which he was not the Army Chief of Staff, Nasution wrote a book called the Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare. This book was based on Nasution's own experience fighting and organizing guerilla warfare during the Indonesian National Revolution. Originally released in 1953, it would become one of the most studied books on guerilla warfare along with Mao Zedong's works on the same subject matter.
[edit] 2nd Stint as Army Chief of Staff and Increasing The Army's Power
On 27th October 1955 and after three years of exile, Nasution was re-appointed to his old position as Army Chief of Staff.
Nasution immediately began working on the Army and its structure by adopting a threefold approach [5]. His first approach was to formulate a tour of duty system so that officers can be stationed and gain experience all around the country. This approach would also result in Army Officers being more professional instead of feeling personal attachment and loyalty to the Province and/or region which he came from. Nasution's second approach was to centralize military training. All methods of training troops would now be uniform instead of Regional Commanders setting up his own method of training troops. Nasution's third and most important approach was to increase the Army's influence and power so that it can be able to take care of itself instead of relying on civilian decisions. Nasution did not have a problem applying the first two approaches but would have to wait to apply the third approach.
By 1957, President Sukarno had begun to introduce the concept of Guided Democracy to his rhetoric is response to his disenchantment with the Parliamentary Democracy approach which Indonesia had adopted since November 1945. In this, he found a common bond with Nasution and the Army, who had not forgotten the way in which civilians interfered with Army affairs in 1952. On 14th March 1957, after receiving the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Sastroadmijojo and his Cabinet, Sukarno declared a State of Emergency.
This move not only added to Sukarno's up until then ceremonial Presidential role but also increased the Army's influence and power as Nasution had wished for. Under this arrangement, Regional Commanders were able to interfere with civilian matters such as the economy and administrative matters [6]. With the behest of Sukarno himself, the Army also began participating in politics, filling in positions which ranged from Cabinet Ministers to Provincial Governors and even DPR members. In December 1957, Nasution further increased the Army's role by ordering officers to take over the recently nationalized Dutch Company. Aside from increasing the Army's role, this move was also designed to stop the influence of the increasingly powerful PKI.
In 1958, Nasution made a famous speech that would become the basis for the Dwifungsi Doctrine which the Suharto regime ABRI would adopt. Speaking at Magelang in Central Java, Nasution declared that ABRI should adopt a Middle Way in its approach to the Nation. According to Nasution, ABRI should not be under the control of civilians. At the same time, ABRI should not dominate the nation in such a way that it becomes a military dictatorship [7].
[edit] The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) Rebellion
In late 1956, there were demands by Regional Commanders in Sumatra for more autonomy in the Provinces. When these demands were not met by the Central Government, they began to rebel and by early 1957, they had taken control of Governance in Sumatra by force. Then, on 15th February 1958, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Hussein declared the establishment of the PRRI. This prompted the Central Government to deploy troops.
As Army Chief of Staff, Nasution would have been involved and mobilizing the troops to Sumatra. However, it would be his 2nd Deputy, Colonel Ahmad Yani who would make his name by successfully putting down the rebellions.
[edit] Return to the 1945 Constitution
On 5th July 1959, Sukarno issued a decree declaring that Indonesia will now revert back to the original 1945 constitution. The Parliamentary Democracy system would be gone and for Sukarno, he was now the Head of Government in addition to being the Head of State. Nasution was appointed Minister of Defense and Security in Sukarno's Cabinet while continuing to hold the position as Army Chief of Staff.
[edit] Guided Democracy Era
[edit] Dealing With Corruption in the Army
Since 1956, Nasution had been trying to stamp out corruption in the Army but the return to the 1945 constitution seemed to have renewed his resolve in this matter. According to him, the Army should set an example for the rest of society. Not long after Sukarno's 5th July Decree, Nasution sent Brigadier General Sungkono to investigate the financial dealings of Kodam IV/Diponegoro and its commander, Colonel Suharto.
Sungkono's findings reveal that during his time as Regional Commander, Suharto had set up foundations to help the local people. However, the way these foundations are founded have been through charging levies (instead of voluntary donations) to production and service industries. Suharto have also been involved in illegal bartering. He had been bartering sugar for rice for Thailand.
Nasution wanted to take action against Suharto and actually considered expelling him out of the Army. However, Deputy Army Chief of Staff Gatot Subroto intervened [8]. Gatot had taken Suharto under his wings when he was the Kodam IV/Diponegoro Commander and had noticed Suharto's talents. Gatot asked Nasution not to expel Suharto because Suharto's talent is one that could be further developed. Nasution listened to Gatot's advice. His decision was to remove Suharto from his position and to punish him by sending him to the Army Staff College (Seskoad).
[edit] West Irian
During the struggle for Independence, Sukarno had always perceived Indonesia as also encompassing West Irian. When the Dutch finally recognized Indonesia's Independence, West Irian continued to be a Dutch colony. Sukarno did not give up and continued to push for West Irian to be included as part of Indonesia through the UN and through the Bandung Conference, where the attending nations promised to support Indonesia's claim. The Dutch continued to remain adamant. By 1960, Sukarno had ran out of patience. In July, he met with his top advisors including Nasution and it was agreed that Indonesia will now confront the Dutch on the matter of West Irian.
As part of preparation for this campaign, Nasution turned to Suharto who in November 1960, finished his Seskoad course. Suharto, now a Brigadier General was commissioned by Nasution to create a strategic force unit which would be on standby, ready to be called into action at any time. Suharto was placed in charge of a taskforce and in March 1961, the General Army Reserve (Caduad) was formed, with Suharto being appointed as its Commander [9]. Caduad would in 1963 change its name to the Army Strategic Command (Kostrad).
At the beginning of 1962, Nasution and Yani was put as overall Commanders of the Liberation of West Irian, with Suharto stationed in East Indonesia as the Field Commander.
[edit] Rivalry With PKI and Division With Yani
Around this time, Sukarno had begun to see PKI, instead of the Army as his main political allies. Although he had set Indonesia on a non-aligned course during the Cold War, the revelation that PRRI was given assistance by America, caused Sukarno to adopt an anti-American stance. In this, he had PKI as a natural ally. For PKI, an alliance with Sukarno would only add to their political momentum as their influence continued to grow in Indonesian politics. In April 1962, as he named a new Cabinet, PKI Chairman DN Aidit and Vice Chairman Njoto were included as ministers.
Nasution was wary of PKI's influence over Sukarno and in turn, Sukarno was aware that Nasution was not happy about PKI's influence and made a move to weaken his power. In July 1962, Sukarno reorganized the structure of ABRI. The status of the heads of the Armed Forces branches would now be upgraded from Chief of Staff to Commander (Example: Army Chief of Staff becomes Army Commander). As Commanders, the heads of the Armed Forces Branches would have more power and they would answer only to Sukarno as the Supreme Commander of ABRI. Assisting Sukarno as Supreme Commander of ABRI, would be an ABRI Chief of Staff. Sukarno appointed Nasution to the position of ABRI Chief of Staff [10] and appointed Yani as the Army Commander. By doing this, Sukarno had decreased Nasution's powers as the ABRI Chief of Staff was only responsible for administration matters and had nothing to do whatsoever with troop handling.
Now in a powerless position, Nasution began to think of other ways to stop PKI's momentum. The right moment came at the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) General Session in May 1963. During the General Session, Nasution had Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (PNI) as well as the Army members present to put forward the motion that Sukarno be appointed President for Life [11]. The rationale behind this was that with Sukarno being appointed President for Life, there would be no elections, and without elections, the PKI would not be able to get in power no matter how big they become. The motion was carried through and Sukarno became President for Life.
Nasution soon began developing an attitude of hostility towards Yani. Both Nasution and Yani were anti-Communists, but their attitude towards Sukarno was different. Nasution was critical of Sukarno for backing and supporting PKI while Yani, a Sukarno loyalist adopted a softer stance. Nasution criticized Yani's soft stance and the two officers stopped getting along. To make matters worse, Yani began replacing Regional Commanders who were close to Nasution with those who were close to himself.
On 13th January 1965, a delegation of officers representing Nasution and Yani met in an attempt to reconcile the differences between the two officers. The meeting was unsuccessful in attempting to get Yani to distance himself from Sukarno but agreed to hold seminars where officers can talk about the current political climate and the role of Army in politics.
As the year went on, a curious document was found. Dubbed the Gilchrist Document, the document spoke about "our local army friends" and suspicion was immediately cast on the Army wanting to launch a coup. Although Yani was quick to deny the allegations, PKI began running a smear campaign claiming that a Council of Generals were planning to overthrow the President. As the most senior officers in the Army, Nasution and Yani were implicated to be part of this Council.
[edit] G30S and Transition to New Order
[edit] Kidnapping Attempt
On the morning of 1st October 1965, troops calling themselves the 30th September Movement (G30S) made their move to kidnap 7 anti-Communist Army officers including Nasution [12].
That morning, Nasution's wife heard the doors in the house being forced open. Curious to see what it was, Mrs. Nasution got out of bed to check. Opening the door, she saw a soldier with his gun raised ready to shoot. Mrs. Nasution quickly closed the door and told Nasution to get away. Nasution wanted to take a look himself and when he opened the door, the soldier shot at him. Nasution narrowly avoided the shot and closed the door as Mrs. Nasution pushed him out of the bedroom window to escape. Nasution escaped to the house of the Iraqi ambassador, who happened to be his neighbor and hid in the garden.
The Nasution household was in chaos as the G30S troops began looking all over the house for Nasution. In the confusion that ensued, Nasution's daughter and sister were shot by a soldier. Nasution's sister would recover while his daughter, Ade Irma Suryani was fatally wounded. At the end, the soldiers left only after detaining First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean who was Nasution's adjutant. Tendean had been mistaken for Nasution in the darknes and was kidnapped.
Nasution continued hiding in the garden of his neighbor until 6 AM when he returned to his house with a broken ankle. Nasution then asked his adjutants to be taken to the Ministry of Defense and Security because he thought it would be saver there. He was then taken in a car, with Nasution crouching on the floor of the car to the Ministry. Nasution then sent a message to Suharto at the Kostrad headquarters, telling him that he was alive and safe. After knowing that Suharto was taking Command of the Army, Nasution then ordered him to take measures such as finding out information on the whereabouts of the President, contacting Navy Commander RE Martadinata, Marine Corps Commander Hartono as well as the Chief of Police Sucipto Judodiharjo, and secure Jakarta by closing off all roads leading up to it [13] . The Air Force was excluded because its Commander Omar Dhani was suspected of being a G30S Sympathizer. Suharto immediately integrated these orders into his plan to secure the city.
At around 2 PM, after the G30S Movement announced the formation of a Revolutionary Council, Nasution sent another order to Suharto, Martadinata and Judodiharjo. In the order, Nasution said that he was convinced that Sukarno had been kidnapped and taken to the G30S headquarters in Halim. He therefore ordered ABRI to free the President, restore security to Jakarta, and most importantly, appointed Suharto to head the operations [14] . Just as Suharto began working however, a message came from Sukarno at Halim. Sukarno had decided to appoint Major General Pranoto Reksosamudra to the position of Army Commander and now wanted Pranoto to come see him. Suharto did not allow Pranoto to go but he knew that Sukarno would not give up in trying to summon Pranoto. To strengthen his bargaining position, Suharto asked Nasution to come to the Kostrad Headquarters.
Nasution arrived at the Kostrad headquarters at around 6 PM, just as Suharto began sending Sarwo Edhie Wibowo's troops to began securing Jakarta from the G30S Movement. There, Nasution finally received first aid for his broken ankle. Once Jakarta was safely secured, Martadinata came to the Kostrad headquarters with a copy of the Presidential Decree which appointed Pranoto his position. After seeing the Decree, Suharto invited Martadinata and Nasution into a room to discuss the situation.
Nasution asked Martadinata how the President came to appoint Pranoto. Martadinata replied that during the afternoon he, Judodiharjo, and Dhani had attended a meeting with Sukarno at Halim to decide who should become the Army Commander now that Yani had died. The meeting had decided that Pranoto should become Army Commander. Nasution said that the Sukarno's appointment could not be accepted as the appointment came when Suharto had begun with the operations [15] . Nasution also added that he will be backing Suharto's decision to not let Pranoto go to Halim. Nasution and Suharto then invited Pranoto in and convinced him to delay accepting his appointment as Army Commander until after Suharto finished putting down the attempted coup d'etat.
With Sarwo Edhie's troops, Jakarta was quickly secured. Suharto then turned his attention to Halim and began making preparations to attack the Air Base. To assist him, Nasution ordered the Navy and the Police to assist Suharto in putting down the G30S Movement. To the Air Force, Nasution issued an order saying that they will not be charged with insubordination if they refuse to obey Dhani's orders. By 6 AM on 2nd October, Halim was overtaken and the G30S Movement was officially put down.
[edit] Missed Opportunity
Although Suharto had been the man of the hour on 1st October, many of the other Army officers still turned to Nasution for leadership and had expected him to take more decisive control of the situation. However, Nasution seemed indecisive and slowly but surely the support began to swing away from him. Perhaps this reason was because he was still rightfully griefing over his daughter, Ade Irma, who died on 6th October.
In the first few weeks after G30S, Nasution was the one who constantly lobbied Sukarno to have Suharto appointed Army Commander. Sukarno, who after 1st October wanted to keep Pranoto had originally only made Suharto the Commander of Kopkamtib but with Nasution's constant lobbying, Sukarno was finally persuaded and on 14th October 1965, appointed Suharto as the Army Commander.
A golden opportunity came to Nasution in December 1965 when there was talk of getting him appointed as Vice President to assist Sukarno in the times of uncertainty [16]. Nasution did not capitalize on this and chose to do nothing. Suharto, whose political momentum was growing took the initiative in early 1966 by issuing a statement saying that there was no need to fill in the vacant Vice Presidency.
On February 24th 1966, Nasution was removed from his position as Minister of Defense and Security in a Cabinet Reshuffle. The position of ABRI Chief of Staff was also abolished.
By this stage, the expectation that Nasution would do something was now gone as Army Officers and Student Movements alike rallied behind Suharto. Nevertheless, he continued to be a respected figure as many Army Officers visited him in the days leading up to the handing of Supersemar. In fact, when Suharto was about to go the Kostrad Headquarters to wait for the delivery of Supersemar, he called Nasution and asked him for his blessing. Mrs. Nasution gave the blessing on behalf of Nasution who was not present.
Nasution's political senses seemed to have returned after Suharto received Supersemar. It was perhaps he who first realized that Supersemar did not only give Suharto emergency powers but also gave him executive control. On 12th March 1966, after Suharto had PKI banned, Nasution suggested to Suharto that he form an emergency Cabinet [17]. Suharto, still cautious about what he can and cannot do with his new powers replied that making a Cabinet was the President's duty. Nasution encouraged Suharto, promising him full support but Suharto did not respond and the conversation ended abruptly.
[edit] Chairman of the MPRS
With his new powers, Suharto began purging the Government of what he perceived to be Communist influence. After the arrest of 15 Cabinet Ministers on 18th March 1966, Suharto went after the MPRS, removing members thought to be Communist sympathizers and replacing them with members more sympathetic to the Army's cause. During the purge, the MPRS also lost its Chairman, Chaerul Saleh and there was a need to fill in the vacant position.
Nasution was an overwhelmingly popular choice as all of the factions in the MPRS nominated him for the position of MPRS Chairman. However, Nasution waited until Suharto supported his nomination before accepting the nomination.
On 20th June, the MPRS General Session for 1966 began holding its assemblies. Nasution set Supersemar as the first agenda on the list by walking into the Assembly Hall with the actual document. The next day, on 21st June, the MPRS ratified Supersemar, making it illegal for Sukarno to withdraw it. On 22nd June, Sukarno delivered a speech entitled Nawaksara (Nine Points) in front of the Assembly. Nasution and the other MPRS members, which had hoped for Sukarno's account of G30S were disappointed. Nothing about the G30S was mentioned. Instead, Sukarno seemed to give an account about his appointment to the Life Presidency, his plan of work as President, and how the constitution works in practice. This MPRS would refuse to ratify this speech.
Over the next two weeks, Nasution presided over a busy MPRS General Session. Under his Chairmanship, the MPRS took measures such as banning Marxism-Leninism, cancelling Sukarno's appointment to the Life Presidency, and ordering for a Legislative Election to be held by July 1968. The MPRS General Session also increased Suharto's power by officially ordering him to formulate a new Cabinet. A constitutional amendment was also made which stated that if the President is unable to replace his duties, he will now be replaced by the Holder of Supersemar instead of the Vice President.
As 1966 wore on, Sukarno was increasingly on the back foot and his popularity was at an all time low. Suharto, who knew that his political victory was near, took to playing the role of the polite Javanese by constantly giving Sukarno reassuring words and defending him from the protests. Other Generals such as Nasution were not as merciful, as the year drew to a close, Nasution claimed that Sukarno should be held responsible for the dire situation which his Government left Indonesia in. Nasution also called for Sukarno be taken to trial.
On 10th January 1967, Nasution and the MPRS assembled again as Sukarno submitted his report (he did not deliver it in person as a speech) which was hoped to finally address the issue of G30S. Dubbed the Nawaksara Supplementary, the report spoke about Sukarno's insistence of calling G30S the 1st October Movement (Gestok). On G30S, Sukarno said that PKI made a big mistake on the morning of 1st October but also added that this was due to the cunning of the neo-colonialists. In a subtle jab towards Nasution, Sukarno added that if he was going to be blamed for the G30S, the Minister of Defense and Security at the time should also be blamed for not seeing G30S coming and stopping it before it happened [18]. The report was once again rejected by the MPRS.
In February 1967, the DPR called for an MPRS Special Session in March to dismiss Sukarno as President with Suharto. Sukarno seemed resigned to his faith, officially handling day to day control of the Government to Suharto on 22nd February 1967 and requiring him only to report if neccesary. Finally on March 12th 1967, Sukarno was officially removed from power by the MPRS. Nasution then swore Suharto into office as the Acting President.
A year later on March 27th 1968, Nasution presided over Suharto's election and inauguration as full President.
[edit] In the New Order
[edit] Deteriorating Relationship With Suharto and Fall from Power
Despite the assistance that Nasution gave him in his rise to power, Suharto viewed Nasution as a rival and immediately began working to remove him from power. In 1969, Nasution was barred from speaking at Seskoad and the Military Academy [19]. In 1971, Nasution was suddenly discharged from military service, aged 53 and two years before the designated retirement age of 55. Nasution was finally removed in 1972 as the new batch of MPR members (elected during the 1971 Legislative Elections) came in and elected Idham Chalid to replace him as MPR Chairman.
Nasution's drastic fall earned him the nickname of Gelandangan Politik (Political Bum).
[edit] Opposition to the New Order Regime
Once he fell out of power, Nasution developed into a political opponent of the New Order Regime.
By the late 70's Suharto's regime had turned from popular to authoritarian and corrupt. At this time many voices began to openly speak out and criticize the regime. After the 1977 Legislative Elections, in which there was alleged electoral fraud by Suharto's Golkar Party, Nasution said that there was a crisis in leadership in the New Order.
In July 1978, together with former Vice President Hatta, Nasution set up the Institute for Constitutional Awareness Foundation (YLKB) . Suharto's Government moved quickly and did not allow YLKB to conduct its first meeting in January 1979. Nasution and the YLKB did not give up. In August 1979 managed to hold a meeting in which DPR members included. Perhaps significantly, ABRI members attended the meeting. During the meeting, Nasution criticized the New Order for not fully implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution [20].
Suharto did not take the criticism lightly. On 27th March 1980, at an ABRI Meeting, Suharto in a speech said that ABRI members should be ready to defend their seats in DPR and that they should align themselves with forces that are for Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution such as Golkar. Suharto followed this up with another speech on 16th April 1980, on the occasion of Kopassus' anniversary. In the speech, Suharto denied allegations of corruption and claimed that if he has to, he will kidnap MPR members if it will prevent the MPR from having the 2/3 majority required to change the constitution.
Nasution then decided that the oppositions of the regime should make a big statement. He gathered ABRI members who were disgruntled with the Suharto regime such as former Governor of Jakarta Ali Sadikin, former Chief of Police Hugeng Imam Santoso, and former Deputy Army Chief of Staff Yasin. Former Prime Ministers Mohammed Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap as well as PDRI Chairman Syarifuddin Prawiranegara joined in. Together with many other big name critics of the Government, they signed a petition which would become known as Petisi 50 (Petition of 50). So-called because there were 50 signatories.
The petition was signed on 5th May 1980 and delivered to the DPR on 13th May 1980. It called for Suharto to stop interpreting Pancasila to suit his own ends and for ABRI to be neutral in politics instead of favoring Golkar. The DPR, especially members of the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party took the petition seriously and asked Suharto to respond on the issue. Suharto replied that his speeches on 27th March 1980 and 16th April 1980 was a sufficient enough response. Suharto added if there was any problem, the DPR can motion for a special investigation. Here the PPP and PDI members stopped, knowing that their motion will be beaten by Golkar's dominance.
For signatories to the petition such as Nasution, Suharto imposed travel bans and made business dealings difficult so that the petition signatories would have a hard time making a living.
[edit] Reconcilliation
By the beginning of the 1990's, Suharto was beginning to adopt a policy of political openness and enforcement of Petition of 50 Signatories' punishment was loosened. In June 1993, when he was in hospital because of illness, he was visited by the Army's top brass. Nasution then received a visit from BJ Habibie, Suharto's Minister of Technology. Habibie then invited Nasution and the other signatories to visit his shipyard and the aircraft factory which had been put under his jurisdiction. The Government also began claiming that although there was a travel ban for the Petition of 50 Signatories, the ban does not apply to Nasution. For his part, Nasution denied criticizing the Government, preferring to call it a "difference in opinion".
Finally, in July 1993, Suharto invited Nasution to the Presidential Palace for a meeting. This was followed by another meeting on 18th August 1993, after the Independence Day celebrations [21]. Nothing political was talked about, but it was clear that both men were keen to reconcile their differences. In an interview in 1995, Nasution encouraged Indonesia to go through a reconcilliation process so that the Nation can be united under the leadership Suharto.
On 5th October 1997, on the occasion of ABRI's anniversary, Nasution was given the honorary rank Jenderal Besar. A rank that he shared with Suharto and Sudirman.
[edit] Death
Nasution died on 5th September 2000 after getting a stroke and going into a coma.
[edit] Family
Nasution was married to Johanna Sunarti, with whom he had two daughters.
[edit] Miscellaneous
Umar Wirahadikusumah served as Nasution's adjutant from 1946-1947
[edit] Further reading
- Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1965
[edit] Notes
- ^ Abdul Haris Nasution. pdat.co.id. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Abdul Haris Nasution. pdat.co.id. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Elson, Robert [2001]. Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, p.26. ISBN 0 521 77326 1.
- ^ Sujatmoko, Bambang (8th March 1997). Dwifungsi Di Tiga Zaman. Gatra. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Elson, Robert [2001]. Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, pp. 57-58. ISBN 0 521 77326 1.
- ^ Elson, Robert [2001]. Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, p.61. ISBN 0 521 77326 1.
- ^ Sumbogo, Priyono B. (8th March 1997). Jalan Tengah. Gatra. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Elson, Robert [2001]. Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, p.73. ISBN 0 521 77326 1.
- ^ Elson, Robert [2001]. Suharto: A Political Biography. UK: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, p.79. ISBN 0 521 77326 1.
- ^ Wibisono, Christianto (20th January 2004). Hentikan "Bharata Yuda" 2004. Suara Pembaruan. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Utomo, Sumaun. Fakta Kebenaran Korban Tragedi Peristiwa 65. A. Umar Said Official Website. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Hughes, John [1967] (2002). The End of Sukarno: A Coup That Misfired: A Purge That Ran Wild, 3rd (in English), Singapore: Archipelago Press, pp. 40-42. ISBN 981 4068 65 9.
- ^ Fic, Victor M. [2005 (Indonesian Edition)]. Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965: Sebuah Studi Tentang Konspirasi (in Indonesian). Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, p. 268. ISBN 979 461 555 2.
- ^ Fic, Victor M. [2005 (Indonesian Edition)]. Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965: Sebuah Studi Tentang Konspirasi (in Indonesian). Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, p. 269. ISBN 979 461 555 2.
- ^ Fic, Victor M. [2005 (Indonesian Edition)]. Kudeta 1 Oktober 1965: Sebuah Studi Tentang Konspirasi (in Indonesian). Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, pp. 270-271. ISBN 979 461 555 2.
- ^ Hughes, John [1967] (2002). The End of Sukarno: A Coup That Misfired: A Purge That Ran Wild, 3rd (in English), Singapore: Archipelago Press, p. 215. ISBN 981 4068 65 9.
- ^ Suwalu, Sulangkung (8th May 1999). Peran Nasution Dalam Antar Soeharto Ke Puncak Kekuasaan. munindo.brd.de. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Transcript of Nawaksara Supplementary. Tempo (5th April 1997). Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Pour, Julius (7th September 2000). Pasang Surut Jenderal yang Selalu Terpinggirkan. Kompas. Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Sejarah Jenderal Beroposisi. Detik (19th November 1998). Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
- ^ Nasution Meets Suharto Again (18th August 1993). Retrieved on 4th November 2006.
[edit] External links
(Indonesian) Abdul Haris Nasution profile on Tokohindonesia.com
